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Abstract 
This thesis explores the social, political and economic relations constituted in relation to 
agrarian cooperatives that work land confiscated by the state from mafiosi owners in the 
Alto Belice valley, Sicily. It examines access to resources (work and land), and the 
cooperatives’ division of labour, paying attention to the material changes that the 
cooperatives (considered in the context of the anti-mafia movement) have brought to 
people’s lives, as well as the tensions regarding social, labour and property relations that 
emerged from these changes. 
The thesis argues that the state’s intervention entailed the promotion of values (‘legality’) 
and relationships antithetical to those that obtained locally, such as kinship obligations and 
local reciprocities, as continuities between local workers’ moralities, and practices with 
mafia codes are seen as contradicting the state ideology of radical change.  
These tensions are explored in the specificities of the cooperatives’ division of labour, 
which, informed by class, relatedness and locality, pose obstacles to the development of 
horizontal, equal work relationships. In this context, the thesis explores the contradictions 
and unintended consequences of the state policy of ‘antimafia transformation’, creating 
fissures between the cooperatives’ administrators, the local workforce and the wider 
community.  
The thesis provides an ethnographic account of a political project of change that 
challenged the complex phenomenon of the mafia by radically shifting the conditions of 
access to material resources. The cooperative project provides alternative values and means 
of livelihood to those associated with mafia dominance in the area, but largely fails to 
address the local social arrangements within which the project unfolds. The thesis also 
addresses debates about horizontal relations in cooperatives, looking at how access to 
resources (land, labour, reputation) is organised across different moral claims and 
evaluations, articulated within and outside the cooperatives’ framework. 
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Map 1: Satellite image of Sicily with the area of Alto Belice indicated.  
Source: Google maps. 
 
Chapter 1   
Introduction 
1.1. The Research: Divisions of Labour, Moralities, Change 
1.1.1. An encounter and what it implies 
It was around 6 o’clock in the morning but we were already late for the fields. I 
tried to explain to Piero, jokingly, that in English, ‘work in the fields’ can be verbally 
associated with ‘fieldwork’, which is what I was1 doing there as an anthropologist. He 
                                                 
1 The choice of the past tense or verbs throughout this thesis admittedly takes away some of the charm of the 
narrative; I recognise the vividness of some classic ethnographers’ present tense as a literary device (e.g. 
Malinowski 2003 [1922]). Although the arguments in support of a ‘vivid writing style’ for ethnographic 
writing are engaging (Geertz 2008 [1973]), I am nevertheless also aware of the falsity of the ‘eternal present’ 
that this literary style implies. For this reason, I use the past tense throughout the thesis, to mark that the 
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seemed unimpressed: ‘Is this British humour?’ As we stood looking at the hills on the 
horizon, kilometres away from the village boundaries, the cobalt blue of the spring skies 
seemed to intensify with every sip of the coffee, every drag of the cigarette. We were 
outside the bar Sangiovannaru, where most peasants took their morning coffee before setting 
off for their plots. No other place in San Giovanni was so lively at this time of day – or 
indeed any time of the day. I counted about 40 people coming and going in the 10 minutes 
we were there. This was the first month of my stay in the village. I had just met Piero, a 
member of the Giovanni Falcone cooperative administration. As he was from Palermo, I 
was interested in seeing how he behaved in the village cafés, not being a local. 
We were on our way to Saladino, a 5 hectare (hereafter ha) tract of land that eight 
years ago belonged to Giovanni Brusca,2 a local imprisoned mafioso; which the state had 
confiscated and allocated to the Falcone cooperative. Our plan was to arrive at the vineyard 
at 6 am and spend the day spraying sulphite (a preservative) on the vines. Just as we were 
about to light up a second cigarette, taking a few more minutes of indulgence, a middle-
aged man approached us. Without introducing himself (although he did offer me a lighter), 
he launched into a long complaint to Piero about the ‘complete mess the coops have made’ 
in local agricultural work relations. There used to be a genuine local market for agrarian 
labour that was now going through what he called, with particular emphasis, ‘worrying 
developments’. Underlining every word he uttered, he pointed at Piero, saying:  
You, your cooperatives, are ruining the game here, with your rules and regulations 
and stuff ... you know, people that have worked for me, in my plots, as they’ve 
done for ages, all of a sudden ask for more dosh, saying ‘hey you don’t give enough, and 
how about those [social security] contributions for a change? Look at the cooperatives, they pay 
                                                                                                                                               
events described should be contextualised in terms of social life in Alto Belice  in 2009, in the inter-subjective 
ways I experienced and came to analyse it. 
2 Brusca was the main mafia figure in San Giovanni during the 1980s and 1990s, notorious in Italy, for his 
spectacular car bomb assassination of the popular antimafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone in 1992 (not to 
mention the other 150–200 murders he admitted).  
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much more, they pay the social security, I might knock on their door instead.’ I’ve been having 
this since you antimafia people started your business.3 
The man left and we got back on the tractor and set off. I was a little perplexed but had an 
idea about what was going on here – which Piero confirmed:  the man was a small-time 
mafioso. But, at the same time, he told me, the man’s rant was not untypical of local 
reactions to, as he put it, ‘what the state and the cooperatives have achieved in San 
Giovanni’. Thus I was presented with a tangible case of reactions to change as channelled 
through the cooperatives; this was why I was there, doing fieldwork. 
This vignette is just one of many episodes illustrating how the coming of the 
‘antimafia’4 cooperatives – cooperatives that cultivated land that the state had confiscated 
from mafiosi – brought about a small breakthrough in the agrarian life of San Giovanni,5 
located in the Alto Belice valley of Western Sicily (see Map 2), where I conducted 
ethnographic fieldwork throughout 2009. 
                                                 
3 I use italics for all Italian and Sicilian words or to denote emphasis. 
4 ‘Antimafia’ is an established term in institutional and grounded life in Italy, adopted by authors as diverse as 
Jamieson (2000), Schneider and Schneider (2003) and Dickie (2004). I call the agrarian cooperatives that work 
on land confiscated from the mafia ‘antimafia cooperatives’, the emic term most often used in the village to 
describe them. The term in this form implies an ideology of opposing the mafia. 
5 While I have anonymised all names of individuals, toponyms and local associations, this is not the case with 
widely known organisations that would be in any case easily identifiable in Italy. I have also not anonymised 
mafiosi who have been imprisoned for life, like Giovanni Brusca, although I have otherwise changed the names 
of mafiosi (most of whom were released after spending three years, the minimum time for being a member of 
the mafia, in prison). 
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Map 2: Villages of Alto Belice1 
Source: Google maps. 
When local agrarian workers discussed their work conditions with me, they said 
that mafia patronage had depressed wages for generations. In discussions about access to 
resources and labour markets, locals suggested that the cooperatives had brought about a 
relative change in accessing jobs, and also a (minor) shift in ways of thinking about labour 
– and the mafia. Expressing the aims of the cooperatives, Gianpiero (a 32-year-old man 
from Palermo), the representative of the Paolo Borsellino cooperative, told me: 
I feel that the aim of the coops will be reached when I hear the peasants in the bars 
talking about trade unionism, not just F.C. Juventus. Our aim is to offer access to 
the confiscated land, standardise labour rights and change consciousnesses. 
Trade unionists told me that the Alto Belice antimafia cooperatives were arguably 
the first agrarian business in the area that always paid full social security contributions and 
net pay above 6 euros an hour for agricultural work. The cooperatives’ daily workers and 
member-workers typically earned 51.62 euros a day (net); the cooperatives’ administrators 
had mostly monthly wages, in addition to the full labour social security contribution made 
                                                 
1 Note: The marked positions are the main villages referred in this thesis. In order to guarantee 
anonymity, names will not be mentioned; San Giovanni (which would be B) has been deleted.  
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by the cooperative as their employer. As they employed no more than 90 people (members 
and short-term contract workers together), this change was minute. Nonetheless the 
cooperatives symbolically ‘took on’ the local mafia’s labour patronage and were an 
important contribution to the livelihoods of many local households and individuals. 
Cooperative workers considered that having a job in the cooperatives established the 
regularisation of workers’ rights, solidified in ‘legality’, a term they used to denote a 
positively engaged relationship to law. For cooperative administrators like Gianpiero, the 
idea of ‘legality’ meant that community wellbeing would improve if all resources were 
legally regulated and mafia was curbed. Crucially, ‘legality’ entailed the end of informal 
work. 
A radical state-led initiative, the cooperatives are hailed, throughout Italy, as the 
symbols of the antimafia movement, and its most successful manifestation. Yet, while it 
unsettled the local labour market in positive ways, the achievements of antimafia 
cooperativism,2 also led to contradictions, which are important to grasp in order to engage 
with the full meaning of antimafia social change in Sicily. A focus on the relationship 
between continuity and transformation, (the bettering of people’s livelihoods and the 
incongruities that accompanied it) as well as on how this relationship was reflected in, and 
drew on, internal divisions of labour within the cooperatives, drive this thesis. 
The research explores the social processes of change enacted in the Sicilian village 
of San Giovanni, and the surrounding area, Alto Belice, through an ethnographic 
exploration of the activity of four work-based3 agrarian cooperatives. These organisations 
                                                 
2 In the literature, the terms ‘cooperationism’ and ‘cooperatism’ are also used (see for instance Fournier’s 
biography of Mauss as a ‘co-operator’ (2006: 107–10). I use the term ‘cooperativism’ to denote a set of 
principles that cooperative members follow: see 2.1. 
3 As discussed later, cooperativism is either producer-based, where autonomous peasants cooperate or 
worker-based, where people co-own land or cultivate land owned by the state, as in the antimafia 
cooperatives. 
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cultivate land plots that the Italian state4 confiscated from the powerful local mafia between 
the years 1996–2009, allowing local people direct access to land and work, without the 
mediation of mafiosi. Focusing on this shift of access to resources (labour,5 land and 
reputation) offered to the cooperatives’ members, and the unintended repercussions this 
entailed, this dissertation examines a politicised project of cooperativism that aimed to 
secure people’s livelihoods away from mafia’s influence.  
1.1.2. Main questions, aims and contributions of this thesis 
I examine the material changes that the cooperatives have introduced in local 
livelihoods – as well as the tensions they have brought in their wake. Sicily’s historically 
complex relationship with the state is central: the confiscation of ‘mafia’ land was intended 
to curb local mafiosi power and promote values of legality and transparency. The thesis 
explains how this antimafia political intervention informed aspects of cooperative activity 
but also entailed the promotion of values and relationships that opposed those that some 
local people, including cooperative members, lived by. 
I wish to show how different moralities6 arose within the cooperatives, presenting 
the incongruities between the set goals of the project and its development on the ground. 
Consequently, I also aim to highlight the complex internal differentiations often faced by 
politicised cooperatives (where the constitution and activity of cooperativism is driven by a 
political project). These differentiations among members (and related hierarchies) are 
                                                 
4 In local discourse the form lo Stato (‘the State’) is established, but my approach required taking a distance 
from what capitalisation might imply. Taussig (1997) has noted the mystification reflected from writing ‘the 
State’ with a capital ‘S’, a way to denote its ‘magic’.  
5 An important strand of the literature in economic anthropology addresses the differences between work and 
labour: here, I suggest that people have access to their own labour but are given access to work through the 
cooperatives and the state, as discussed later on. This is in line with the current state of play in most of the 
relevant literature in Europe (Mollona 2009) and elsewhere (Parry 2009) while debates on the differentiations 
as to ‘owning’ one’s labour stemming come from other anthropological research, such as the Melanesian 
literature (for instance: Josephides 1986; Strathern 1990). 
6 I use the term to encapsulate people’s evaluations of situations as ethically acceptable according to their 
standards and within their social situatedness; as the ethnography will show, definitions were dynamic and 
always contextual to people’s experience.  
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equally related to obligations and social networks outside the cooperative’s framework as 
they are with activities performed within the framework of cooperative work itself.  
My analysis is based on ethnographic evidence showing that divisions of labour 
develop in politicised cooperativism because some cooperative members (are able to) 
identify with its basic political premises more than others do. Politicised cooperatives, 
albeit delivering degrees of social change, contain different ideas, practices, and morals – 
sometimes complementary and others at odds with each other. Antimafia cooperatives’ 
main goal and practice was to offer stable employment, contributing to the bettering of 
locals’ livelihoods. But ‘cooperatives’, like ‘livelihoods’, should be examined in terms of the 
broader social activity of their members, and hence in a framework that includes 
relationships beyond waged employment within them. Cooperatives, I show, are influenced 
by values coming from their members’ experiences in their broader social milieu including 
kinship, the informal economy and local codes and idioms), often different from those 
claimed by their political principles. Some of these relationships, in the case of Alto Belice, 
are deemed to belong to a problematic ‘tradition’, which the cooperatives strive, in 
principle, to supersede. For example, the research shows how kinship relations, seen as 
highly suspect, (because the loyalties they generate are seen to contradict the ideals of 
legality and meritocracy), are in fact constitutive of cooperatives in practice, giving meanings 
to the experience of workers’ participation in them.  
The thesis aims to elucidate how different morals and practices inform divisions of 
labour within cooperatives and how members experienced these differentiations, asking:  
1. What values pull cooperatives together and how do people relate to these values? 
What contradictions exist between values within and outside the cooperative 
context?  
2. How is cooperativism interacting with relatedness, class and continuities in 
particular local codes, relationships and practices taking place outside a cooperative 
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framework? In the end, how do tensions between political principle and local 
values influence divisions of labour in political cooperativism?  
The varied moralities stem from members’ different allegiances: some adhere to a model of 
cooperativism guided by state planning and some lean towards local relationships and 
obligations (including kinship and neighbourhood). The research then elucidates the 
interaction between local values, codes and practices, and the pursuit of a state-planned, 
legality-oriented system7 of value. This interaction informs, as explored elsewhere in 
Southern Europe (Herzfeld 2003), interesting hierarchies, especially when they compete 
within the same work organisation. 
This work aspires to be the first ethnography of the antimafia movement that pays 
attention to livelihoods and production processes rather than civil society mobilisation. 
Examining the consequences of the changes introduced by the antimafia cooperatives in 
the lives of individuals, families and institutions in Alto Belice, it also explores broader 
meanings of change and the continuities involved alongside it, in Sicily and beyond. 
The thesis shows that cooperatives are internally differentiated organisations whose 
divisions of labour are not simply the result of exposure to markets, as so often explored in 
the relevant literature (see the following section) but also the fact that the workforce in the 
cooperatives studied here are composed of people embedded in different, often 
                                                 
7 Anthropological discussion of value overlaps with the bulk of economic anthropology’s theoretical 
explorations, and Graeber’s book provides an excellent elaboration of this (2001). Throughout the book, 
Graeber argues that human actions and artefacts are differently valued within specific contexts but avoids 
suggesting that such contexts constitute, for example, separate ‘domains’ (2001: 17–18), or indeed, as is 
popular in much current anthropology, ‘regimes’ of value (he criticises the repercussions of Appadurai’s 
(1986) argument as potentially neoliberal (Graeber 2001: 30–31)). In this thesis, when referring to different 
contextualisations of what people value, I shall use the term values to mean ‘conceptions of what is ultimately 
good, proper, or desirable in human life’ (Graeber 2001: 1). As the thesis does not examine value 
theoretically, I opted for the use of a term that carries less weight, in order to focus on how the discussed 
contextualisations of cooperative members’ lives (implying social relations, codes and practices), are entangled 
with cooperativist economic activity, especially since this activity is endowed with notions and aims of 
political and cultural change interacting with people’s experiences within the cooperatives. In a few cases, I 
shall use the term ‘a system of values’, to denote, rather than endorsing a structuralist approach implied in 
‘system of value’ (Graeber 2001: 223-224), the codification of certain concepts in state-regulated and 
legislated discourse, imposed through the law; (the tension between legislation and local ‘systems of values’ 
has been, after all, a long-standing concept in legal theory (Kelsen 2007: 8)). 
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irreconcilable, social relations and circumstances. In the political context of a project whose 
lynchpin is legality, it is significant that legal categories do not have meanings or values 
shared universally. My work therefore provides an account of a radical political project that 
challenges the mafia but largely fails to grasp the local social arrangements within which it 
unfolds.  
1.1.3. Cooperativism as labour and cooperative divisions of labour  
The ethnography follows members of cooperatives in different fields and activities 
they negotiated within and outside the cooperatives’ framework: recruitment and relatedness, 
work and livelihoods, land and reputation. This reveals the different, and often 
contradictory, ideas and practices through which people of the cooperatives approached 
the resources available to them (land and work), establishing relationships between 
cooperatives and kinship (Chapter 4), informal income seeking (Chapter 5), social 
arrangements around land (Chapter 6) and flows of reputation (Chapter 7). A historical 
backdrop to the local antimafia movement and cooperativism is also provided, to locate the 
contemporary cooperatives in a history of tense relationships between law, landownership 
and markets (Chapter 3). 
Antimafia cooperatives are distinctive in that they are principally driven by the 
creation of waged work. This view of cooperativism as labour – specifically, as a vector of 
waged employment– is important, as political cooperativism is often identified with the role 
of doing away with wage work (see Mauss in Fournier 2006: 125–26). In the absence of 
regular waged labour in Alto Belice, the cooperatives, enacting the state’s antimafia project, 
set out to provide job opportunities, rather than challenge the capital/labour distinction, as 
radical cooperatives have historically done in Italy (Meriggi 2005). In other contexts where 
workers’ cooperativism appeared as labour, this was primarily in a salvage role for jobs, 
helping withstand transformations in labour markets such as neoliberal privatisations 
(Buechler and Buechler 2002; Bauerkämper 2004), or contributing grassroots means to 
22 
 
retrieve work after crises that dismantled waged employment (Sitrin 2006). In post-Soviet 
collectives struggling to maintain employment, workers ‘remain locked in the alienated 
forms of symbolic collectivism inherited from the past, treating the collective as a resource 
imposed from above’ (Ashwin 1999: 168). Such state interventionism in (and through) 
collective work has been explored via political projects where the state retained land, in the 
USSR (Humphrey 1983; 1998), but is rare in the context of a neoliberal market economy, 
like Italy; in Alto Belice, as explained in the next section, it was part of a political project. 
Antimafia cooperativism, inspired by legality, aims to instigate a value system over 
resources (employment and property) that contradicted many local values, forming a 
process amenable to hierarchisations, as not all members morally and practically identified 
with it in equal terms.  
Rooting divisions of labour in antimafia cooperatives’ subjective members 
experience entails a differentiation from contexts described in the sociological and 
anthropological literature. Sociologists underlining internal differentiations in cooperatives 
(Bartlett 1993) rarely emphasise the role of moralities, codes and social relationships, some 
assuming a Simmelian perspective, to stress the lack of ‘trust’ (Gambetta 2000; Cook et al. 
2007). Drawing on the market’s8 drive for competitiveness, cooperatives are often prone to 
‘restructuring’, diverging from their original equity-orientated organisation of labour. 
Increasing specialisation (‘to speak the language of the market’) ousts horizontal work 
relations within them (Checker and Hogeland 2004: 33). Most often, antagonistic markets 
imposing practices of ‘governance’ (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010: 80) eventually create 
internal differentiations and hierarchies in cooperatives, in the direction of ‘middle class 
reforms’ (Kasmir 1996: 63). These shifts denote ruptures informed by neoliberal structural 
                                                 
8 I’m taking the term as used by the authors I discuss, who stress free market competitiveness; I do 
acknowledge we should be careful to not naturalise markets in terms of ‘economics’ discourse; of course, 
anthropological work speaks to that (Geertz 1978 and 2008; Carrier 1997), presenting ‘other’ aspects of 
market activity, which diverge from economistic rhetoric. 
23 
 
adjustment (Whyte 1999; Gunn 2000) or conservative political ideologies (Narotzky 1997: 
120). 
The implied idea appears to be that cooperatives operating in a capitalist economy 
are (increasingly becoming) disembedded from the community; for example, subscribing to 
market guidance and bureaucratisation (Burawoy 1991; cf. Ferguson, same volume). The 
anthropological endeavour here is to question the idea that labour divisions are structured 
in economic terms only, especially in cooperative projects (like antimafia cooperativism, as 
shown below) that maintain ambiguous views of aspects of local life such as kinship, local 
codes and ‘tradition’. This way, we can highlight contemporary cooperatives’ ability to 
adapt to change in volatile ways (Vargas-Cetina 2005). Accounting for new developments, 
such as cooperatives endorsing projects offering potentials for ‘postcapitalist politics’ (CEC 
2001) or ‘community economies’ (Gibson-Graham 2006: 110–27) or formed as indigenous 
responses to neoliberal transformations (Stephen 2005), requires attention to the values 
coop members and contractual workers9 endorse in their lives and livelihoods.  
Cooperative organisation in Italian agrarian contexts has been channelled through 
politics elsewhere, too; Tuscany offers a well-researched case, where the Communist Party 
encouraged producers to cooperate, already since the 1950s (Pratt 1994: 71). In Sicily, 
instead, the project of curbing the mafia took the form of a radical state-led economic 
intervention that created work, distributed land and organised cooperatives. My 
ethnography tests the limits of the consolidation of these resources in antimafia 
cooperativism, codified in the categorisation of recruitment as meritocracy (Chapter 4), of 
work as waged employment (Chapter 5) and of land as property (Chapter 6). The narrative 
explores how locals’ experience of membership in antimafia cooperatives spilled over other 
                                                 
9 I shall be calling the contract workers ‘daily workers’, to distinguish them from the member-workers. Note 
that most member-workers were paid daily themselves; but they were not daily workers in that they had 
contracts of permanent and continuous employment with the cooperatives. 
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social fields, presenting continuities of cooperative members’ activity with local codes and 
moralities (gossip, registration of land to women, informal work, moral ownership of land). 
The tension between the legislated and the local denotes the pluralism of economy as 
different value arenas, different domains of value that interact (Gudeman 2001). What 
developed among members within the cooperatives, however, rather than struggles over 
value (Graeber 2001: 115; De Angelis 2007) were clashes of values, registered in diverse 
social experiences among coop members. 
My ethnography shows that this interaction can take place within the same 
cooperative, and stems from the tensions between changes imposed by a political project 
and continuities of members’ morals and practices with local codes the project aims to 
tackle. In that way, my research argues that divisions of labour to an extent reflect a 
distinction between state-driven cooperativism (a system of value codified in regularisation of 
resources) and the grounded meanings of experience of partaking in cooperatives (whose 
members follow local values). 
1.2. Context 
1.2.1. The History of Confiscations and the Formation of the Consortium 
Palermo in the 1980s had the highest rates of violent crime among European cities 
(Sterling 1991; Dickie 2004). The mafiosi, coordinated in the vertical structure of Cosa 
Nostra (Lodato 2001; cf. Tilly 1974), selectively eliminated state bureaucrats, including 
investigating magistrates, who challenged their aims. The number of the mafia victims, 
dubbed ‘excellent cadavers’ (Stille 1996; see also Sant Cassia 2007) included MPs such as 
Pio La Torre, who had sponsored an anti-mafia law in 1982 (Rizzo 2003) that set up the 
formation of antimafia confiscations. His assassination that same year indicates just how 
25 
 
important the law he had crafted actually was.10 The ‘Rognoni–La Torre’ Law (number 
646/82, co-proposed with the Christian Democrat MP Virginio Rognoni) made two 
fundamental amendments to Article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code. It introduced a 
specific crime of ‘mafia’-related as distinct from ‘organised crime’ and introduced the 
power of the courts to confiscate the assets of persons belonging to the mafia, as well as 
that of their relatives, partners, and families who in the past five years before a confiscation 
had acted as ‘straw persons’.11 
La Torre’s collaboration with Rognoni also shows the convergence of the two 
major parties, Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)12 en route to an 
antimafia political consensus (Lane 2010: 34–36). La Torre belonged to the moderate 
faction of the PCI. The communists promoted ‘an alliance of democratic forces’ against 
mafia violence, raising awareness of mafia intimidation of the peasant movement (Rizzo 
2003). Interestingly, as a trade unionist, La Torre had been imprisoned for his part in Alto 
Belice land occupations in 1948, an action aimed in part against mafia power. This shows 
how state policies on mafia shifted over time (Ginsborg 2003b: 205): by the mid 1990s, in 
response to intense mafia anti-state violence and civil society pressures, the state took a 
more active antimafia stance, and the confiscation law was a key intervention in this policy 
(see  2.1).  
                                                 
10 It has been said that ‘the mafia kills in the way a state does; it does not murder, it executes’ (Dickie 2004: 
97). 
11 Legally, a ‘straw person’ (prestanome) is a person who does not intend to have a genuine beneficial interest in 
a property but to whom such property is nevertheless conveyed, in order to facilitate a more complicated 
transaction at law (in this case, retaining the plots’ ownership). In Alto Belice, such people were often victims 
of mafia intimidation but equally often, were mafia affiliates. The issue of nominal land ownership is 
complex, as it regards the visibility of mafiosi vis-à-vis the state. In terms of criminal procedure, once proved 
that an asset is directly or indirectly controlled by a mafioso it becomes confiscated, despite its nominal status. 
This is not to be confused, however, with the practice of registering wives as nominal landowners (explored 
in 5.2) or mafiosi’s wives actually owning plots, acquired from inheritance; in that case, the plots are legally 
glossed as familiari and are not confiscated (6.1). 
12 The PCI (Communist Party) became, at the time of La Torre, the largest Western communist party (Shore 
1990). The right-wing DC (Christian Democracy) was the historical right wing party of Italy, which single-
handedly governed the country from the mid 1940s to the mid 1980s (Ginsborg 2003a: 141-185). 
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Anthropologists exploring the specific characteristics of Italian communism, have 
noted that its ‘escape from Leninism’ (Shore 1990) consolidated the party’s hegemonic 
success in most of the country, but not Sicily (Li Causi 1993; see also 3.1.3). The PCI 
elaborated and posed the ‘moral issue’ (la questione morale) to politics, which was 
incorporated in contemporary Italian political discourse. Focusing on the transparency of 
the public sphere, it entailed exposing the role of ambiguous political agents (like the 
mafia). The principle of ‘legalità’, (law plus morality), invoked by left-wing legalistic agendas 
and endorsed by the antimafia cooperatives, is currently used in ways that emulate and 
reproduce the ‘moral question’ of the late 1970s (Rakopoulos 2011).  
New legal measures were introduced in the early 1990s, when a series of mafia 
killings had provoked popular contempt for the organisation (Jamieson 2000: 127). The law 
providing for the ‘social use of assets confiscated by the mafia’ eventually came into effect 
in 1996 (n. 109/96), passed in response to the activism of the NGO Libera.13 One million 
signatures were gathered supporting the demand for ‘the mafia to restitute what was 
unjustly usurped’ (Libera 2008b).14 Therefore dubbed ‘a popular initiative legislation’ (Pati 
2010), the law introduced a procedure to ensure the ‘social use’ of the confiscated assets 
(Libera 2010). Once a mafioso is convicted, his assets, including property rights, are handed 
over to the Ministry for Internal Affairs15. Having identified the territorial jurisdiction 
where the assets are located, it passes them to the relevant municipality. In the case of land 
                                                 
13 Libera is an ‘umbrella NGO’, the largest in Italy, to which 1,500 organisations adhere (see www.libera.it). 
There is a Libera branch in 50 Italian cities. It caters for ‘the antimafia struggle’, promoting ‘the restitution of 
land’ (Cooperare 2009) and ‘the eradication of mafias from Italian social life’ (Libera 2009a: 12).  
14 Presenting the views of state institutions and Libera, in order to elucidate the reasoning behind 
confiscations and cooperatives, I quote from few, selected sources, (as the available material is enormous), 
including websites, leaflets, posters, booklets, press releases, and conferences papers on ‘the antimafia’ that I 
followed. I focus on three main sources: a collaborative book of the Ministry of Interior, called ‘L’uso sociale 
dei beni confiscati’ (The social use of confiscated assets), edited by two key Libera administrators (citation: 
[Frigerio and Pati]), the website of the Consortium, the state apparatus responsible for the allocation of the 
assets to cooperatives in Alto Belice, discussed below in this chapter (citation: [Consorzio]) as well as its 
publication ‘Focus’, and finally, Libera’s leaflets, newsletters, the magazine bearing its name and its website 
(www.libera.it) (citation: [Libera: Year], as these unsigned documents represent the NGO at large). All the 
above are cited as primary sources. 
15 Specifically the National Agency for Assets Seized and Confiscated from Mafia Clans. 
27 
 
this includes ownership, usufruct and adjunct rights. This jural process, as an ‘extraordinary 
measure’, draws from legal theory of exceptional circumstances.16 
An example will help clarify this process. Giovanni Genovese (a San Giovanni 
mafioso) owned a vineyard in the territory of Reale (an Alto Belice village), bought to 
launder drug money in the mid 1980s. The mafioso was arrested in 1997; the land plot was 
confiscated in 1999 and passed into the property of the state; the Reale municipality then 
transferred its usufruct to an antimafia cooperative, under renewable lease contracts valid 
for 20 or 30 years. These social agrarian cooperatives17 fall into the category of appropriate 
social use as they abide by the principles of Italian cooperativism and are not for profit 
organisations, protected in the constitution (Article 45). They are supported by the state, 
and Libera, which says that the land was allocated to the cooperatives ‘as they represented 
the community’ (Libera 2008a) and founded ‘an economy of legality and solidarity’ (Libera 
2009b). Libera pushed for a legality-oriented discourse promoting the antimafia 
cooperatives. 
Despite the cooperative movement’s 150-year-old history (Sapelli 1981), the Italian 
‘social cooperatives’ are relatively new. The antimafia cooperatives specifically were created 
                                                 
16 When arrested, a person accused of mafia-related crimes is asked to prove the provenance of their assets; 
this undermines the presumption of innocence in Italian (and generally European) Criminal Law. Under 
normal criminal procedure, this fundamental democratic principle is undisputable. But here, ‘the realm of 
mafia is an ‘exceptio legalis’, as the Palermitan magistrate Dr Rossio told me. These ideas reflect broader 
tendencies in legal theory in Italy, and can be seen in the light of Carl Schmitt’s jural theory of the ‘state of 
exception’, according to which the sovereign is ‘he’ who decides in exceptional situations (2008). Hence the 
Italian state justifies its toughened criminal procedure (Ingroia 2009) as ‘extraordinary measures’ required to 
counteract the delegitimisation of the state’s monopoly of violence by the mafia, even incorporating values 
bordering on being undemocratic and in potential violation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 6. Current Italian theorists who find kinship with Schmitt’s theorem include Giorgio Agamben (2005): 
his figure of the ‘homo sacer’, set inside/outside the conventional realm of the law, in a permanent state of 
exception, has been dominant in recent social science, impacting on anthropology as well). Schneider and 
Schneider (2002) also discuss aspects of this problematic of ‘emergency’ in antimafia legislation. 
17 The major differentiation in agrarian cooperatives is between work-based coops, composed of workers, 
such as the antimafia cooperatives, and production-based coops, whose members are producers (Sapelli 
1981). The former are composed of waged members-labourers and are work organisations with shared capital 
between members; in this case, the usufruct of land. The latter are composed of independent producers who 
sell their produce to a co-owned winery, which processes and distributes their produce (more on this in 
Chapter 3, from a historical perspective). In the case of Alto Belice, the Sancipiriddu coop-winery catered for 
800 producer-members who sold their grapes for vinification and bottling.  
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in response to the 109/96 law, and use confiscated land plots, machinery and other 
resources taken from mafia (tractors, harvesters and a winery called Cento18) and bestowed 
on the cooperatives between 1996 and 2006 to be ‘restituted back into productivity’ 
(Frigerio and Pati 2007: 3; Pati 2005). In 2012, there were eight such cooperatives in Italy 
(see Figure 1.3), cultivating land hailed as ‘liberated’ or ‘emancipated’ and presented as the 
result of grassroots mobilisations with state backing (Procino 2003). The fact that four of 
those eight cooperatives were located in the Alto Belice area of Western Sicily made that 
the ideal site to study ‘antimafia change’. Libera and many journalists alike claimed the area 
had been ‘liberated from the mafia’ and was an example for communities across Southern 
Italy (Morelli 2003; Libera 2006: 2).  
After the mid 1990s, when the relationship between state and Cosa Nostra shifted 
from connivance to conflict, triggered by an escalation of mafia violence, the jailing of 
numerous Alto Belice mafiosi between 1996 and 2000 (12 clan leaders in San Giovanni 
alone) multiplied the number of landed properties in the hands of local municipalities. 
Mayors pushed for the formation of a specialist bureaucratic apparatus to administer the 
transfers of usufruct rights to local cooperatives, guarantee the ‘social use’ and ‘associated’ 
use of the land and promote the cooperatives’ activity at large. 
The mayors of five Alto Belice villages welcomed the creation of the Consortium 
‘Development and Legality’19 (Consorzio ‘Sviluppo e Legalità’) in May 2000, which to this day 
oversees the cooperatives’ activity, ‘to administer the assets in associated use and for a 
social goal’ (Focus 2001: 1). Tasked with the transfer of confiscated land and other assets 
                                                 
18 The means of production, (land and machinery) of the antimafia cooperatives are owned by the state: this 
also refers to the Cento confiscated winery where vinification and bottling takes place. Part of the funding for 
the renovation of the Cento came from the European Union’s PON-5 programme, to assist development and 
security against illegality. The cooperatives retain the total control of the use-value (legally: usufruct) of the 
assets nevertheless. 
19 The guiding principles of the cooperatives, therefore, were these interconnected notions; as Luca, the 
president of Falcone, told me, ‘There is no development without legality and no legality without 
development; this is our mission here, to enact both’.  
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‘from the clans to the state and the community’ (Focus 2001: 12; Candito 2012), the 
Consortium imposed a model of antimafia cooperativism characterised by the pursuit of 
legality and values endorsed in legislation (‘work’, ‘property’), especially regarding the 
regulation of land and labour. 
The Consortium, whose seat is in the San Giovanni municipality, has two branches: 
in one, led by the local mayors, personnel may change through the municipal elections that 
take place every four years. The other branch is a permanent team of four bureaucrats 
appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. The managing directorship of the Consortium is 
a permanent position chaired by a Palermitan lawyer, Matteo, who has a PhD in law. When 
I first asked him his views on the confiscations, he told me they were due to ‘a state of 
permanent legal emergency with mafia issues in our country’. The Consortium’s presidency 
rotates every year among the eight mayors. The municipalities that originally participated in 
2000 were Curriuni, Reale, Chiana, San Cipiriddu, and San Giovanni. Three more villages 
joined three years later: Rocca, Fonte, and Principe. The Consortium20 was promoted by 
the centre-left Prefect of the Palermo province of the time, as well as by the leftist mayors 
of San Giovanni and Curriuni. The NGO Libera has played a key role: despite not having 
any administrative powers itself (not being a state organisation), the Consortium has 
delegated to the NGO full responsibility for the representation and marketing of the 
cooperatives, in what Matteo described to me as ‘a joint venture of state and civil society 
against the mafia’. The NGO Arci21 also assisted in this, catering for the Lavoro e Altro 
cooperative, the most openly left-wing among the four I examined. 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 1 for more details on its structure. 
21 Arci, an openly leftist association, is the largest politicised association in Italy. The cooperative Lavoro e 
Altro was intricately linked with the Arci branch of Palermo, which was particularly active in the ‘antimafia 
struggle’, as well as in issues of anti-racism, anti-sexism and environmental activism. Arci was openly critical 
of Libera’s non-political view of the antimafia movement.  
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It is important to emphasize the local character of the restitution process. The 
cooperatives studied here cultivate land that had been confiscated from significant Alto 
Belice mafiosi.22 The Lavoro e Altro was located in Curriuni, while the three others (Falcone, 
Borsellino and the much smaller Liberanima23) were in San Giovanni. Collectively, the land 
tracts these cooperatives managed amounted to almost 600 Ha; they include mainly organic 
vineyards and cereal farms (Libera 2009a; Consorzio 2010). The cooperatives also had the 
usufruct of two beautiful Alto Belice 19th century masserie (farm houses), both confiscated 
from Giovanni Brusca, and turned into agricultural tourism establishments (agriturismi). The 
fact that the majority of confiscations in Italy took part in the cradle of Cosa Nostra was 
highly symbolic.24  
The rhetoric of this redistribution of assets used by official agencies such as the 
Consortium, presents a just state actively intervening to restore to an (idealised) community 
what has been ‘stolen’ from it. State documents explaining ‘whither to confiscate’ (Focus 
2001) resemble a Marxist analysis of primitive accumulation.25 These documents present 
mafiosi as having ‘usurped’ the agricultural land from what was allegedly in the common 
domain, available to all (Consorzio 2010). Land was allocated to the cooperatives ‘as they 
represented the community’ (Libera 2008c) and had founded (to promote) ‘an economy of 
legality and solidarity’ (Libera 2009b). In fact (see 3.1.3 and 3.1.4), there had been only one, 
short-lived historical case of collectively owned land in Alto Belice, in 1946 peasant land 
occupations. The confiscated land, as the state apparatuses and the NGO claim (in texts 
                                                 
22 Totò Riina and Giovanni Brusca, today imprisoned for life, controlled Cosa Nostra’s heroin trafficking in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when Sicilians controlled the largest share of the world’s circulation of the drug 
(Camilleri and Lodato 2002). Giovanni Brusca lived almost all his life in San Giovanni. His nicknames speak 
for his fierce activity: ‘u verru’ (the pig) and ‘u scanacristiani’ (the strangler). 
23 The Falcone, Borsellino and Liberanima cooperatives were guided by Libera’s Palermo. There were Libera 
members in the administration teams of both cooperatives.  
24 See Appendix 7 for a map of confiscated assets in Italy. 
25 Marx’s ideas on primitive accumulation are enlightening in terms of his critique of property in Capital (vol 
1, VIII, chapter 26; 2008: 363-366) as a hub of historical social relations obscuring processes of violence: state 
or private force. Arlacchi argues extensively on the theme of ‘mafia primitive capital accumulation’ (Arlacchi 
1986; Cacciola 1984). 
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co-authored by their representatives) symbolises ‘a resource for the area, an opportunity for 
development and civil growth’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 5). Following this line of argument, 
they envision newly created cooperatives as horizontal work organisations (all members 
being equal in pay and work tasks) to ‘democratically accommodate the land that returned 
to the community, after the mafia had unlawfully usurped it’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 37) 
and to guarantee the ‘community’s participation in the social use of the confiscated assets’ 
(Frigerio and Pati 2007: 67; Libera 2008b). The state confiscations project is still ongoing at 
the time of writing of this thesis, 16 years after its inception.  
1.2.1. The cooperatives 
The first land plot to be restituted, i.e. allocated to a social cooperative, was a 
vineyard in Corleone, of Totò ‘The Beast’ Riina, confiscated in 1999, and bestowed on the 
Lavoro e Altro cooperative. (As mentioned, the municipalities retain legal ownership of the 
confiscated assets, and the cooperatives only hold the usufruct). The Consortium 
promoted the idea of ‘more cooperatives’ to accommodate all the land that had been 
‘restituted to the community’ since its inception in 2000. Two local cooperatives, Akragas 
and Paradiso, set up in 1998 before the Consortium existed, had been shut down in 2002 
(see 4.2). Promoted by Libera and the Consortium, public competitions were held in 2001 
and 2006, for the formation of two more cooperatives in the Alto Βelice area. Establishing 
the cooperatives was advertised as ‘the possibility to restore back to the community the 
land that mafiosi usurped from it’ (Focus 2001). Driven by an ideology of communalism and 
‘justice’, a key element was replacing the mafia as patron by ‘reconstituting the presence of 
the state in the area’ (Libera 2006). Speaking about the public competitions for recruitment 
in the cooperatives, Matteo emphasised to me a phrase of Alberto Dalla Chiesa,26 which 
                                                 
26 General Alberto Dalla Chiesa had been the head of Sicily’s Carabinieri (the military police, one of the three 
police forces of Italy, and active in hunting mafiosi). Dalla Chiesa was assassinated in Palermo in 1982, only 
100 days after he had taken office; his legacy is still debated in Italy, partly because he had played a key role in 
curbing the Red Brigades in the North, when he served as Carabiniere General in Torino, yet failed to crush 
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had become a mantra of antimafia cooperativism: ‘the state gives as a right what the mafia 
offers as a gift.’ 
The public competitions resulted in the hiring of the core workforce and the 
establishment of the cooperatives I have studied most closely: the Giovanni Falcone (2001) 
and the Paolo Borsellino (2006)27. The 15 original members of each were selected by the 
Consortium and Libera. The positions were publicly advertised and the meritocracy-
oriented selection process involved detailed scrutiny of the applicants’ abilities, antimafia 
commitment, kinship connections and social contacts. The cooperatives were not allowed 
to employ anyone who had any mafioso in their ‘social circle’, including kin (up to the 3rd 
degree, inclusive), friends and affines (Bando 2001). Most of my informants were therefore 
either people selected in that process or others who joined later, replacing members who 
had left; they were recruited through connections they had among the existing cooperative 
workforce. In addition, there were workers on short-term contracts of seasonal 
employment, paid by the day (‘daily workers’). By 2009, the number of people making a 
living through these two cooperatives was double the original 30. 
There were two types of cooperative members: administrators and manual workers. 
The difference between members and other (‘daily’) workers were, firstly, contracts, in that 
members had permanent contracts, although there were important distinctions between 
administrator-members and worker-members concerning levels of remuneration and 
timing of payment, as well as periods of actual work. While administrator-members enjoyed 
permanent and continuous contracts, the member-workers were given contracts that were 
permanent but only covered work during the agricultural season. Only three worker-
                                                                                                                                               
Cosa Nostra (N. Dalla Chiesa 2007; Stille 1995: 61). Dalla Chiesa is revered by people in the antimafia 
cooperatives, who often quote him. 
27 Giovanni Falcone was the magistrate–antimafia expert who prosecuted Cosa Nostra for a decade until the 
Alto Belice mafia executed him in 1992. Paolo Borsellino died in a mafia-caused explosion 100 days later. For 
general information on the Falcone, Borsellino and also the Lavoro e Altro cooperative, and their balances 
for the year 2008, see Appendices 4 and 5. 
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members had a monthly wage, most being paid on a daily basis. The second key feature 
marking out members was democratic participation, since all members sat on the Members’ 
Assembly, which met annually. By contrast, non-member-workers signed three-month 
contracts for seasonal agrarian work, paid on a daily basis, and had no rights to democratic 
participation. (To distinguish them, as and where appropriate, from the worker-members I 
shall use the terms ‘daily workers’ or ‘braccianti’.) 
However, the member/non-member distinction is misleading. On the one hand, 
worker-members and on-members had much in common despite the undeniably significant 
difference between stable employment and short-term contractual work. Manual members’ 
work (and hence pay) was as seasonal as that of most daily workers. Due to their similar 
pay, work and living conditions the situation of the daily workers was to some extent 
comparable to the permanent worker-members, with whom they identified, given that they 
also considered themselves to be ‘parts of the cooperative’ (see Figure 1.1). 
On the other hand, as the thesis explores in depth, there were crucial differences 
among members, between the administrative and worker-members. In that respect, diverging 
from a marked tendency in anthropology of work to distinguish between workers in stable 
employment and contractual workers,28 I focus on stratification within the category of those 
in stable employment separating administrators from worker-members, not least because 
the latter tended to be allied with daily workers29. The two-tiered organisation of all Alto 
Belice cooperatives (which, in turn, established a pattern followed by antimafia 
cooperatives elsewhere, outside Sicily) is a salient issue, with repercussions in terms of 
                                                 
28 Of course, this is an older discussion, often highlighting gendered stratifications (for example: Goddard 
1996). Recent anthropological research on industrial settings (Parry 2007; Sanchez: 2010) where there is a 
consistent divide between fixed and (sub)contracted workers takes the discussion further. The line of 
argument is that those in stable employment, unlike contractual workers, are privileged (‘embourgeoised’, as 
Parry has it) by comparison. The debate on precariousness and genealogical differences among workers is 
also akin to this discussion (Procoli 2004; Standing 2011).  
29 This is why, for most of the thesis, the term ‘manual workforce’ or ‘workers’ means both daily and 
member-workers, unless stated. I do appreciate that, legally, administrators were cooperative workers, too. 
However, the teams identified themselves as ‘administrators’ and ‘workers’ respectively.  
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class, and the overall meaning of participation in antimafia cooperativism. Much can be 
said in terms of the industrial democracy (Holmström 1989) of the antimafia cooperatives; 
however, as the mechanics of voting and ‘collective’ decision-making were not often 
disputed in the field, and as I hope to show that internal stratifications go well beyond 
systems of voting, I shall not dwell on this theme in my ethnographic narrative.  
In fact, the argument I propose is as follows: although bereft of voting rights in the 
cooperatives, the shared conditions and values of daily workers and worker-members 
meant that they ahd similar experiences (and status). In addition, worker-members ,carried  
the burden of sharing potential losses incurred by the cooperative. The lack of ‘voice’ in 
the coops of the non-members, was less significant in marking broad stratification than the 
issue of livelihoods. In fact, it is part of my argument that, in order to understand the 
internal divisions within the cooperatives, we need to move methodologically and 
analytically, beyond a focus on schemes of decision-making, not least because, as the 
relevant literature notes, they have been appropriated by and as techniques of ‘governance’ 
(Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). It is telling data, nonetheless, to juxtapose with cooperatives’ 
‘participatory democracy’ the fact that the Falcone, Borsellino and Lavoro E Altro all had a 
similar mode of collective management whereby the ideas of the administration teams 
dictated the overall planning. 
In all three, this was arranged in two decision-making bodies: the Administration 
Council, meeting monthly, and the Members’ Assembly, meeting annually, where all 
members had a vote. I observed Administration Council meetings in the three coops. In 
the three coops’ assemblies I followed in 2009, all decisions by the Councils were approved 
with a 100% majority, including the Councils’ annual planning and previous year’s accounts 
(bilancio). The Assembly also elected the members for the next year’s Council, always 
reflecting the views of the Consortium and Libera in electing a majority of administration 
members over worker-members (for each cooperative, three administration members and 
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two worker-members were selected). As for the significance of the Members’ Assemblies 
as a form of ‘democratic participation’ and control, suffice it to quote the opinion of Mina, 
Falcone’s vice-president, which she confided to me just after one of the coop’s annual 
Assembly meetings: ‘Well yes, the Assembly is important, but too much democracy can be 
a waste of time when deciding things corporate; we need organization and quick decisions.’ 
While highly suggestive, this phrase on its own cannot provide the necessary 
nuances of what the administrator/worker division of labour in politically driven 
cooperativism really meant for the lives and livelihoods of worker-members. Where 
collective decision-making falls short of ‘industrial democracy’ (Holmström 1989), this is 
the outcome rather than the reason for internal stratifications. The reasons, I shall show, lay 
mostly outside the cooperative framework, in the backgrounds of the members, the broader 
social relationships in which they were embedded, and how these related differentially to 
the political project guiding the coops. For this reason, I examine disagreements, splits and 
conflicts in the workplace and beyond, as indicative of opinions challenging the legality-
oriented ideology of the cooperatives that were never expressed in the democratic bodies 
of the organisations, at least not during my fieldwork. 
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Figure 1.1 
General information about the Alto Belice cooperatives 
Name Location Land Other assets Organisational 
affiliation 
Established 
Lavoro e altro Curriuni 
130 ha in Alto Belice 
(of which 14 ha is vineyards) 
19 ha in Canicattí 
(100 km away) 
An agrotourism 
establishment 
opened in 2010 
Arci May 1999 
Liberanima 
Partinico   
Legal seat: San 
Giovanni 
3 ha of lemon groves –– 
Libera  July 2007  
Borsellino  San Giovanni 
130 ha in Alto Belice (32 of which is 
vineyards) 
20 ha in Casteltermini (110 km away). 
 
An agrotourism 
establishment 
opened in 2010 
Libera  June 2006 
Falcone35 San Giovanni 
155 ha (30 of which is vineyards).  
50 ha from the municipalities of 
Trapani and Paceco (100 km away). 
A winery (Cento). 
An agrotourism 
establishment 
opened in 2006. 
Libera  June 2001 
                                                 
35 See Appendix 6 for information on its production, assets, capital and profit (the coop’s balance approved by the Assembly in 2009).  
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Figure 1.2 
Pay and membership status in the Alto Belice cooperatives’ workforce 
 Cooperative members36 
 
Contractual (‘daily’) workers 
Name  
Administrative workforce Manual workforce Administrative workforce Manual workforce 
Liberanima 
2 members  
(on monthly wage of c.500€37) 
3 members (on daily pay of 
51.62 €net) 
–– 1 seasonal worker (man) 
Borsellino  
5 administrators 
 
on monthly wage ranging from 
1200€ [Salvo, president] to 940€ 
[Niko, administrator]) 
 
12 members (all of them 
on daily pay) 
–– 4 seasonal workers (men) 
Falcone 
7 office-based administrators 
on monthly wage ranging from 
1230€ [Luca, president] to 1030€ 
[Manlio, administrator]) 
 
10 member-workers 
 
4 of them on monthly-
wage contracts of c. 1000€ 
, 6 on contracts based on 
daily pay 
 
 
2 office-based administrators, 
on annual renewable 
contracts 
11 seasonal workers, cooperative 
members as fieldhands (men, on 
daily pay contracts); some 
amassing a monthly 700€ 
 
4 seasonal workers (men) in other 
capacities, e.g. tourism 
 
5 seasonal workers (women) 
Lavoro e 
altro 
3 administrators 
(on monthly wages ranging from 
1100€ [Vito, president] to 800€ 
[Mario, administrator]) 
12 member-workers  
–– 4 seasonal workers (men) 
                                                 
36 Note: All members were on permanent contracts. All figures denote mixed pay. 
37 The issue of pay is not organized in thoroughly consistent data presentation here; the reason is that, hard as I tried, I was not allowed to inspect all different contracts the 
cooperatives had with members/daily workers and relied mostly on people’s own statements. 
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Figure 1.3 
General information about other antimafia cooperatives 
Cooperatives outside Alto Belice 
 
Name Location Land Affiliation Members Established 
Il Gabbiano Rome  30 ha (mainly vineyards) Independent  3 2008 
Le Terre di 
don Peppe 
Diana 
Caserta area 
(Campania) 
No land – buffalos for mozzarella 
production  Libera 7 2009 
Casa dei 
Giovani 
Bagheria 
c100 ha (dry farming) Used to collaborate with Libera38 
but now independent  
9 2001 
Valle del 
Marro 
Gioia Tauro  
[Calabria] 
60 ha (mainly vineyards) 
Libera  10 2008 
Beppe 
Montana 
Catania area of 
Eastern Sicily 
2000 orange trees 
100 olive trees 
Libera 
(and Etna Consortium for 
Legality and Development) 
4 2011 
 
Defunct Cooperatives in Alto Belice 
 
Akragas  San Giovanni  
130 ha (mainly vineyards) 
Preceded Libera and the Consortium 4 
Established 1998. 
Liquidated by the 
Consortium in 2002. 
Paradiso San Giovanni 
130 ha (mainly vineyards) 
Preceded Libera and the Consortium 5 
Established 1998. 
Liquidated by the 
Consortium in 2002. 
                                                 
38 The Consortium and Libera’s imposition of a regularisation of labour did not work in the case of Casa Dei Giovani, as the adm inistrators paid no national insurance 
contributions to the workers. This caused a scandal, which is still, at the time of writing, under investigation. Meanwhile, the Casa is isolated by other cooperatives, the state 
and Libera. 
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1.2.2. The field site and what it represents 
San Giovanni was thus the ideal site for fieldwork: the most successful project of 
confiscation and redistribution of mafia land in Italy had taken place there. It was also, as 
mentioned, the birthplace of Giovanni Brusca, and still has a reputation for being one of 
the most mafia-influenced villages in Italy.39 In a widely discussed and overquoted article, 
published right after Brusca’s arrest, a leading antimafia journalist called San Giovanni ‘the 
village of the 800 Bruscas’ (Fava 1996), meaning that Giovanni ‘The Pig’ Brusca, a mafioso 
who, by his own account, had killed ‘around 150 to 200 people’ (Lodato 2006: 3), was the 
tip of the iceberg in a sea of social consensus and kinship links: the ‘tradition’ of San 
Giovanni was mafia connivance. ‘It is not easy to construct normality in a village bloodied 
up by hatred,’ claimed another article (Corrado 1997). Later, the same newspaper, Corriere 
della Sera, conducted a survey, in which allegedly 60% of sangiovannari40 said the mafia was ‘a 
great thing’ (Mignosi 1999).  
That San Giovanni – a place with such heavily charged history – was targeted for 
‘antimafia change’ obviously had considerable symbolic weight. The subsequent portrayal  
of how the ‘village of the 800 Bruscas’, virtually the epitome of mafia consensus, converted 
to become a village of ‘antimafia heathen’, as Libera claimed, was salient– especially given 
the cooperatives’ recruitment policy for locals of excluding anyone who had even remote 
kinship, affinity or friendship links to mafia. 
Regarding this idea of tradition, this thesis makes a contribution informed by 
ethnographic specificities unique to Sicily, precisely due to the presence of the mafia in the 
island, often linked to local traditions and popular imagination (Breschi 1986). The mafia 
‘tradition’ is seen as an obstacle to progress (Centorrino et al. 1999; Paoli 2003) cooperation 
                                                 
39 As mentioned earlier, in 1992, Brusca killed Giovanni Falcone, amongst other 150–200 people,. In 1995, he 
also strangled and melted in acid Giovanni Di Matteo, a 13-year-old child, the son of a rival mafioso (Lodato 
1999). These atrocities gave the place its bad reputation. For a genealogy of the Brusca ‘clan’, see Appendix 3. 
40 This colloquial word is the demonym used for people from San Giovanni. 
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and civic trust (Gambetta 1996; 2008), an upkeeper of familism, which dissolves civil 
society (Putnam 1993; Jamieson 2000; Gunnarson 2008; see also 2.1). Many ethnographies 
focus on relations of continuity and change, owing to Anthropology’s past fascination with 
culture, and/or social structure, as its starting point. What is interesting from an 
anthropological perspective is that Alto Belice, and specifically San Giovanni, are cases 
where tradition is considered decidedly problematic.  
Often, in situations anthropologists study, tradition is either treasured and change is 
seen as desirable in some ways but disruptive (of culture and social structure) or the 
anthropologist insists that traditions being abandoned have some value. In the case of a 
place where tradition is so deeply associated with violence and criminality this becomes 
almost impossible and actually creates a very unusual situation ethnographically (see Taussig 
2005, although in Sicily violence was not salient anymore41). Yet, as I mentioned, since the 
mafia is ‘cultural’ or ‘social structural’ in certain received ethnographic senses, taking down 
‘its’ economic power provoked a series of interesting implications that not only dispute a 
political economy framework, but also challenge received ethnographic sensibilities 
regarding tradition. 
This is also true for lay perceptions of the mafia phenomenon, in my experience. 
Since I returned from the field, people I described my work to asked me whether the mafia 
was still strong in Sicily. People’s interest revolved around a thematic core, the island being 
the locus classicus of mafia, the ‘heart’ of the mafia tradition (Lane 2010). Not surprisingly, 
the film industry informed most people’s views: many inquired whether I was a mafia 
movie enthusiast or how close to movies’ depictions of ‘the mafia’ were to reality’. When I 
explained to acquaintances in London (including Italians) that my research was on ‘the 
                                                 
41 While I was in the field, in 2009, two assassinations took place; the responsible, Peppe ‘The Buffallo’ 
Brusca, a 78 year old man, was arrested. In the same year, in the neighbouring Consortium village Fonte, 
Domenico ‘the vet’ Raccuglia, one of the five most important fugitives of Italy was arrested in his native 
village (Fagone 2009). 
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antimafia’, not the mafia, most reacted with mixed feelings of disappointment and 
enthusiasm. For many, this sounded more intriguing than the mafia itself, connoting 
heroism and commitment for the people involved. Interestingly, gendered frameworks 
often informed these discussions. Many assumed that antimafia activists were ‘brave men’ 
and asked me about how successful ‘the antimafia’ had been. However, rather than 
uncritically accepting the claim that ‘antimafia’ equals ‘change’, I examine how activities of 
people involved in the cooperatives transform meanings of land, labour and discourse, 
while at the same time reproduce established practices and allow for continuations with 
past relationships.  
My research took place throughout the whole of 2009. A pre-doctoral research stay 
in Sicily lasted six months, from January to July 2007, throughout which I sought a locus to 
research ‘antimafia social transformation’. Confiscations appeared as the only case where 
an initiative against the mafia had produced changes in Sicilians’ livelihoods and antimafia 
activism yielded income. Having interviewed journalists, judges, police officers, and NGO 
activists, it seemed to me that mobilisation around antimafia initiatives was manifested as a 
‘sense of civic duty’. Different research interlocutors42 answered both ‘why take action 
against the mafia?’ and ‘what changes has opposing the mafia instigated to your life?’ by 
stating ‘being a good citizen’.43 Most thought an ‘antimafia San Giovanni’ was a laughable 
image, due precisely to the village’s reputation as a ‘traditionally mafia’ place; it was for this 
reason that San Giovanni cooperatives appeared as the ideal site for participant observation 
around people actively contesting the mafia while making a living, made more sense. 
                                                 
42 I shall use the terms ‘informants’, ‘interlocutors’ and ‘research participants’ interchangeably. My preferred 
term is the latter but it was not applicable in all instances.  
43 Di Maggio (2009) traces this through organised questionnaires, using categories such as ‘antimafia 
commitment’, ‘liberation’, ‘change’, etc, in order to map what motivated people to apply for a job in the 
cooperatives.  
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San Giovanni was hailed by Libera agents I spoke to, as a village whose land was 
‘liberated from the mafia’, an idea also promoted by the Consortium (Consorzio 2012). 
During harvest, volunteers from Northern Italy visited San Giovanni, through Libera-
organised summer camps to help the cooperatives with agricultural work; this public image 
the place had acquired made it all the more appealing. After I visited the village a few times 
and contacted people from the cooperatives, I decided to move to San Giovanni. Although 
many cooperative members (the administrators) hailed from Palermo and lived in the city, 
commuting 31 kilometres to San Giovanni to work, it was in San Giovanni where mass 
confiscations of mafia leaders’ landed property had taken place and where the seat of the 
Consortium was located. 
I asked Checco, the Falcone cooperative’s ‘PR’, to help me move to the village. He 
explained that several journalists from Italy and abroad had visited the village to write 
about the antimafia experience there44. A journalist himself, he admitted he could not 
understand why I had to spend a year there to get a grasp of the situation. Nevertheless, he 
introduced me to signor Pippo Pitrè, a 58-year-old day worker from the Falcone, and ex-
member of the Borsellino cooperative, asking him to help me out. I soon took up a 
permanent residence in the village, in Pippo’s empty apartment, paying him rent, who 
became a key informant. He and his family had moved to another house, 2 kilometres 
outside the village, in 2007. 
                                                 
44 During fieldwork I witnessed visits from journalists across the board and around the world, who wanted to 
take interviews from antimafia cooperative members: the Italian National Geographic, a glossy magazine 
from Germany, the Guardian, and even a culinary review from Japan. Titles they came about describing the 
case included words such as ‘revolution’, ‘heroes’, ‘change’. Some reporters expressed distress, as the Daily 
Telegraph’s envoy: ‘... it was heart warming to see this brave soul so commemorated, but as we wandered the 
vines and [Checco] spoke of ‘localism’ and the measures necessary to prevent the Mafia themselves 
penetrating the committees set up to manage the confiscated land, I couldn’t help partaking of that fatalism 
which so many have seen as intrinsic to the Sicilian character...’ (Self 2009). The Guardian underlines 
continuities in the antimafia movement: ‘The estate is run by the Borsellino co-operative... “So many 
courageous men lost their lives in the fight against Cosa Nostra,” said [Checco] as we walked through the 
fields.” “Now, we, the new generation, are finally able to finish the work that they so bravely began”’ 
(Rafanelli 2008). 
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Photo 1:45 The view from the balcony of my apartment: via Porta Palermo. 
The official population of San Giovanni is 8,349 people (ISTAT 2011), although 
most locals insisted that the number of permanent residents was 4,000 at best. The village 
was founded as San Giovanni dei Mortilli at the foot of the Mato hill in 1779, built 
according to the needs of a system of land tenure (latifundism46), hosting the largest 
number of people in the smallest possible space. Anthropologists have described the inland 
Sicilian ‘agrotown’ as a technology of densely populated settlement that reflected the needs 
of the latifundist system (Schneider and Schneider 1976: 34; Blok 1974: 47). Blok argues 
these ‘peasant agglomerations’ are characteristic of Southern Italy generally (2000: 136–54; 
1969). Interestingly, San Giovanni’s history was born out of a confiscation: the valley’s feudi 
belonged to the Jesuit College of Trapani (Belli 1934) (their names still demarcate land 
territories today: Dammusi, Mortilli, Signora). In 1776, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
ordered the expulsion of the Jesuits, and the Marquis of Sambuca, a member of the Sicilian 
nobility, acquired their land (Comune di San Giuseppe Jato 2008). He was issued a license 
to build a settlement for the agrarian workforce of his latifundio. The nobleman’s 
                                                 
45 All photos, unless otherwise stated, are by the author. 
46 Latifundism, a capitalist type of estate-based agrarian political economy (Schneider and Schneider 1976: 7; 
see also Petrusewicz 1996).  
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settlement attracted braccianti47 (agrarian workers) from neighbouring villages; the site’s 
position on a route to Palermo led to its rapid development (Comune 2009). In 1820, the 
village population was more than 5,000. A part of the hill collapsed in 1838, giving rise to 
the adjunct village of San Cipiriddu (today’s population: 5,016, (ISTAT 2011)), built to 
house San Giovanni’s homeless population.  
Locals called San Giovanni ‘un paese’, a village. There were hardly any public spaces; 
the villetta, however, a widening of the vibrant Palermo road (via Palermo), formed an 
unofficial square; its five bar (cafés) were packed with teenagers on weekend evenings. The 
building where I lived was well situated in the thick of things, close to the villetta. Opposite 
the apartment was the Billiards café, which, I soon noticed, was popular with mafiosi. The 
balcony looked out onto a panorama of the Mato valley: vineyards as far as the eye could 
see. The size of the apartment was inconvenient (200 square metres, when I only used a 
couple of rooms) but, as it was very close to the village centre and the cooperatives’ offices, 
I found it ideal from the start. 
  
Photo 2: Detail of the viletta: a monument. Photo 3: The Billiards café, close to my home. See 
7.1.2 for a narrative about its role as a local mafia 
meeting place. 
                                                 
47 The term, in the Sicilian context, denotes agrarian proletarians (Schneider and Schneider 1976), people 
whose only means of livelihood were their braccia, their arms. The cooperatives’ daily workers called 
themselves braccianti. It is a widely used term in Sicily, akin to the bracero notion (Kearney 2004). 
45 
 
 
 
Photo 4: The entrance to the shared offices of the 
Falcone and Borsellino cooperatives. Notice the 
humble buildings; the red door is a warehouse; the 
cooperatives’ offices were on the first floor; notice the 
red banner welcoming the ‘E!state liberi’ of volunteer 
labourers in the confiscated fields. The banner made 
the offices quite conspicuous, unlike most of the year.  
Photo 5: The highway, with San Giovanni on the right; 
above the village, notice the Mato hill. 
The Falcone and Borsellino antimafia cooperatives shared the same offices; after 
Calatrasi (the giant winemaker of the area), they were the most widely advertised 
enterprises of the village. Yet, their offices were difficult to find. On via Palermo westwards 
towards the bar Cerniglia, located at the edge of the village, the cooperatives’ offices are 
ungracefully located behind a petrol station. This was where the cooperative administrators 
worked, mostly young Palermitans. They were unimpressed by San Giovanni. Overlooking 
the Mato valley, its panoramas were charming but cooperative members commuting from 
Palermo felt the village itself was dreadful. Every morning they had to travel the 31 
kilometres from Palermo along a highway they described as a dire construction, financed 
by a 1980s money-laundering scheme for the profits of international heroin trafficking in 
which San Giovanni mafiosi were central players. 
Cooperative administrators complained about the locals’ ‘aesthetics’, suggesting 
that the entire village had been constructed on the back of mafia-related speculazione edilizia 
(real estate speculation), done as cheaply as possible. In fact, many people visiting the 
village found the derelict facades of most houses embarrassing. Consumer cooperative 
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representatives often came from Bologna (the capital of Emilia in Northern Italy) to visit 
the antimafia cooperatives and confirm their collaboration. They compared San Giovanni 
to impoverished Bolivian villages they had visited while backpacking, when young. Once, 
Flavio, a representative of CoopTirreno, a leftwing consumer coop from Bologna, came to 
San Giovanni to liaise with people from the cooperatives as a business partner (his coop 
was to distribute the antimafia cooperatives’ produce in Bologna). This was a success, as it 
sealed links between Northern Italian consumer coops and the antimafia cooperatives.48 I 
accompanied some of my research interlocutors who fetched him from Trapani airport. As 
we approached the village in the car, Flavio said to me that San Giovanni looked like a zoo 
and the locals (‘imbued with mafia’, he commented) were the animals in the zoo. He 
imagined that it must take a lot of effort collaborating with the locals and even suggested 
that, I should call myself not an ethnologist (anthropologist) but an ethologist. Later the 
same day, at an interview arranged in advance, Luca, the president of Falcone cooperative, 
was somewhat embarrassed, and apologetic towards me, regarding the idea of their 
business partner, and wished to clarify that the cooperatives had a specific role in the area, 
often not understood either by locals or by their Emilian partners: 
Here [in San Giovanni] we find ourselves [he spells each syllable out clearly and 
raises his voice] in an unevolved society (una società non-evoluta) –-not only due to the 
presence of the mafia but also due to the fact that income, culture and social status 
are in such a condition that the only thing that matters to people is the price [of the 
produce]. That’s it. It is not important how something is produced – the only thing 
that matters is its price, nothing else. And since I work in San Giovanni and not in 
                                                 
48 I acknowledge that there is an absence of discussion of the issue of distribution and consumption of the 
organic produce of the antimafia cooperatives in the thesis. Fieldwork has elicited enough data to dedicate a 
chapter to this issue; however, as this is not the focus of this ethnography, I have not included these findings 
in my analysis. The consumption of the produce is not really relevant to the antimafia issues arising from 
confiscated assets nor am I trying to cover the entire economic management and entrepreneurship of the 
antimafia cooperatives. I note, in passing, that around 90% of the Alto Belice cooperatives produce is 
channelled to Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, to Legacoop consumer cooperatives. Legacoop is the left-
leaning association of cooperatives of Italy, where Falcone, Borsellino, Lavoro e Altro and Liberanima 
adhere. Unicoop is the second largest cooperative league, historically affiliated to the DC and the centre-right. 
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Bologna, I have an eye open for all the world market but I pay attention on how to 
impose change on this reality. [emphasis added] 
There were many signs of local mafia presence, which Palermitan administrators 
complained about. For lack of plaster, the building where I stayed, as well as most of the 
surrounding apartment blocks, showed bare red brick. Neighbours were proud to 
emphasise that ‘in a peasant community like ours, there is not much need for comfort’. 
Some argued that the unattractive brickwork facing the main streets of the village indicated 
‘what it meant to be a peasant’ and, indeed, to come ‘from a village with a mafia past’. I 
associated the shabbiness with the mafia’s logic of contempt for conspicuous consumption 
(Arlacchi 1986: 23). When I started visiting local homes, invited by friends, housewives 
were happy to show off shiny new pieces of cutlery or furniture but shrugged when 
questioned about the lack of plaster on their house’s outfacing walls, often responding, ‘It 
is better to enjoy some luxury without people knowing your riches’ or ‘Better to show you 
are a pauper while you actually reign’. A neighbour told me a local adage popularised by 
mafiosi, to explain the apparently anti-consumerist local ethos: megghiu cummannari chi futtiri 
(it’s better to command than to fuck).49 
1.3. People and Methods 
My ethnography is based on data gathered from studying the everyday life of people 
involved in the antimafia cooperatives and the Consortium in the village of San Giovanni. 
My focus on the use of confiscated mafia land also took me to the other seven villages of 
the Consortium as well as conducting some interviews in Palermo or San Giovanni. My 
general approach was to follow the lives of cooperative members through their inter-
related social spaces: confiscated vineyards, cooperative offices and peasant homes in San 
Giovanni, as well as meeting places of antimafia activist organisations in Palermo. In that 
                                                 
49 The adage implies that pleasure comes from controlling people, rather than enjoying material luxuries. 
Arlacchi also notes the lack of conspicuous consumption among Sicilian mafiosi, unlike, for example, 
Neapolitan cammoristi (1986; 1993; 2010). 
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sense, my ethnographic material comes from participant observation with around 150 
research participants involving three different, yet interconnected, social networks. Firstly 
there were people involved in public institutions and civil society associations in the Alto 
Belice villages and in Palermo, namely the Consortium, Libera and Arci NGOs, as well as 
lawyers and associations dealing with antimafia issues. Secondly, interacting with village 
peasants also led to minor entrepreneurs (e.g. café and bar owners) and others related to the 
cooperatives in some capacity, for instance, suppliers of seed or of fertilizers – and grapes. 
About 20 farmers sold their produce to the cooperatives, through supplier contracts 
stipulating their adherence to ‘the antimafia cause’. My main research participants, however, 
the backbone of my fieldwork, were the people who made (at least part of) their living 
working with the antimafia cooperatives. These included farm workers (cooperative 
worker-members and agrarian daily workers,) seasonal workers in the cooperatives’ 
agrotourism department and office-based administrators of the cooperatives Giovanni 
Falcone, Paolo Borsellino and Lavoro E Altro (as well as some from Liberanima, based  in 
Partinico, a town just outside Alto Belice). Most key interlocutors were members of the 
Falcone and the Borsellino cooperatives, whose shared offices in San Giovanni, made it 
quite straightforward to use a ‘snowball’ sampling technique among their members. For 
Lavoro e Altro, less represented here, I traced people connected to this organisation when 
I visited Curriuni periodically for pre-arranged meetings or just staying at their office, a 
space entangled with local life. Liberanima, which people called the ‘fourth antimafia 
cooperative’, consisted of only five people, all of whom I interviewed. 
Reflecting the fact that methods and argumentation are in dialogue with each other, 
my methods in studying the cooperatives’ office-based administrators and the agricultural 
workers (worker-members and ‘daily’ members (see 1.2.1) evolved as I became more aware 
of how their relationships were constituted as a two-tiered system. Pursuing the emergent 
issue of these different groups of informants’ social situatedness required different 
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methodological approaches, which ultimately showed a multiplicity of differentiating social 
factors: class (by and large middle-class/working-class), location (urban/rural), 
generation/age difference (administrators much younger, by a median of 12 years), family 
responsibilities (most administrators were unmarried and had no children, while manual 
workers were married with children), gender (the manual workforce team was composed of 
men only). This is also one of the reasons why I explored people’s wider social networks 
outside the cooperative context, as described above.  
The other way in which I went outside the cooperative context was to follow the 
other livelihood activities of the manual agricultural workers (members and non members, 
i.e. the ‘daily workers’). This entailed visits to homes, work in their private land plots and 
spending leisure time in cafés. In the summer months, I also formed focus groups and 
conducted participant observation among a number of young volunteers from Northern 
Italy, who participated in the harvest of the cooperatives joining a volunteer work service 
programme organised by Libera.  
Participant observation involved sharing my time between the office and vineyards 
of the Falcone and Borsellino, voluntarily working as ‘an unpaid pen-pusher and a bracciante 
in the same working day,’ as local member-worker Enzo pointed out. However, this intense 
experience of combining the two types of work participation ‘in the same working day’ was 
mainly during the harvest season.  
Rushing from the fields to the office became my routine in periods of the 
agricultural cycle that demanded intensive work in the plots: after an 8-hour shift in the 
vineyard starting around 6 a.m., I would then get to the offices for my afternoon ‘rota’, 
staying for a few hours, usually from 2 to 5 pm. The offices (as noted, shared by the two 
cooperatives) were the site of my participant observation of the lives of the coop 
administrators’ work. Following my research interlocutors in their day-to-day work during 
these periods required meticulously planned strategies of coordination, waking up at 5.30 
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am, waiting to be fetched by a local worker’s car (Adamo’s, Fano’s or Tano’s), travelling to 
the fields and then engaging in manual labour. When there was no need for agricultural 
work, I visited the administrative offices every day, and stayed through the members’ eight-
hour shifts. I interviewed interlocutors, gave a hand with administrative work, or simply 
spent time around people working or visiting there – and often departed for other places or 
meetings, with the car of the Falcone cooperative, accompanying a member.  
The bulk of participant observation among the manual workforce involved work in 
the vineyards alongside the cooperatives’ worker-members and daily workers. Among the 
Alto Belice locals, most of my informants were local peasants, with very modest 
livelihoods. Agricultural production, especially viticulture (mainly Sicilian white varieties), is 
the main source of income for most households. I followed workers during the agricultural 
cycle, doing work such as spraying, caring and watering the vines, and eventually harvesting 
their grapes; I also followed some in their private plots and homes. The harvest demanded 
particularly intensive work; it was then that the entire manual workforce (member-workers 
and daily workers was deployed), from mid August to early October. Working the soil on 
the confiscated land was a satisfying endeavour, which provided insights into people’s 
experience of the labour process, as well as their views on how working for the 
cooperatives was a meaningful and moral activity.  
Therefore, most empirical data informing this thesis’ arguments about relatedness 
(Chapter 4), livelihoods composed by employment and income opportunities (Chapter 5), 
moralities and attitudes to land (Chapter 6) and local gossip (Chapter 7) comes from liaising 
with cooperatives’ manual labourers on a daily basis, at work and leisure (cafés). I also 
recorded the life stories of some local workers, such as Enzo, Adamo and Giuseppe.  
Coming back to the first group of research informants (as identified in 1.2.1), 
Because lawyers, NGO activists, Consortium agents and policymakers all informed the 
project of the confiscations and distribution of land, I learned, interviewing them, about 
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their ideas on ‘community’ and ‘justice’. These interviews provided the material needed to 
explore state ideologies of community (often referred to as collettività, ‘collectivity50), 
integrated into cooperativism, as well as to examine the ‘extraordinary’ legal measures to 
tackle mafia. (The bulk of the tape-recorded material I gathered came from Consortium 
administrators and lawyers. Interviews with these people inform the thesis throughout, 
especially regarding ideologies of and the state actors’ different views on the mafia and 
antimafia change.) 
Regarding law, landed property and ownership (Chapter 6), a significant source of 
data was official and legal paperwork produced by the Consortium, the cooperatives and 
the Courts of Justice. Plot maps and confiscation documents, as well as legal ownership 
documentation from the Italian Cadastre offered a rich source of material that I integrated 
into my ethnographic narrative. For much of this archival work I drew on my experience as 
a lawyer, particularly as regards scrutinising court hearings and rulings as well as property 
documents. The state archival material is particularly illuminating concerning the stories 
inscribed in their records, as anthropologists have suggested (Tarlo 2000; Hamilton et al. 
2002). In my case, tracing the legal property titles of some confiscated assets revealed 
histories of people to whom mafiosi had had assets registered as straw people; I traced some 
of these cases back to the real people behind the names on paper. This opened the research 
to fascinating stories that informed my scrutiny of ‘moral ownerships’ in 6.2.  
Although what constitutes a ‘mafioso’ is legally defined (Article 416bis, Italian 
Criminal Code), mafia activity rests on certain degrees of social consensus. Therefore, just 
as the term ‘political economy’ cannot contain what happens on the ground regarding the 
coops’ economic activity, similarly ‘mafia’ is a far more complex condition than the term 
                                                 
50 In the context of these communications, the terms communità and collettività were often used interchangeably 
but interlocutors clarified when I asked. Colletività had a more encompassing meaning, projecting the 
cooperative’s endeavour on a national scale – thus presenting Alto Belice as a paradigmatic community for 
antimafia in Italy at large.  
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‘mafia-related crime’ entails, demanding a multidisciplinary approach, for which my 
background in law was useful. In this regard, accessing these documents and the juridico-
political discourse about them was as valid for my anthropological research as observing 
how their implementation influenced the everyday realities of informants. Especially with 
regard to change in property statuses, a vast literature in anthropology reads in legal 
documentation the disputes and fissures among people on the ground (for instance Davis 
1973; Mundy 2002; 2007). In contemporary Sicily, both in legal paperwork and on the soil 
of the vineyards, the lines between state activity and the agency of the family, as well as 
between policy and what constitutes kinship, become blurred, in a constant interaction 
between lived experience and legal categorisation. While the Consortium’s and the 109/96 
law’s redistribution policies have materially contributed to positive change in people’s 
livelihoods, they have also presented locals with a series of intricate responsibilities, which 
potentially undermine the fixity of land property statuses after the confiscations. As an 
anthropologist who has undergone legal training, I traced these intricacies from land to law 
and back, paying attention to people’s experiences. 
  
Photo 6: Member-workers (the four men in the 
foreground) and volunteers (the younger people in 
the background) of the Borsellino during lunch break 
in the vineyards of Castello, during harvest, in 
August. At the front: Niki, Peppe, Ciccio, and 
Donato. 
Photo 7: Two members of the Falcone 
cooperative in the Cento winery: Enzo and 
Paolo; they are cousins and come from the same 
village, Rocca. 
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1.4. Ethics and Positionality: Informed Consent, Confidentiality, Safety 
and Reciprocity 
Research among people struggling against the mafia posed a number of ethical issues 
before, during and after fieldwork. I originally handed a personal declaration to the three 
cooperatives’ presidents, stating that all information gathered was to be totally confidential, 
masked behind careful layers of anonymity in my thesis and in any articles that would stem 
from my research. To the best of my abilities, I gave the same assurance, orally, with each 
person I came into first contact with. My emphasis on how I had to change all names of 
people, places and organisations, however, provoked curiosity rather than ease among 
many interlocutors. 
In fact, it was in relation to confidentiality that I first glimpsed how the two-tiered 
organisation of the cooperatives reflected differentiated ethics (moralities). Seeking to 
organise my methodology to accommodate the intricacies of the cooperatives’ division of 
labour in terms of ethics, required some telling manoeuvres. (As noted, methods and 
argumentation converge). The administration members could not grasp why I wanted to be 
so ‘secretive’ when their remit was all about publicity and transparency. Some explained to 
me that not anonymising posed no dangers to them, as they had already been exposed 
quite extensively to the local society, and even on a national scale. In fact, some saw my 
research as another channel of publicity. For them, publicly ‘naming’ mafiosi as well as 
publicising names of antimafia activists was part of their antimafia activism.  
The manual workforce, on the other hand, living in Alto Belice, took a different 
stance. They were careful to remind me that what they shared with me could be publicised 
‘anywhere I wanted but Sicily’. Tano for instance told me, that ‘as long as it remains in the 
limits of my village and my island, I want you to be cautious’. I followed this advice and 
managed to act according to the needs of different informants. These contradictions posed 
severe ethical issues for my research but I followed the confidentiality protocols suggested 
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for anthropological fieldwork, not revealing interlocutors’ identities and protecting them 
from each other (Caplan 2003; Edel and Edel 2000). This was particularly significant, given 
that I met a few mafiosi while doing fieldwork, whose names I also altered for the thesis (but 
not those currently imprisoned for life). 
People’s ideas on safety thus echoed the cooperatives’ internal division between the 
administration/office-based/Palermitan team and the agricultural/fields-based/local team. 
As I was not a local, most villagers who were not connected to the cooperatives thought I 
was a new member of the administration team of a cooperative. My first impression was 
that this could entail risks. Initially, feeling in danger was a prominent emotional state for 
me: I spent the first months of fieldwork worrying about mafia intimidation, always 
carrying with me a USB with all my notes, naively fearing that someone would break into 
my house. As with confidentiality, and in relation to it, I initially projected ideas on safety 
(informed by my anthropological training) onto my relationships with locals. A few months 
into the fieldwork process, the more I acknowledged that often ‘mafia’ and antimafia were 
interwoven in San Giovanni, the more I realised that my disquiet was groundless: there was 
no reason to believe that local mafiosi wished to harm me or my interlocutors. There had 
been hardly any violent or threatening activities against cooperative members.  
Notions of danger and safety were contested issues in the field, on the relative 
safety of interlocutors and anthropologist sometimes conflicted. For instance, Adamo, a 
40-year-old agricultural member-worker of Falcone from San Giovanni, commented on my 
unwillingness to meet a mafioso recently out of prison, calling me ‘a pussy and a fake 
anthropologist,’ suggesting that ‘a real man and a proper anthropologist should be into this 
kind of stuff’. The mafioso was a friend of his; Adamo insisted I meet him. For Adamo, the 
danger in this case was if the office-based administrators found out about our dealings, as 
this could have had consequences for his position as a member of the cooperative (see 
Chapter 7). I felt I had to find a balance between the danger of being challenged by his 
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perceptions of what constituted a ‘real man’ and a ‘real anthropologist’ and the danger of 
being discovered by members of the office team as someone who had relations with ‘the 
mafia’. I opted for the first danger, and met the mafioso.  
Some days after I had met the man and interviewed him, 31-year-old Marelio, an 
administrative member of Falcone, called me in. He had overheard me talking on the 
phone and suspected I had dealings with mafiosi. Finding this situation dangerous, he asked 
for details. I clarified that I could not share information with him, in order to protect 
informants by not revealing who says what to me. He commented that I was buying into 
omertà, the dangerous ethics of the mafia code of silence. He therefore identified what 
anthropologists perceive as ethical behaviour, with mafia morality. Silvio, the 34-year-old 
president of Borsellino, an administrator as well, heard through local gossip about my 
contact with Adamo and the mafioso. He thought my contacts with ‘the mafia’ put me in 
danger and suggested disciplining the person whom he suspected had led me to establish 
bridges between ‘the cooperative and the mafia’. This was the danger Adamo had 
mentioned, as it imperilled his job. Thankfully, he was never disciplined. 
This event elucidates the subtle ethical challenges I faced during fieldwork. Codes 
of conduct were informed by the cooperative distribution of labour (influenced by people’s 
class and other background), revealing the often contradictory morals that separated 
colleagues in the cooperative, divided across distribution of labour, personal background, 
participation in local kinship and friendship networks. It also shows the relationality of my 
research position: contingent to each specific relationship I established with people. In the 
background is the heavily gendered nature of my fieldwork, as ‘being a man’ was 
understood as a performed pattern of behaviour that I had to live up to in order to fulfil 
expectations some interlocutors had from me. Episodes like this allowed me to reflect on 
my gendered position in the field and on how the, arguably rigid, ethics of anthropological 
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fieldwork often contrast indigenous ideas about respectability, as the fact that 
confidentiality was glossed as ‘omertà’ shows. 
The effects of such reflexivity, triggered by my interaction with locals, touched on 
other issues of research positionality. The much discussed issue of the anthropological 
researcher’s ‘privileged’ position vis-à-vis their research participants only partly applied to 
my case. My physical features, knowledge of Italian popular culture and literature,51 non-
suggestive accent, and relative experience in agrarian work, even led many locals, when 
meeting me for the first time, to treat me as a Sicilian visitor to the area. My (basic level) 
knowledge of the Sicilian dialect, dubbed a language in itself by most locals, was also an 
asset. However, when a conversation moved from Italian to Sicilian, interlocutors 
immediately realised I was not from the island, which then often became the object of 
jokes and sarcasm.52 My degree of familiarity shaped most of my initial interactions with 
interlocutors, from ‘extreme’ cases where some informants joked that I must have Sicilian 
origins and even felt that my being Greek confirmed this to the majority of interlocutors 
who, while appreciating my facility in relevant matters, eagerly insisted on the uniqueness 
of Sicily as a cultural hybrid formed of centuries-old distillations of cultures. However, for 
most, ‘the Hellenic aspect’ shone above other facets: Sicilians were ‘Greeks who had 
become Italians’.  
These (perhaps essentialist) accounts worked in most cases to my benefit, as I 
gained people’s trust, which allowed me access to their lived spaces. Many locals were 
                                                 
51 My stay as an Erasmus exchange student at Rome’s LUISS (Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi 
Sociali) university during 2002 had familiarised me with such particularities of life in Italy; my previous visits 
to Sicily had familiarised me with details ranging from local trattorie to names of mafia clans. Finally, my 
engagement with translations of contemporary Italian poetry added an insight into a field many people 
appreciated. Villagers discussed with me anything from D’Annunzio’s verse to  perceptions of Berlusconi 
abroad. 
52 It is worth noting that the bilingual environment of my fieldwork research implied different, class-informed 
registers of language: the Palermitan administrators spoke ‘proper’ Italian, whilst the local workers spoke in 
dialect. I acknowledge this in my translations, opting for colloquial words to transmit some of the ‘colour’ of 
Sicilian but also to underline how language reflects class in cooperatives.  
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intrigued by the presence of ‘the Greek’ among them, and some identified similarities 
between Sicily and Greece: the two regions were, allegedly, ‘insular’, relatively impoverished 
and ‘corrupt’ peripheries of a nonetheless historically rich European ‘South’. Although this 
relationship was sometimes uncomfortable, partially accepting these labels won the trust of 
many people, as they saw in me someone from a background no more privileged than 
theirs, especially when I explained that I was raised in a rural area where viticulture was the 
way most people made their living. During participant observation in the vineyards, this 
personal background was particularly appreciated by co-workers.  
The gendered aspect of this assimilation, however, had counter-productive effects; 
despite the fact that (or possibly because) I looked like many locals, my status as an 
unmarried young man in the village did not help in gaining access to households where 
young women lived. This problem was somewhat alleviated with time, especially when a 
female friend visited me in the field. This gave me the reputation of being engaged, which I 
confirmed when asked. Nevertheless, I never managed to enter the homes of most of my 
interlocutors. This biased my research, as the data gathered from spending time with 
female research participants, usually housewives, could have been richer and wider 
otherwise.53 
These issues also conditioned my ways of reciprocating towards my research 
participants, to bring back to them a sense of the research achievements and returning 
some of their trust. Cigarettes and liquor from Greece became popular among agrarian 
workers of the cooperatives. When I had to meet people outside the work context but, for 
reasons mentioned above, not in their homes, I made sure I treated them to drinks or a 
meal, although this proved, in a couple of cases, to violate their own principles of 
                                                 
53 Women, in San Giovanni and Alto Belice at large, rarely work outside the household, and most definitely 
never in the fields, as I discuss in Chapters 5 and 6. Gendered issues defined the local political economy in 
and around the cooperatives; drawing from the admittedly often gender-informed data, I aim to elucidate this 
facet of people’s livelihoods in the ethnography. 
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hospitality, which I eventually opted to prioritise. Another contribution I managed to offer 
was English lessons to some coop members, particularly the president of the Falcone 
cooperative, Luca. He enthusiastically asked me to help him, as he thought English skills 
were valuable for the cooperative’s development, now that they had started, in a modest 
way, to export to niche markets in Germany. These intensive language classes helped create 
a bond early on. Some cooperative members commented that, while, as a researcher, I 
aimed to being ‘taught’ by Luca, I ended up teaching him: this reciprocity reinforced the 
inter-subjectivity of the ethnographic experience.  
It is important to note that most interlocutors saw my presence in the village as a 
‘success of the antimafia’. Fifteen years ago, I was told, this research would have been 
impossible, as I probably would have been assassinated. I am aware that this was proof, for 
many people, of the change the cooperatives had brought about. In this respect at least, 
intentions and outcomes of action were identical. Peppe, a young research interlocutor, 
insightfully remarked that ‘you are the answer to your research question,’ meaning that my 
very safe presence in the field was already proof that Sicily had changed immensely. This 
thesis describes, analyses and problematises this change. 
1.5. Thesis Overview (Description of Chapters) 
Chapter 2 locates my thesis within the relevant literature, identifying sources that 
influenced my analysis. Firstly, I discuss debates on mafia and antimafia, proposing that 
mafia has always been entrepreneurial and that analysis of the recent antimafia movement’s 
responses should be focused on livelihoods, rather than on civil society politics, so central 
to existing research. Following the lead of economic anthropology in rejecting the idea of 
‘the economy’ as an autonomous sphere, I examine ‘cooperativism’ as a notion that has 
been open to interpretation related to members’ moralities. Different, contradictory 
political ideologies, and corporatist and radical processes alike, have influenced 
cooperativism. My work discusses how the economic and political systems (markets and 
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states) in which cooperatives integrate, inform their internal divisions of labour, focusing 
on diverse ethics and practices. I discuss how anthropologists have approached the state 
and law, especially in relation to the separation of work from home, as it has been central 
to conceptualising cooperativism. Noting discussions on the state as ‘imagined’, sensu 
Anderson, I also pay attention to the tangible, grounded consequences of state activity; 
following Ferguson and Scott, I consider both intended and unintentional results. Land and 
law being central to conceptualisations of the state, I also discuss how anthropology has 
understood land as property. As debates about property often discuss states in transition, I 
address literature looking at change at state level, while also stressing distinctions between 
‘mythical’ and ‘jural’ land categories.  
Chapter 3 historicises the relationships among mafia, the state, and the peasant 
movement in Alto Belice. A historical ethnography of local struggles for land and 
cooperativism, useful to conceptualise the continuities and transformations of agents and 
practices, it offers the background to current events. The key concept is the dynamic 
configurations among state, mafia, local forms of cooperativism and antimafia struggle. I 
analyse processes that gave rise to the antimafia movement, arguing that Sicilian 
cooperativism developed incorporating antimafia ideology and practice. Like Anderson’s 
nationalism, cooperativism is a modular notion, acquiring various meanings according to 
different historical circumstances. In Alto Belice, its dynamic relationship to the law was 
expressed in ‘revolutionary legality’. A history of local struggles for access to land and 
markets entailed, by and large, two modes of organisation of the local peasantry and 
different mafiosi practices (from patronage to brokerage). Firstly, before the agrarian reform 
of 1953, the landless peasants’ struggle focused on claiming land and involved land 
occupations and the formation of ‘revolutionary legalist’ cooperatives, aimed against the 
latifundo system, landlords and their mafiosi middlemen, the gabellotti, who orchestrated the 
1947 Portella della Ginestra massacre. Secondly, after the land reform, when most local 
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peasants became smallholders, their focus of struggle became gaining access to markets. 
The peasant movement organised new cooperative models (wineries), relevant to this day, 
to avoid a new form of mafia: the senzali, brokers who controlled produce price, grapes 
specifically. Contemporary antimafia cooperatives, influenced by both workers’ and 
producers’ cooperativism have taken on board this history in selective ways.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the ways cooperative members were recruited, making three 
arguments: different ideas of relatedness granted people access to work in the cooperatives; 
these were expressed in different idioms (raccomandazioni and networking), conveying 
different approaches and often transforming local kinship ideas; distinct spheres of 
relatedness formed through this process in the cooperatives. Across the coops’ labour 
division, the administrators rejected kinship-based recruitment, arguing it cannot elude 
mafia-bound local relationships. Reflecting ideas of the Consortium, they promoted 
political alliances organised around networking, forming what they called meritocracy-
centred ‘virtuous circles’, which constituted, as I argue using Bourdieu, non-kinship 
relatedness. Conversely, manual labourers used kinship-based raccomandazioni 
(recommendations) to hire new people. This local code transformed established ideas of 
kinship, blurring boundaries between home and work, to produce ‘antimafia families’. Each 
recruitment idiom was used by one group only, forming relations among equals of similar 
class and origin backgrounds. While they each contributed to the making of the 
cooperatives in complementary ways, there was no communication between these spheres 
of relatedness. Horizontal relations in the cooperatives became problematic. When 
administrators attempt to appropriate the raccomandazioni idiom, workers rejected the 
‘political’ raccomandazioni as immoral patronage. Following this finding, I propose new 
approaches to patronage. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the livelihoods of local cooperative workers and their 
families. It examines practices making up families’ income, alongside changes that the 
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cooperatives brought about. The key idea is that locals pursued their livelihoods not only 
inside the cooperatives’ regulated employment framework but also outside it. This chapter 
juxtaposes local workers’ participation in the new regime of cooperative waged work 
(which, as noted at the very start of the thesis, was a breakthrough locally) with their 
continuing engagement with two practices: land registration to women and a ‘mutual aid’ 
system of exchanging informal work. These continuities do not imply static repetition of 
‘tradition’. Registering land to wives acquired new meanings after men were employed by 
the cooperatives, becoming a tool to claim unemployment benefits. I argue that, ironically, 
the employment ‘standardisation’ that antimafia cooperatives introduced served to 
reinforce an informal income-seeking practice, which in fact stemmed from mafia ethics. 
Furthermore, alongside their employment by the cooperatives, local men continued to 
exchange informal labour for money. The cooperatives took a part in tracking down this 
illicit practice and penalising local peasants. I discuss how peasants’ political mobilisations 
‘against the state’ incorporated demands  to de-penalise their ‘mutual aid’ practice, and also 
how mafiosi tapped in to the situation, promoting the idea that the practice was part of the 
local ‘way of life’ that antimafia activists were trying to eliminate. Formal waged 
employment, household strategies and informal work are thus interwoven to show how the 
cooperatives’ employment co-articulated with contested local informal livelihood practices.  
Chapter 6 looks at Alto Belice land plots. The main argument is that the 
interaction between one system of value, codified in jural landed property, and local values, 
based on a notion of  ‘moral ownership’, informed the social arrangements around the 
plots. I firstly examine changes in the legal status of land as property, arguing that 
lawmakers incorporated local ‘kinship’ categories (family, clan) and assumptions about 
gender and genealogy into the legal categorisation of property. These assumptions, legally 
reified in the context of confiscating mafia land left non-confiscated mafia plots (familiari) 
in uncomfortable proximity with cooperative-’owned’ plots, which often shared a common 
62 
 
boundary. Administrators saw, in the boundaries of the confiscated plots, the borders of 
the ‘moral universe’ of antimafia. By contrast, most locals recognised degrees of moral 
ownership (a flexible notion, reflecting Abramson’s idea on ‘mythical land’) accorded to the 
mafiosi past land proprietors, drawing on different values (neighbourliness, gender) to 
contest the consequences of the jural re-categorising of property. Workers’ allegiance to 
moral ownership and the continuing practices of plot neighbours distressed administrators. 
The chapter shows the unintended, contradictory results produced by state activity: aiming 
to dissociate mafiosi from the cooperatives, the law actually produced proximities that 
brought them closer.  
Chapter 7 examines the interactions cooperative administrators had with locals in 
San Giovanni. I argue that gossip was used by administrators and by others (locals and the 
police) to monitor points of intersection between mafia and antimafia. Intercepting the 
flows of informal information locally, the administrative cooperative members kept a 
surveillance watch, identifying their potential local allies but also policing their fellow – 
local – coop worker-members to ward against the ‘contaminating’ threat of mafia contact. 
In treating gossip as a resource, administrators were appropriating a local code in order to 
protect the cooperatives from the local community. ‘Gossiping’ – the exchange of rumours, 
the narrative performance of stories – was an established local practice in which local men 
circulated ideas and news and positioned themselves vis-à-vis others, participated in by 
people as different as barmen, policemen and mafiosi. For coop administrators, tapping into 
gossip was a means to police the ‘moral borders’ of the cooperative, an idea put forward in 
Chapter 6 and extended here from land to discourse. The most significant gossip for the 
administrators was about the chain of gossip itself: who was talking with whom, which I 
look at in terms of gossip as meta-talk, talk about talk. If cooperative members talked with 
mafiosi or with those close to them, they were liable to being ousted from the cooperatives. 
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Moreover, some locals utilised rumours about them and shifted from mafia to antimafia 
stances.  
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Chapter 2   
Cooperatives, the State, Land, Mafia and Antimafia: 
Theoretical Debates and Contributions 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the literature from current economic and political anthropology 
and other social sciences on the themes salient to my work: the mafia/antimafia 
relationship, cooperatives and – through them – the state/law and land. The aim is to 
delineate the key theoretical issues presented in the ethnographic discussion. For other 
themes that arise in the ethnography, alluded to in this chapter (relatedness, patronage, 
kinship and the law, livelihoods, and reputation), I weave theoretical reflections into each 
chapter’s narrative. The present chapter locates the thesis in relation to the current state of 
play of the discipline, acknowledging wider discussions for which there is no scope to 
expand in the ethnography.  
Exploring cooperatives highlights interactions with legal and local value systems. I 
emphasise the ideological processes that inform cooperatives’ internal divisions of labour, 
locating the sources of these ideologies often in structures external to them, and 
emphasising the different morals of their workforces. As cooperatives interact with 
legislation and often develop partially as state projects (as in Alto Belice), I present aspects 
of the relevant literature on law and the state. Then, I go on to examine property, the 
state’s way of categorising land, the main resource at stake in Alto Belice cooperatives, 
identifying the ruptures that antimafia property legislation brought about.  
The heart of this thesis is an analysis of political cooperativism, especially in its 
relation to the state and to people’s livelihoods. The antimafia cooperatives, however, have 
emerged in a very specific configuration of tensions between state and mafia power. They 
have been endowed with the mission to affirm state power over Alto Belice and, precisely 
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for this reason, were bestowed with land that the state had confiscated from mafiosi. As 
explained in the next chapter, historically the relationship of state and mafia throughout the 
20th century has been more often one of connivance and collusion than of conflict. Chapter 
1 has already located the historical specificity of the rise of the antimafia cooperatives in 
terms of the shift in state policy towards radical antimafia intervention in the early to mid-
1990s, which underlies the specifics of this unique cooperativist endeavour. Hence, this 
chapter begins with a theoretical discussion that seeks – albeit through a somewhat oblique 
approach – to elucidate the development of mafia and the political counter-responses to it, 
which have taken a variety of forms including but by no means limited to the burst of 
antimafia activism in the 1990s. 
2.1. Mafia and Antimafia: Tradition, Change and Livelihoods 
Rather than focusing centrally on the mafia, this thesis explores the social arrangements of 
a project of social transformation in a changing Sicily (Davis 1996). Contemporary Sicily, 
undergoing changes influenced by the mix of mobilisations dubbed ‘the antimafia 
movement’ (Jamieson 2000; Orlando 2003; Santino 2000; Schneider and Schneider 2002b; 
2003), is an ideal site to explore how this social–political ‘experiment’ relates to continuity 
and change, a central concern of anthropological enquiry (Bloch 1989: 132). In Chapter 3, I 
locate this question in historical time (Fabian 2002; Kalb and Tak 2006), exploring how the 
historical interrelationship of mafia and antimafia has been negotiated in contemporary 
Sicily, in the context of the island’s ongoing experience of decades of continual change 
(Schneider and Schneider 2006). 
Engaging with social change has been problematic for anthropologists as well as for 
geographers and historians of the region. There has been much debunking of the way that 
‘the Mediterranean’ has been constructed as an ethnographic and geographical region 
characterised by stasis, whether of social structures or moral discourses (Goddard et al. 
1994a and 1994b): broadly, the survival of ‘tradition’. Some critiques focus on the way 
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gendered identities and kinship relations are portrayed in terms of a stagnant continuity 
with the past (Goddard 2000), while others have tackled the conventional geographical 
depiction of the Mediterranean as a region unified through the association of patronage 
with ‘tradition’ (Kockel et al. 2012a and b; Stacul et al. 2006). The idea of ‘honour’, as a 
distinctive mafia tradition (Blok 1981; Falcone 1993; Calderone and Arlacchi 1993; Gilmore 
1987), has been challenged by historians in accounting for change (Bell 2007). Related to 
the critique of assumptions about the persistence of an immobile, change-resistant, world 
of ‘tradition’, anthropologists have also questioned the essentialising of Sicily in much 
literature and ethnology (Blim 1998; Saunders 1998; cf. Whyte 1944). 
This is the context in which the theme of mafia was long located, associated with 
the reinforcing of the idea of ‘tradition’ in Sicily. Attempts to reorient this intellectual 
project notably include the ethnographic work of Blok, and Schneider and Schneider, who 
have proposed dynamic historical explanatory schemes that account for continuity and 
change in ways that re-situate perceived ideas of tradition. Blok (1974) focused attention on 
configurations of different levels of power, while Schneider and Schneider (1976) called 
upon world-systems theory to understand the mafia as itself undergoing constant 
‘transformative experience’ (1999), meanwhile focusing on ‘cultural codes’ where the 
meaning of change is figured in relation to (not temporal but social) continuities in values 
(1976: 81). I take up this idea to denote continuities of local codes with antimafia rather than 
mafia values, but also to position certain local practices in the context of dynamic activities. 
I also build on Schneider and Schneider’s use of the notion of ‘broker capitalism’ (1976: 
160) to explore the dual position of Alto Belice mafiosi as longstanding patrons and 
subsequently brokers. 
Some aspects of the ‘tradition’ problem are rooted in Banfield’s ‘modernisation’ 
paradigm, presented as a critique of ‘familism’ (Banfield 1958). This approach has had an 
enduring, albeit implicit, influence on the sociology of Sicily and Southern European 
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societies at large. In Alto Belice, the Consortium employed a strict rhetoric and practice 
suspicious of continuities with local relations, thought of as primordial. In building the 
cooperatives, it appears that there was a political aversion towards kinship, understood as 
part of a problematic tradition linked to mafia (although, as my ethnography will show, 
antimafia cooperativism did converge with family structures). In this vein, historians and 
anthropologists have argued that the mafia rose through Sicily’s dislocated route towards 
modernisation (Blok 2000; Schneider and Schneider 2003; Dickie 2004; Lupo 1993; 2011).  
Classic Sicilian authors themselves present fatalistic, albeit complex, views of the 
island’s population. Giovanni Falcone felt he was ‘an instrument of the State in a terra 
infidelium’ (1991: 9), adding that ‘the culture of death does not solely belong to the mafia: all 
of Sicily is impregnated with it’ (1992: 73). Literary works also associate Sicily with impeded 
social change and inertia, often resorting to essentialisms. Sciascia (1996) saw the 
playwright Pirandello and ‘pirandelism’ as a metaphor for Sicily; his own writings on the 
mafia are pessimistic about the possibility of change (1979). Tellingly, the most cited phrase 
in modern European literature regarding fin-de-siècle Sicily’s capacity for historical change 
comes from Tomasi di Lampedusa’s Sicilian masterpiece The Leopard: ‘everything must 
change so that everything can stay the same’ (‘se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com’è, bisogna che tutto 
cambi’, 2010: 23). My fieldwork illuminated this maxim, which I had originally resisted, 
convincing me that it has some degree of validity.  
Legal theorists and historians have described mafia as Sicily’s ‘most enduring 
problem’ (Finley et al. 1987: xi; Turone 2008: 36). Most themes of ethnographic research in 
Sicily coincide with mafia: gender and honour (Blok 2000), brokerage and cultural codes 
(Schneider and Schneider 1976), reproduction and class (Schneider and Schneider 1996), 
land ownership and violence (Blok 1974), friendship (Boissevain 1965), politics (Chubb 
1982 and 1989; Dolci 1968; cf. Dolci 2007), immigration (Cole 1997; Lane 2010), gender 
(Dino 2006), ‘cultural values and codes’ (Gambetta 2009), social consensus (Dino 2011).  
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The fact that such diverse research converges around mafia indicates not simply its 
relevance across many fields of Sicilian social life but, rather, that the mafia orchestrates 
something close to a system of ‘total services’ (sensu Mauss 2002: 7), as it encompasses such 
a wide range of social life. Moreover, Sicily is referenced as the prototypical case for 
comparative studies of emerging forms of organised crime elsewhere, drawing analogies 
with Cosa Nostra (Allum and Siebert 2003; Glenny 2009; Varese 2006; 2011). The island 
and the mafia have been linked as an archetype for academic researchers as well as for lay 
people: Sicily is ‘mafia’s locus classicus’. 
But what is the mafia? The notion itself has not attracted recent anthropological 
interest. Earlier anthropological work focused on the social relations and cultural 
associations of people associated with the mafia rather than providing a strict definition of 
the mafia itself (see, for instance, Blok 1974 and 2000), an emphasis that is followed in this 
thesis as well. On the other hand, sociologists have attempted to grapple with the concept, 
principally by underlining the distinctiveness of mafia vis-à-vis organised crime in other 
contexts (Santino 1997; cf. Hill 2006). Sociologists have both drawn from legal theory and 
inspired it: the distinction is crystallised in the Italian Criminal Code (art 416, paragraphs 1, 
2). Article 416 bis (Paragraph 3), arguably the most debated article of the Code, defines a 
mafia association in the following terms: 
Mafia-type unlawful association is said to exist when the participants take advantage of the 
intimidating power of the association and of the resulting conditions of submission and 
silence [omertà] to commit criminal offences, to manage or in any way control, either 
directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorizations, public contracts and 
services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for any other 
persons... (cited in Turone n.d.) 
This is the most convincing definition to date of what makes an organised crime 
group the mafia; it is significant that this is endorsed by the Criminal Code. It stands largely 
as the interdisciplinary interaction of work in both legal theory and sociology.  Mafia, in 
Santino’s sociological analysis, is defined as at once a network and an organisation, 
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employing a set of welfare and of coercion practices (2006; 2007). The relationship 
between force and consensus in the making of mafia’s power is widely discussed as a 
historical tension between strategies of intimidation and consent-acquisition that mould 
communities’ relative adaptation to and collaboration with mafiosi practices (Schneider and 
Schneider 2003; Santino 2005). 
In this thesis, I shall treat this definition as a starting point, while paying attention 
to the implications of anthropological analysis, which, would treat the term mafia1 as 
descriptive of both a structured organisation and of a hub of networks that pursues 
intimidatory activity by controlling a territory, i.e. drawing on a degree of social consensus 
in a specific locality; (and San Giovanni provides an excellent example). 
Mafia’s peculiar capacity for and power of intimidation (Turone 2008), distinct 
from that of organised crime, implies the enduring organisation of efficient capitalist 
entrepreneurship that mobilises local networks, as well as the exercise of coercion. Some 
theorists have acknowledged this entrepreneurial spirit as a break with ‘tradition’, while 
others (Lupo 2010) saw mafia’s entrepreneurship as an element that renders the 
organisation as an essentially modern phenomenon.  
 
Arlacchi’s classic monograph (1986) identified a ‘mafia spirit of capitalism’ rising in 
the 1980s (see also Arlacchi 2007). Before this, he argued, mafia activity had been 
‘primordial’, developed on ‘agrarian’ and ‘archaic’ bases: the convergence between honour 
and wealth sparked a ‘new’ mafia (Arlacchi 1983: 120; Hobsbawm 1965). Influenced by this 
definition of a modernised, capitalist mafia, some authors drew on theories of ‘social 
                                                 
1 The first use of the term ‘mafia’ is in 1864, in the play I mafiusi de la Vicaria. The Sicilian early anthropologist 
Giuseppe Pitrè (1841-1916) was the first to point this out. It is generally agreed that the mafia is as modern as 
the Italian state (Dickie 2004). The mafia rose with the Risorgimento in the 1860s, developed with land-
overseers such as the gabeloti, and established itself throughout Sicilian 20th century history (see chapter 3), 
eventually as the Cosa Nostra, whose entrepreneurial peak (the time it achieved the highest levels of profit 
and influence), was in the 1980s-1990s through international heroin trafficking.  
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capital’, inspired by Putnam’s account of the lack of civic traditions in Southern Italy 
(1993), to analyse this ‘new’, entrepreneurial, Cosa Nostra filling gaps of ‘trust’ (Gambetta 
1996; Allum 2006; Gunnarson 2008; but see Sciarrone’s critique, drawing on mafia’s 
historical dynamism, 2009: 45). 
Interrogating the theme of mafia entrepreneurialism, some Sicilian economists and 
sociologists linked it to ‘regional underdevelopment’ (Centorrino et al. 1999: 37), often 
connected to its effects on speculative capitalism (Fantò 1999). Thus the ‘parasitical’ mafia, 
through racketeering, drives out legitimate investors (Centorrino et al. 2003). Mafia’s 
‘unsustainable development’ combines financialisation with a ‘reserve army of criminals’ to 
accumulate resources (Perna 1994). Thus, to live in the land of mafia offers the strange 
privilege of experiencing the ‘obscure origin’ of wealth in the capitalist process (Saviano 
2007: 17). These perspectives stress the coexistence of tradition and transformation in the 
changing shape of mafia activity, nuancing Arlacchi’s original point. With the mafia 
reconceptualised as constantly undergoing change (Paoli 2003; Dino 2002; but see Pizzini 
Gambetta 2006), the antimafia movement has itself responded in terms of constant 
transformation (Santino 2000; 2007). 
Lupo disagrees with Arlacchi’s emphasis on a sudden mafia modernisation, noting 
that mafiosi were active members of the Sicilian bourgeoisie, leading cosmopolitan lifestyles: 
Don Calò Vizzini reportedly took part in international meetings of the sulphur mine 
owners’ association in London in the 1920s (Lupo 2011: 8), while mafiosi: 
... were organisers of cooperatives and won much of their power base by serving as 
intermediaries in the transfer of land from the large landowners to the peasants and 
therefore by placing themselves firmly astride the collective movements precisely in 
the post-war years following the first and second world war ... they played a role 
that could not be imagined outside of the great political and social modernisation 
processes of the twentieth century. (2011: 9) 
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Therefore, mafia is part of modernisation, not a hindrance to it, capitalising, for 
instance, on policies such as the 1950s agrarian reform (see 3.2.1). ‘It’ is modern and 
flexible. Santino tackles what he characterises the ‘pseudo-dilemma’ of Cosa Nostra’s 
‘unicity’ or ‘plurality’ (whether it is a monolithic organisation or a network), seeing these as 
integrated concepts (2007: 13). Movement of capital, resources and people constructs this 
integration across organisations and borders, as the mafia’s internal centralisation and 
external fluidity is a relational networking system (Armao 2009: 47). 
Many contemporary authors, then, refuse the depiction of mafia as a symptomatic 
survival of a ‘traditional’ past, proposing, rather, that the mafia bourgeoisie integrated 
Sicilian capitalism into world markets – e.g. the rich Conca d’Oro was the mafia’s cradle in 
the late 19th century (Dickie 2004: 102–06; Santino 1995; 2007). However, Lupo goes 
further, here dissociating his position from that of Arlacchi to reject the 
‘archaic/entrepreneurial’, Old Mafia/New Mafia divide itself as a: 
… naïve, all-inclusive model of modernisation [that] relegates culture, clientele and 
blood family ties to the traditional world, placing in the world of the present 
‘impersonal organisation’, while instead the problem lies in understanding the 
complex interactions that exist, past and present, between the former elements and 
the latter institution. (2011: 23) 
Following Lupo, my work on cooperatives diverges from the simplistic ‘modernisation’ 
paradigm that counterposes ‘tradition’ (kinship) to ‘change’ (law, meritocracy). On the 
contrary, I show that kinship bonds encourage change, while, conversely, transformative 
processes solidify continuities in local codes.  
The role of the state, and the nature of different groups’ engagement with it, has 
been a key aspect of this social change. In Blok’s account, ‘mafia developed ... when the 
modern state superimposed itself on a marginal peasant society which was still largely 
feudal in its basic structures’ (1974: 6–7). More generally, my account of the contemporary 
situation draws on Blok’s account of ‘configurations of power’: 
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The concept of configuration emphasizes the changing patterns of 
interdependencies in which individuals and groups of individuals are involved: both 
as allies and as opponents. The locus of change is not extraneous to the 
configuration. Change evolves from the built-in tensions and polarities between the 
elements that form the configuration. (1974: 9) 
Analysing the interdependencies between antimafia ideology, the peasant movement, 
cooperativism and the state (a configuration, sensu Blok), I focus on the tensions among 
them. The current pattern of configuration is state action against the mafia. While there 
were many complexities involved, in how this came about, briefly it can be said that the 
escalation of mafia violence surpassed the state’s (varying) degrees of tolerance. The state’s 
shift from a de facto policy of collusion to active antimafia intervention thus marks a 
discontinuity in the mid-1990s (see also 3.2.5). For Schneider and Schneider, one factor was 
that the end of the Cold War de-valued Cosa Nostra’s role as a bulwark against 
communism in Sicily (2003: 4). The decline of the DC’s political class, intertwined with 
mafia for decades, was a further factor (Ginsborg 2003b: 201–03). Even so, it is notable 
that the shift to antimafia intervention was anomalous in the 1990s context of neoliberal 
rollback of the state action in Italy and Europe (see also analyses from the USSR, where the 
collapse of the state contributed to mafia expansion (Volkov 2002; Glenny 2009; Varese 
2011)). The Italian state’s move to radical state interventionism thus stands out as 
exceptional within the wider political context the forces of opposition to the mafia had 
been long developing. 
Overall, I aim to challenge the totalising identification of Sicily with the mafia, 
using antimafia cooperatives to discuss change, in a site where consensus with violent 
brokerage and patronage practices of mafiosi has been prominent. Recent accounts 
recognise a history of relatively grassroots dissent to mafia activity (Behan 2008; Moroni 
2010). A number of authors have, since the mid-1990s, identified Sicily as a ‘site of change’, 
reflecting on current processes of social transformation observed when integrating 
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ethnography and history (Davis 1996; 1998; Schneider and Schneider 1996; 2006). 
Constructing new engagements with the state, antimafia cooperatives participants tackle a 
mafia both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, in the configuration of locality and state, reflecting 
on participants’ different ideas. However differentiated, these engagements involve changes 
in material processes, an undertheorised aspect in the discussion on the antimafia.  
The focus on ‘civic education’ and ‘moral reform’ has itself been hegemonic in 
current analyses of the ‘new’ antimafia movement. Schneider and Schneider’s monograph, 
focused on late 1990s Palermo, follows the civil society mobilisation known as ‘the 
Palermitan spring’; ‘educating for legality’ in order to design sound citizens, became the 
antimafia movement’s major contribution to local civic life (Schneider and Schneider 2003: 
260–90). Sociologists prioritised institutional change as the key input to drag society away 
from mafia (Girolamo 2009), while popular mobilisations have been theorised as ways in 
which people manifested their ‘civic duty’ on the streets (Jamieson 2000). Recent culturalist 
approaches promote the idea that ‘the culture of the mafia’ can be eroded through 
educational reform (Gunnarson 2008). Exponents of the ‘new’ antimafia argue for positive 
engagements with the state, starkly differentiated from how the old braccianti saw state 
agents as allies with mafiosi (Arlacchi and Dalla Chiesa 1987). Some of these analyses take 
for granted the mainstream discourses on the separation between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ mafia, 
assuming a modernisation paradigm neatly separating tradition and change. (This is not 
true of Schneider and Schneider’s more nuanced approach (1996; 2003), which underlines 
the issue of class.) 
The conventional argument goes like this: the starting assumption is that the 
‘agrarian roots’ and ‘primordial spirit’ of the old mafia (Arlacchi 1986) configured a rural 
antimafia movement based on ‘livelihoods’. However now, as mafiosi are entrepreneurs in 
their own right, no longer acting as the longa manus of landowners, civic education is the 
focus of antimafia, guided by an enlightened urban ‘civil society’ (Giorgio and Cento Bull 
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2005; Orlando 2003). Seeing political movements as moral politics, however, cannot fully 
account for the agrarian moral economies they inspire (Edelman 2001), as I shall argue in 
the case of antimafia agrarian cooperatives. 
My own research is premised (although not exclusively) on recognising the 
importance of livelihoods and access to material resources. This is not only where the 
contemporary antimafia movement has made its most tangible contribution but was also a 
focus of historical struggles of Sicilian peasants. I emphasise that, for much of the 20th 
century, the antimafia movement came together as a class mobilisation of the landless and 
land-poor against mafia brokerage and patronage (see Chapter 3). At the same time, the 
differentiation between civil society discourse and materially oriented politics corresponds, 
as my work delineates, to the two-tiered division of labour in the cooperatives, where 
Palermitan middle-class administrators pursue antimafia principles, while local peasants 
appear less engaged with this discourse. This parallels Schneider and Schneider’s analysis of 
the antimafia movement as an agglomeration of diverse civil society interests (urban and 
middle class) whose moral and educational reform projects met a degree of resistance from 
working-class Palermitans: city’s labour market was conditioned by the mafia, seen as an 
employer-patron who ‘put food on the table’ (2003: 314, fn 10). 
 This also connects to insights that the antimafia movement, since the 1980s, 
shifted its focus ‘from class struggle to civic duty’ (Santino 2000; Bolzoni 1998), or ‘from 
peasant to urban wars’ (Schneider and Schneider 1997). An influential figure in the 
antimafia movement, Sciascia, saw this drift of attention away from livelihoods as lined to 
the ‘professionalisation’ of the movement, causing some outrage when he characterised 
magistrates who had played a leading part in mafia prosecution, as ‘antimafia professionals’ 
(Sciascia 1987). Schneider and Schneider examine the contradictions between Sciascia’s 
antimafia and the ‘new, urban, educated, left-wing antimafia’ (1998: 245–59). Comparably, 
Sampson notes how anti-corruption became a ‘grant category’ in Eastern Europe: the 
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rhetoric of NGO ‘warriors of integrity’ mobilised a discourse of ‘projectualisation’ oriented 
to funding mechanisms triggered by market-oriented catchphrases (2005: 103–05). More 
generally, accounting for social change should not be limited to morally driven discourses 
inspired by NGOs as socially transformative processes often stem from production and 
labour (Harvey 2011). Santino notes that the ‘failures’ of the antimafia movement were due 
to its downplaying of class and exploitation (2000). This highlights the limitations of the 
movement’s voice precisely because it separated livelihoods from civic duty, identifying 
antimafia commitment as ‘a choice’ of people, with which they engage in their leisure time. 
At the same time, ‘conditioning and provisioning’ for working class and peasants was – as 
will be explored – a channel for mafiosi’s consensus and continuity (Schneider and 
Schneider 2003: 311–17; also 2005b). 
My work seeks to fulfil the need for a study of change in Sicily predicated on work 
provision and material processes: instead of moral reform, examining a production-based 
antimafia mobilisation. Gledhill notes that conflict is ‘about control of historicity’, citing 
Touraine’s words that social movements are ‘the work that society performs on itself’, 
struggling about greater participation in the state (2000: 188). The antimafia cooperatives, 
channelling social transformation based on production-based processes, reflect this point. 
My research contributes a study of the antimafia from below and within. Exploring the lives 
of people whose livelihoods are linked to the struggle against mafia influence in Sicily, 
positively engaging with the state, I inquire into the transformative experience this 
involvement means for their livelihoods, examining an antimafia rearranging access to 
material resources.  
These are all strong reasons for moving the focus of inquiry away from civil society 
and onto people’s livelihoods. In the end, however, the strongest reason comes from the 
ethnographic evidence of my research itself. Although to an extent cooperatives are an 
imposed, top-down movement, the active changes they brought to people’s livelihoods is 
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an empirical novelty; thus what I propose is a modest paradigm shift. This approach 
actively tackles the ‘old/new’ antimafia discontinuity and demonstrates continuities with 
the antimafia peasant movement’s historical past.  
2.2. Cooperatives and Cooperativisms 
2.2.1. Cooperatives and institutions, legal and economic  
Cooperatives in the modern sense were born in England, after the industrial 
revolution; the first was established in Rochdale in 1844 (Webb 1912). The Rochdale 
paradigm distinguishes cooperativism from previous ventures that involved cooperation 
(Zangheri et al. 1987). It could only develop in an industrial division of labour (cooperation 
between differentiated tasks) and class differentiation (Durkheim 1997). Modern 
cooperatives, therefore, are expressions of workers’ organisation seeking equity in the 
workplace and direct management of production. They often can be traced back to political 
projects. The cooperative movement’s equality-pursuing project was a reaction against the 
institutionalisation of charity in the form of the 1834 New Poor Law, famously criticised by 
Polanyi (2001: 82). The movement, drawing on mutuality and self-help, counteracted the 
idea of the ‘undeserving poor’ , aimed to bridge class differences and involved community 
participation in local economies, often as an alternative to the hierarchies of waged labour 
(Taylor 2011: 240; Nash et al. 1974). Therefore, workers’ management, mutuality among 
members, community participation and tackling the capital/labour dichotomy are the main 
characteristics of cooperatives. 
There are two notable features of workers’ cooperativism in Alto Belice; although 
they are not unique to Alto Belice they are contingent on the specificities of the antimafia 
political project. Firstly, antimafia cooperativism arose not as an alternative to wage labour 
but from its absence: where agricultural jobs existed, they were subject to the harsh terms of 
mafia patronage and were never regulated by labour rights. Antimafia cooperatives 
followed a very pragmatic strategy, offering employment to poor, petty producers. The 
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priority was not to counter wage labour but to set conditions of production and 
remuneration. Indeed, the main link pulling the antimafia cooperatives together is wage 
labour. Secondly, the ‘capitalist’, in Alto Belice, is the state, which grants access to the means 
of production (land, machinery) and through them to work, to the members of social 
cooperatives. As noted in 1.1.2, state rhetoric presented this process as the ‘restitution of 
land to the community’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007: 2). Thus, the state, as owner and 
gatekeeper of ‘communal’ land, endows cooperatives with decommodified land and crafts 
an ideological model for cooperativism.  
This land has been withdrawn from market and has no exchange value, as it does 
not partake in commodified transactions. It is ‘given’ to the cooperatives to safeguard it, 
remaining inalienable (Weiner 1992); like special-purpose money, it is ‘earmarked’ (Zelizer 
1997), endowed with a particular kind of (political) role. At the same time, labour, the other 
main resource antimafia cooperatives allow locals to access, also changes form, wrested 
from the mafia as the state seizes control over jobs. While there is a resemblance to classic 
state collectivism (Humphrey 1983), in Alto Belice, this state-driven project that 
decommmodifies land and offers job protectionism is taking place in neoliberal times, in 
the face of broader deregulation and state roll-back (Castells 2011).  
This brief discussion also relates to my overall argument about the distinctive 
relationship of cooperatives to law. Cooperativism aims to produce horizontal relations in 
the workplace (see below) and supersede the capital/labour distinction, not via direct 
government control of the means of production but, rather, through collective 
management by autonomous workers. Yet, it is evidently not an anarchist project. As 
Mauss emphasised, cooperativists see a role for the state in providing a legal environment 
that makes such associationism viable, or that even encourages it; they seek to accomplish 
‘a state within the state’ (Mauss 1905 cited in Fournier 2006: 126). In Alto Belice, the state 
not only provides a legal framework for cooperatives but owns the decommodified land and 
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promotes their establishment through a law-governed process, in the face of neoliberalism, 
aiming to ‘amend the community’s relation to the law and legality’ (Consorzio 2010).  
I historicise this discussion in Chapter 3, discussing the specific configuration of 
cooperativism and legislative history from which antimafia cooperatives grew: the 
orientation of the Sicilian left towards legality and the related ‘revolutionary legalism’ 
tradition. The reason for choosing the cooperative form to accommodate confiscated land 
was because it was seen as representing of community participation (Smith 2006; Hart et al. 
2011: 15), as well as instituting equal relations between different classes in the workplace, 
equity of work tasks and equivalence in pay. In Alto Belice, the conjuncture of state 
(protecting decommodified land), fair labour market and community participation is the 
basic condition for the cooperatives. However, this thesis will nuance this scheme, 
illuminating the specificities of their internal divisions of labour.  
This conjuncture reveals the plurality of cooperativist economic practice. Since 
Malinowski (1922) and Mauss (1922), anthropologists have denaturalised the Western 
hegemonic paradigm (see Polanyi on Malinowski: 2001: 50) that the economy is an 
‘autonomous’ sphere forming a potentially globalised total system (Hann and Hart 2011: 
162). Anthropologists also criticise totalising models, suggesting instead that capitalism or 
socialism are labels that describe ‘what makes an economy historically distinctive, but 
remain merely references to just part of what goes on in an economy’ (Hart et al. 2011: 5). 
For example, Graeber notes that:  
… the market is a model created by isolating certain principles within a complex 
system (in this case by fixing on a certain form of immediate, balanced, impersonal, 
self-interested transactions – what we call ‘commercial exchange’, which is almost 
never found in isolation but always surrounded by and drawing on other logics –
hierarchical, communistic ...) and then creating a totalising model within which the 
books all balance and all debts and credits ultimately cancel one another out. No 
such bounded entity could ever exist, either in time or in space. (2009a: 131–32)  
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The 2008 financial crisis rejuvenated interest in the longstanding debate on the 
multiple range of human economic practice (Hart et al. 2011: 2), including aspects of 
mutuality in the market (Gudeman 2009: 26). This condition demands a nuanced approach 
to the idea that state and market are opposed to each other, as neoliberal discourse argues 
(Carrier 1997). In this direction, anti-utilitarian approaches have developed, opting for a 
Maussian holistic perspective on economy (e.g. La Revue du M.A.U.S.S.), as well as 
explorations of ‘solidarity economy’ (économie solidaire) (Godbout and Caillé 1998; Defourny 
et al. 2000). This tendency emphasises the multiple characteristics of an economic system 
and also relates to cooperativists’ critique of mainstream economics. According to Graeber, 
Mauss, as cooperativist and anthropologist, ‘felt that existing popular practices provided 
the basis both for a moral critique of capitalism and possible glimpses of what future 
society would be like’ (2004: 18). 
This does not exclude relationships to markets, an enduring aim of cooperativism, 
but guarantees cooperatives an often distinctive position within capitalism. They form 
mutuality enclaves of moral economy, that, interestingly, are used by a community in 
relation to a market in ways often detrimental to other participants in that same market 
(Gudeman 2008: 103). In Alto Belice, the Consortium’s allegiance to antimafia principles 
excludes those affiliated to mafia from access to confiscated land and, through that, to 
labour. Defining what is the community – and thereby excluding others from access to land 
and work – is crucial in my research, as cooperative members entertained differing ideas on 
what constitutes community, which informed different moral economies within the 
cooperatives. 
Sitrin appropriates the term ‘horizontalism’ (horizontalidad), an emic expression used 
by member-workers in cooperatives at the ‘recuperated’ factories in Argentina to describe 
workers’ democracy and community participation (2006). The principle of horizontalism, 
compatible with different types of cooperatives, interacts with the complex relationships to 
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law and morality that develop among cooperative participants. Horizontalism is an aim for 
Sicilian antimafia cooperatives, although, in Argentina, workers’ coops often operated at 
the margins of legality (Klein 2007). In my ethnography, the antimafia struggle engages 
with positive legislation and is dissimilar to movements that ‘reclaim the state’ (Hainwright 
2003), whereas in Argentina, legality is merely a pivot for activists’ moral claims. This is 
evident in Brazilian squatters’ ambiguous relationships with the law (Holston 1989) or the 
landless movement MST balances among tolerated illegality, legal impunity (Wright and 
Volford 2003: 290–307) and state support (Nugent and Vincent 2006: 346; for squats 
bordering on illegality see Bey 2008). 
2.2.2. Cooperatives and divisions of labour 
Cooperatives are mostly guided by horizontalism in organising labour but 
nonetheless operate with internal divisions, as is the case with antimafia cooperativism. I 
argue that cooperative organisation, drawing on relations between community and 
economy, often becomes a channel for experimentation inspired by regionalism and 
political ideologies, which are the source of such internal divisions. My work is particularly 
attentive to the respective moralities attached to these divisions. Accounting for the oft-
noted shift of cooperatives from being orientated as horizontally organised work 
associations to acquiring hierarchised divisions of labour, authors identify two different, 
but interrelated, external influences, coming from institutions: authoritative political 
(usually state) ideologies and/or competitive markets. I shall discuss them here and show 
why developments in Alto Belice cooperatives are somewhat different. 
The widely discussed Basque cooperativist experiment in Mondragón initially 
positioned itself against totalising systems: it was ‘a reaction against -isms’, especially 
Taylorist specialisation and division of labour. Workers referred to Machado’s verse: ‘the 
path is made walking’ (‘se hace el camino al andar’) to convey their pragmatism (Whyte and 
Whyte 1991: 257). In that way, ‘cooperativism was true socialism – not just one way to 
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achieve it’ (1991: 253). Eventually, the idea that Mondragón’s complex of cooperatives had 
to be ‘more closely integrated if it was to compete effectively in the European common 
market’ (1991: 201) led to the restructuring of the organisation of labour, imposing 
hierarchisations in lieu of horizontal relations. Sharryn Kasmir characterises these 
transformations as ‘middle class reforms’ (1996: 63–91). 
In post-war Italy, the protection of cooperatives was enshrined in the Constitution 
(1947) as a ‘third way’ between liberalism and collectivism and between state and market 
(Paolucci 2005). When the Constitution was being created, communists suggested that 
cooperative property should be the only property form recognised (Sassoon 1997: 209–12). 
Cooperatives thus enjoyed a welcoming political atmosphere and were encouraged by 
affiliations with mainstream political parties (Bonfante 1981). During the 1970s, 
cooperative representatives developed relationships with local authorities that boosted the 
‘Italian economic miracle’, evident in ‘communist-leaning’ Emilia, alongside the familial 
enterprise-based ‘Third Italy’2 development scheme (Bagnasco 1984; 1979; Bagnasco and 
Sabel 1995). Emilia’s ‘red cooperativism’ has been seen as the adoption of political 
ideologies on (horizontal) organisation in production, counterposed to Veneto’s ‘catholic 
political culture’ and associated ‘white’ cooperativism (Trigilia 1986; 2002). The cooperative 
movement radically transformed local economies, weaving community with economic 
practice (Thornley 1981; Oakeshot 1978; Thompson 1991) and achieving ‘worker control 
in action’ (Dow 2003: 67–82). This condition modelled ‘industrial democracy’ according to 
internal horizontal work relations and solidified relations between community and 
workplace (Holmström 1989). Socialist ideologies inspired workers’ management, 
emphasising ‘solidarity’ and equity in work relations as cooperativism’s fundamental 
principle (Macpherson 2008). 
                                                 
2 Anthropologists have cast doubt on this term (e.g. Yanagisako 2002, Ghezzi 2007). 
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In recent Italian cooperativist developments, ‘solidarity’ has given way to ‘mutuality’ 
as the dominant, organising discourse, as cooperatives seek to open up to global market 
opportunities (Zamagni and Felice 2006; Zamagni and Zamagni 2010). As in Mondragòn, 
‘cooperative networks’ formed in Central Italy involved policy-making and inter-
cooperative cooperation (Bulgarelli and Viviani 2006: 96–100; Sapelli 2006). Admittedly, 
this was not without tensions: social solidarity and market-orientation have always been 
entangled in cooperativism (Degl’Innocenti 2003). Early on in the movement’s 
development, cooperativism’s main organisational issue was to maintain equality as the 
priority while also being focused on growth (Bonfante 1981; Bartlett 1993). Equally, the 
criss-crossing between subsidiary policies towards the cooperative system and the 
administration of ‘coop-entrenched municipalities’ has been continuous since the 1970s 
(Pugliese and Rebeggiani 2004). The institutionalisation of cooperatives and exposure to 
markets affected horizontal work relations. For this reason, Burawoy (1991) characterised 
cooperatives as ephemeral organisations, unable to withstand tendencies towards 
bureaucratisation and hierarchies.  
The literature on how cooperatives move from horizontal to hierarchical 
organisations, rich as it is, often fails to engage with the differentiated viewpoints and 
practices within hierarchised cooperatives. Discussions of hierarchisation do not explain 
how opinions and practices are manifested in (and informed by) cooperative members’ moralities 
(an issue overlooked, in varying degrees, by many key writers: e.g. Kasmir 1996; Sapelli 
2006; Zamagni and Zamagni 2010; Holmström 1989; Macpherson 2008.) Moralities and 
ideologies operative among the workforce are especially significant for an anthropological 
approach to the division of labour in order to nuance the idea of hierarchisation and the 
division of labour itself, as well as to discover how people experience this tendency away 
from horizontalism. It would be simplistic to see the division of labour as (just) 
‘management impositions’ within a cooperative’s structure; often, these internal 
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differentiations are informed by aspects of members’ lives outside the cooperative 
framework. 
This is a main point of this thesis. The sociological analysis of cooperatives is 
committed to showing how they become internally differentiated, without elucidating in 
detail what this differentiation entails for coop members. The diverse opinions and moral 
stances intertwined with their division of labour often remain undertheorised. My 
ethnography not only sheds light on these nuanced differentiations in terms of moralities but 
also argues that this division is often constructed by different viewpoints among the 
workforce, and reproduces them accordingly. Therefore, while, in the literature, 
specialisation and division of labour arise because of cooperatives’ exposure to competitive 
markets and conservative state ideologies (see below), in Alto Belice it is, rather, a tension 
between the Consortium’s normative idea and participants’ different concepts of 
community (as well as their embeddedness in different social relations) that is the main axis 
for internal differentiations. Cooperativism is (as described above) contextual, shaped by the 
configurations of power at a given historical moment. In that respect (as I will argue in the 
next chapter), it is a ‘modular’ notion, sensu Benedict Anderson (2006): the principles of 
cooperativism, instilled in the context of mafia-controlled agrarian production, developed 
in very specific forms in Sicily, as vectors of antimafia mobilisation. In the context of post-
2000 Alto Belice, antimafia cooperativism came to entail a commitment to legality, which, 
as the ethnography will show, created tensions in its adaptations to the local situatedness of 
members. Cooperative administrators set out to apply the principle of antimafia cooperativism 
– which eventually contributed to making (internally differentiated) antimafia cooperatives.  
While Holmström recommends a comparative approach, considering regional 
characteristics of community-based Central-Italian and Catalonian cooperativisms (1993; 
cf. Bartlett 1992, for another comparison), comparisons should be made with caution. As 
ethnographic accounts of Catalonia make evident, apart from competitive markets, 
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autocratic regimes may have an impact on horizontal relations within cooperatives, and on 
the ways cooperatives interact with the community in which they operate. In that context, 
what Narotzky calls ‘the political economy of affects’ (2004: 57–82) – claims to friendship, 
community idioms and family relations – served to sustain, but therefore maintain, workers 
in their precarious job situation. The ‘glue’ holding this set of work relations together was 
(also) a vision of cooperativism stemming from a conservative regime: ‘... the Catalan way 
is workers’ cooperatives: an “imagined community” of social relations of production, an 
ideology of harmony between capital and labour through national identity’ (Narotzky 1997: 
187). Catalonian regionalism instrumentalised cooperativism, identifying in the co-
articulation of casa (the family unit) and cooperativa (the unit of labour) local expressions of 
the nation’s unity (Narotzky 1988). This corporatism deployed ‘a hegemonic cultural 
concept that consistently glosses over differentiation and conflict, and pictures a history of 
cooperation, common objectives and non-existent class struggle’ (Narotzky 1997: 119). 
Gavin Smith also identifies such tendencies: regulations governing Spanish cooperatives 
made an already informalized economy more informal (1999: 179). Nevertheless, there 
have been other cooperativism experiences, as per the Catalonian Republican industrial 
colonies (Terradas 1979), while anarchist cooperativism also developed earlier, in mid-
1930s Andalusia (Mintz 2004). 
In the relevant literature, therefore, there are divergences from horizontalism (equal 
work relations as in principles of industrial democracy) when an idea (e.g. socialism) about 
the wellbeing of the community becomes the main priority of the common economic 
endeavour. Divisions of labour inspired by market-oriented specialisation and corporatist 
relations diverted the historical role of cooperativism away from tackling the labour/capital 
conflict (Smith 2006). Marx, interestingly, criticised but did not condemn the cooperative 
movement. He saw, in its bridging of capital and labour, firstly, a preliminary victory of the 
political economy of the latter over the former and, secondly, ‘the husks of the old system 
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and the seeds of the new’ (Bottomore 1991: 111). However, for that victory to be 
complete, political power and not localism was required. His interest in cooperativism was 
therefore underpinned by a dialectical relationship among state, society and market. For 
Marx, cooperatives are founded upon a historical contradiction:  
The cooperative factories run by workers themselves are, within the old form, the 
first examples of the emergence of a new form, even though they naturally 
reproduce in all cases, all the defects of the existing system, and must reproduce 
them. But the opposition between capital and labour is abolished here, even if at 
first only in the form that the workers in association become their own capitalist, 
i.e. they use the means of production to valorise their own labour. These factories 
show how, at a certain stage of development of the material forces of production, 
and of the social forms of production corresponding to them, a new form of 
production develops and is formed naturally out of the old. (Inaugural Address, 
MECW 6: 78, cited in Bottomore 1981: 571) 
Mauss’ appreciation for the cooperative movement presents a slightly different 
aspect: while Marx saw in cooperatives the dialectics of present contradictions and the seed 
of future developments, a kind of future-present, Mauss, actively involved in cooperativism 
himself (Hart 2007: 5), insisted that consumer cooperatives brought about ‘practical 
socialism’ (Fournier 2006: 125). Economic experiments were thus not imagined or planned 
but experienced, in radical cooperativism (as per Mondragòn case, above). Speaking before 
the First National and International Congress of Socialist Cooperatives (in July of 1900), 
Mauss stated: 
… we will educate him [the citizen] for his revolutionary task by giving him a sort 
of foretaste of all the advantages that the future society will be able to offer 
him...we will create a veritable arsenal of socialist capital in the midst of bourgeois 
capital. (cited in Graeber 2001: 151) 
Durkheim himself, described as ‘a kind of guild socialist’ (Morris 2005; Thompson 2012: 
31), also shared similar views, regarding cooperatives associations striving for social justice. 
The radical horizontalist kind of cooperative environment described by Mauss is 
conducive to liberation from waged work (encouraging, in turn, greater citizenship 
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participation). However, as I have already mentioned, Sicily was exceptional in that, 
political cooperativism inspired by antimafia, far from abolishing agricultural wage labour, 
instead created it (albeit in a regulated form). This might seem like ethnographically 
documented cases where cooperatives played a ‘salvage’ role for jobs: recalling Sitrin’s 
findings on the Argentine crisis (2006) or narratives of Eastern German cooperatives in the 
neoliberal 1990s (Buechler and Buechler 2002; Bauerkämper 2004) and post-Soviet 
collectives, where familial and gendered solidarity were reinforced by memories of a state 
sense of collectivity (Ashwin 1999; Humphrey 1998). But the Alto Belice case is distinct 
from these examples too, as the antimafia cooperatives created jobs, in the absence of a 
viable labour market , and indeed in the midst of neoliberal market fundamentalism, which 
proclaims ‘salvation from government’ (Brown 1997). More precisely, as explained in 
Chapter 5 and alluded to in the vignette opening this thesis, although there was agrarian 
waged labour in Alto Belice before the cooperatives – it was always unregulated, rare and 
exploitative, part of the informal economy’s local networks, mostly controlled by mafia. 
The cooperatives did not eliminate this (see 5.3) but added regulated work to the setting. 
Cooperatives in this context, where mafia patrons have historically determined the labour 
market, are simultaneously viable alternatives to the paradigm of the ‘autonomy’ of the 
economy and manifestations of capitalism’s contradictions. 
I shall show, however, that it was the antimafia principles themselves that rendered 
these cooperatives amenable to hierarchies. The antimafia cooperativism principle 
promoted by the state was that bestowing the use of confiscated land on cooperatives 
‘recuperates land to the community, reconstituting a communal use of land’ (Libera 2010a; 
Consorzio 2010). I shall suggest that this principle, imposed in the Consortium’s normative 
language, and external to ways locals lived their lives before the project, influenced the 
antimafia cooperatives’ horizontalism, eventually contributing to the creation of internal 
divisions. This situation was also informed by the different ideas local coop members 
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themselves held about state, community, kinship and mafia itself. Antimafia 
cooperativism’s strict legalism, aiming to dissociate the cooperatives from certain aspects of 
local community and tradition, created contradictions on the ground that affected the 
cooperatives’ development.  
The case of the antimafia cooperatives brings together the contrasting views of 
Marx and Mauss. The Maussian perspective is that cooperatives become vectors for 
people’s lived practice, models of economic activity that offer alternatives to hierarchies of 
power in labour relations. Cooperativism arose historically to combat wage labour, and the 
associated division of labour, with the aim of correcting the resultant social inequalities. But 
it was also a response, already since Rochdale, to markets for labour (in the case of Sicily, 
conditioned by mafia) that often left people without jobs. It developed, often on moral 
grounds, drawing on ideas of ‘community’, regionalism, and communalism. The fact that 
antimafia cooperatives do not defy the state but involve positive engagements with it also 
confirms the Marxian critique outlined above. In that respect, their horizontalism is framed 
in dynamic configurations ‘between’ the market and state policy; it becomes a struggle for 
different values, which has been seen as ‘communalism’ (De Angelis 2007).  
‘Cooperatives’ is then not a self-explanatory term but one claimed and contested by 
varied groups, associated with different political and ideological allegiances, and formed as 
a response to different problems and needs. They arise in relation to a broad range of ideals 
and actors, from state to social movements, from fascist to communist or anarchist 
ideologies. They are often outcomes of top-down planning rather than grassroots initiatives 
or experiences – not divorced from the local context but not derived from it either. Market 
structures and political ideas imposed from ‘outside’, shape and are shaped by members’ 
everyday work experience and social relations. This also takes place in the Alto Belice 
cooperatives I discuss. Cooperativism is, I suggest historically in Chapter 3 and 
ethnographically in the remainder of the thesis, a ‘modular’ notion, borrowing the term 
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from Anderson’s conceptualisation of nationalism (2006). Apart from the contingent 
characteristics of cooperatives, my work builds on the idea that there are many 
cooperativisms and not a single cooperativism: divisions of labour within cooperatives 
imply different ideas on what type of moralities (and moral economies) different 
cooperative members across the work teams of a cooperative strive for. 
2.3. State, Land and Community: From Imagination to Practice 
2.3.1. The unintended consequences of state activity  
Looking at cooperatives that have a political agenda, a good part of my research is 
committed to tracing the meaning of the state in people’s everyday lives: how different 
engagements with ‘it’ were negotiated. While cooperatives at large, as discussed, promise 
the creative weaving of economy and community, the Consortium’s regulations involved 
confused ideas about the meanings of community. Anderson’s work on nationalism, and 
particularly his notion of ‘imagined communities’ (2006) has been a source of inspiration 
for a number of anthropologists’ approaches to the state. I follow Anderson in tracing the 
imagined projection of the community’s interests in the state, as expressed in the rhetoric 
of the Consortium, and the way this inspired the cooperatives’ administration members and 
determined their practices.  
Many anthropologists argue that it is difficult to study ‘the’ state (‘an illusory 
general interest’) without reifying abstract structures as actual social relationships (Fuller 
and Bènèï 2001: 2–5). Herzfeld sees the conceptual separation of state and people as 
stemming from the Western ideology of ‘transcendence’, and its ‘separating [of] eternal 
truths from the mere contingencies of society and culture’; this symbolic construct is then 
liable to reification (Herzfeld 1993: 19; 2005). Abrahams proposes that anthropologists 
should treat the popular idea of the state as an object of analysis in its own right (1998: 75–
79). I read this proposal alongside Ferguson and Gupta’s suggestion that states are 
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themselves composed of bundles of social practices, ‘every bit as local’ in their social 
situatedness and materiality as any other practice’ (1997: 15). 
Asad proposed studying the ‘abstract’ state institution by looking at it as an 
‘imaginative’ structure, to which powers are delegated (Asad 2004: 279–89). Earlier, Gupta 
suggested that the state is ‘imagined’ through a ‘discursive construction’ (Gupta 1995). 
Among discursive approaches popular in the anthropology of the state since then, Hansen 
and Stepputat’s proposal is useful. The authors suggest approaching each actual state as a 
historically specific configuration of ‘a range of languages of stateness’ (2001: 3–37), 
including ‘the codification of social relations in law’ (2001: 16). I take this view on board, 
assessing the parameters that constructed landed property legislation and its imposition on 
the ground. Rather than arguing that law enforcement should become a prism through 
which the state is ‘imagined’, however, I focus on the consequences of the cooperative 
administrators’ imaginative identification of the community’s wellbeing with the state. I 
then explore the tangible results of state intervention in my research interlocutors’ lives. In 
that way, my ethnographic stress on the land confiscations (from mafia) brings out the 
issue of material transformations taking place through the application of law.  
Steinmetz emphasises that the process of ‘state-formation’, involving law, is 
ongoing (1999: 9). Approaching law as a processual category is key here. Locating the state 
in the process of legislative production and its socially configured continuities, i.e. the 
consequences of laws for people’s lives, is one useful ‘bottom-up’ way of research (legal 
theory itself points to ‘recognition’ as a vital axis for law, see Hart 1997). I acknowledge 
this is equally open to reification, as it might treat the law as an artefact (Wastell 2007: 68). 
Instead, it should be seen as a process, as ‘the law and the social context in which it 
operates must be inspected together’ (Moore 2000: 55; Moore 2005) to capture the ‘life of 
the law’ (Nader 2009). The processual approach of legal anthropologists thus incorporates 
legal artefacts in dialectics of ‘repotentialisation, in which the formative design of the 
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artefact is always hostage to the evaluation of the performance of the artefact’ (Mundy and 
Pottage 2004: 24). 
Anthropologists have stressed that legal categories in non-western contexts have 
often puzzling effects (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). Some of my informants displayed 
ambivalent relationships to the law and stood ‘at the frontiers of legality’ (Harris 1996: 2). 
In fact, the degree to which informants were sufficiently socialised ‘into’ the law reflected 
their differentiated identification with antimafia cooperativist principles. My research 
addresses law in the integrated process of the (socially informed) lawmaking and the 
(socially arranged) products of the law, the intricacies of law’s material consequences, 
which are often unintended and go against the legislators’ planning. I consider this process 
to be a continuum between the law’s inception, application and grounded results, which 
include all sorts of consequences. My work elucidates the unintended consequences of the 
state’s jural codification and legal production. In Sicily, diverse voices initially proposed the 
law on the ‘social use’ of confiscated resources (Libera 2008a; Pati 2010). The enactment of 
this law (number 109/96) led to tensions between jural and moral interpretations, as it 
brought about unexpected contextual arrangements (explored regarding land in Chapter 6). 
Since the state is rooted in human agency, addressing only its successes would limit the 
scope of analysis. Instead, bringing out the unplanned consequences of state activity helps 
demystify ‘its’ study; the results of the state’s unplanned actions are as important as its 
successes (Scott 1998). Part of this situation is that the ‘peopled’ state’s legitimacy is 
interactively built from below (Herzfeld 1993; 2005), as people on the ground accept the 
legal system even as they manipulate aspects of it. I then identify the state both in and by 
the unexpected and planned manifestations of its activity.  
Discussing the ‘peopled’ state in Sicily raises the issue of corruption, due to the 
ongoing complicity in different levels of state power with mafia and due to the moralising 
discourses articulated around the antimafia, which tackle this complicity (the ‘moral 
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question’, as discussed in 1.2.1). Corruption has been seen as a way people negotiate, claim 
and ‘imagine’ the state (but also as ‘a threat to democracy’, as per Della Porta and Mény 
1997). Gupta proposes that the narratives of corruption that ‘produce the state’ are 
important means of social cohesion in India (Gupta 2005: 173–76, cited in Haller and 
Shore 2005: 16–17). Research from Indian contexts underlines how the ‘informal economy 
of the state’ (seemingly ‘corrupt’ services provided to peasants) is in fact embedded in the 
local moral economy (Shah 2010: 71–73). Peasants ‘hold the state hostage’ through 
‘coercive subordination’ by reconstituting political relationships initially characterised by 
social distance in personalised patronage idioms (Osella and Osella 2001: 152–55). 
Alexander’s argument that Turkish workers, negotiating access to resources, see the state 
institution as their ‘personal state’ is also akin to this debate (2002). In African contexts, the 
state becomes the object of multiple practices of reappropriation and ‘ways of doing’, while 
a ‘rhizome’ of personalised relationships links the lowest with the highest, through 
patronage (Bayart 2009: 208–09; 219). The notion of ‘low politics’ in Italy can be associated 
with Bayart’s ‘patronage’ (Ginsborg 2003a: 210).  
In Alto Belice, antimafia cooperatives instigated a series of different local 
discourses about the state, detached from ‘corruption narratives’. These were mostly 
removed from the salient discourse in the progressive media against Berlusconi, in power at 
the time of fieldwork. My informants very rarely identified ‘the state’ with Berlusconi, a 
quintessential figure embodying corruption in European politics (Lane 2010). In other 
words, they entertained popular ideas of the state (in Asad’s sense) related to locally 
beneficial legislation rather than general state power. Moreover, the above ethnographies 
frame patronage as a bottom-up activity, which ‘personalises’ the state. I take them on 
board to discuss the idioms of job recruitment in the antimafia cooperatives; however, 
while kinship is central in the above conceptualisations of patronage, bridging households 
with middlemen to reach power, my ethnography treats patronage differently. My 
92 
 
informants identified patronage (an act they considered immoral) as the hiring of workers 
in the cooperatives who were not kin-related to an existing cooperative member, but linked 
instead through particular politics affiliations (see 4.3.1). I also show that the interactions 
between grounded experience and state activity were premised on local discourse about the 
‘state’s presence’ and appropriations of local discourse (gossip) by the police (7.2.2). 
The languages of stateness, the discourse produced by the state (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001), influenced everyday life, imposing what Consortium agents called 
‘standardisation’. This standardisation entailed framing people’s practices in a legislated 
value system that implied dissociating people’s cooperative activity from unregulated 
practices in the community, notably informal work. However, in Alto Belice, informal 
labour (lavoro nero) and corresponding moral stances on land plots (which sat alongside their 
legal statuses, as ex-mafia properties) remained pertinent even after the new legal relations 
of land and labour established in relation to the cooperatives. Antimafia cooperativism 
introduced (and imposed) a legalised categorisation of land plots and a legalist approach to 
labour, in order to dissociate them from a tradition of informal work relations and mafia 
landownership. ‘Standardisation’ implied that, for cooperative members, all work was 
regularised as ‘employment’ and mafia landownership was recast as state-owned landed 
property. However, as I show, this imposition failed to entirely replace local arrangements 
and perceptions of land and labour through the lens of morality and community.  
Indeed, the normativity that standardisation sought to impose produced some 
awkward results. As Ferguson notes for the World Bank in Lesotho, the institution’s 
reports used a rating system premised on a ‘discursive normativity’ detached from local 
experience, which eventually produced contradictory results (1994: 30). In Sicily, the state’s 
discursive normativity, creating new property statuses for land, produced instead 
unexpected contiguities between mafia and antimafia actors. The confiscations law 
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attempted to create sharp mafia/antimafia boundaries, further marginalising local mafiosi 
from control over resources. 
In fact, the effect was to create contiguities between ex-mafia plots controlled by 
the cooperatives and plots still in the hands of mafiosi or their families, which, in turn led to 
further results contrary to the state’s intention of lessening cooperative members’ contacts 
with mafiosi (Chapter 6). While cooperative principles sought to physicalise mafia/antimafia 
demarcations, in the belief that ‘margins are ... natural containers for people considered 
insufficiently socialised into the law...’, the grounded situation was that it is not easy to 
‘exile’ individuals, as ‘lying outside the state ... like rivers, [margins] run through its body’ 
(Das and Poole 2004: 9). The state’s normative discourse produced ‘uncomfortable’ 
proximities between land plots still belonging to mafiosi and land plots in cooperatives’ use. 
The Consortium antimafia strategy entailed the dissociation of the cooperatives 
from their local context, separating work in the cooperatives from ‘suspicious’ local kinship 
and familial environments. The state model of antimafia cooperativism, pursued by the 
Consortium, promoted keeping home and work as separate realms, a separation often 
taken to be a key change with the rise of industrial capitalism (hence seen as part of 
modernisation) but convincingly challenged by feminist history, sociology and 
anthropology. The reality on the ground for antimafia cooperatives is different from the 
sociological paradigm, suggesting flows between work and home, which in turn created 
‘antimafia families’ (as discussed in 4.2). Hareven’s work is dedicated to historicising this 
relationship (1993; 2000), while Zelizer (2005), Goddard (1996), and Yanagisako (2002), 
drawing on different contexts, tackle it ethnographically, suggesting that boundaries 
between households and the economy are porous and complex. I problematise the 
relationship between kinship and work more fully in Chapters 4 and 5, while in 6.4, I 
briefly engage with the history of European family structures and attendant ideologies, 
drawing on the work of Jack Goody (1983). Goody identifies the longue durée of the 
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historical interaction between political and ‘private’ institutions, the state, marriage and 
kinship (understood widely, to include clanship) as a mutual relationship that defined land 
tenure and territorial control. This is also significant in terms of mafia, as territory, land and 
kinship are key concepts to conceptualise its prominence in Alto Belice. 
In Sicily, after decades of an ‘absence of the state’ (Blok 1974), politics (and the 
antimafia movement, as described in the next chapter) developed in ways that can be 
compared to Lazar’s ‘citizens despite the state’ (2008). The Consortium’s confiscations, 
however, brought a geographically limited but radical change. Scott emphasises that when 
legal categories, their adjunct normative practices and state planning remain detached from 
local meanings, the consequences can be dire (Scott 1998; 2010). The Consortium’s idea of 
cooperativism can be regarded this way. Scott analyses ‘transformative state simplifications’ 
(1998: 4), denoting abstract planning inspired by ‘high modernist ideology’, as prone to 
contradictory results. He underlines how ‘formal schemes of order are untenable without 
some elements of the practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss’ (2010: 7); planning, 
while ignoring local social arrangements, was shared across different ideological systems 
(1998: 199). ‘Planning for abstract citizens’, often glossed in progressive rhetoric, produces 
realities that can hardly be predicted and are often unintended (Scott 1998: 343–47). Scott’s 
critique can be paralleled by Ferguson’s point that institutional discourse is ‘a practice, it is 
structured; [it is] not “mere” rhetoric – it has real effects, which are much more profound 
than simple “mystification” (Ferguson 1994: 18). The Consortium’s antimafia discourse can 
be classified as ‘abstract planning’, detached from local specifics.  
My ethnography builds on this, adding one contribution: in Sicily, the legislative 
process is premised on an ideological dipole: on the one hand, it dissociates the 
cooperatives from tradition and local practices; on the other, unlike the institutions 
explored by Ferguson and Scott, the Italian state does attempt to build on certain kinship 
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notions (such as family and clan3), creating some of its jural categories. As the state 
categorisations of (mafia) family and clan are, however, carelessly drawn from local ones, 
contradictory consequences arise. In the next section, I engage with some theoretical 
debates on land and landed property, relevant to my research.  
2.3.2. Land and property  
Legal conceptualisations of land and landscape are central to national imaginaries 
(Abramson 2000a: 8–10). As discussed in chapter 6, in Sicily, the ‘discursive normativity’ of 
the state’s kinship categories relates to land tenure. The modern theoretical premise of 
moving from ascribed kinship to contractual relations in accessing land (clan to market) 
and indeed the territorial claims of the state over land are important (Maine 2008 [1844]. 
There are often tensions between treating land as the essence of nation and as privately 
held commodity. 
Polanyi has been influential in elucidating the historical role of the state in the 
framing of a market in land and generally of how law constructs and sustains market 
activity. For him, ‘the gearing of markets into a self-regulating system of tremendous power 
was not the result of any inherent tendency of markets towards excrescence, but rather the 
effect of highly artificial stimulants administered to the body social’ (2001: 60). Polanyi’s 
attention to the ‘fictitious’ commodification of nature as land in this process is particularly 
important. Laws permitting land enclosures affected the land’s value, while land (and 
                                                 
3 For Morgan and Engels, before the introduction of private property and the construction of the familial 
unit around it, the basic structure of kinship was the matrilineal clan. The work of Goody (1976; 1983; 2000) 
and Tillion (1983) informs my own argument on ‘clan’ land tenure and the state policy to tackle it, as it forms 
analogies with mafia and the antimafia confiscations, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Clanship has a 
different meaning in Goody’s discussion of landed property and family (1983). In Alto Belice, it is 
dramatically different, linked to mafia (see Chapters 5 and 6). Conversely, ‘family’, a unit based around the 
household, is linked with transmission of property matrilineally or directly to women, through the process 
Goody called diverging devolution (1983). Blok notes how blood imagery is evoked, in Sicily, to constitute 
mafia, whose main unit is ‘the family’ (2000: 87–89). In my ethnography, as discussed in Chapter 6, ‘clan’ 
rather than ‘family’, is the state and mass media kinship metaphor to identify a mafia coalition. 
96 
 
labour) formed the backbone of both legal and customary laws before enclosures, being 
part of social organisation under feudalism and the guild system:  
Enclosures were an obvious improvement if no conversion to pasture took place. 
Enclosed land was worth double and treble the unenclosed. Where tillage was 
maintained, employment did not fall off, and the food supply markedly increased. 
The yield of the land manifestly increased, especially where the land was let. 
(Polanyi 2001: 36) 
Land, the pivotal element in the feudal order, was the basis of the military, judicial, 
administrative and political system; it status and function were determined by legal 
and customary rules. Whether its possession was transferable or not, and if so, to 
whom and under what restrictions; what the rights of property entailed; to what 
uses some types of land must be put – all these questions were removed from the 
organization of buying and selling and subjected to an entirely different set of 
institutional regulations. (Polanyi 2001: 72–3) 
In Alto Belice, integrating local connotations of land tenure into jural categories 
created tensions among members of cooperatives cultivating the confiscated land. Hann 
and Hart’s (2009) volume rethinks the legacy of Polanyi through emphasising the idea of 
‘the commons’ in the current global fervour for privatisation, while associations between 
‘commons’ and ‘community’ have also been noted (Ostrom 1990; Taylor 2011: 22). These 
ideas are useful, as in Alto Belice state actors claim that the confiscated land is ‘returned to 
the community’, evoking a reversal of land enclosures ‘appropriated unlawfully by mafiosi’ 
and implying a ‘return to the commons’ (Buğra 2007a; Milun 2010). The land’s 
decommodified status encourages the formation of moral economy enclaves, ‘islands of 
good’ (Libera 2010a) – whose produce nevertheless participates in the market. The 
cooperative land as property produced is, to use Chris Hann’s application of Polanyi’s idea 
of ‘embeddedness’ to property shows how commodities such as land remain ‘embedded’ in 
social relations and cannot be separated from them (1998: 1). These broader social relations 
‘backlash’ in tensions in the cooperatives’ internal work relations, engendering further 
differentiations among members.  
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In Alto Belice the confiscated assets are therefore, in the eyes of many, signifiers of 
political cooperativism, antimafia ideology and state power – which also led to conflicts. 
The social arrangements around law became the site of tensions between views of the 
confiscated plots’ ‘moral ownership’ and their legal classification as held in trust by the 
Consortium in the form of the inalienable, decommodified assets, allocated to the 
cooperatives. Anthropologists have noted many claims and struggles around property in 
legal agrarian transformations (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009; Wiber 2010). In Brazil, the 
grassroots MST incorporates legalistic claims to land, pushing for the realisation of law 
decrees giving fair land redistribution (Gledhill 2004: 346–47; Stedile 2004), while laws 
responding to land claims often led to eventual misrule and ruptures (Holston 1991; 
2008b). Building on the discussion in the previous section, it can be seen that Holston’s 
work is useful, as he elucidates how contradictory land legislation allowed for layers of 
illegalities (2008a: 136). In that direction, my work contributes new findings regarding 
tensions among the legislated and the grounded, socially arranged, claims to land. I explore 
the perplexities that legal reification instigates, as contiguities and continuities of people’s 
ideas and practices around local land challenge legal categories. The conflicts between 
local/moral ideas of ownership and state/jural categories of property are the axis of 
Chapter 6, allowing also for analogies with the interaction between jural and mythical 
conceptualisations of land (Abramson 2000a). 
The tensions between land as symbol of the nation and of the state or as privately 
held commodity is often complicated by more radical versions of modernity, such as 
socialism. Much has been written about attempts to redistribute lands following radical 
changes in post-Soviet and post-colonial politico-jural regimes (Abrahams 1996). This 
literature also shows that property transition accommodated past claims alongside land’s 
actual usages. Some cases bring to the forefront the contested moralities at stake, in such 
new uses and allocations, akin to notions of ideas on land’s ‘moral’ ownership in Alto 
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Belice. Research in Eastern Europe has highlighted contestations across ethnic lines 
(Kaneff 2002) or the ‘fluidity’ and ‘porosity’ of land restored to communities (Verdery 
2003; Humphrey and Verdery 2004). Verdery’s ‘politics of elasticity’ underlines that new 
land claims arising from restitutions, involved murky negotiations, often imperilling local 
relations (1996: 159). The ‘uncomfortable contiguities’ among land plots in Alto Belice can 
be compared to this situation. The discourse on states-in-transition relates to the changing 
characteristics of property (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009b). Authors have shown that 
‘transition’ was a model not backed up by practice, as other issues came to the fore: 
recombinant forms and movement from central administration to disorderly ‘clan’ control 
(Stark 1990), or return to fiefdoms, which, indeed relates to discourse on the rise of ‘Mafia’ 
(Humphrey 2002: xxi and 6). My work in Sicily fits with this tradition in that, exploring the 
cooperatives’ allocations of the confiscated land, I highlight the grounded continuities that 
accompany legal changes. 
A question stemming from my ethnography is whether the antimafia confiscations 
were a top-down project of social transformation. As discussed, I focus on the state 
activity’s unintended changes: how they provoked reactions, accommodations, and 
uninvited results. Studies of socialist agrarian transformation show how repeasantation 
(Page 2010) or compulsory villagisation programmes (Scott 1998: 223–61) met various 
degrees of resistance. As in Alto Belice, there were disjunctures in both socialist and post-
socialist examples, between what was legislated at the centre, and what happened in rural 
areas. This indicates further dimensions to the ‘moral ownership’ theme: for some, moral 
ownership was conceived as being against the central directives of state institutions – and 
hence may count as another unintended consequence of the state-induced processes of 
change. Verdery notes that ‘a local sphere obedient to central directives was a laughable 
image’ in Romania (2002: 27), while the oxymoron of ‘conflicting complementarity’ 
between state and locals’ strategies that Creed points out in the process of ‘domesticating 
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revolution’ is also relevant in Sicily (1998: 8). Comparisons with this literature are, however, 
limited. Firstly, there, property conflicts are produced because of a movement ‘from plan 
to clan’ (Dunn 2004: 79), from the state to the private. This situation is also evident in 
post-colonial Tanzania, where ‘people obtain rights by virtue of their membership of 
descent groups’ (Caplan 1975: 98). In Alto Belice, by contrast, people are promised (and to 
an extent experience) the reverse movement, from a ‘malignant’ private to a ‘benign’ public 
apparatus. The Sicilian ‘from the clans to the state’ is therefore exactly the reverse 
movement in comparison with post-socialist land restitutions. Secondly, the socialist 
organisation of property collapsed, alongside its political upkeep. The restitutions 
‘attempted to create the status pro ante’ returning land to individuals claiming it on the 
basis of pre-socialist rights (Verdery 1996: 133–36). Antimafia cooperatives, instead, come 
into contact with mafiosi every day, partly because of the state’s new concepts of property, 
enacted in the confiscations. Unlike socialism in Eastern Europe, mafia is still a salient 
phenomenon in Alto Belice. The ‘perpetuated political interpretation of agriculture’ that 
Creed notes for post-socialist Bulgaria (1998: 219) takes place, in Sicily, precisely because of 
the actual, grounded experience of mafia, far from obsolete, in the face of the Italian state’s 
‘post-mafia’ discourse of Alto Belice being ‘liberated from the mafia’ (Libera 2010b).  
In the next chapter, I discuss theoretical analyses on mafia and antimafia, and state 
how my research contributes to these debates, providing a historical narrative that shows 
how mafia has been entrepreneurial and closely linked with political processes throughout 
the 20th century, and how the peasant and cooperative movements, articulated in antimafia 
directives, responded. The antimafia cooperatives manifest continuities between, on the 
one hand, antimafia commitment, production and organisation and, on the other hand, the 
class-based peasant movement that contested mafia throughout the 20th century. I narrate 
this history in order to show how people’s experience of the antimafia cooperatives in Alto 
Belice evolved in relation to the land confiscations and associated access to land and work. 
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Chapter 3   
Modularities and Configurations: The Antimafia 
Movement and Struggles over Land and Cooperativism 
Introduction 
This chapter opens up the theme of social change – and the continuities that accompany 
processes of change. It offers a historical/local contextualisation of the dynamics of 
interactions between the key categories – the state, cooperatives, mafia and antimafia, and 
the overlap between their agents – as these emerged in Alto Belice, the ‘hinterland’ of 
Palermo. At the same time it should be emphasized that this is very much an 
ethnographically based chapter, presenting a historical ethnography that situates my 
informants’ activities and ideas in historical time (Fabian 2002). It gives voice to 
contemporary actors, my informants from Alto Belice, as they reflect on ‘the antimafia 
movement’, commemorating it and updating its meaning today. Moreover, as the first 
ethnographic chapter, it provides the backdrop for the ethnographic discussion in the 
remainder of the dissertation. 
In exploring the interactions between state, cooperatives, mafia and antimafia, one 
crucial question posed here is the ways in which the antimafia movement has been 
intertwined with cooperativism and communism in rural Western Sicily, a question that 
becomes more acute when we look at the ways in which their actors have overlapped. 
Ethnographic exploration allows an assessment of the lasting impact of this interaction and 
the meanings of these notions today, reflecting on people’s current negotiations of 
historically informed terms.  
The range of narratives that research participants shared with me is interspersed 
here with discussion based on secondary sources. Thus richly historicised, the relations 
between mafia, antimafia and cooperatives can be better understood in terms of the 
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continuities of agents and practices and, equally, in grasping their transformations. In 
parallel, I also examine the particular form of rural communism that developed in Sicily. 
This chapter has two main goals. Firstly, I am aiming to make a historical and 
ethnographic contribution, exploring the trajectory of struggles over time. The antimafia 
peasant movement developed through a history of conflict, engaging relations of 
production with configurations of state, urban and rural politics. I elucidate how peasant 
movements were organised around antimafia in terms of cooperativist claims and practices. 
These elements interacted with each other in various ways, to the point where in certain 
instances they became intertwined. My model draws on Blok’s portrayal, in The Mafia of a 
Sicilian Village (1974), of mafiosi acting as patrons and violent middlemen (often alongside 
state agents), and also the changing configurations of tensions between state and mafia 
relations, which range from collaboration to conflict. I show that there has been a shift in 
the focus of political struggles regarding alliances, claims and agents, from struggles over 
land to struggles over markets, where mafia re-emerge as powerful middlemen but now in 
the role of market brokers (senzali).  
Throughout I stress the role of legal and rural administration processes, as both 
aspiration and outcome. Cooperativism and antimafia mobilisation interacted in important 
ways with legal and policy frameworks. The pivotal moment for this shift was the agrarian 
reform legislation passed in 1950, enabling the Sicilian Regional Assembly to pass decrees 
passed by 1953. Although this law broke up latifundia, at least nominally, it was a moderate 
reform that did not collectivise land or provide for access to agricultural resources that 
would have made the resulting small plots viable in time. It was passed by a relatively 
conservative government, in response to popular pressure. The historical narrative up until 
the 1950–53 agrarian reform shows how struggles around land were directed against the 
latifundo, landlords, and mafia patrons (gabelloti) while the struggle primarily took the form 
of land occupations led by communists and socialists. The outcome, albeit contested as to 
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whether it fulfilled the peasants’ aims, was the Agrarian Reform Law. (1953) The 
convergence between (most) peasants’ positive stance towards law as a means of change 
and (some) politicians’ support for the peasant struggles produced a form of ‘revolutionary 
legality’ that has, to a degree, been rejuvenated in today’s antimafia movement. Antimafia 
mobilisation in the case described in the thesis is based on a model of cooperativism akin 
to collectivism: the peasants set up worker-cooperatives, based on communal land use (not 
necessarily land ownership).  
The agrarian reform was undoubtedly a rupture in the fabric of social relations: in 
changing land tenure it also changed earlier experiences of cooperativism (i.e. worker-
cooperatives) and the character of antimafia mobilisation. As I develop the narrative in the 
second part of the chapter the focus of struggle shifts from control of land to control of 
markets. The peasants’ means of struggle becomes producer-based cooperativist organisation 
involving cooperative wineries and, more actively than before, political parties. The target 
of struggle shifts to the monopoly of markets and mafia brokers (senzali). Here, my account 
of the history draws on Schneider and Schneider’s focus on global political economy and 
their discussion of mafia as a form of broker capitalism (1976; cf. Gribaudi 1991). Alto 
Belice was of great importance for the export of agricultural produce throughout Italy and 
beyond. Schneider and Schneider saw rural Sicily in this light: a region integrated in 
international dependencies through flows of people and produce, proposing that mafia 
power rose not from the isolation of the region but from engagement in global dynamics1 
(1976: 10). Antimafia mobilisation in the post-agrarian-reform era (including the present) 
directed against brokers is linked to a different practice of cooperativism: the constitution 
and development of producer-based cooperative wineries (instead of landless workers-
cooperatives).  
                                                 
1 Schneider and Schneider draw on history and world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1974). 
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The second aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to more general and 
theoretical questions about the nature of cooperativism. While it may be understood in 
terms of the guiding principles, forms and ideas configured across different cooperatives, 
cooperativism (as well as communism, with which it was associated) in Alto Belice has 
various meanings for different people in diverse places and times. A historical approach to 
cooperativism in Alto Belice, therefore, needs to give an account not only of its broad 
ideals but also relationships on the ground. 
Notably, there are various kinds of cooperativism; for example, the wine industry is 
particularly well suited to a cooperative mode of organisation involving producer-based 
cooperatives, while the bracciante movement of the 1940s organised a different form of 
communalist, worker-based, cooperativism. The local variant of politicised cooperativism 
has to do with antimafia ideology, which developed as a historical current within. In that 
direction, I propose to conceptualise cooperativism as a ‘modular’ notion, possessing some 
core characteristics but changing in form and content in relation to the specific contexts in 
which the ‘module’ is developed and deployed. Here, I am drawing on the way Benedict 
Anderson approaches nationalism, nationality and nation-ness as cultural artefacts, which 
came into historical being in specific circumstances and were:  
… the spontaneous distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of historical forces; but ... 
once created, they became ‘modular’, capable of being transplanted, with varying 
degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be 
merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological 
constellations. (Anderson 2006: 4) 
Anderson’s account suggests standardisation of a notion that in turn allows 
portability and distillation in new contexts. Finally, a third, minor, aim of the chapter is to 
discuss the changing forms and significance of the mafia and the mafiosi in the different 
economic and political contexts as well as their changing interests in each instance. This 
feeds back into the discussion on how contemporary mafiosi are part of the social and 
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cultural landscape. This inquiry emphasises the enduring impact of mafia influence in the 
area, challenging the Consortium’s idea that ‘the land has been liberated from the mafia’ in 
Alto Belice. 
3.1. Land and Dissent 
3.1.1. The Casa del Popolo 
In Alto Belice, a social centre, the Casa del Popolo (People’s House) in the village of 
Chiana, 5 kilometres from San Giovanni, was most active in the salvaging and shaping of 
local historical narratives, especially regarding agrarian struggles. The progressive political 
culture of the village allowed for constant re-negotiation of the past aimed at constructing 
collective memory (Connerton 1990; Fracchia 2004), which I traced in oral accounts.2 Early 
in my fieldwork, trade unionists and members of the antimafia cooperatives had advised 
me to visit the Casa to hear ‘the old men and their stories’. Constructed in the 1950s, the 
Casa was a welcoming place, ‘filled with history’, as a resident described it. Socialist realism 
style paintings, resembling the Mexican muralists or the Sicilian communist artist Renato 
Guttuso, hung on the walls, depicting mothers working in fields alongside their children 
and moustached men waving red flags over grain piles. In the dim light, across tables 
scattered in the main room of the Casa, old men played cards, read the paper and chatted. 
 
 
Photo 8: The entrance to the Casa Del Popolo at 
Chiana 
Photo 9: A banner on a wall of the Casa. Notice the 
hammer and sickle surrounded by a heart, symbol 
of the massive women’s participation in the rural 
communist antimafia movement. 
                                                 
2 See Charlton et al. (2006) and Portelli (1991; 1997) for methodological issues in collecting oral accounts. 
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When I asked what period the murals and paintings depicted, a man simply 
explained that Sicilian braccianti and contadini (peasants) had been involved in so many 
struggles that it would be misguided to identify the paintings with any one specific 
historical. The men present, all between 50 and 80 years old, then debated what would be 
most important to portray: the Fasci Siciliani dei Lavoratori (Sicilian Workers Leagues) (Fasci)3 
movement of the 1890s? the post World-War II land occupation movement? the 1960s 
cooperative movement? Everyone agreed that any of these historical moments was equally 
qualified for artistic depiction. ‘All of these struggles consisted of families claiming land, 
forming cooperatives to manage it, occupying it to ensure it ... communist struggles but 
also family struggles, with women and kids involved,’ a trade unionist clarified. Evidently, 
the peasants’ collective historical imagination was informed by their political sympathies 
and also encompassed the rich variety of actors in these struggles. Interestingly, despite the 
widespread and often violent rural unrest in Sicily throughout the 19th century (Aya 1976a; 
1976b), none of the Casa points of historical reference went back to uprisings before the 
Fasci in the 1890s. This suggests that their historical awareness was mapped by the limits of 
genealogical narrative: their grandfathers had lived memories of the Fasci.  
Taking the instances that the people of the Casa found significant for the 
construction of cooperativism and antimafia consciousness, I therefore locate the 
beginning of the relevant historical narrative in the 1892–93 Fasci movement, as this was 
also the launching point of modern peasant struggles and involved both the formation of 
cooperatives and the building of antimafia politics in practice. The Fasci was a federation 
(the meaning of the term in Italian) of braccianti, which had a mixed (socialist and Catholic) 
background and aimed at the collectivisation of the latifundia. In this respect, current 
antimafia cooperatives members often refer to the Fasci movement as ‘the ancestor of 
                                                 
3 The Fasci Siciliani dei Lavoratori has nothing to do with Fascism. Mussolini appropriated this term from left 
wing terminology of the 1920s when establishing his movement (Mack Smith 1983), much in the same way 
National Socialism was configured in late 1920s Germany. 
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antimafia cooperativism’. Here I shall highlight the role of Verro, a Fasci leader, to show 
that mafia and antimafia often interpenetrated in the development of the peasant 
movement. I also discuss the peasantry’s radical involvement in cooperativism from its 
origin and the impact it had in cities and internationally. In this way, historicising helps to 
both de-provincialise and nuance my field of enquiry. 
3.1.2 Verro and the Fasci movement (1892–1915): the birth of the antimafia? 
Antimafia activists today invoke the trade union leaders Barbato and Verro, 
considered antimafia organisers despite their ‘lack of clear consciousness in organisational 
matters’ (Renda 1977: 195). Verro was one of the leading figures of the Fasci movement, 
which drew together landless peasants, regardless of gender or age, to demand better work 
conditions. Fasci-coordinated groups of braccianti occupied landed estates (latifundio), 
challenging the absenteeism of Palermo-based proprietors, and formed cooperatives to 
cultivate these lands. The Fasci Siciliani was a key influence in re-ordering socialist priorities 
in Southern Europe. Kautsky hailed the Sicilian ‘bracciantato’4 as ‘the centre of the 
sympathies and thoughts of the international proletariat’5 (quoted in Romano 1959: 547). 
Subsequently Marxist scholars have rejected the idea that the movement was a 
‘spontaneous’ outgrowth of peasant consciousness of a jacquerie type, insisting on its 
‘protagonismo’, i.e. its crucial role in late 19th century labour movement (Renda 1977: 328; 
Santino 2000). Verro’s contribution to the ‘Corleone agreements’ (i patti di Corleone6) 
confirms this position (Renda 1977: 160–170). Leading Alto Belice trade unionists like 
Verro from Corleone and Barbato from Chiana were imprisoned in 1894, after the 
movement was crushed by the state. 
                                                 
4 Portmanteau merging bracciante (agricultural worker) and proletariato (proletariat) often used by trade unionists 
and cooperative agents. As described in Chapter 5, in Sicily, a bracciante is a person who works as a field hand, 
making a living through daily wage labour in an agrarian context. Historically, braccianti refers to landless 
peasants; today most braccianti employed by the antimafia cooperatives owned land of their own. 
5 However, note the anxiety about the mixture of ‘socialism, anarchism, business and mafia’ in a letter 
Labriola sent to Friedrich Engels, reporting on the Fasci (in Santino 2000: 33). 
6 I patti was the first trade union collective contract in Italy (Paternostro 2009). 
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Some writers have described the Fasci as socialist or even anarchist (Giarrizzo 1975; 
Ganci 1977) and as ‘the birth of the antimafia movement’ (Santino 2000: 16; Scolaro 2008). 
However, recent research has stressed infiltration of the Fasci by local mafia (Dickie 2004: 
138). Verro even joined the mafia himself (Dickie 2004: 171), aiming to provide further 
impetus to the movement through connections and alliances with mafiosi in struggling 
against the state. These alliances suggest that attempted peasant mobilisation was in 
response to a specific configuration of state and agrarian class oppression. Gramsci argued 
that the state had allied itself with the latifundists in the inter-war period (2005: 67). 
However, the mafia foresaw the violent demise of the Fasci and opportunistically joined the 
state and the city-based absentee landlord class, solidifying the ‘historical bloc’7 of the early 
20th century, despite having temporarily allied with the peasant movement. After martial 
law suppressed the Fasci in 1893, a massive peasant exodus from Sicily took place, largely 
through fear of state and mafia retaliations. Following the flow of migrant labour, Verro 
went to the USA for 2 years, after he was released from prison in 1896. Subsequently he 
returned to Corleone in 1898 and became the mayor of the village in the first elections after 
the introduction of universal suffrage (Paternostro 1994), capitalising on his Fasci 
involvement and establishing agrarian cooperatives anew (Paternostro 2006a and b). On 3 
November 1915, he was assassinated by three local mafiosi (Paternostro 1994: 48; Hess 
1998). 
The example of Verro illustrates the intricacies of the Fasci movement: the mutual 
reproduction and eventual cross-fertilisation of mafia and antimafia led to fuzzy conceptual 
boundaries between mafia/antimafia and who could be identified on ‘either’ side, especially 
in times of social upheaval against a conservative state in struggles related to widespread 
                                                 
7 Gramsci’s term for ‘the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures, [which] is the 
reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’ (Gramsci 1971: 366). He applies this concept to 
analyse events after the Fasci, and the alliance of mafia with the conservative state, although he does not refer 
directly to the mafia.  
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claims for resources (land and work). Conversely, it is important to grasp how the mafia 
arose within peasant mobilisation before the mafia turned against it: before they resorted to 
violence, mafiosi incorporated and emulated the social alliances they could not control. This 
has been a key reason for the relative social consensus the mafia has historically enjoyed. 
Today, members of the antimafia cooperatives locate the Fasci activists as the ‘deep 
historical origins of the antimafia movement’. Public commemorations link the villages of 
Alto Belice through common processes of remembering (Connerton 1990), often 
organised by trade unions. In June 2009, I participated in one such ceremony, a modest 
event held in Verro’s memory, which took place in front of his statue in the main park of 
Corleone. I was taken there by people working for the antimafia cooperatives, who told me 
that it was an ‘annual event in memory of a peasant leader who paid for his antimafia 
commitment with his life’. Amongst the – very few – attendees were cooperative 
representatives (such as Checco from the Falcone cooperative), the mayor of Corleone and 
trade unionists. Together they commemorated Verro without any mention of his mafia 
affiliation, indeed stressing his ‘sacrifice’ in the struggle against the mafia. The mayor of 
Corleone read out a list of people who had been assassinated by local mafiosi because of 
their antimafia activity. In a narrative genealogy commencing with Verro, ‘the antimafia 
forefather’, the list incorporated people as diverse as Placido Rizzotto (a communist trade 
unionist) and Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa (a carabiniere general). 
This modest commemorative event shows how the antimafia legacy is renegotiated 
today. Current antimafia activists separate historical actors from the messy contingencies of 
their time, to construct a genealogy of great names retrospectively cast as ‘those sacrificed 
in the antimafia movement’. The contemporary antimafia cooperatives see themselves as 
the continuation of the tradition of the antimafia movement, and thus arguably their 
activists, in such commemorative narratives, evoke a ‘selective tradition’ comparable to the 
cultural expressions used by labour aristocracies historically, as Gavin Smith notes, to 
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‘represent’ the ‘cultural survival’ of working class traditions and struggles (1999: 30). 
Iannazzo, the far-right Corleone mayor’s position is indicative: he privately told me at that 
event, that he felt isolated, as his antimafia sentiment and commitment derived not from 
the ‘movement’ but the ‘fascist antimafia struggle’. He felt isolated, as contemporary 
antimafia cooperatives identified with the communist peasant tradition of Alto Belice. In 
the next section, after briefly discussing Sicilian Fascism, I examine the characteristics of 
rural communism and why it was so central to antimafia organisation in the countryside 
(unlike fascism or ‘sicilianism’), juxtaposing it to politics in Palermo that were expressed in 
separatism (Spataro 2001). 
3.1.3. Inter- and post-War configurations: Fascism, urban Sicilianism and 
rural communism 
According to some historians of the inter-war period, state and mafia had no visible 
interconnections. Finley et al. assert that the ‘outward manifestations of the Mafia were dealt 
with far more effectively by Mussolini than by any liberal government in modern times’ 
(Finley et al. 1986: 107, emphasis added). However, the fascist over-criminalisation of the 
island’s population (11,000 arrests in Palermo alone), was not coupled with policies aimed 
at tackling the relatively favourable social consensus towards mafia. The reluctant 
withdrawal of the ‘iron Prefect’ Mori from Palermo in 1930, loosened the state’s grasp on 
Cosa Nostra (Duggan 1989: 258–60). For this school of thought, Fascist leaders’ antimafia 
attempt to monopolise violence was hesitant because of their awareness of the obstacles 
posed by omertà (the mafia’s code of silence).  
Other historians, however, argue more convincingly that there were other reasons 
why Fascism did not challenge the latifundo system’s vested interests in maintaining mafia 
gabellotti.8 Local fascists were affiliated with mafiosi patrons and so the latifundia protection 
                                                 
8 A gabelloto was a protector, a middleman in the agrarian labour market, the main figure of mafia patron at the 
time. Their landholding was a service to the absentee landowners of the big Sicilian estates before the 1953 
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(which relied on mafia labour patrons, i.e. gabellotti) was left intact (Duggan 1989: 193). The 
reproduction of the agrarian bloc within Fascism suggests mutual interests of state and 
mafia (Lupo 1981). Mussolini’s ‘commitment’ to the eradication of the mafia was therefore 
mere political rhetoric. Local memories speak of affluent mafiosi who took an active part in 
dissolving agrarian cooperatives alongside the fascist police. Signor Nicosia, born 1925, a 
regular at the Casa del Popolo, simply told me his memory of how, in the main square of 
Chiana : ‘in the deep times of Fascism, there was that mafioso who sat himself down to eat, 
and he had that frittata [fried foodstuff], it smelled so good ... while we were wasting away 
from hunger….’ On a wider scale, anti-socialist sentiment shared by fascists and mafiosi 
aggravated mass labour emigration abroad or to Northern Italy, especially for the radically 
politicised in the braccianti movement (Schneider 1990). Some braccianti, previous habitués 
of the Casa, had been forced to change jobs and emigrate for fear of violence: they fled to 
Australia, Argentina or ‘Merica’, ‘despised as we were by fascists and mafiosi alike’, as old 
pensioner peasants in the Casa told me.  
Eventually, the mafia capitalised on the historical changes: links between Sicilian 
and US Cosa Nostra assisted the Allied invasion of Sicily (summer of 1943), the first 
important moment in the military advance against the Axis in Europe. A flow of 
intelligence from mafia to the US Navy facilitated the relatively safe invasion of the island 
(Campbell 1977; Newark 2007; Follain 2005). To reciprocate for this cooperation, the US 
Army helped install 55 mafia mayors across the island during the ‘transition to democracy’ 
(Costanzo 2006; but see Lupo 1997: 21–33), including local brokers like Lucky Luciano and 
                                                                                                                                               
reform; in that respect, they occupied middlemen positions between different levels of power, local and 
broader, securing the landlords’ profits through violent means of controlling the local agrarian landless 
workforce (Blok 1974: 33). Local historian Nania, notes for San Giovanni, that the gabellotti patrons soon 
turned into the local burgisi (bourgeoisie) in the 1920s, forming the Alto Belice agrarian middle classes, as they 
pocketed substantial parts of the profit made and maintained positions of local power: the ‘public order in the 
area’ from the mid-19th century already (Nania 2000: 131). After the breakdown of the estates and the 
distribution of land, as shown in the latter part of this chapter, the violent labour patrons, gabellotti, now acting 
as landowners in their own right, turned into brokers (senzali). 
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Calò Vizzini. Cosa Nostra became a player in containing the spread of communism to the 
South after the leftist Resistance to Fascism spread in the North (Robb 2009: 125). In the 
course of this momentum, an urban, mafia-backed separatist politics developed in Sicily 
(Nicolosi 1981) as ‘the mafia exploited the gap left by an ineffective state...’, leading to an 
‘outburst of sicilianismo, the arid local patriotism that had so often been used by the Sicilian 
ruling class to defuse any attempts at reform’ (Finley et al. 1987: 190). Secessionist 
fomentations gained ground in Palermo, linked to mafia sicilianist populism, peaking with 
the formation of the Movement for the Independence of Sicily, a party with deep 
Palermitan mafiosi influences, whose ideology oscillated between separatism, 
‘indipendentism’ (Ganci 1977) and ‘Sicilian patriotism’ (Nicolosi 1981).  
What is most important for this thesis is that separatist politics failed to spread to 
Alto Belice despite its adjacency to Palermo, where the lack of industrial development 
made separatism a powerful force among the poor in a city bereft of jobs in productive 
sectors. Meanwhile, the Alto Belice braccianti, influenced by the communist party, took to 
the fields en masse, occupying the estates under the slogan ‘give the land to those who 
work it’, thus contributing to the collapse of the latifundo (Blok 1974: 83). Resources were 
immediately available, in terms of land: the alternative political future that the braccianti 
demanded was the collective ownership of the latifundo. The impetus of post-War change 
thus allowed peasants to seize land and transform the latifundist exploitative system of 
production. Events such as the occupation of the Drago estate in October 1946 by 3,000 
peasants from Chiana and 1,000 from San Giovanni, who formed cooperatives to cultivate 
it, are typical of the movement at that time (Di Matteo 1967: 484).  
The trade unionist Placido Rizzotto led a number of similar land occupations; the 
mafia assassinated him in 1948 (Paternostro 1994). Today the Falcone antimafia 
cooperative owns the usufruct of a plot confiscated from a Corleonese mafioso in the Drago 
area. Here, compacted in a piece of land, lies a tangible continuity, linking one of today’s 
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antimafia cooperatives to the past of the ‘antimafia movement’ (see Appendix 5 [map IV]. 
Local narratives claim that this tract of land was the very place where Placido made his 
passionate speech to the gathered braccianti before they occupied the Drago estate, faced 
with the mafia’s gabelloti’s threats and violence. 
Immediately after post World War II therefore, the braccianti, in a revival of the 
Fasci, formed cooperatives and organised communitarian uses of land on the squatted 
latifundia (Santino 2000). Communism was winning over the peasantry, despite ‘the anti-
bolshevik crusades’ of mafia patrons (gabelloti) and their co-opted bandits. (In that period, 
armed raids in the homes of well-known unionists and political assassinations of dozens of 
communists led to a turmoil of terror, led by mafiosi and executed mainly by brigands like 
the infamous Giuliano (Dickie 2004: 210). Anthropologists have noted how, in different 
places the PCI assisted certain (often rural) working class to develop a political identity (Li 
Causi 1993) and sense of citizenship (Pratt 2003), becoming a grassroots cultural influence 
(Shore 1990). Pratt notes that, in Tuscany, the PCI was ‘the movement, which produced an 
historic transformation of peasants into citizens, able for the first time to claim rights and 
participate in a political and civic culture [...] [and] should be assessed on the same terms as 
other civil rights movements’ (2003: 85). For this reason, Sicilian rural communism should 
be contextualised in terms of the specific historical circumstances, which, as I show in the 
next section, were co-articulated with the pursuit of ‘revolutionary legality’ and backed by 
the member of the Italian parliament belonging to the Communist party (PCI). The 
function of the gabelloti was to protect, through violent means, the interests of the 
absentee landowners. These mafia overseers eventually, in the early 20th century, developed 
into a rural middle class (Blok 1974; Nania 2000), fiercely opposed to the peasant 
movement. 
Sicilian rural communism was represented by grassroots peasant organisers such as 
braccianti unionists of the CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) union, 
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affiliated to the PCI, Placido Rizzotto being the most well known. As discussed below, 
narratives of communist history were expressed in idioms9 of bravery that allocated a place 
for the emergence of antimafia commitments. At the same time, the ideal of rural 
communism built on ideas of land communalism in what I have described earlier (2.3.2) as 
a call for the ‘re-appropriation of the commons’, in a reverse Polanyist framework (Polanyi 
2001: 36). This grassroots communalism of the peasants encouraged the formation of 
worker-based cooperatives, the most efficient system of communal land cultivation. 
‘Appropriating the commons’ was not arbitrary in its development; in fact, it was 
encouraged by a specific favourable configuration of some state agents’ ideologies and 
legislative activities, as shown below. 
3.1.4. Revolutionary legality and Portella: post-War law, land and violence 
Post World War II land occupations and cooperatives lasted from the Liberation 
(autumn 1943) to the Portella della Ginestra massacre (spring 1947). What especially marks 
this period of activism is that the movement’s legalist claims found a response and basis for 
actions in the Gullo decrees (decreti Gullo), notably Decree Number 279, 19 October 1944 
(‘concessions of uncultivated land to farmers’). This law-oriented impetus in turn provides 
a basis for comparison not only with the 1953 agrarian reform but also with current 
developments in Sicily, based on the idea of legality that contemporary antimafia 
cooperatives promote. The impetus in question provides a framework to historicise the 
significance of law and the idea of legality for current antimafia cooperativism. More than 
that, what is at stake is the ways that interactions between peasants and political power 
centred on legislative procedures. Alto Belice experienced what Hobsbawm has described 
as the ‘entrenched legalism of peasant land invasions’ (1974: 124); in fact, there was an 
‘interrelation among the collective memory of the peasants and the organised mobilisation 
                                                 
9 The term ‘idiom’ is used in this thesis to include not only verbal but a wide range of other practices. 
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around a law favourable to them’ (Hobsbawm quoted in Rossi-Doria 1983: 115). Even 
after Portella put a stop to direct action, the Gullo decrees represented a basis for peasant 
mobilisations and cooperativism that corresponded to the peasantry’s ‘legalist sense of 
justice’ (Rossi-Doria 1983: 114). 
The decreti were laws initiated by the communist minister of agriculture (Gullo) in 
the Italian Coalition government formed in April 1944,10 inaugurating the process that 
would lead to the demise of the latifundia and their eventual distribution to the braccianti 
who cultivated them. The minister’s policies were embraced by the southern peasantry, and 
he (and the PCI) was conscious of their needs. For instance, the decree no 279 19ct 1944 
(concessions of uncultivated land to farmers), drawing on previous ones (decrees 25 June 
1944, n.151, 30 October 1943, n.2/b and 29 May 1944, n.141), notes: 
Art. 1 – All farmers legally associated in cooperatives or other similar organization, 
can obtain land allotments from the private and public sector which are 
uncultivated or insufficiently utilized in relation to their potential, the agricultural 
needs of the area and the cultural needs of the cooperatives in relation to the agricultural needs 
of the nation. 
Art. 5 – The duration of the concessions may not exceed four agrarian years. 
[emphasis added]11 
Delighted with the cooperative movement, Gullo and his party thought that the 
extension of cooperative property might offer an impetus for ‘communist’ administration 
on the island. In the Documents of the 5th Congress of the PCI, Gullo and Grieco 
(prominent PCI members in the Constituent Assembly) proposed that: ‘at all costs, we 
have to direct the activities of the cooperatives towards collective forms of management .... 
we always have to search cooperativist forms, to encourage the peasants to renounce the 
                                                 
10 At the time, Italy was governed by a Coalition in which the conservative Christian Democracy (DC) party 
was in the majority but in which the Communist Party (PCI) also participated. Stemming from broader the 
anti-Fascist consensus, it achieved a lot in its brief existence but collapsed due to Cold War tensions when the 
Communists were thrown out of government in ‘the May 1947 crisis’ – which in fact was partly induced by 
the dramatic events of Portella, in Alto Belice (Ginsborg 2003: 111–13). 
11 Source: http://www.centrosocialesaliano.it/inglish_pages/gullo_i.htm. 
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constant fragmentation of land [that a reform would bring about]’ (quoted in Renda 1976: 
60). However, the delay in implementing the law angered the bracciantato, who started 
applying it de facto, occupying the latifundia and forming cooperatives to manage them. 
Occupying these lands, cooperatives participants were: 
… in full consciousness that they represented a form of revolutionary legality 
[legalità rivoluzionaria] ... aiming to maintain at any cost possible the de facto 
possession of the lands already occupied and worked .... The motto of the masses 
was ‘We shall not move’.... [The peasants] transcended the myth of Sicily’s 
insularity, essentialised in the independence of the Sicilian homeland (patria 
Siciliana). (Marino 1979a: 199) 
The communist minister’s law expressed solidarity with the peasantry while, at the 
same time, aiming to capitalise politically on the movement’s legalism, supported 
cooperativist management of land in Sicily as a projection of a collectivist future.12 The 
consolidation of class conscious braccianti masses around this mode of legalism 
counteracted the ‘inter-classist’ alliances of the urban-based absentee landlords of the rural 
areas (Marino 1979b: 178). The revolutionary legality of the landless peasants was coupled 
with the radical legalism of the most progressive agricultural law proposal in Italian history. 
Gullo’s decrees were contested within the Coalition government (Renda 1980: 48). The 
main Segni decree (September 1946) extended their impact, proliferating opportunities for 
cooperativist agriculture (Di Matteo 1967: 484). These developments allowed the braccianti 
to impose, through activist means, legislation suspended by the Italian state, which 
appeared unclear about the agrarian reform it had planned. Post-war legislation allowed 
only a small scope for worker/peasant political action directed against mafia and absentee 
landlords. A Sicilian sociologist asserts: 
The [Gullo and Segni] decrees were not revolutionary in themselves; the problem was 
to have laws that would set the large landless masses in action, from a class position 
                                                 
12 ‘The cooperative is the cell of the future socialist organisation’, noted Gullo (quoted in Rossi-Doria 1983: 
106). 
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counteracting the reactionary hegemony. ... The decrees were ‘revolutionary’ in that 
context; the terrain of the struggle was laid out by the decrees; this allowed for the 
rupture of the inter-classist policy and for the formation of a social block alternative 
to the dominant one. (Brigaglia 1977: 41; emphasis added) 
When Brigaglia states that the decrees ‘allowed for the rupture of the inter-classist 
policy and for the formation of a social block alternative to the dominant one’, what he is 
referring to is the mobilisation of peasants around ‘revolutionary legality’ a class-based 
movement pulled together through interactions with progressive legal policies. The Gullo 
decrees were the outcome of exceptional circumstances and did not represent any long 
standing pro-peasant radical policy in Sicily. They are significant however, because they 
brought into being a tradition of revolutionary legalism in Sicily (relevant to contemporary 
antimafia cooperatives as well: see 3.2.5). Members of the antimafia cooperatives today 
took up these measures on the ground (literally) and constantly refer to them. The 
emergence of this ‘revolutionary legality’ is critical because it marks out one way in which 
Sicily is very different from many other cases, where land occupations are self-consciously 
in defiance of a legal order. Contemporary examples include the reclaimed factories in 
Argentina and workers’ ‘horizontalism’ (Sitrin 2006), or almost any squat (Bey 2008). Sicily 
in the late 1940s became a point of compromise, where leftist politicians managed to get a 
legal framework friendly to occupations organised by landless workers and 
cooperativisation into law, because conservative forces assumed as a matter of course that 
these would never be enforced. Mafia arrangements were obviously one extreme example 
of the on-the-ground forces that ensured it would never happen. This meant there was an 
unusual situation where the common interest of the state, of protecting the interests of 
major property owners, was not only privatised (which is hardly unusual) but criminalised, on 
paper, and occupations were often at least ostensibly legal. As noted (2.3.2), there are other 
examples, notably Brazil’s MST, where this happens, but even there legality is just seen as a 
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loophole (Stedile 2002). This different orientation to legality in the Sicilian Left is central to 
current configurations of the antimafia movement. 
While the Coalition national government in summer 1947 was suffering internal 
tensions (the tensions regarding the Gullo degrees are an example of this), regional 
elections took place in Sicily. The triumph of the People’s Block (Blocco del Popolo, a 
coalition of the PCI and the PSI, the socialist party, which gained 30.4% of the vote, when 
the conservative party came second with 20.5%) shook the political system at large. 
Nationally, this contributed to the May 1947 crisis; locally, it had violent, destabilising 
effects linked to the peasantry’s fear to oppose the mafia (Santino 2006). Regional elections 
on 18 April 1947 signalled the victory of the Popular Block, a large coalition representing 
the radicalised landless peasants (Smith 1987). The twofold character of the peasant 
movement (its militancy and activism coupled with its legalism and parliamentary 
representation) suggests that their activism aimed to establish a fair agrarian reform that 
would endorse and promote cooperativism. Prevailing over mafia’s sicilianismo (regionalism) 
was a success: the electoral triumph was a surprise, as it flew in the face of what I described 
in the previous section as urban alliances between mafiosi and the separatist landlord class 
(Marchese 2006: 58). Signor Nicosia from the Casa del Popolo, who was a 22-year-old 
bracciante at the time of the elections, had joined the communist party and voted for the 
Popular Block and felt that ‘the world had started to make sense at last’. I was struck by his 
passionate will to share his experience, as we sat at the table where he and his friends, such 
as signor Schirò, passed most of their day. They were fascinated by discussing contemporary 
politics, enjoying the company of the young, and noted that many youngsters’ interest in 
the peasant movement was ‘boosted by the [contemporary] antimafia cooperatives, which 
do a good job in keeping our history alive’.  
Nicosia then told me about the events at Portella on May Day 1947, as the crowds 
of largely landless peasants gathered to celebrate a day of rest and post-election political 
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euphoria: gunfire into the crowd of braccianti families caused mayhem. People from the 
three villages that led the peasant movement were killed and wounded. Scattering, people 
ran across the hills and back down to their villages. No one could tell at that point who was 
shooting: ‘bullets came from all sides’ (Casarrubea 2005: 250). Many in the Casa del Popolo 
were Portella survivors but, as signor Nicosia’s storytelling was most vivid, his comrades let 
him narrate: 
... we had won at the 18th of April [elections]; we took part in the elections with the 
Blocco del Popolo, under the flag of Garibaldi. And we took to the street for only the 
third time after so many years of Fascism, to celebrate our victory and the 1st of 
May. And Barbato’s rock [explained below] was approachable for the first time. That 
piece of granite stood there in the midst of the place and had become a symbol for 
the demonstrations. Before and during the early years of Fascism the braccianti who 
demonstrated along with their families went there to eat. So we reached that and, as 
in the days of our fathers, set to munch the bread and onion. And then there was 
the havoc. The shootings and the running … all of a sudden. People started fleeing 
the place. I was scared. The most incredible thing was the horses’ screams ... like 
sirens from everywhere around; a hellish sound, very frightening. And we saw 
horses covered in blood…. 
Signor Schirò (interrupting):  
... we were the three revolutionary villages. And we took it [to Portella] in Mayday; 
landless peasants. We made our way to Portella, all hugging each other, [people] 
from San Giovanni, from San Cipiriddu, on the first of May and other occasions. 
To celebrate the memory of the Fasci... And in ‘47, I was, when they started 
shooting, right by Barbato’s rock. I was 10 metres away from my uncle who was 
holding the socialist flag all this time, as people rose from eating and started 
running around. And in the end there were like 6 of us [from Chiana] and 5 from 
San Giovanni and 2 from San Cipiriddu who were shot.  
Many of those present in the Casa del Popolo, agreed that ‘the dead of Portella call 
for justice; they ask who armed the Portella killers’. An ex-communist, who had fled Sicily 
for Australia immediately after Portella, told me, ‘Not a single President of the Republic 
came over to apologise and honour us for the first massacre of the state [strage di Stato] in 
modern Italian history’. It is widely believed in Alto Belice that Portella was the first of 
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many ambiguous violent eruptions in which the state’s secret services were involved. 
Interestingly, people today do not recognise historical borders between mafia and state 
violence in events like Portella. There is debate among historians about whether the 
massacre was an ambush of the demonstration by mafiosi (Manali 2001), or by the infamous 
Giuliano gang recruited by mafiosi (Dickie 2004; Lomartire 2007) or by an alliance of neo-
fascists and US secret services working closely with mafia (Casarrubea 2005: 251). Relations 
between mafia and banditry in specific moments of historical tensions have also been 
discussed (Hobsbawm 1965; 1972).  
My interlocutors, however, do agree on Portella’s solemn commemoration as a site 
of the ‘most dearly felt’ May Day celebrations in Sicily – and one of the most important in 
Italy. Thirteen rocks lie in symbolic representation of the thirteen people shot dead in the 
tragic event. A sad poem in the Sicilian dialect is carved on a 14th rock, the so-called ‘stone 
of Barbato’.  
  
Two monuments commemorating the peasant struggles of the late 1940s 
Photo 10: The ‘stone of 
Barbato’ with a poem 
inscribed on it, at the 
Portella della Ginestra site 
Photo 11: Right: monument to the mafia’s victims in San 
Giovanni: the intellectual, the peasant and the youth, under 
the Blocco banner, are portrayed in ‘socialist realism’ style, 
while a mother is protecting her wounded child. 
I joined May Day there in 2009, alongside antimafia cooperatives members. A few 
committed unionists from Chiana and Palermo had marched earlier in the morning from 
the Casa in Chiana (4 kms away) to the site. They were joined there by hundreds of families 
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coming from Palermo in a convoy of cars, parked for a couple of kilometres along the 
main road linking San Giovanni to Chiana. A local brass band played throughout, adding a 
suggestive note to the sunny day, as the music mixed with horns, talks and young laughter. 
The celebratory feel to the day peaked when the band started playing the Italian partisan 
song Bella Ciao and the Internationale, while the 8 mayors of Alto Belice villages (and 
members of the Consortium) walked to the ‘stone of Barbato’ to lay their commemorative 
offerings. Many in the crowd laughed, as some mayors, visibly annoyed, were known 
supporters of the far right. 
The lives of some of the current antimafia cooperatives workers had been indirectly 
influenced by the Portella events. Peppe from San Giovanni was 40 at the time of 
fieldwork, and so not yet born in 1947, but Portella had had an impact on his family’s 
history. Although the family were by no means leftist militants, his young aunt had gone to 
Portella with her nine-year-old daughter and her husband to participate in the feast along 
with their friends and were caught in the crossfire. Fearing further retaliation, they went to 
Tuscany and settled there. Peppe’s older brother had immigrated to Germany some years 
later. Anna’s name is inscribed on Barbato’s rock but Peppe has never been to the Portella 
site to see it. As he tells it, the family ‘fled due to mafia influence. Portella was a lesson to 
the landless movement at large: mafiosi showed they were ready for everything’. Very sad, he 
told me: 
My little cousin, Anna, I often think of her, although I never met her. If she were 
alive today she’d be 28 years older than me! She was running with her mum, she got 
the bullet in her head, my aunt did not understand what happened, as she was 
running scared in the mayhem, she still had the little hand in her hand, dragging a 
body covered in blood… then she took her to San Giovanni… the kid died there. 
Contemporary antimafia cooperatives invest in projects of ‘social tourism’, which 
included visits to Portella. During the one-day, urban visitors sit next to Portella’s rocks 
and hear a guide narrate the 1947 events. Falcone employs young Palermitans as guides 
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seasonally on day contracts. I noticed that these cooperative representatives ‘explained’ the 
communist politics of the Portella demonstration by stating that ‘the peasants were 
communists for a piece of bread’. Roberto, a 25-year-old tourist guide for the cooperative 
Falcone, explained to me that ‘Libera advises us to be moderate’. At the same time, he also 
thought contemporary antimafia cooperatives continued the radical struggles ‘for land’. ‘At 
home I say things similar to Chiana’s old men, but here it’s a job, and I have to be 
cautious,’ he specified.  
The tour guide’s remarks are representative of the way contemporary antimafia 
cooperatives deal with the history of the antimafia movement, summarising the various 
ways continuities with the past are articulated with current processes. As Gavin Smith 
notes, activists ‘select out from and reformulate various patterns of tradition’ (1999: 188) 
and this also characterises antimafia cooperatives depiction of the history of the area’s 
cooperativism and antimafia. Cooperativism, like communism in Sicily, mingled so saliently 
with the antimafia movement that it appears like a modular concept being ‘translanted, with 
varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be 
merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations’ 
(Anderson 1983: 4). Therefore, cooperative models, like in Anderson’s scheme for 
nationalist ones, are adaptable to local contexts – and give voice to inchoate local desires by 
formulating them in terms of an imagined community. This approach shows that 
cooperativism has been a ‘modular’ notion (sensu Anderson), both in the historical 
specificities of its manifestations and in the ways people reminisce on it, reproduce it and 
commemorate it today. Its local historical development embraced the antimafia movement 
and evolved through it. 
The members of contemporary antimafia cooperatives downplayed the 
‘revolutionary legality’ of the Alto Belice peasants, in favour of promoting (and reading 
historical events through) a moderate political discourse. Their view recognised the 
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importance of employing legality (legalità) but excluded the ‘revolutionary legality’ of the 
Alto Belice peasants in favour of moderate contemporary reflections on history and the 
present. In the next section I look at the local political economy introduced by the agrarian 
reform. 
 
Photo 12: Checco gives a speech to gathered tourists, explaining the history of the Portella 
massacre, at the actual site of the historical event. 
3.2 Cooperative Wineries and Markets 
3.2.1. The agrarian reform: a shift in class relations (1950s) 
The most significant policy after Sicily became autonomous in 194613, was the 1953 
agrarian reform introduced by law number 841/50. Views on this reform in the relevant 
literature vary widely, many dubbing it a disaster. Most of my informants among local 
viticulturers and trade unionists in Alto Belice, however, looked back to the reform 
sympathetically. Nevertheless, some bitterly reflected on the lost opportunity for a ‘new 
world’ that the pre-reform cooperative movement had sought. Since the late 1920s, the 
PCI had been critical of the long awaited reform, as Gramsci pointed out: 
The Turin communists (though they supported division of the land, subordinated 
to the solidarity action of the two classes) themselves warned against ‘miraculist’ 
illusions in a mechanical sharing out of the big estates.  
                                                 
13 Although it never became independent, Sicily was proclaimed an ‘autonomous Region’ of Italy. Today it is 
one of the five regions that have their own special autonomy, the only one with a parliament, and by far the 
largest. The Sicilian Assembly has the power to decide important issues such as the direction of EU funds for 
agriculture and health.  
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In the same article, of 3 January, we find:  
What can a poor peasant achieve by occupying uncultivated or poorly cultivated 
lands? Without machinery, without accommodation on the place of work, without 
credit to tide him over till harvest-time, without cooperative institutions to acquire 
the harvest .... (Gramsci 1927: 5) 
With the application of the Gullo decrees to the uncultivated and poorly cultivated 
lands a few years back, the swiftly constituted grassroots agrarian cooperatives managed 
land across more people, in comparison to the post-reform situation. Cooperatives in 1946 
shared more than 86,000 ha, among their 50,000 members; 99,049 ha were allocated by 
1950, of which 17,157 to braccianti and poor peasants and 24,759 ha to 7,712 small-holders 
(Santino 1997: 17). Therefore, the social base which the state’s agrarian reform reached was 
more limited in scope, than the peasant movement’s achievements. Moreover, the 
cooperativist organisation that rendered the peasants able for collective bargaining in 
reaching urban markets was substituted by a small-holder economy. The law aimed at 
shaping a small-proprietor class, offering land to individual families as opposed to 
collective organisations (as in Pratt 1994). It hence discouraged the formation of 
cooperatives and thus simultaneously deprived the locals of their main means of political 
and antimafia organisation. Many peasants, bereft of means of production other than land 
and of credit facilities, became dependent and vulnerable, resulting in another wave of mass 
emigration in the 1950s. A parliamentary commission set up by the PCI opined that, after 
the local barons had shared land among their kin, by 1949, 1,400 ha (mainly of vineyard) of 
land was left abandoned just in the Alto Belice village of San Giovanni alone. The 
commission found, for instance, 450 ha in the ownership of ‘the prince of Principe, the 
gabellotti being the four brothers Caruso, known mafiosi of the Sacco clan, nicknamed the 
‘Caesar of Western Sicily’, as well as two other latifundia whose mafia gabellotti financed 
bandits (quoted in di Matteo 1967: 271). 
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The official figures identify 2.33 ha as the median landholding for each family that 
benefited from the land reform, with 93,075 ha of land overall effectively allocated. The 
number of peasants who received land was given as 105,324, representing 10.7% of the 
island’s population (state documents cited in Riforma 1950). The statistics fail to capture the 
overall distress that the agrarian reform brought about. The median land holding of my 
informants in 2009 was 3.5 ha of vineyards, a good portion of which could be traced back 
to 1953, passed on through inheritance. The statistics fail to capture the overall distress that 
the agrarian reform brought about. 
Almost all my peasant informants from Alto Belice and specifically from San 
Giovanni were heirs to land tracts their parents had acquired through the agrarian reform. 
The overall positive memory of ‘the shifting point’, as some locals called the break-up of 
the latifundo, is reinforced by the relatively atypical position of San Giovanni on the 
agrarian reform map as one of the few ‘islands’ in Sicily that benefited from ‘state-funded 
modernisation (planning and investment)’ (Finley et al. 1986: 219). For Finley et al., overall, 
‘though conservative, particularly in their failure to encourage cooperatives, the laws of 
1950 did induce change and perhaps 750,000 acres of new farms were created as a direct 
result’ (Finley et al. 1986: 219). Other historians (Renda 1976) are equally sympathetic to 
the reform. By contrast, a number of anthropologists and sociologists regard the reform in 
Sicily as a ‘failure’ (Schneider and Schneider 1996: 250–54), ‘a failed land reform’ which had 
‘political intentions’ (Blok 1974: 79) or an ‘anti-reform’ or ‘counter-reform’ (Santino 2000), 
some making links to critiques of South American agrarian reforms (Gledhill 1991). 
My argument follows the latter line of analysis, contributing reflections on the 
characteristics of the policy behind the reform both for the ‘revolutionary’ and ‘communist’ 
San Giovanni (so deeply entrenched in peasant and antimafia struggles) and for Sicily at 
large. The agrarian reform is important for my thesis because of the overall shift in class 
balances it created and – mainly – because it eliminated grassroots cooperativism 
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altogether. In this thesis, I pay attention to unplanned and unintended consequences of 
state action. However, what here seems an unintended consequence of state policy was in 
fact thoroughly planned. Alongside the immediate (relatively fair, albeit limited) land 
distribution consequence of the agrarian reform there was an intended one (break-up of 
cooperativism) that had longer term, enduring and politically important impacts on Sicily: 
the main – and entirely intended – result of the agrarian reform was to destroy radical 
bracciante cooperativism through fragmenting land into family tracts. Pratt makes a similar 
case for the 1953 reform in Tuscany, where ‘a class of family members emerged not 
through market forces but through the direct action of the state’ (1994: 63), arguing that 
the de-radicalisation of the PCI-sympathetic ex-sharecroppers was the political aim of the 
land reform.  
Moreover, during the years of turbulence that preceded the reform, many large 
estates had already split into peasant leaseholds. By dividing their property among relatives, 
landlords escaped the effects of the legislation (Blok 1974: 77–79; Mack Smith 1968). 
Therefore, the latifundo were only nominally broken up; in fact, most (absentee) wealthy 
families retained the land (Blok 1966). Their large estates were dissolved but the local class 
structure and de facto family power over large tracts of land was largely left unchallenged. 
The reform pacified a revolutionary peasantry: as it influenced class relations, the peasantry 
antimafia mobilisation itself changed, soon after the reform took place. As most of my 
interlocutors were born after 1953, they were brought up in smallholder families and began 
to mobilise around producer-based cooperativism as the way to tackle the loss of control 
over the means of production that the reform had inflicted on their fathers’ generation. 
Gaining not only access to markets but bargaining power became the aim in the new 
context, and this meant sidelining brokers, the role that mafia had come to monopolize. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I show how this took place. 
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3.2.2. ‘Senzali’ brokers and cooperative wineries (1960s) 
Viticulture, people’s main occupation at my ethnographic research site, is central to 
my research. While the Alto Belice area also comprises villages such as Curriuni, 
traditionally focused on cereal-centred agriculture, in San Giovanni, the overwhelming 
majority of my local informants in and around the antimafia cooperatives were families 
committed to monocrop viticulture for generations. As wineries are the outcome of 
historical interactions between culture, politics, kinship and economy, looking at 
cooperative wineries allows us to examine the richness of social relations of production. I 
show that peasant integration into broader organisational structures took place through 
struggles to organise the vinification processes. This was pivotal for political alliances and 
relationships both against the local mafia. Exploitation by mafia brokerage and the political 
commitment of some locals produced local moves towards cooperativism, as peasants 
sought to reach urban markets. The cooperative winery is the main focus of my analysis, as 
the basic unit of production around which interests of various social groups and individuals 
overlapped. Through it, I trace political mobilisation and antimafia organisation. 
Understanding Alto Belice requires looking closely at the social conduits of change 
and economic development related to vinification. Sangiovannari viticulturers set up 
institutions to integrate the production and commercialisation processes, establishing 
cooperative wineries for grape processing and engaging with the wine trade. Before it could 
reach markets, wine had to be produced and viticulture peasants focused first on the 
process of transforming the fruit of the land into a finished product, identifying common 
ownership of technological means to make wine at reduced costs as the way forward: 
viticulturers organised themselves collectively while retaining their families’ economic 
‘autonomy’,14 as informants put it, guaranteed through the land reform distribution of 
                                                 
14 On the autonomy of the peasant household, see the vast discussion stemming from Chayanov (1986 
[1925]) and Lenin (2004 [1899]), effectively problematised by Gavin Smith, who shows that ‘autonomous’ 
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vineyards. In this way, they continued the communitarian legacy of the braccianti movement, 
while building on the new property dynamics instituted by the agrarian reforms. The 
ideology of class was now linked to the ‘autonomy’ of the household, as noted in a 
historical ethnography of a viticulture economy in Southwestern Sicily (Schneider and 
Schneider 1996). 
People committed to vine cultivation in Alto Belice experienced a fairly rapid 
transition from being braccianti to occupying (unstable) positions in the new class 
formations. In guaranteeing a piece of vineyard to each family, the agrarian reform had 
tackled only one economic grievance. The problem, which inspired cooperative wineries, 
was the speculative power that the mafia exercised in determining the price of the grapes. 
Even in the latifundist period, a rising class had moved out of rent-capitalism into 
becoming middlemen (Blok 1974: 67), setting the price of grapes (Davis 1981; Bandiera 
2003a; 2003b). Schneider and Schneider, in the context of monocrop agriculture in Sicily, 
call this mafia activity ‘broker capitalism’ (1976: 160). Hence the impetus for establishing 
viticulture cooperatives:15 it guaranteed a piece of vineyard to each family. Viticulturers still 
needed to process the produce; the establishment of cooperative wineries came as an 
outcome of this concern. 
In Alto Belice, ‘broker capitalism’ was identified with the figure of the senzale, 
central to local configurations of the hinterland’s integration into urban markets. The senzali 
worked for wine merchants in Palermo, Rome or abroad, dictating price levels and buying 
the harvests of independent producers at low prices. They acted coercively but also aimed 
to create a relative degree of consensus; this helped them coordinate with each other and 
                                                                                                                                               
peasants pursue their livelihoods in a multiplicity of practices (1989); I take up this problematic 
ethnographically in Chapter 5. Chayanov influenced Sahlins’ concept of the ‘domestic mode of production’ 
(1972) but has also been criticised (Harris 1984), and since then by many feminist anthropologists (see the 
discussion in Narotzky 1997, especially pp. 129-137). Gudeman’s model formulated around the ‘base’ of the 
‘house’ is more useful here, although he also speaks of subsistence, which is impossible in viticulture, as the 
produce is not edible; similarly for coffee producers (Roseberry 1983). 
15 Of course, vinification was irrelevant to peasants before the reform, as they did not own land or produce. 
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rendered them systemic to the functioning of wine’s economy. This coordination led 
different mafia clans to come together in Cosa Nostra (Lodato 2006), guaranteeing 
efficiency for their brokerage. After the agrarian reforms, therefore, mafiosi clans and their 
affiliates shifted from controlling people’s labour to acting as middlemen between 
producers and the market. In Alto Belice, to this day, these middlemen are called senzali. 
Threatened by low prices and a non-existent bargaining power, peasants, who 
themselves or through their broader families (genealogically and laterally) had participated 
in struggles as braccianti, faced new form of dependence in the late 1950s through senzali 
control of prices and markets. This gave rise to further struggles that aimed to address 
market insecurity. The peasant movement recuperated, almost within a generation, the 
experience of the bracciante mobilisations. Change in landed property relations in Sicily did 
not result in shifts in wealth distribution (Schneider and Schneider 2006). The experience 
of the land occupations and the mafia violence against them had crafted a movement that 
mobilised anti-mafia sentiments. In viticulture, produce processing helped to transform this 
antimafia social dynamism of land-owning peasants. The winery substituted land as the 
resource around which peasants’ collective claims were formulated: the peasant movement 
therefore became a massive social participation for cooperation in reaching urban markets 
with their wine), avoiding mafiosi brokers. 
3.2.3. The peasant movement cooperative winery Sancipiriddu  
The cooperative winery Sancipiriddu in the village of San Cipiriddu, at the outskirts 
of San Giovanni, established in 1968, was the main outcome of the cooperative 
movement’s mobilisation, and the majority of locals soon joined it. At the time of 
fieldwork, the winery had 800 members. Trade unionists I spoke with described this huge 
enterprise as ‘the FIAT of our area’, – ‘the main source of income for locals’ as well as 
social integration through labour. The winery became, for people in Alto Belice, a means of 
community-building and policy making, which also influenced their political representation. 
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The cooperative movement and, with that, the antimafia mobilisation of the peasantry, 
peaked in establishing the Sancipiriddu. Giulio Rillo, the middle-aged incumbent president 
of Sancipiriddu, spoke to me of its origins:  
The Sancipiriddu winery comes from the ‘60s ... it gathered around it the 
communists of the area; my father was also there. Italiano16 together with 30 other 
people, communists and not, created this cooperative, because in the area there 
were people buying grapes from the producer to determine its price, directing 
everything ... there were those people of the area, we call them i senzali... today they 
call them brokers ... Well, the famous senzale decided the price ... the word [senzale], 
translated from Arabic, means ‘people roaming like this’, tradesmen. So, they always 
decided who acquired the grape – most often they were linked to the mafia, they 
were mafiosi. This is the reason people made the coop, basically, to avoid the senzali 
activity. 
Becoming a cooperative member of the Sancipiriddu winery entailed integrating 
into political participation, guided for three decades (until the PCI disbanded in 1991) by 
the communist party. Similarly, in Tuscany, the PCI’s support contributed to the 
emergence of formal cooperatives (Pratt 1994: 73). The offspring of a vanguard 
commitment of local communist peasants, with immediate experiences of mafia violence 
and family memories of the Fasci, Sancipiriddu began as the cooperative attempt of a few 
families and spread through the area through kinship and friendship ties (Terranova 2006). 
It started to grow in the early 1970s, largely as part of PCI policies, attracting state funding 
aimed at displacing the role of mafia and incorporating peasants into the political system, 
and, partly containing the mafia’s influence. This was partly due to the alliance with the 
village branch of the CGIL union (affiliated to the PCI), which lobbied the party for 
support. The cooperative thus had grown out of a political movement, established itself 
through political institutions and played a central role in integrating people into political 
parties. 
                                                 
16 As portrayed in the book-homage to him entitled The Man of The Vines (L’uomo delle vigne, Terranova 
2006), Pino Italiano, 82 when I met him, was still loyal to the PCI, which he thought was capable of antimafia 
struggle. 
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The integration of producers into cooperativism generated representatives within 
the peasant movement who translated this momentum into rural political and 
administrative power. Since their inception in the 1960s, cooperative-wineries have been 
led by people with explicit political commitments, in Palermo and beyond. Nationally, the 
cooperative movement developed through two opposed routes: red cooperativism, 
supported by Legacoop and the PCI, and white cooperativism, sustained by Unicoop and 
DC. Industrial sociology has shown that cooperatives, fundamental to Italian capitalism, 
have supported small-scale entrepreneurship throughout Italy, alongside local 
administrations (Trigilia 1983; 1986) and family networks (Blim 1990). What is distinctive 
about Alto Belice is that Sancipiriddu’s links to PCI political patronage was in pursuit of 
further protection against the mafia.17 In this way, peasant organisations sought to de-
provincialise their concerns with mafia intimidation, making sure these concerns are 
represented on state level. Contemporary antimafia cooperatives continue to seek such 
patronage today and Legacoop and CGIL suggest to them new people to recruit as 
cooperative members.  
Acquiring positions in local political echelons, or getting involved in the 
Sancipiriddu winery, in turn implied being constantly exposed to mafia retaliations, a 
danger recognised in the way people spoke of communism using idioms of bravery as well 
as ideology18 The local experience of communism and antimafia was expressed in different 
but inter-relating idioms, communism here functioning as a moral discourse. Interviewing 
peasants who had been militant for red cooperativism in their youth, I found they used 
terms like ‘courage’ or ‘manliness’ to describe their 1960s and 1970s ‘communist’ 
commitment. The development of local communism is informed by reputations for being 
                                                 
17 Analogies can be drawn with the similar activity of most administrators of the current antimafia 
cooperatives, as per sections 5.3 and 4.1. Specifically in 4.3, I critique the notion of political patronage in the 
contemporary antimafia cooperatives.  
18 See also 4.2 for an ethnographic discussion of idioms of bravery in current cooperatives. 
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‘courageous’, still recognised today (Li Causi 1993). Communism, akin to cooperativism, 
and existing alongside it, is a ‘modular’ notion: a standardised political concept that adapts 
to the specifics (including antimafia struggle) of Sicily’s historical and geographical context. 
People involved in the antimafia cooperatives today, in employing a vaguely leftist rhetoric, 
draw upon the ‘thin red lines’ they feel they have inherited from previous decades. 
As mentioned, Pino Italiano was the most influential communist peasant organiser, 
establishing the Valle Mato cooperative in 1963, which evolved into the Sancipiriddu in 
1968. His commitment to anti-broker organisation established him as an outspoken 
antimafia leader as well. He became the first president of Sancipiriddu in 1968, keeping the 
position until 2000 when he nominated Rillo as his successor. They both became mayors of 
San Cipiriddu, for 12 years overall. Rillo was himself the son of an influential communist 
peasant, active in the constitution of the Sancipiriddu winery. The management of the 
winery remained shared between the two families from 1968 and until today, a policy that 
is branded as ‘Stalinist’ by many young peasants today. Reflecting on Pino, in interviews 
Rillo described him as a ‘life teacher’ and a ‘benefactor whom I have followed since my 
youth’. The winery presidents often suffered mafia intimidations in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which escalated in the violence of the early 1990s: in 1994, the San Cipiriddu mafia clan 
Agrigento burnt the cars and country homes of the then mayor Rillo and his deputy mayor 
Italiano. Local unionists insist these represented the mafia policy of destroying ‘the 
Sancipiriddu consensus’. The agents of the Lavoro e Altro and the Falcone cooperatives 
issued frequent statements in support of Sancipiriddu. Before they set up Centopassi, their 
own winery, in 2009, the antimafia cooperatives used Sancipiriddu for their vinification, 
choosing it for political reasons as their members felt a ‘political kinship to the old 
generation’, as Piero, the cooperatives’ 35-year-old agronomist told me. This suggests a 
certain historical continuity within the antimafia cooperativist movement, as I discuss in the 
closing section of this chapter.  
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The peasant consensus formed around the Sancipiriddu19 thus implies that the 
efforts to form a cooperative winery were undertaken in order to sideline mafia brokerage 
and gain direct access to markets and to consolidate political alliances capable of 
guaranteeing long-term security against mafia senzali. Pratt argues that consensus around 
the PCI meant that social relations were experienced under a communist umbrella (2003: 
73). Correspondingly, it should be emphasised that the politicised antimafia movement was 
organically rooted in relations of production (as inflected by Gramsci 1972): neither the 
outcome of urban intellectual organisation nor an offspring of the middle classes, it was the 
result of collective responses to mafia broker capitalism. These responses affected both 
cooperativism and antimafia politics and constituted a constant backdrop against which 
antimafia cooperatives still operate today, and to which my informants made constant 
references. In the case of Sancipiriddu, the antimafia movement shaped relations of 
production, distribution, and indeed cooperativism, while antimafia politics, since the 
‘recuperation’ of the Sancipiriddu winery, reflected its values: leftist politics combined with 
peasant autonomy, but signifying a withdrawal from immediate post-war claims to 
revolutionary transformation and collective use of land. 
With the passing of time peasant autonomy became problematic: the mounting 
crisis of the management of the cooperative winery seemed irresolvable at the time of 
fieldwork. Families’ pressing need for waged work contributed to contemporary antimafia 
cooperatives stressing their role as offering employment and framing cooperativism as 
(paid) work. In the 1980s, although political clientelism (initially advantageous to most 
producers, through the Sancipiriddu) had persisted, remuneration of producers was 
becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. Anthropological studies have stressed the perils that 
common ownership of some of the means of production entails for peasants’ real 
                                                 
19 The actual mechanics of coop wineries were simple: each family harvests their own grapes which they did 
not sell on the market but put together in making wine on a collective vinification site. 
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autonomy. Anthropologists influenced by Marxism have underlined, in these processes, 
peasants’ ‘subsumption to capital’ (Narotzky 2001), their ‘super-exploitation’ as peasants 
semi-proletarianised by merchant capital (Roseberry 1978; 1983, 1989), and exploitation in 
class-informed patronage (Li Causi 1980). These ethnographies suggest similarities with 
Sicily, involving stages of political mediation among hinterland, city, region and state 
encountered elsewhere in the Mediterranean too (Ghezzi 2007; Narotzky and Smith 2006; 
Levy 1996). Similarly to post-Portella mafia aggression in Alto Belice, memories of 
Francoist violence in Spain impacted on people’s political activity (‘becoming politicos’) 
(Narotzky and Smith 2006); having depoliticising effects on cooperatives (Narotzky 1997: 
190), which came to reflect images of bureaucracy rather than reciprocal links between 
members (Smith 1999: 179). However in Sicily, sidelining the mafia, contributed to a 
politicisation of the peasantry, organised in cooperative wineries. 
The involvement of state funding in cooperative wineries was fundamental to party 
politics in the area. The ‘presence of the state’, that my informants so heatedly debated, is 
historically shown through public funding of cooperative wineries – since the 1970s and till 
now – and talk of patronage. Political alliances are visible in cooperatives proposing 
different models of production corresponded to competing political parties’ funding 
policies. In their turn, parties were integrated in broader balances of Cold War affiliations, 
for instance the PCI propagating the ‘Communist World’. The Sancipiriddu winery sprang 
out of claims and horizontal relations of the peasant movement, incorporated in leftist 
party politics. The Sancipiriddu ‘consensus’ is an interesting case of rural politics and 
economics marked by the developments of peasants’ organisation to combat the mafiosi’s 
activity. This model is less evident in the area’s ‘white’ coop winery, owned and controlled 
by a family who retrospectively criticise political intervention in cooperativism. 
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3.2.4. The Miccis: cooperative winery Fusa 
Before I first visited Mario Micci, the richest wine producer of the area, local 
peasants told me the most contradictory stories about him as having colluded with or 
persecuted by the mafia. As I sat in his comfortable living room, he very quickly launched 
into criticisms of Sancipiriddu: ‘the politics informing the organisation of production could 
not survive in contemporary times’, adding that ‘cooperatives are associated with the state, 
they have always been assistentialist,20 corporatist ... they formed a parasitic class, which 
was receiving Cold War subsidies for 40 years.’ His family were pioneers of ‘white’ 
cooperation. The Micci family, heading Fusa, the other great coop winery of the area 
established in the late ‘60s, moved out of the state subsidy system through a joint venture 
with their privately owned company, Trasi, in the late 1990s. The firm was the most 
important wine entrepreneur of the village, permanently listed among the most successful 
Italian wine firms. 
Mario, a 50-year-old single man, affluent yet inconspicuously integrated in the 
village, lived at his family home with his elderly father, a rich farmer, cooperative broker 
and peasant organiser, who positioned himself ‘in the tradition of Sicilian country gentlemen’ 
(my emphasis). The walls of the grand room where we met were covered with the portraits 
of family ancestors, arranged in genealogical order. Mario explained in detail:  
That person, bearing the same name as mine, was the mayor of the village in 1830; 
that one next to him started producing in bulk for export to England in 1840, using 
land in emphiteusis,21 which was first acquired by that gentleman over there in the 
oldest portrait, painted in 1810. 
Mario and his brother had studied medicine at the prestigious Padua University, 
just like their father; but ‘the soil called us back’, he told me as he served coffee. I noted the 
class-inflected aversion that mafiosi provoked in the Miccis. As Mario put it, alongside the 
                                                 
20 He means that they depended on state assistance, through funding. 
21 The system of emphiteusis was important in the rise of the rural bourgeois class in Sicily (Blok 1974: 40).  
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‘country gentlemen’, a parasitic criminal class had started to thrive after the Risorgimento in 
the 1860s. He described how the mafiosi (whom he called ‘stinking shepherds’22) threatened 
his father with kidnapping his children (Mario and his brother) when they were infants. 
The boys had been sent to boarding school in Florence and visited Sicily once a year, 
during which time they were confined to the house. 
Mario had acquired the position of winery president from his father, and in 
1997encouraged the integration of the production process between Fusa and Trasi, 
establishing an assembly contract with the family’s private company. Despite this 
transformation, the Miccis boast that Fusa is still a healthy ‘white cooperative’, which has 
countered Sancipiriddu and united part of the anti-communist ‘catholic world’ (Trigilia 
1986). The family takes pride in saying they were ‘the IBM of the area,23 not its FIAT’, 
distinguishing their cooperative from the Sancipiriddu. Maurizio described the family 
coalition that created Maranfusa: 
Maranfusa was born out of my father’s plan to create a fortified farmhouse 
(masseria) .... Instead of building the masseria like a landlord, my father convinced 
500 families, who were neither mafiosi nor communist but sympathetic to centrist 
politics, and united them under the umbrella of solidarity and profit. This has 
represented for us a web of consensus ... that saved us from getting killed, as this web 
created an invisible army .... Touching us like a family meant touching a web of 
consensus, an ensemble of families with common interests .... And it was, until a 
certain period, counterproductive for the criminals to dare an act of this kind; they 
were committing intimidating acts anyway, but never anything really significant. 
[emphasis added] 
This ‘white cooperativist’ model conceived and put in place by a bourgeois family 
of San Giovanni and countering the ‘red cooperativist’ model of the Sancipiriddu winery 
will be discussed further in the conclusion to this chapter, alongside broader ideas, to 
                                                 
22 He used the term ‘pecorai puzzolenti’. Brusca, in his autobiography, complains that urban mafiosi and upper 
class Palermitans alike called Alto Belice mafiosi ‘villagers’ or ‘peasants’ (viddani) (1999).  
23 Maurizio, interestingly, used the mafia-informed term ‘territorio’ (territory) to mean ‘area’, a term popular 
among local peasants as well. 
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suggest two competing forms of social consensus that tackled, to an extent, the mafia’s 
broker power and political influence in the area. 
3.2.5. The contemporary context: land confiscations and antimafia 
cooperatives  
In this final section of the historical ethnography, and segueing into the 
ethnographically informed account of contemporary antimafia cooperatives offered in 
Chapters 4 to 7, I shall briefly show how these contemporary cooperatives relate to the 
older ones, and how the history presented above links to the key issue of confiscations of 
mafia land in such a way that the historical process can be seen, as members say, ‘peaking 
in the contemporary cooperatives.’24 
As explained in the Introduction (1.2.1), all the contemporary cooperatives 
examined in this thesis cultivate land confiscated from the Alto Belice mafia by the state 
between 1996 and 2009 and, from 2000 onwards, bestowed on the cooperatives via the 
Consortium ‘Development and Legality’. Interestingly, one cannot help but see the exciting 
continuities with history: the work of the Consortium in distributing the confiscated land 
resources after 2000 amounts to a small-scale legal agrarian reform.25 Reading Consortium 
leaflets on ‘reconstituting unlawfully usurped land back to the collectivity and the 
community’ (Consorzio 2001), in the light of my informants’ approving views of peasants 
‘communal struggles’, I propose that the confiscations draw, ideologically, on the 
revolutionary interlude of the late 1940s, the only period in Sicilian history where land was 
collectively held. The identification of community and state is thus partly rooted in this 
reading of the historical circumstance. Moreover, judging from the Consortium’s rhetoric, 
when the state appropriated the assets from mafia landowners, this land confiscation took 
                                                 
24 See Appendix 6 for information on contemporary cooperatives’ capital, and production scale.  
25 As noted in the introduction, after the Consortium was set up in 2000, all confiscated land within the eight 
municipalities of Alto Belice was delegated to distribute the land and oversee its use. The municipalities retain 
ownership of the confiscated assets, the cooperatives holding only their usufruct. 
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place on a unique basis. The state meant to redistribute land back to the community in a 
Polanyist reversal of the enclosure of the commons (2001), a reversal that had not taken 
place after the war, much to peasants’ disappointment. In this picture the Consortium 
president, Matteo (drawing on what sounds like a Marxist account of primitive 
accumulation26), argued that state intervention corrects the mafiosi ‘usurping’ of the land, 
stealing what was ‘originally’ in the common domain and available to all. Arlacchi’s 
extensive arguments on the theme of ‘mafia primitive capital accumulation’ (Arlacchi 1983; 
1986; see also Cacciola 1984) seem retrospectively highly relevant to the state confiscations 
project still ongoing at the time of writing of this thesis, 16 years after its inception.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, after the mid 1990s the nexus between the state and 
Cosa Nostra (when their relationship shifted from connivance to conflict, triggered by an 
escalation of violence caused by Alto Belice mafia (Lodato 2001)), most local mafiosi were 
arrested, some jailed for life. Most arrests took place in 1996, the year the law on the ‘social 
use’ of the confiscations was passed. As noted many times earlier, the idea of ‘restituting 
the mafia land back to the community’ (Libera 2010) was promoted by civil society 
mobilisation, ‘spearheaded by the ‘urban antimafia movement’ (Schneider and Schneider 
2003), and peaking in 1996 with the passing of Law No. 109 of 1996.). The first land plot 
to be ‘restituted’, i.e. allocated to a social cooperative, was a vineyard previously owned by 
Totò ‘The Beast’ Riina, in Corleone, in 1999, bestowed on the Lavoro e Altro cooperative. 
Following the Consortium’s expansionary promotion of the need for ‘more cooperatives’ 
to accommodate the land ‘restituted to the community’, the Falcone, Borsellino and 
Liberanima cooperatives were born. Two older local cooperatives, Akragas and Paradiso, 
set up in 1998 before the Consortium came into being, had ceased to exist at the time of 
fieldwork (see 4.2).  
                                                 
26 Marx Capital, volume I, part VIII, Chapter 26: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation (2008: 363-366). 
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In Alto Belice, land confiscations hit mafiosi such as Riina, Brusca, Di Maggio, 
Genovese (all imprisoned for life between 1995 and 1998,27 or under witness protection 
status at the time of fieldwork). All these prominent Cosa Nostra clan leaders had been 
involved in heroin trafficking and had committed, or commissioned, hundreds of 
assassinations between 1982 and 1996. There were also other mafiosi (such as Netti and 
Baffi), who in 2009, while I was in the field, had already been released from prison, as they 
had never committed violent criminal acts. Such persons’ mafia status was disputed by 
locals; they were employers and, in our contacts, told me they thought of themselves as 
mainly ‘peasant entrepreneurs’. However, they had also invested in real estate locally and in 
landownership abroad (predominantly in Romania). Some local land holdings remained in 
mafiosi hands (see Chapter 6). 
Locals often mentioned to me how San Giovanni was called ‘Kabul’ or ‘Beirut’ in 
Palermo during the mid 1990s: Giovanni Brusca was still on the loose and even the Army 
was stationed in the village to tackle the mafia, with temporary curfews imposed (Corrado 
1998). By comparison, my fieldwork took place in a period of virtually no mafia crime and, 
indeed, no protection racketeering. While I was in San Giovanni, ‘only’ two mafia 
assassinations took place, when a Brusca clan member exterminated a rival clan. The 
decline of violence, however, did not imply that cooperative members were not afraid of 
some retaliations for the fact that they were cultivating confiscated property. Interestingly, 
the fear of violence was also inversely proportionate to the degree of familiarity of a 
member with the local context. Specifically, administrators of the cooperatives were more 
sensitive to minor instances of mafia threats and, local workers argued, ‘used them’ to 
attract media attention to the antimafia cooperatives.  
                                                 
27 An excellent account of arrests and trials of mafiosi in the mid-1980s is provided by Falcone (1986). We lack 
a comprehensive work accounting for more recent developments, although Lodato (2001) does offer 
interesting background on the Alto Belice arrests.  
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An example of this is how the Borsellino administrators reacted to a fire in their 
olive grove. Although the Carabinieri ruled out the possibility of mafia arson, a rock concert 
was quickly arranged to provide moral and material support to the ‘coop under threat’: 
organised locally, the concert took place within a month of the event. Featuring rock star 
Ligabue (the Italian equivalent of Bon Jovi), it was a success and yielded a 50.000 € profit. 
The singer publicly proclaimed his solidarity with the coop and symbolically planted a 
young olive tree in the grove, surrounded by journalists and Libera activists. However, the 
gesture did not find unanimous support across Pio members at the time: ‘The point is to 
make money out of agriculture, not to make a fuss,’ Manto, a Borsellino worker told me. 
The Falcone was established in 2001, after a public competition organised by the 
Consortium, and the Borsellino in 2006 in the same way. The Lavoro e Altro dated from 
earlier, even before the Consortium itself, having been set up in 1998, and had been 
allocated land from the municipality of Curriunni. The overall political situation, informed 
by the antimafia-sympathetic, urban civil society mobilisations of the 1990s, had created an 
ostensible antimafia consensus among local politicians; however, as I witnessed myself, this 
was often debatable. For instance, Malva, the mayor of San Cipiriddu and also the 
Consortium’s president (in 2009), dined with local mafioso Baffi (see sections 5.3 and 7.2) 
while Tazio, the mayor of Rocca and a Consortium member, was arrested for mafia 
affiliation in 2006 (see Appendix 4). 
Thus there are reasons to qualify the picture of the historical process peaking in the 
contemporary cooperatives. Overall, despite the claims to ‘continuity’ with the struggles of 
the antimafia peasant movement, this inspiration was ideological rather than direct. None 
of the many people who had been involved in previous social or specifically antimafia 
struggles was involved in the newly created cooperatives. However, Sancipiriddu people 
like Rillo supported the new cooperatives, as did most trade unionists. Their inspiration 
from ‘red’ rather than ‘white’ cooperativist models came specifically from their 
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administrators’ ideological sympathy with the historical peasant movement, their present-
day collaboration with ‘red’ consumer coops in Emilia (Northern Italy) and involvement in 
progressive Palermitan civil society. As a proportion of the local population, participation 
in the cooperatives was small (some 150 people’s livelihoods were immediately associated 
to income from the cooperatives, when in San Giovanni only, the permanent population 
was ca. 4500 people). Unlike the history they drew from and referred to, these cooperatives 
could not accommodate massive popular participation and were not grassroots 
organizations.  
 The social struggles of the antimafia movement today do not confront mafia’s 
violence, although mafia agents are still active (see, for example, 6.3). Rather than having to 
face mafia patronage or brokerage, the cooperatives are taking over the mafia’s control over 
material resources. The struggle is now around the usufruct rights to land and the ways that 
is managed vis-à-vis the local social arrangements around the land. The struggles around 
usufruct are akin to the pre-agrarian-reform mobilisations, while attempts at 
commercialisation are akin to post-reform. Most important, struggles against the mafia now 
have different priorities. While in the past cooperatives were channels to avoid mafia 
influence (gabellotti patrons, senzali brokers), antimafia cooperativism today aims at attacking 
mafia: antimafia has become the end of cooperativism, not its means. 
Conclusion 
Gramsci described pre-World War II alliances in Italy characterising Southern Italy in 
terms of an ‘historical bloc’, ‘the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the 
superstructures in the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’ 
(Gramsci 2005: 366). However, by the 1950s the continuing relevance of this term for 
Sicily is debatable (Lupo 1981). The bracciante movement had claimed a fair redistribution of 
land in ways more radical than the break-up of the latifundo instituted by the agrarian 
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reform, which nevertheless did change land tenure. For Gramsci, in the real, historical 
landscapes of power that come into being in particular times and places, certain ways of 
understanding the world, are not merely conjunctural but may be distinguished as ‘organic’ to 
the extent that they link to, and effect significant change in, a society’s economic base 
(Gramsci 2010).  
Specific ‘cultural’ phenomena in specific cultural contexts are structural and organic 
(Crehan 2002). In that respect, class opposition to mafia manipulation (through patronage 
before the agrarian reform, brokerage after) was integrated within the peasant movement 
and the formation of the cooperatives. However, it is interesting to consider what is at 
stake in the term ‘cultural’: antimafia mobilisation, rather than being a conscious political 
choice, became ‘a way of life’ that both adapted and shaped the peasantry’s broader 
conditions of life in Alto Belice through a communism informed by bravery idioms, party 
loyalties and the favourable legal and political climate related to Gullo’s policies in the 
1940s. 
The mafia’s continuity as an organisation and its strategic transformation from a 
pre-agrarian-reform network of violent gabelloti patrons to a post-agrarian-reform nexus of 
coordinated senzali brokers was crucial for the intersections of political economy and 
culture in Alto Belice. Mafia activity and peasant organisation against it, – as well as the 
local interpenetration of antimafia and cooperativism ideals – have conditioned local 
particularities of cooperativism and political culture. This interpenetration had the effect 
that, although developed in different configurations between state, mafia and peasants, the 
cooperative organisation of production and the antimafia mobilisation were always almost 
inseparable. These values interacted through a range of configurations involving the state 
and the markets and were formed through peasant struggles, originally centred on accessing 
land before the agrarian reform and, after it, on accessing markets. Contesting mafiosi 
shaped the peasant movement as antimafia, contributed to the establishment of local 
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cooperative wineries and, through them, to links to wider political structures, such as the 
PCI.  
The historically contingent character of the organisation of the local peasantry 
includes a range of actions and incorporates a variety of interrelated factors: flight in 
reaction to violence, mass land occupations, formation of cooperatives based on 
communalist ideas, creation of cooperative wineries. Similarly, they frequently organised in 
terms of communist politics, fused with antimafia militancy. The antimafia phenomenon 
arose amidst the tensions between social movements (focused on acquiring land or 
accessing markets) and mafia. It partly inspired the cooperative organisation of different 
levels of production (grape cultivation before the reform; vinification after). In this way, 
Alto Belice’s peasant integration into cooperative wineries entangled economy, politics and 
antimafia with each other.  
To sum up, on a theoretical level, the historical discussion in this chapter has 
illuminated a number of points regarding cooperativism. My main argument is built on an 
analogy with Anderson’s approach to nationalism as a ‘modular’ notion (2006), applied to 
cooperativism as well as to ‘communism’ in the Sicilian case. I have argued that the 
historical case of cooperativism in Sicily shows that specific circumstances on the ground 
(mafia activity and the peasant movement’s antimafia responses) have rendered peasant 
cooperativism a practice both distinct in its Sicilian specificities and contextualised in two 
different circumstances in the history of Alto Belice. The first set of circumstances relates 
to communalist worker-based cooperativism (as per the 1940s), which drew on 
revolutionary legality to propose a reappropriation of the commons. The second set of 
circumstances relates to post-agrarian-reform producer-based cooperativism, premised on 
small-proprietor viticulturers. The ‘modularity’ of cooperativism as a cultural construct is 
thus, in Sicily, adapted to the circumstantial ideological weight it carried in these two 
different periods. Its ideology was, moreover, informed by antimafia commitment: 
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cooperativism became a model of organisation as well as an ideal of organising to avoid or 
confront the mafia, alongside exploitative landlords and distant urban markets. It has been 
‘transplanted’ in the current configuration of antimafia cooperatives.  
On an ethnographic level, I have underlined how the peasant movement engaged in 
different forms of cooperativism. Absentee landlords before the reform had mafiosi patrons 
(gabellotti) as their local middlemen. After the reform, mafiosi again occupied a middleman 
role but now as senzali, controlling local peasants’ access to markets, in terms of raw 
materials (grapes). The discussion elucidated the dialectics of politics and economics in the 
formation of cooperativism and of the antimafia movement in Alto Belice. I also showed 
how contemporary antimafia cooperatives capitalise on both traditions, the cooperativism of 
autonomous producers (as per the post-agrarian-reform scheme) and on the pre-agrarian-
reform workers’ cooperativism. The commemorations, tourist initiatives and their general 
rhetoric draw on both these traditions: their members speak of ‘thin red lines’ linking these 
experiences. Importantly, though, contemporary antimafia cooperatives are not, as might 
have been expected, historical elaborations of the producer-based cooperativism of recent 
decades but, rather, resemble, in their organisational form, the worker-based cooperatives 
of the 1940s and even the 1890s. Their claims to ‘revolutionary legality’, their rhetoric of 
‘reclaiming the commons’ and, the fact that they do not own the land they cultivate, having 
only usufruct rights, strongly echo (with some differences) older developments of Sicilian 
antimafia cooperativism. This resemblance is, importantly, utilised ideologically, by 
cooperative administrators. Organisationally, they are workers’ cooperatives with an explicit 
antimafia stance, more akin, on a superficial level, to Alto Belice cooperativism of the 
1940s. At the same time, however, they retain elements of producers’ cooperativism in that 
they are supported by the state, in a configuration where politics shift against the mafia. 
They hence resemble the cooperativism of the 1960s and onwards. 
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In this chapter, I have also shown that the relations between ideological and/or 
kinship-based relationships (mafia and antimafia) and local economic models (different 
models of cooperative agriculture) developed against a backdrop of political struggles. I 
have suggested that the state has been filtered through various local institutions, including 
cooperatives and mafia. Using intertwined historicities of peasant associationism and 
political activity, I have shown how the organisation of social relations of production in 
Alto Belice has been formed, arguing that cooperativism, politics and antimafia interacted. 
Finally, I have analysed the relation between land tenure, and cooperative institutions in 
Alto Belice, that configure the background for antimafia cooperativism today. I have 
suggested that the main consequence of the agrarian reform (destroying cooperativism by 
fragmenting land into family-owned tracts) was not unintended ‘collateral damage’ of the 
reform but rather a well planned scheme. The revival of producers’ cooperativism in recent 
decades is echoed in the contemporary antimafia cooperatives: in the following chapter, I 
shall enquire into the modes they were constituted. 
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Chapter 4   
Raccomandazioni and ‘Networking’ in Recruitment: 
Different Spheres of  Relatedness in the Cooperatives 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the ways antimafia cooperatives recruited people and the 
relationships between cooperative members. It focuses on two different forms of 
relatedness and horizontality in the cooperatives. The way in which the cooperatives were 
set up involved the coexistence of two domains: working-class households in Alto Belice 
and middle-class networks in Palermo. The ethnographic narrative offered here addresses 
the way these domains related to the two-tiered organisation of the cooperatives’ members 
in terms of the administrative and manual workforce teams1, focusing on what I call their 
incompatible ‘spheres’ of relatedness and their associated idioms.2 Here I follow David 
Graeber’s understanding of ethnographic writing as ‘aiming to describe the contours of a 
social and conceptual universe in a way that is at once theoretically informed, but not, in 
itself simply designed to advocate a single argument or theory’ (2009a: viii). Hoping to 
avoid such partiality in its ethnographic supporting evidence, this chapter does put forward 
specific arguments. Firstly, I propose that two different idioms of relatedness 
(‘raccomandazioni’ through kinship and ‘networking’ through politicised liaisons), granted 
people access to cooperatives, transforming local ideas of kinship. Secondly, these idioms 
were constituted through different ‘spheres’ of relatedness, which cannot communicate 
across the cooperatives’ teams. 
                                                 
1 As in most of the thesis, in this chapter, ‘workers’ or ‘manual workforce’ are terms used to encompass both 
daily workers and member-workers). 
2 Idioms here imply not only oral communications but also broader practices of transmission of meaning 
among people. They are ways people convey meaningful transmissions (of resources, or ideas), as per 
Carsten’s idioms of relatedness (2000: 24). 
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I characterise the different linkages operative in the recruitment practices of 
cooperatives in terms of ‘relatedness’, using this term in Carsten’s sense, as ‘more inclusive 
than kinship’ (Carsten 2000: 4),3 and thus highly appropriate to Alto Belice, to include both 
familial/kin-based relations and social ‘networking’. This allows me to put the otherwise 
strongly contrasted recruitment practices of cooperative administrators and workers on a 
comparable footing, understood in an integrated sense as involving different modes of 
relatedness. I shall use ‘kinship’ only to define very specific cases akin to the Schneiderian 
paradigm (1980). Both mediation (raccomandazione4) and networking (circolo or network in 
Italian) are emic terms used by those involved in recruitment practices in cooperatives. 
However, their relatedness norms and idioms were directly opposed: non-kinship 
networking for administrators, kinship-based mediation for workers. Raccomandazioni were 
based on kinship relations: local workers brought their relatives in the cooperatives. This 
dynamic idiom rearranged established ideas on kinship, creating what informants called 
‘antimafia families’. Networking was premised on the lack of local kinship links. 
Administrators and the Consortium argued that only ‘virtuous social circles’ can constitute 
antimafia cooperatives. The ‘virtuous’ element here implies the absence of kinship-based 
recruitment. For this reason, I locate the meanings of relatedness in the prominent rhetoric 
linking kinship to mafia influence. 
There has been a transformation in managing material resources (from mafia-
controlled to state- and cooperatives-controlled management), which implies changes in 
people’s access to them. Since the setting up of the cooperatives, this change drew upon 
values that lay outside the domain of political economy, such as kinship (exclusion of up to 
                                                 
3 Carsten’s notion, based on the sharing, the transmission, of ‘substantial resources’ such as food (Carsten 
1995) has come under criticism as it broadens the scope of kinship to such an extent that it includes ‘all sorts 
of relationships’ (Holý 1996: 168). I use the term ‘relatedness’ cautiously, to delineate the branch of 
relationships among locals in Alto Belice that are renegotiated through the job offers and the constant 
relations among homes/families and antimafia cooperatives, as well as to include non-kinship relationships 
among administrators from Palermo. 
4 Raccomandazioni is the plural form.  
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3rd degree kin in the cooperatives’ recruitment) and ideology (recruitment on the basis of 
antimafia commitment). These ideas were codified in the regulations of the Consortium. I 
show that the recruitment included, on the one hand, the local manual workers’ 
recommendations (raccomandazioni) for family members and, on the other, the Palermitan 
administrators’ ‘virtuous circles’ of non-kinship networking. My analytical outlook 
juxtaposes networking and raccomandazioni, arguing that their complementary activity (being 
different forms of how people experienced their relatedness) staffed the cooperatives. As 
long as these two spheres of different relatedness (which corresponded to the two teams in 
the cooperatives’ division of labour) were kept separate, there was stability in the 
recruitment process. However, when members of the cooperatives or politicians started to 
engage in raccomandazioni, conflicts emerged. Workers of the cooperatives thought that this 
vertically arranged clash of idioms (raccomandazioni/networking) constituted ‘patronage’.  
I have discussed, in 2.1 the centrality of ‘horizontal’ work relations’ for 
cooperatives, to indicate equality among members, and of balance between the activity of a 
cooperative and the community in which it operates. Ι show that two different types of 
horizontalities (in the plural) developed in Alto Belice cooperatives. Contested relations 
within a group endorsed the same idioms of relatedness, while relations between groups 
produced conflict, understood as patronage. I argue that different groups were invoking 
different spheres of relatedness that barely communicated with each other, suggesting 
separate ways of envisioning moral economy, as well as different values.  
The chapter develops in a threefold manner: it moves from what administrators 
called ‘virtuous networking’ to what workers called ‘antimafia families’ and from there to a 
discussion on patronage. I argue that the idioms of networking and raccomandazioni belong 
to different groups and cannot mingle. This is building an argument about cooperative 
horizontal relations, arranged in two different spheres, and expressed in two different 
relatedness idioms. The focus commences with Palermitan administrators, then moves to 
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the local manual workforce and wraps up with an analysis of internal conflicts caused by 
when local workers’ relatedness idioms were used by administrators. Thus ultimately the 
separate spheres of relatedness of the two teams expressed in the different idioms of 
recruitment and contributing equally to the composition of antimafia cooperatives means 
that a general horizontality among cooperative members cannot be established. 
 
Photo 13: Commercial fairs, family and enterprise: an instance where members of the two teams came 
together. Here, a manual worker (Adamo, with his daughter Marella) and an administrator (Giusy) co-
host a stand with the products of the Falcone cooperative on display at a fair in Palermo. 
4.1. Virtuous Networking: The Administrators 
4.1.1. Networking versus kinship 
Ernesto, 30 years old, the sales manager of Falcone, was enthusiastic about my 
presence in the office of the cooperatives, where I helped with chores many afternoons. As 
we were roughly the same age, he found our discussions stimulating and was willing to 
share information about his background. He was proud of the fact that he had been 
involved in political associations for a long time and was intrigued by my questions about 
his social networks. He told me in an interview: 
I was involved in politics for many years [ho fatto politica per molti anni] and was active 
in associations in Palermo [ho fatto associazionismo]; I was also in the Union of my 
university department. But distributing flyers or organising a campaign is one thing; 
it is quite another to, ... you know, contribute to real change. Well, I knew Luca, I 
knew Libera in Palermo, I knew the association well; I knew Luca since forever as 
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we were friends, we did initiatives together ... we had undergone a great part of our 
experience together. We had met in the Left Youth [Sinistra Giovanile]; and then 
again later on, I had already done some stuff, the studies, had lived a bit abroad, I 
was already collaborating with Libera ... and a job opportunity [una finestra: literally, 
a window] opened in the cooperative. So, by the start of 2004 I became a volunteer 
member and then an admin member. I mean, with Luca it’s like we shared our 
biographies. We share our cooperative biographies, but also what came before that. 
Ernesto explicitly connected ‘the cooperative ambience’ to the development of the 
centre-Left and to his own personal, political and professional maturation process (his 
‘cooperative biography’) in this environment, merging his different experiences to show a 
single trajectory, emphasizing especially his networking with Luca, the 35-year-old 
president of Falcone. He insisted, in our conversations, that these milieux ‘guaranteed the 
antimafia principles’. Almost all administrators in the three cooperatives I studied came 
from Palermo and had no relatives in Alto Belice. In fact, the Consortium agents saw their 
lack of local kinship ties as an asset: the rhetoric of the Consortium, suspicious towards 
local kinship (associated with the problematic mafia tradition) found in them ideal 
examples of meritocratic excellence. Similarly, for the Consortium’s director, Matteo: as the 
administrators came from outside Alto Belice, they were by definition immune to 
corruption, which they saw as linked to local kinship. In this way, the administrators 
distinguished themselves vertically from the locals, claiming that administrators were more 
committed to antimafia, partly due to their lack of kinship links in the area.  
This was crucial in the matter of recruitment: Palermitan administrators considered 
that the reproduction of their teams should be completely dissociated from kinship 
connections. Unlike the cooperatives’ manual workforce, made up of Alto Belice locals, 
they were suspicious of familial idioms and kinship ideologies, often mentioning how mafia 
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familialism – meaning ‘friends of friends’ and comparatico5 relations – had damaged the 
area’s economic development. Among the administrators, by contrast, axes of what they 
called ‘networking’ prevailed, which they saw as appropriate to the specifically professional 
features of their role in the cooperatives’ distribution of labour. Their mechanisms of 
reproducing their team were thus developed outside the sphere of the home and kinship 
relations. 
What, then, is the meaning of ‘networking’ and how did cooperative administrators 
sustain this idiom? Having grown up in Palermo, cooperative administrators shared 
common social milieux. All had higher education backgrounds and some had lived outside 
Sicily, indeed a few, such as Ernesto, outside Italy, for short periods. Fewer in number than 
the manual workers,6 they were often single, and younger (all less than 40 years old). Unlike 
the manual workers, administrators did not have other jobs or income sources outside the 
cooperatives. They certainly had fewer responsibilities than their manual worker colleagues 
but only a few lived with their parents in Palermo and some had the burden of covering 
their rent. Some of them would inherit property from their parents (who were civil servants 
or employed in services, and not agriculturalists) but none owned land themselves. 
Importantly, their remuneration from the cooperatives was on comparatively much 
better terms than that of their manual work colleagues, as they all had stable renewable 
contracts, whether permanent or short term (two years, for instance), (15 out of 25 
administrators across the three cooperatives) and therefore could rely on a monthly wage 
of around 1,000–1,300 euros net (depending on the job post). Additionally, some 
                                                 
5 Research in Sicily (Schneider and Schneider 1976), Calabria (Arlacchi 1982) and Campania (Saviano 2006) 
has suggested that fictive kinship codes are partly evocative of mafia. The centrality of the godparenthood 
(comparatico) institution is one such concept (Holý 1996: 166; cf. Goody 1983).  
6 As suggested in Chapter 1, and explained in the next section, ‘manual workforce’ is the generic term I use to 
speak of both (daily) workers and member-workers, as they shared common experiences, their cooperative 
positions being more nominal than real in terms of pay and benefits. Their shared relatedness idiom adds to 
my overall decision to analytically approach them together. Their differences were not felt enough to 
constitute a further stratifications in the cooperatives, beyond the axis administrators/workers. Kinship links 
between member-workers and workers underlines this point, as shown below. 
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administrators, such as the Falcone and Borsellino cooperatives’ public relations 
responsible Checcho, the sales managers, or the presidents of the three cooperatives, 
enjoyed job perquisites, especially travel. They often travelled to Emilia (in Northern Italy) 
to establish and maintain links with consumer coops to promote their produce, or 
elsewhere in Italy to promote the ‘antimafia idea’, invited by local boroughs, at events 
hosted by schools. In Alto Belice the cooperatives maintained the exclusively male tradition 
of manual farm work and so whereas the manual workforce were all male, in the 
administration teams, some women had key roles. For instance, the vice-presidents of both 
the Falcone and the Borsellino cooperatives were women in their early 30s.  
Most administrators felt lucky to have a job in the first place.7 Lacking material 
resources of their own, they compared themselves, financially and in terms of status, with 
their friends in Palermo, graduate youngsters seeking waged employment. Being employed 
by the antimafia cooperatives was a symbol of rank, typically recognised as important social 
capital within their social circles. Among people of the same background, most were seen 
as successful: meeting Ernesto, Claudia or Enza in Palermitan cafés in the weekends, I 
noted how their friends and partners thought that, in gaining jobs with the cooperatives, 
their university degrees were valued and valorised and that their jobs in the cooperatives 
were creative. Meeting Marelio’s friends (university-educated males in their early 30s), I 
observed that they thought he was privileged to have a stable job. 
Administrators often met outside work on occasions such as the Addiopizzo8 feast 
or Libera’s film evenings; several of their friends worked at these events. In the words of 
Checco, attending such events was not only political socialisation but also an ethical 
                                                 
7 Youth unemployment was 37.2% in Sicily at the time of fieldwork (ISTAT, 2009). 
8 Addiopizzo is the name of a Sicilian civil society association catering for the horizontal organisation of 
retailers who adopt an ‘anti-racketeering’ policy, shopkeepers who refuse to pay racketeering money to the 
mafia. Today, the association has NGO status and 300 retailers subscribe to its principles. Even so, it is 
estimated that 80% of Palermo’s retailers still pay the mafia’s protection (ISTAT, 2009). 
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‘obligation vis-à-vis their social allies’ (such as the Addiopizzo). For most, their 
employment was continuous with their broader beliefs and ideas; working in the 
cooperative was ‘more than just a job’, as Mauro, the Falcone’s marketing manager put it. It 
was even, as Ernesto told me, ‘a mission’ and ‘a political project’. They took pride in acting 
according to the specific framework of regulations and ethics that set the official discourse 
of the cooperatives, a commitment to meritocracy and legality. In focus groups I organised, 
Ernesto solemnly stated that his job was ‘also about ideology’ and ‘a certain mission’. 
Marelio added that they ‘embodied’ civil society principles for San Giovanni, in that way 
acting, ‘as an adjunct to Libera’; in that respect, they expressed dominant ideas set by the 
Consortium ‘Development and Legality’, following its meritocracy-based, legalist agenda. 
Their private lives and their lives in the office were part of the same continuum.  
Administrators thus saw themselves as ‘professionals’ and strongly believed that 
their teams (in the Falcone, the Lavoro e Altro and the Borsellino cooperatives) were based 
on ‘meritocracy’. They even claimed that the very term ‘networks’ was an indication of 
merit, as it was distinct from terms like ‘family’ or ‘friends’: it was, as Checco told me, 
‘neutral’. Most administrators thought that any cooperative formed through and along 
friendship or kinship lines was in principle a ‘failed case’. Matteo, the president of the 
Consortium, as well as the presidents of the cooperatives stressed to me that the experience 
of making a ‘kinship-based’ antimafia cooperativism in Alto Belice had been ill conceived. 
In fact, this explains why in 2001 the Consortium had closed the two small cooperatives 
Akragas and Paradiso, set up in 1998 without public controversy and cultivating 
confiscated land. Composed of local family members, they had worked alongside the 
Falcone in 2000. The Consortium took the decision to close them ‘due to the messiness 
that the kin relations of their members brought about’, as Matteo told me. In the case of 
Akragas, the family running the cooperative had become indebted to a bank and used their 
own familial assets to pay back their debts, ignoring the Consortium regulations, which did 
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not permit its cooperative to merge family capital and state (confiscated) assets. At the time 
of fieldwork, years after their cooperative had been dissolved, the members of the ‘Akragas 
coop family’, as they are known in the village, were still suffering major financial troubles. 
They refused to give me an interview. The father asked me to mention only that ‘the 
experience of the confiscated land has been disastrous for our family, and we need to keep 
it in the past, not to remember it’. 
The case of Paradiso was even more dramatic; the data I have regarding it comes 
from the hearings of the Palermitan court that oversaw its case. Enrico, the son of the 
family running the cooperative, was a friend of a person related to a mafioso. The mafioso 
‘recommended’ two people to a friend of Enrico and the friend convinced Enrico to hire 
them. When the Consortium found that people ‘affiliated’ to the mafia were hired, it 
immediately took back the confiscated plots from the cooperative. The family-based 
cooperative was soon shut down. The experiences of these two cooperatives exacerbated 
the Consortium agents’ mistrust of kinship relations. 
In order to sideline kinship, Libera became the main channel for hiring and 
maintaining the administrative workforce. As part of their ‘professional skills’, 
administrators had to have activist credentials, obtained through what informants, such as 
Ernesto, called ‘association experience’ (esperienza associazionista). Such experience could 
include the Addiopizzo antimafia activism or showing motivation towards ethical business 
practice; for example, two administration members had Master’s degrees in ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility’. As noted above, when Ernesto explained the social networks in 
which he was embedded, he took pride in stressing his relations with Luca, the Falcone 
president (‘we share biographies’) in creating the antimafia cooperatives, as well as his own 
‘professional development’ in that milieu. Luca, the son of a leading trade unionist, 
described what he called the ‘cooperativist part of my biography’ in terms of a combination 
of two interrelated activities: university activism and allegiance to the centre-Left. In an 
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interview, he also used the term ‘shared biography’ to describe relations with people like 
Ernesto but also with other current cooperative members and people who (in 2009) were 
the Falcone’s collaborators and suppliers. 
Despite holding a PhD, Luca had not pursued an academic career because of what 
he called ‘the nepotistic networks in the University of Palermo’. He and his friend Giulio 
Erice had been overlooked for lectureships, although they were promising academic 
agronomists. They nevertheless established contacts through research in the Faculty of 
Agronomy and went on to collaborate with each other after university. Today Erice 
administers the Tazza farm in Termini Imerese, on which the state had bestowed land 
sequestrated9 from a man accused of being a member of the mafia. The two enterprises are 
in collaboration: Falcone provides Tazza with packaging, marketing and commercialisation 
services.  
Luca’s genealogy of political activism in fact includes his own kinship relations with 
people in politics; his involvement with esperienza associazionista and political activism was 
heavily influenced by his family background. His father was the president of the 
communication workers trade union (a strong union of the public sector in Sicily) and his 
brother an MP in the Sicilian Assembly (the Parliament of the autonomous region of 
Sicily). The lack of kinship ties that supposedly guaranteed and promoted administrators’ 
meritocracy claims in fact refers only to kinship local to Alto Belice: in Palermo, they were 
themselves entrenched with kinship -and friendship- relations that played a key role in their 
own lives and careers. Here, I draw on Bourdieu’s problematisation of ‘meritocracy’ and his 
emphasis on the reproduction of certain fields (such as the academy) taking place through 
‘genealogical’ succession, where kinship is also a factor (1988). Administrators were 
                                                 
9 In criminal proceedings against a person ‘for mafia’ his assets are sequestrated when he is formally charged, 
despite the presumption of innocence. They are then confiscated if the defendant is convicted’ for mafia’, i.e. 
for any type of criminal offence related to article 416 bis of the Criminal Code., if he cannot show they have 
an innocent origin. 
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themselves embedded in kinship-informed hubs (not less because, as most were unmarried, 
they still felt attached to their parents). Their own kinship background informed and 
reproduced their class positions. Administrators’ support of the Consortium’s rhetoric 
refers to kinship relations of other people, people whom they did not see as equals: Alto 
Belice local workers.  
When people joined the cooperative workforce as administrators, they were 
typically already linked together in ‘horizontal’ relations through past professional and/or 
political bonds, which determined future contacts and eventual job recruitment. Mina and 
Claudia had taken the same Masters degree in Milan; Checco knew Marelio and Gianpiero 
from Libera and Addiopizzo; Loredana knew Luca from his studies in Agronomy and 
through Libera: the list goes on, including everyone involved in the administration of the 
cooperatives. Gianpiero told me that some of the people in the administration were his 
‘lifelong partners’. Along with the theme of shared biographies, the idea of ‘lifelong 
partners’ shows that social networking is understood as a process of building bonds of 
relatedness. Networking can thus be characterised as a relatedness idiom for the 
administrators. This in turn provided the lynchpin of recruitment: administrators would be 
‘brought into a coop’ on the basis of their network linkages, their ‘shared biographies’ with 
other administrators or the fact that they were ‘lifelong partners’ in a common political or 
ideological cause, that is, elements in their past activity, political and other, when they had 
shared time with others who had already arrived in the position of cooperative 
administrators.  
When administrator informants explained their own links to me, they often 
condemned the nepotism and corruption in the city (Palermo) and public institutions (eg 
the universities), which had excluded them from other labour markets, as in the case of 
Luca and Erice. This throws much light on how administrators distinguished their own 
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networking practices as ‘virtuous’, and the term ‘virtuous circle’,10 as they used it to 
legitimise their own practices. They had crafted the neologism as a word play on the way 
they used the term ‘vicious circle’ to refer to relations of corruption and patronage, 
influenced by the mafia. They deemed the ‘virtue’ of their networks to derive from their 
‘meritocratic’ formation, part of their commitment to antimafia, seeing themselves as 
gatekeepers of legality.  
When I asked him to elaborate, Ernesto told me that ‘the household’ was a 
‘particularistic unit’, while ‘networks’ were the expression of ‘broader interests’: networks, 
for the informant, implied politicised solidarity while households meant seclusion from 
society. Administrators thought the responsibilities of cooperative members towards their 
families were often restrictive on the development of cooperatives, as the obligations and 
dangers which cooperative membership entailed were difficult to reconcile with 
maintaining a family. Family and cooperative were mutually exclusive in this respect, 
especially when their interrelationship implied continuities with broader local relationships, 
including relations with mafiosi. Kinship and friendship, ‘friends of friends’ (amici degli amici) 
and affinity (comparatico) had been historically (in the bigger picture) and specifically (in the 
cases of Akragas and Paradiso) charged with mafia connotations, and administrators 
therefore deemed them ‘vicious circles’. By contrast, Palermitans presented networking 
among activist social circles as virtuous. Claudia for example stressed the fact that not only 
was she not from Alto Belice but indeed, she came from outside Sicily (where she had 
transferred at 30 years of age). She emphasised to me that she had ‘shared a lot of time, 
ideas and thoughts’ with Mina, when their paths crossed studying for a Masters degree in 
Corporate Social Responsibility. The fact that Claudia eventually joined Libera and engaged 
                                                 
10 I am adopting the use of this indigenous term both to elucidate and problematise it. 
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in antimafia associationism ‘brought her closer’ to the Palermitan Mina and enclosed her in 
the ‘virtuous circle of the antimafia’, as she told me.  
The virtuous circles, webs of relationships among equals unmediated by kinship, 
created a sense of a closed group of relatedness among Palermitan administrators. 
4.1.2. Networking as relatedness 
What administrative members, using the idiom of virtuous circles or virtuous 
networking, identified as meritocratic might sound like just another version of nepotism. 
Their invocation of ‘meritocracy’, which purports to be neutral with respect to class, is for 
this specific reason more effectively ideologised, with recruitment through ‘virtuous circles’ 
of relatedness functioning as administrative teams’ class-related reproduction (Bourdieu 
1977). Meritocracy is typically associated with invocation of ‘modernisation’ and 
‘development’, as well as with ‘transparency’ and ‘legality’; in that way, the virtuous 
networking replicated the rhetoric of the Consortium ‘Development and Legality’. In that 
respect, their relatedness was structured on their middle-class backgrounds, formed on 
networks based on shared ideals and activism and broadly shared political allegiances, 
promoting this rhetoric. It is particularly interesting to note that this idea of modernisation, 
associated to meritocracy and legality, implicitly draws on ideas portraying the mafia as 
‘archaic’ and pre-modern; in 2.1, I have discussed how Lupo (2011) challenges this 
unproductive idea, connected to ahistorical notions of ‘tradition’. 
Most of all, the idea of virtue and meritocracy here was premised on a consensus 
about what it was not: the exclusion of kinship relations from the administration groups. In 
that respect, the antimafia networking was a type of relatedness performed against kinship – 
nepotism, their much emphasized point of differentiation. Administration members 
exploited their lack of kinship ties locally to legitimise their networking. This is evident in 
cases of ‘shared biographies’ and ‘lifelong partnerships’ as per Luca, Ernesto and Giulio, as 
well as participating in common milieus in Palermo. 
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Based on the above, I argue that the presumed virtue of administrators’ networks 
was presented as an alternative to kinship, informed by ideas of political allegiance, which 
should be seen as an idiom of ‘networking’ relatedness. The Consortium and Libera all saw 
these links as a legitimate basis of recruitment, justified as means of promoting meritocracy. 
Defined by the absence of kinship bonds with the village, the virtuous circles formed very 
specific ‘moral borders’ for the cooperatives, aimed at warding off the potentially 
corrupting influence of nepotism. The administrators’ networking formed one side of the 
relatedness idioms that constituted the cooperatives, the other being raccomandazioni. 
The division of labour in the cooperatives therefore drew on certain ideas about 
kinship, a concept often seen as class-informed11. The insistence on lack of local kinship 
links was informed by specific configurations of class (middle class as opposed to workers) 
and social backgrounds (city as opposed to village) and functioned to exclude local workers 
from ever occupying positions of power in the cooperatives.12 
The administrators’ virtuous networks were not aware of the local historicity of the 
antimafia movement, as regarding the fact that local peasant struggles involved the 
mobilisation of families. In terms of the detachment of work and family, the ‘virtuous’ 
recruitment the antimafia cooperatives’ administrators advocated is, on the one hand, 
highly selective in its history of the antimafia movement, ignoring the kinship-based 
networks that informed mobilisations around the antimafia, as stated in the historical 
description in Chapter 3 (see for example the discussion in the Casa del Popolo in 3.1.1). On 
the other hand, it ignores the ongoing kinship networks supporting and shaping the 
experience of the antimafia cooperatives (as shown in the following section). The overview 
of the movement that administrators embraced was related with the ideological tendency to 
                                                 
11 For example, for an analysis of kinship among the middle class in Greece, see Sant Cassia (1992). 
12 I shall explore this legitimisation further along discursive themes in Chapter 7. 
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present the cooperatives as breaking from local kinship traditions, not taking into account 
the contribution of families. 
This project of modernisation resembles Weberian ‘ideal-type’ concepts of the 
modern as involving the separation of family and kinship relations from work (2009 
[1922]). Weber’s notion of bureaucracy itself proposes an ideal type separation of kinship 
and office, which seems to reverberate with the ideas the antimafia cooperatives’ 
administrators had for themselves. The (legal and accounting) separation of the business 
enterprise from the household was crucial for the emergence of modern Western 
capitalism, for Weber – a prerequisite for the deliberate planning of rational economic 
action (1978: 63). Anthropologists have challenged this hypothesis. Yanagisako’s work for 
instance, is useful because it tackles the myth that ‘advanced’ capitalist enterprise is the locus 
classicus for such separation (she writes about the affluent Northern bourgeoisie of Como). 
Critiquing Weber, she notes that:  
While this separation may have been a significant innovation, Weber’s error was to 
misconstrue the legal fiction of separation – which was put in place for the purpose 
of limiting individual and familial financial liability – as a de facto separation of 
family relations from business relations. In other words, Weber turned a legal 
fiction of the separation of the family from the firm into a social theory in which 
the family and the economy in modern capitalist society were cast as distinct 
institutions. (2002: 21–22)13 
Similarly, administrators took at face value the Consortium principle for politicised 
antimafia cooperativism, that family/kinship relations and cooperative membership were 
mutually exclusive, in a modernism akin to what Yanagisako attributes to the Weberian 
analytical model. Namely, they embraced the political fiction of total separation from 
kinship relations as part of their cooperative experience, creating a networked relatedness 
of their own.  
                                                 
13 In the next section, I take up this discussion further. 
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The Consortium ‘Development and Legality’ picked Palermitans as administrators 
because of their lack of kinship ties to Alto Belice villages. Since Luca took over the 
presidency in the Falcone cooperative, they have been reproducing the role of the 
‘detached’ administrator through networking among commuters to Alto Belice. Their 
teams’ coherent ‘virtuous circles’ suggested ‘borders’ within which the ideology of legality 
(including, of course, meritocracy) and development, fundamental aspects of modernism, 
were contained. This ideology represented a ‘moral universe’ that the administrators 
thought was in need of protection from the contamination of kinship relations. Their 
specific common backgrounds (young, educated, middle-class) secured this system of 
reproducing the administration teams. This was not merely in the abstract: in their everyday 
practice they detached themselves from the ‘family’ and the household, the sphere of 
immediate experience for the manual workers’ cooperative recruitment.  
In the remainder of this chapter, the data gathered among workers show that, for 
the majority of people participating in the antimafia cooperatives (the local, manual 
workers) kinship is not only relevant but indeed constitutive of what it meant to them to 
participate in antimafia cooperatives. 
In the next section therefore, I show how kinship-based relatedness in fact 
significantly contributed to antimafia cooperativism. Ι show that local raccomandazioni 
practices equally contribute, as idioms of relatedness, to the making of cooperatives, seen 
as part of what constitutes antimafia cooperativism. In fact, the cooperative experience 
blurred local workers’ idioms of what is home and what is work. This conflation of terms 
tends to confirm that the ‘separation’ of home from work remains a highly ideologised, but 
historically unachieved, project of modernity (Zelizer 2005). ‘Benign forms’ of capitalism 
such as social cooperatives have nourished the myth of this separation, despite claims of 
cooperativists in the name of ‘community participation’. In this element, a basic 
characteristic of cooperativism, especially in political-inspired forms (Zamagni and 
161 
 
Zamagni 2010: 23–25; but also see 2.2) there are tensions with meritocratic strand of 
modern economy’s agenda. Alongside Yanagisako’s (2002) critique of Weber, therefore, 
Bourdieu’s critique of the ideologised concept of ‘meritocracy’ (1988) is also useful to think 
through ‘networking’. 
4.2. ‘Raccomandazioni’: Antimafia Families among Local Manual 
Labourers 
My question in this section is how a kinship-based form of relatedness developed among 
non-administrative workers and how they reconciled the relationship of kinship and work. 
This relates to my broader question about the bridge between community and work in 
antimafia cooperatives. It becomes particularly salient given that cooperativism as antimafia 
was strongly ideologised by Libera and the Consortium’s suspicion towards kinship, 
implied in their rhetoric of corruption and patronage, understood as continuous with the 
mafia tradition of Alto Belice. The state model of antimafia cooperativism was 
underpinned by the idea that the community’s wellbeing lied with the state’s intervention, 
important in displacing and disrupting this problematic tradition. While the ways 
administration members constructed their recruitment echoed this ideology of an antimafia 
cooperativism detached from kinship, locals entered the cooperatives through channels of 
kin or friends’ ‘recommendations’ (raccomandazioni or in Sicilian: raccummannaziuni). If 
‘raccommandazioni’14 provided a thread between kinship and work, what does this thread 
consist of and how does it connect to people’s conceptualisations of the values of family 
                                                 
14 My decision to use the Italian term rather than English equivalents (literal: ‘recommendation’ or, more 
loosely, ‘a reference’) is not meant to indicate a presumed unbridgeable translation but to demarcate the 
variety and flexibility of meanings attaching to the term in Alto Belice and in Italy at large (Zinn 2001). 
Raccomandazione implies ‘mediation’: to recommend someone for a job. There has been debate as to whether 
raccomandazioni are ways to transgress, or reproduce, class stratification (Sylos-Labini 1975). Ginsborg notes 
their organic role in the Italian political system (2003: 101, 202), stressing social mobility. Palermo has been 
called ‘sponge-city’ (città-spugna: Cole 1997; Cole 2007), as local middle classes have achieved social mobility 
through accessing jobs in the public sector via raccomandazioni. Chubb notes routinised political party practices 
‘of 30 raccomandazioni per day’ in Palermo (1982: 93), which echoes Bayart’s (2008) description of African 
‘opportunity states’. The sociologist and activist Danilo Dolci’s accounts have stressed how racommandazioni 
from the powerful have framed the working lives of the poor since the 1950s (Dolci 1958; 1964; 1968), 
proposing forms of political mobilisation inspired by Gandhian approaches to tackle these problems (2007). 
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and cooperative – and indeed antimafia cooperativism? I should also note in advance that, 
in Alto Belice, ‘household’ and ‘home’ are used interchangeably. The vast majority of my 
local informants were members of a nuclear family, with whom they shared a home. I 
discuss household composition in more detail in the next chapter. As Harris underlines, 
‘the household denotes an institution whose primary function is co-residence’ (1984: 52). 
(Chapters 5 and 6 elaborate on this definition of household, showing how household as co-
residence is both deeply rooted and reproduced in legislation). 
‘Virtuous clientelism’, implying ‘benign’, non-nepotistic networks providing routes 
to jobs, have been proposed as a way to resolve the ‘Southern [Italian] problem’ (Piattoni 
1998; Pipyrou 2008). As recent works emphasise, in the increasingly precarious Italian 
labour market much still turns around raccomandazioni, a practice that remains a constant, 
albeit updated (Procoli 2004). Zinn views raccomandazioni more through a framework of 
corruption than of patronage, arguing that corruption, as a ‘shared knowledge’ that ‘creates 
actors’ personhood’ has substituted for patronage as a ‘hegemonic discourse in the current 
state of play’ in the social sciences (Zinn 2005: 233; Zinn 2003).  
4.2.1. Relatedness through raccomandazioni: making ‘antimafia families’ 
In 2001, Falcone was composed of 15 members and no day workers. The members 
of this original team, coming from various villages of Alto Belice and from Palermo, had 
been gathered without knowing each other and without prior experience in cooperatives. 
Ten of the original members had gradually left the cooperative out of fear, lack of financial 
support or disagreements with other members. Of the remaining original five, only Luca 
had a decision-making role by the time of fieldwork (having been the cooperative president 
since 2004). Continuing relations of friendship, affinity, and kinship supplied the Falcone’s 
(as well as the other two cooperatives’) manual workforce member-teams, formed among 
villagers, to substitute the members who had left. Permanent members brought in 
newcomers, mainly daily, contractual workers, who proved as permanent (and, mostly, as 
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well-paid) positions as those of the member-workers’.15 Being recommended became the 
only mode of recruitment to the cooperatives’ manual workforce teams, marking a 
divergence from the public contests’ principles. The kin of members and workers entered 
the cooperatives ‘by default’, as Enzo described it, explaining that the practice of hiring 
seasonal workers was ‘as natural as the feelings of being related to someone’. Men were 
hired to work the plots and women for services such as the agriturismi; all these people were 
related to existing cooperative members.  
Pippo introduced Adamo to me as a cousin he had ‘mediated for and 
recommended’. Affinity relationships were also important: elder cooperative members 
secured jobs for their brothers-in-law (cognati) or sons-in-law (generi). Adamo presented 
Donato (the 26-year-old boyfriend of Paolo’s daughter), saying, ‘His father-in-law mediated 
for him’. Enzo Riceli was proud to state that his raccomandazioni had ‘brought many distant 
relatives into both San Giovanni cooperatives’. When I traced this back to people he had 
‘recommended’, such as Ciacio and Pippo, they confirmed he had mediated for them. In 
some cases, relationships between the Falcone and Borsellino work pools overlapped: one’s 
son-in-law could be another’s brother. This suggests that common kinship pools lay behind 
the rhetoric of ideological ‘solidarity’ between the two cooperatives, reinforcing their 
interrelationship.16 (See Figure 4.1 below, for a map of raccomandazioni). As he had been a 
member of Falcone since 2002, Enzo’s raccomandazione for his own sons Ciccio (a 
Borsellino member-worker) and Lino (a Falcone daily worker) was undisputed.  
Often, therefore, wages from two different cooperatives ended up in the same 
household, as with Enzo’s family. People thus associated the cooperative with home, 
seeing it as a home. Boasting that three men of her household worked for two different 
                                                 
15 As shown in 5.2, this ‘freedom’, to cite Pippo, a non cooperative member of the workforce, allowed for 
extra income, in the form of benefits, when not working. 
16 In fact, the presentation of ‘solidarity’ among cooperatives was a common idiom used to establish political 
alliances with institutions, as explored later in the chapter. 
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cooperatives, Santa concluded, ‘our family, our Riceli home is a coop’, using the term casa 
(home: co-residential household). Her sons, Lino (20) and Ciccio (25), and her husband 
Enzo (49), saw their household as an ‘antimafia family’; so did Santa herself who, like Rita, 
bracketed together family and cooperative, ‘one being the other side of the other’. All four 
members of the Riceli family received some income from the Falcone and Borsellino 
cooperatives, albeit in differentiated ways. Enzo was one of the only three Falcone 
member-workers, who received a monthly wage (of 1100 euros); Ciccio received a mean of 
600 euros monthly, as being a member-worker of the Borsellino as his permanent contract 
was based on daily payments; Lino’s pay, as a daily worker, amounted to a mean of 600 
euros monthly as well; Santa received seasonal daily pay (mean of 150 euros monthly) (see 
Figure 5.2). This financial situation solidified their belief that theirs was ‘the very definition 
of an antimafia family’. Importantly, this belief was not based on a common ‘consumption 
pool’ in the family, as each managed the major part of their finances independently.  
Rita Giuffrè was a 50-year-old woman from Rocca and Santa’s best friend. Paolo, 
her husband, of the same age and origin, was a permanent worker in the Falcone and 
recommended his wife for casual jobs with the cooperative. I often worked alongside her 
and other cooperative members’ wives. She too referred to the ‘cooperative being our 
home’, prompting other ‘ladies of the coop’ (as they referred to themselves) to tell me 
about how their households spilled over into the cooperative. Some ‘coop ladies’ used the 
term ‘antimafia family’ to describe their households, in this way distinguishing their own 
from other local families. They employed the discourse of ‘antimafia families’ in different 
ways: on the one hand, to refer to generational overlaps of family members in the 
workforce of the cooperatives; on the other, to provide meaning to the cooperative 
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experience itself, and in this way to ‘familiarise’ their relationships with each other. They 
were proud to stress that being part of an ‘antimafia family’ was ‘something special’.17 
During the preparation of Christmas packages of cooperative products, I worked 
continuously alongside ‘the coop ladies’. I observed that Rita’s and Maria’s use of ‘home’ 
idioms to describe ‘their’ cooperative was often exclusionary, delineating the social 
boundaries of the cooperative group and setting the terms in which ‘foreigners’ were 
allowed into the cooperative by the grace of homely hospitality.18 Despite her friendly 
behaviour, Rita often reminded me that I ‘had got the job because I was a foreign 
observer’, while she and her friends had it ‘because we are the other side of the 
cooperative; the cooperative relies on us wives’. Many other women made similar 
associations between their family values and their cooperative experience. Maria, Pippo’s 
wife, likened the ‘unity’ of a cooperative to that of a family. When Pippo fell out with the 
Borsellino cooperative, he told me that some of his ex-colleagues were ‘conspiring against 
him’. Maria, who was particularly proud of her husband’s involvement in the cooperatives, 
severely criticised him for his using the term ‘conspiracy’, saying ‘a coop is like a family; 
conspiracies do not take place in it’.  
Therefore, actively pro-family views of members’ wives complemented the 
cooperativist experience of their husbands and, by and large, of their families. Importantly, 
what Rita called ‘the other side of the cooperatives’ suggests that antimafia families were 
constituted as such by absorbing the cooperative into family values, and extending family 
into the cooperative. Maria saw ‘family’ as a unifying force: she applied this quality to the 
cooperative. This overlooked the fact that some members of the household received a 
regular wage from the cooperative while others, including herself and the other ‘coop 
                                                 
17 The cooperatives were then symbols of class distinction locally as well as in the case of the Palermitan 
administrators (Bourdieu 1989).  
18 In parallel, some women also used ‘home’ to describe Italy in xenophobic tones: Santa thought ‘Islamic’ 
immigrants had to convert to the Christian values of ‘our home’.  
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ladies’, only received sporadic payments for daily chores.
19
 The differences in pay and wage 
regimes of local men and women reflected divisions of labour and distribution of resources 
at home. The household divisions of labour, in turn, reflected the cooperative’s labour 
organisation: women did not work the soil and were hence not granted member status in 
the cooperatives. The positions in the cooperatives’ manual workforce were strongly 
gendered20. Rita’s analogies between home and cooperatives reflected this gendered 
division of labour, brought from the home to the workplace and vice versa.
21
 
Women often discussed the reproduction of people, families and cooperatives in 
the same breath. Caterina, considerably younger than her colleagues, had moved to San 
Giovanni together with Piero, her husband, who was a member of Falcone. They had a six-
month old baby, born in the village. Caterina worked for Falcone only occasionally and, 
because of her pregnancy and the child’s rearing, she had not done so for a while. This did 
not matter since she saw her recruitment to the cooperative and the birth of her baby as all 
part of ‘the same process of bringing up an antimafia family’. In a discussion I had with 
her, Rita, and Santa, Caterina went to great lengths to portray to us the importance of 
Falcone for her young family. As she narrated her story: ‘the coop is responsible for the 
whole of my life. I met Piero through the cooperative and my daughter was born within it. 
We were made a family through the cooperative’. ‘No doubt her first word will be CO-OP’, 
commented Rita, petting the baby. Rita and Santa commented that their families had 
                                                 
19 Women’s discourse on the co-reproduction of families and cooperatives rested largely on accepting the 
very low valorisation of their own work. This idea was based on the historical positioning of female labour in 
Alto Belice: working the fields was an exclusively male job, which women were not allowed to do. As I argue 
in the following two chapters, this condition was also partly informed by local mafia ethic. Ironically, this 
gendered work ethic was a point of continuity between mafia and antimafia families, constituting the norm of 
the local antimafia families and the cooperatives, in which their members worked: some in leading roles with 
steady income (men) and others in secondary roles with sporadic daily pay (women, who, as mentioned, were 
never members of the manual workforce teams). 
20 For instance, the term ‘manual’ itself seems selectively applied in a gendered way: packing Christmas boxes 
is seemingly not classified as ‘manual’ but ‘services’. 
21 The next chapter will explore ‘traditional’ gendered divisions of labour as a local ‘continuity’ reproduced 
unchanged, despite the ‘rupture’ cooperatives claimed to inaugurate.  
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‘found the coop on their way, and changed through it, while Caterina’s family grew within 
it’. This illustrates how the cross-fertilisation of family and cooperative sometimes took on 
naturalising undertones: reproduction of family and cooperative represented in literal 
reproduction (babies). Caterina affirmed that her young family was an antimafia family par 
excellence. 
Apart from changing existing idioms of kinship by mapping family onto 
cooperative, the raccomandazioni acted as vectors of relatedness, giving a new directionality 
as actions that built and built upon enduring relationships (see Figure 4.1). 
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Examples of this include the cases of the ‘brotherly’ feelings Adamo felt for Pippo, 
or Giuseppe, who was employed on daily work contracts, and constantly complained about 
the indifference of his Borsellino cooperative colleagues in not allocating him more work 
days, but saw the efforts of Giusy, a Falcone member, as ‘sisterly’, as she used her influence 
Figure 4.1: Examples of raccomandazioni 
SEASONAL WORKERS FALCONE MEMBERS BORSELLINO MEMBERS 
 
     Maria [mother] 
 
Tano [cousin] 
 
     Antonella [sister] 
 
  
Giuseppe   
  
 
 
 
              Marinella [wife] 
 
 
Pippo [cousin] 
 
 
Adamo                               
 
 
 
Domenico [brother] 
 
 
Donato [son-in-law] 
 
Rita [sister] 
Carelli  
 
Stefano [brother-in-law] 
 
cousin 
 
Santa [wife] 
 
Lino [son]    
    Niki                             
[friend] 
 
Enzo 
 
 
Ciccio [son] 
elder son 
  Salvatore Mancuso 
brother 
Luca Mancuso 
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to do precisely that. Raccomandazioni thus informed and reconfigured the meaning of 
kinship in Alto Belice, creating new linkages. This is one important reason why local 
workers defended and evoked idioms of kinship-based relatedness, as kinship helped them 
to guarantee jobs in the cooperatives, despite the cooperatives’ rhetoric on meritocracy. In 
the next section, I discuss the elastic relatedness bonds formed among people after a 
raccomandato entered a cooperative. In the process of constituting antimafia families, 
merging the nuclear family and close kin with cooperative identity, the manual workforce 
stretched kinship bonds in order to maximise employment opportunities. 
In the next section, which explores the transformations and continuities in the 
interactions between family/home and cooperative in more depth, I suggest that this was a 
mutually enriching process that enhanced ideas of relatedness and cooperativism and thus 
shaped the workers’ experience of antimafia cooperatives not against kinship but as crucially 
intertwined and supported by kinship. The consequences of forming antimafia families at times 
produced processes of prioritising among people and constructed hierarchies of values.  
4.2.2. Changing ideas of kinship through the cooperative experience 
So far we have been examining how decisions in respect to cooperative recruitment 
became part of their relatedness-making process. But what happened in cases of conflict? 
Rita Giuffrè had a brother, Carelli, who was hired by Falcone after the 2001 public contest, 
which constituted the cooperative. Carelli had mediated on Rita’s behalf, giving a 
raccomandazione for her husband, Paolo, and also Paolo’s cousin, Enzo, bringing them into 
the cooperative. Carelli was a founding member of Falcone, and his influence in mediating 
counted. Eventually, however, the very affines he had recommended challenged his own 
position in the cooperative. Once established in the cooperative, Paolo openly accused 
Carelli to their co-members of overcharging the cooperative when be bought machinery 
from Paolo’s shop, keeping the difference for his own profit. In a Falcone members’ 
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meeting, Paolo was supported by his cousin Enzo in publicly exposing Carelli and 
eventually managed to get him fired for his fraudulent behaviour. 
Carelli and the cousins thought about the event in quite different relatedness terms. 
Carelli explained to me, ‘I thought that my raccomandazione introduced honest family people 
to the cooperative – but they disappointed me.’ Paolo told me that he saw Carelli’s fraud 
against the cooperative as being dishonest to his own affines, his own ‘family’. Enzo chose 
to ‘withdraw’, as he put it, his affinity connection and ignore his indebtedness to Carelli, 
choosing to ‘think more as a coop member than as a relative’, as he explained to me. 
Finally, Rita resented her husband’s and her cousin-in-law’s decision, admitting to me and 
to others that she was distressed she had to pick loyalties. 
This incident presented Rita with contradictions between the identification of 
kinship and work, corresponding to household, her more broadly defined ‘family’, and 
coop. She now realised that she had to re-classify people whom she had grouped as 
members of her family and home. She felt, she explained to me, that the cooperative had 
ceased to be both home and family, which had challenged her belief that ‘the cooperative is 
our home, our family’ (‘la coop è casa nostra, la nostra famiglia’). Now, her brother, ‘who was 
family’ (as she said of Carelli) was excluded from the cooperative by actions of her 
husband, her ‘home’ (the nuclear family household). Her interwoven categorisation of the 
wellbeing of family and cooperative had now been challenged. Therefore, she had to 
choose between brother and husband, as one had to ‘come first’. She opted to stay with the 
cooperative, as she told me ‘in order not to contradict my husband, my home’ (casa, i.e. 
household). Her household, seen as nuclear family’s co-residence, came before brotherly 
love, when juxtaposed to the cooperative’s priorities. Later, she explained to me that she 
saw her brother as a ‘co-member’ with her husband and ‘the cooperative’s and my home’s 
good came first’. The raccomandazioni recruitment strategies therefore, revised people’s 
established kinship and friendship relationships, when challenged, because cooperative 
171 
 
members prioritised their own relations with other members over them. Re-classifying 
practices like Rita’s, which rearranged relatedness idioms (family and home) to 
accommodate someone’s position in the cooperatives, were common.  
Niki, the manager responsible for the agriturismo of Falcone, had originally been a 
raccomandato of Enzo. After a few months on the job, Anna, to whom he was accountable, 
fired him after a disagreement. Now unemployed, he thought it was obvious that Enzo 
should recommend him for a bracciante position in a cooperative. This expectation was 
enhanced because he and Enzo were ‘brotherly’ friends and compatriots, both hailing from 
the small village of Rocca. Enzo’s word counted in the cooperative’s recruitment scheme 
but he had to pick his raccomandazioni wisely, as he could not accommodate many people. 
He preferred to mediate for his 20-year-old son Lino, who was unemployed and needed a 
job. Enzo and Niki both told me that Lino entering the cooperative made their Miceli 
home a real ‘antimafia family’. 
Niki and Enzo were not speaking to each other, at the time of fieldwork. They both 
translated the cooperative’s recruitment in fictitious kinship terms, speaking of ‘betrayal’. 
Niki told me, ‘Enzo Riceli was born without siblings but found a brother on the way: 
myself. And now he has chosen not to have a brother anymore… the whole Riceli family is 
crap – apart from the mother: a true Santa’.105 When asked, Enzo admitted they used to be 
‘brotherly’ but commented, ‘How am I expected to prioritise anyone over my own family? I 
now only say hello to this person because my [Catholic] faith dictates me to do so; he 
otherwise is a stranger to me.’ Yanagisako proposes that betrayal can be a force of 
production in Italy (2002: 114–116). In this case, the raccomandazione practice produced 
betrayal, raccomandazione being an idiom partly informed by the moral need to prioritise the 
home/family and the cooperative over people who fall outside cooperatives’ recruitment 
                                                 
105 Santa means female ‘saint’ in Italian.  
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and consequently cease to see each other as relatives. Prioritising one person over another 
(Lino over Niki) was a not untypical moment, part of the experience of shaping new sets of 
relatedness in the context of cooperatives. In the process of Enzo’s raccomandazioni, the 
fictive kinship idiom collapsed and he prioritised his nuclear family. In a break from work 
in the vineyards, I talked family matters with Lino, the younger Riceli. He was particularly 
proud that the Ricelis were the epitome of an antimafia family: every member was 
somehow involved in the cooperatives in one position or another. Lino, like everyone else 
in the cooperatives’ manual workforce, used the terms ‘family’ and ‘home’ interchangeably. 
Moreover, he clarified that his family now had ‘this parallel meeting place outside the 
home’, meaning that every day he met his father Enzo and brother Ciccio in the fields, or 
in the Centopassi winery, where Santa also came in the course of her work. Enzo joined in 
the discussion, agreeing with his son. However, Fano, another cooperative colleague, 
interrupted us to say angrily that someone from the administration team had told him that 
‘family matters were sometimes less urgent than the cooperative’. Lino immediately 
chipped in with ‘and you didn’t spit in his face?’. His father and other co-workers nodded 
in agreement.106 For Lino and others, frictions did arise in the constitution of antimafia 
families. Ultimately – if forced to choose – the priority was clear: family over cooperative. 
Thus, as the example of Lino illustrates, the overarching – and genuinely embraced – 
presumption and lived practice is that cooperative membership means that ‘we are an 
antimafia family’. And yet, this equation family and cooperative may break down, in which 
case, as Lino made clear, family trumped cooperative. 
The broader question is how this discussion feeds back into the debate about the 
role of kinship in antimafia cooperatives. Interlocutors from Alto Belice (manual workforce 
                                                 
106 This exchange should be read in the light of the previous discussion of administrators, whose political 
alliances created alternative ties of relatedness among them. Here the workers’ reaction indicatively reveals the 
nature – and strength – of many local people’s response to the networking relatedness of the Palermitan 
administrators.  
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members and their wives) drew on the idioms of family and kinship to talk about other 
social relations and groups – antimafia cooperatives. This practice proposed a 
cooperativism that was inclusive of kinship and that implicitly or, sometimes, explicitly 
rejected the administrators’ image of antimafia cooperativism, which corresponded to the 
official state model of the Consortium. This model is inspired by the modernist ideal of 
escaping the grip of local relations by separating work from family. Both administrative and 
manual workforce teams made use of relatedness for skill-oriented recruitment, and hence 
to reproduce themselves in the cooperatives as teams. However, the workers’ recruitment 
model changed local relations through cooperativism, through this process enriching both 
the realms of kinship and of work. At the same time, this model reproduced existing ideas 
both of skill and kinship, and also how they corresponded. This approach is more in tune 
with the historical experience of the antimafia movement and cooperativism, as antimafia 
struggle has been articulated, in the past, through kinship relationships as well (see, e.g., 
3.1.1). Moreover, it confirms that cooperativism is a ‘modular’ notion (Anderson 2006), 
which means different things to different people and is always contextual and dynamic to 
the specificities of the historical and geographical contexts it develops in. 
For these reasons, I argue that people of the local workforce teams renew – 
revitalise and, at the same time, re-work – ideas of kinship as a form of cooperative 
relatedness. Rather than promoting a modernist separation of work and family (with its 
corresponding ‘meritocratic’ networking relatedness), their practices proposed mediations 
between work and kinship, or cooperative and ‘home’, in ways that incorporated the 
rhetoric of collective labour relations (Ashwin 1999). Their relatedness through the 
cooperative embraced a dynamic idea of kinship in which the boundaries of ‘family’ could 
be renegotiated. This resonates with the work of anthropologists interested in the 
interactions between kinship and production processes (Yanagisako 2002; Goddard 1996; 
Glover 2010) or indeed the tensions between family values and market (Zelizer 1994), who 
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argued that the boundaries between home and work are, by and large, blurry. However, in 
antimafia cooperatives, when there is clear conflict, boundaries are momentarily de-blurred 
and family trumps cooperative. 
Ethnographies of work and labour in Italy have rigorously explored the co-
articulation of rural work and family (Assmuth 1997; Pratt 1994), although accessing jobs 
via family links is, of course, not limited to cooperatives or to agrarian Italy. Ethnographic 
evidence suggests that in industrial settings, where there is stability and continuity of 
employment, generational, but also horizontal (e.g. through siblings), transmission of work 
through kin is an important mechanism for the recruitment of young workers (Blim 1990; 
Mollona 2005a). Some more insights come from anthropological work in historical 
contexts, illustrating the interpenetration of family and industrial life; Hareven (1993), for 
example, stresses that changes in one affect the forms of the other (Hareven 2000). 
Thompson (1967) argues that in early industrial capitalism this process has caused 
‘disruptions’ in familial relations. Kinship networks provided the basis for migration from 
rural areas abroad (for Sicily: Schneider 1990) or to centres of industrial work, while 
‘flexible familism’ contributed to the ‘expansion of class’ (Kalb 1997: 91). Indeed 
‘familialism’ (Piore and Sabel 1986) proved to be an insufficient way to analyse how 
boundaries between home and workplace blur, as it rests on the assumption that there is a 
fundamental gap between home and workplace, and therefore already implies what is under 
scrutiny (Morris 1992). This approach makes the intermingling of home and workplace 
appear to be a ‘cultural’ particularity of places like Sicily, an anomaly of a canon of 
modernity in which home and work are – by definition, in other words by theoretical fiat – 
kept separate. However, as indicated above, ethnographic work on the relationship 
between families and enterprises emphasises that ‘advanced’ capitalist milieux, such as 
Lombardy in Northern Italy, have long genealogies of association between kinship and 
industry (Yanagisako 2002; Ghezzi 2007; Bonomi 2008). Keith Hart also convincingly 
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points out that we conveniently call juxtapositions of family and business ‘corruption’, 
although they happen practically everywhere (2005).  
The policy of antimafia cooperatives, led by the image that mafia was associated 
with family, took an ‘anti-kinship’ stance so far as recruitment was concerned. As this 
related to administrators, this meant a ‘meritocracy’ agenda (whose problems have been 
discussed above); for workers, it conflicted with the dynamic interactions of home and 
work, of kinship and collective labour initiatives. For cooperative workers, the conflation 
between home and cooperative was part of what it meant to them to participate in 
antimafia cooperativism. Nor was kinship an inflexible modality; rather, it could facilitate 
and ‘host’ change. Specifically, the manual workforce members embraced changes in work 
through continuity in kinship and not against it. The workers’ practice actually renovated the 
relationship between home and work. This could be compared to Bloch’s (1989) take on 
the ability of ritual to invest practices with new meanings serving a novel order. Although 
here the form is not rituals but the established idiom of raccomandazione, Bloch’s framework 
helps see how the relationship of change and continuity can be manifested through a 
‘traditional’ practice retained despite ‘change’ in its ideological connotations (1992). In fact, 
the raccomandazione, as significant in the antimafia cooperatives as in informal work relations 
before people were employed in the cooperative framework, has helped create antimafia 
families. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss ethnographically what constituted 
patronage for cooperative workers. I frame this discussion by asking what happened when 
the different notions of relatedness used by the teams in the two-tiered organisation of the 
cooperatives overlapped and clashed: specifically, when administrators used raccomandazioni, 
an idiom linked to kinship, in order to hire people with whom they maintained political 
alliances, for the manual workforce team. I explore what role the notions of patronage and 
horizontality had in this debate. Since the idiom of raccomandazioni does not recognise gaps 
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between home and work while the idiom of networking aims for what their agents claim as 
‘meritocracy’, some interesting conflicts arose, throwing light on both these spheres. 
4.3. Horizontalities: Relations between the Teams and Ideas of 
Patronage 
4.3.1. Clashing idioms: disputes over raccomandazioni and networks 
Not all raccomandazioni were morally acceptable to the cooperative workers. Gossip 
about what people called ‘political raccomandazioni’ within a cooperative was often bitter. In 
fact, what counted as the ideal in one idiom, i.e. raccomandazioni, was precisely what was 
condemned in the other, i.e. patronage, as shown below. Manual workers criticised 
raccomandazioni from a ‘political source’, which were improper and to be excluded in this 
idiom, strictly limited to familial relations. As Enzo put it, ‘It is understandable to make a 
raccomandazione for family or friends but political stuff does not make sense’. Notably, he 
and other older members of the Falcone cooperative commented sarcastically on how 
Fano had come to be employed in ‘their’ cooperative. Fano, a 45-year-old from Curriuni, 
did not come from a peasant background; indeed he described himself as ‘a gentleman’. 
For 17 years he had been the proprietor of an ice cream store in the centre of Curriuni but 
had gone bankrupt. Members of the Falcone cooperative unanimously believed that, as an 
active supporter of the Left, Fano’s appointment must have been ‘through a political 
raccomandazione’. When Fano drove me to the vineyards in his newly purchased Nissan, his 
colleagues often mockingly pointed to the car, saying that ‘the coop money can do miracles 
for political affiliates’. 
However, there were some who suggested that ‘we should draw a veil over the 
issue of Fano’s presence in the coop’. They felt embarrassed on his behalf because, lacking 
any kin connections to the manual workforce, he had no way of justifying his presence in 
the team. Posed with teasing questions such as ‘and how exactly have you ended up here?’, 
Fano had no answer. Giuseppe, a Falcone worker, told me that ‘Fano was parachuted into 
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the cooperative from the world of politics’. For a raccomandazione to be proper, ethical and 
acceptable, Giuseppe explained, it had to come from a relative, rather than from the 
‘shadowy’ world of politicians and trade unionists. The underlying idea, as Enzo suggested, 
was that ‘if it is not done through kinship but through politicking, it is unethical’.  
Fano admitted to me that, in fact, he had got the job through ‘a political 
raccomandazione’ – but challenged me to prove that ‘my London University’ did not work in 
‘similar patronage-oriented ways’. Surely, he suggested, my own ‘anthropologist job’ was ‘a 
gift, a raccomandazione by some Englishman patron’. As we worked side by side in the 
vineyards, he often complained that members of the cooperative expressing right-wing 
ideas should be expelled and that his own ethics were much more ‘compatible with the 
coop’. For instance, he sometimes publicly confronted Adamo on what he called Adamo’s 
‘reactionary’ ideas on religion and immigration. The response of other members was that 
this showed that he had been recruited ‘due to those [leftist] ideas he shares with our 
president’, bypassing what for them was the only proper basis, namely kinship. 
It is important to identify the circumstances in which recruitment practices could 
become problematic, or negatively defined, and how people portrayed them in terms of 
immorality, corruption and ‘patronage’, especially given the charged local ‘tradition’ of 
immoral conduct, associated with kinship, through mafia families, according to the rhetoric 
of the Consortium and Libera. For both the administrators and the manual workers in 
antimafia cooperatives, recruitment was strongly inflected in moral terms. However, the 
two systems, and idioms, of recruitment were normally insulated from each other. As 
shown above, network-based recruitment of administrators took place independently of 
the raccomandazioni-based hiring of the manual workforce people. The two-tiered 
organisation of the cooperatives reinforced the differentiation between these moral 
universes. Within a specific team, therefore, horizontal relationships among team members 
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were harmonious. Vertical relations between the two teams’ recruitment practices often 
entailed moral conflicts and became an occasion for moral criticism.  
A key point of conflict was that politicians and trade unionists often arranged 
raccomandazioni unrelated to the manual workers’ kinship relations. The mayor of Curriuni 
for instance, told me he felt a ‘need to guarantee the smooth functioning of our 
cooperatives’. Politicians and trade unionists saw the cooperatives as the continuation of 
Curriuni’s antimafia political struggles, such as the Fasci and the 1940s land occupations 
and cooperative movement (note, however, that the antimafia movement was always 
articulated within/through households and families). Developing sympathies to the 
cooperatives’ administrators, as they saw them as sharing similar political views, leftist 
politicians and unionists were keen to put in place a system of politically motivated favours, 
promoting the hiring of left-wing locals by the cooperatives. The main agent in this activity 
was the leftwing CGIL trade union, and specifically its ex-communist functionary, Dino 
Paternostro, author of books on the history of the antimafia movement (eg Paternostro 
1994). The municipality backed this effort: Pippo Cipro, Curriuni’s first Consortium mayor, 
was an ex-communist himself, sympathetic to the CGIL and to Arci (Associazione Ricreativa e 
Culturale Italiana (Recreative and Cultural Association of Italy), the association that oversaw 
and influenced the Lavoro e Altro cooperative, when the cooperative established in 2000. 
Cipro suggested many political raccomandazioni. To this day people hired that way, face the 
sarcasm of some co-members on how they were recruited. 
The Lavoro e Altro cooperative, which had opted to identify with Arci, also found 
itself in the spotlight for other reasons. Some peasant informants from Curriuni thought 
that Arci was an instrument of ‘the communists’ and thus that its members were nostalgic 
about the era of ‘Eastern European dictatorships’. Once, as I shared a meal with friends of 
the Tomara brothers, they jokingly advised me to ‘stick around and feast with the 
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comrades’. The political persuasion of the members of Arci, sometimes ridiculed,107 was 
associated with constant patronage-like support for the Lavoro e Altro cooperative by left-
wing sources. In the context of Curriuni, a stronghold of agrarian mobilisation in the past, 
people read this militancy as equivalent to an identification with the CGIL union (see 
Chapter 3). The politics of the Left oscillated, in this mountain town, between the two 
poles of the Arci and the CGIL. The municipality promoted this interaction, especially 
during the early 2000s, and this inheritance resonated in peasants’ stories of ‘favours’ that 
the mayor had promoted. The suspicion of ‘political raccomandazioni’ and their 
characterisation as ‘immoral patronage’ should not be considered as a dissociation of locals 
from the activist history of the peasant antimafia movement, of which they were proud. In 
fact, as suggested earlier in the thesis, they considered the cooperatives to be a form of 
continuation of that tradition. Rather, I argue that their suspicions implied that they  
privileged  kinship over politics, as a moral basis for recruitment to the cooperatives. 
People suggested the existence of links among Curriuni’s CGIL, the ex-mayor and 
the president of the cooperative, all members of what Pino called ‘the lefty networks’. 
Some local antimafia families often complained about the cooperative administration being 
‘too left-wing’. Pino Anemo’s family members felt they were an ‘antimafia family’ by 
conviction and tradition, but argued that Pino, a militant for the local right-wing 
administration, ‘could not climb the coop hierarchy because of his bravery to be vocal 
about his political affiliations’. In fact, Fano ridiculed Pino as ‘a half-mafioso’, because he 
had campaigned for the UDC party.108 Similarly, workers of the Borsellino cooperative, 
such as signor Mento or Niki, suggested that I should investigate ‘how the Marcuso 
                                                 
107 ARCI is often paraphrased in the context of Alto Belice as Associazione Rifondazione Communista Italiana 
(Communist Refoundation Association of Italy), referring to Rifondazione Comunista, the last successful 
communist party in the country. 
108 The acronym stands for Unione del Centro (Union of the Centre) but in the joking local jargon it is 
paraphrased to Unione dei Carcerati or Unione dei Carciofi (Union of the incarcerated or of the artichokes, a 
metaphor for mafiosi), to indicate the centre-right wing party’s mafia allegations. In Alto Belice, these liaisons 
were highly pronounced.  
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brothers got in [to the coop] and brought others with them, through their politica in 
Curriuni’. The Borsellino cooperative in particular, composed of people who were 
constantly criticising each other in private, often seemed to me like an ensemble of 
contradictory channels of raccomandazioni, with those deriving from familial links widely 
approved of as legitimate, unlike the ‘political’ ones. During pauses at work in the 
vineyards, workers often ridiculed the public contests of 2001 and 2004 through which 
Falcone and Borsellino were constituted. ‘The public contests were a joke, and therefore 
people just got in through their politics or kin, whatever was handier’, Enzo informed me.  
Thus recruitment arrangements for the manual workforce, when done outside the 
familial domain, were a particularly acute source of conflict. What triggered conflict was 
not, as one might imagine, manual workers’ sense that they had no say in the management 
of resources or were excluded from decision-making in what was purported to be the 
cooperatives’ industrial democracy (the typical idea of cooperative horizontality, as 
discussed in 2.1). Rather, what they objected to was the appropriation of the established 
raccomandazioni practice by the administrators and their political allies outside the 
cooperatives, as the access to jobs through kinship was the reason for conflict between 
teams. This underlines the constitutive aspect of kinship in antimafia cooperativism.  
The appropriation of raccomandazioni was seen as the intrusion of an ‘alien’ idiom   
into what was considered to be a separate sphere of ‘relatedness’ that belonged to the 
workers, of a sense of belonging that is linked to what is ‘our own’ and to solidarity (sensu 
Edwards and Strathern 2000). In the above narrative, people evoked ‘patronage’ as a 
(shared) term of condemnation in order to reject as ‘immoral’ a type of vertical relation 
between the teams of the cooperatives in which the administrators’ team imposed its 
recruitment idioms on the manual workforce. So, antimafia cooperatives were shaped by 
the efforts of these two differently regulated spheres of labour reproduction, normally kept 
separate from each other. However, when there were attempts to mingle kinship and 
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politics, or one entered the other’s field by utilising its idioms (raccomandazioni across 
political affiliations, as opposed to kinship bonds) or, even more, when cooperativist 
regulations imposed certain priorities on the management of assets over families (as per the 
case of Akragas and Tempio, above), conflicts arose, out of class antagonism, as is seen 
most forcefully below.  
I argue below that ‘patronage’, a term charged within anthropological debate, needs 
to be revisited,109 the antimafia cooperatives provide a solid backdrop to measure its precise 
meaning in context. Specifically, for local people, only political parties and politicians linked 
to the administrators’ networks can be ‘patrons’. A raccomandazione ‘proper’, on the other 
hand, involved only people related to each other and this does not count as patronage. 
Indeed, as explored earlier, the raccomandazioni reinforced people’s sense of relatedness. 
Therefore, members of the manual workforce considered the appropriation of the 
relatedness-based idiom of raccomandazione by the networked administrators unethical, 
because they thought the administrators dissociated it from the experience of linking family 
to work in the fields, understood to be the established and moral pattern for the manual 
workforce team. The workers of the antimafia cooperatives thus defined patronage in 
terms of mingling the workplace with politics, not with kinship110. 
 
                                                 
109 This could also apply, to an extent, to clientelism, often associated to patronage (as per Chubb 1982), but 
not to nepotism, so intrinsically linked to kinship.  
110 Interestingly, of course, patronage and mafia have been linked in ethnographic discussions to both politics 
and kinship, which my findings contradict (Pardo 1996; Cole 1997; but see Blok 2001, who acknowledges 
‘netoworking’ in particular). Moreover, anthropologists have debated whether patronage obscures class 
divisions among semi-autonomous peasants who do not own all means of production (Li Causi 1975; 1981; 
Littlewood 1980), Li Causi arguing that class positionalities allowed patronage to thrive in Sicily, through 
mafia. My discussion takes class into account, but examines work organisations (cooperatives) where different 
people work together, and not autonomously. 
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My data shows how the vulnerability of manual workers leads to their moral 
critique of certain non-kinship based raccomandazioni, glossing them as patronage.111 In the 
case of Alto Belice, intra-class relations (horizontal relations among equals) are used to 
construct different spheres of horizontality within the cooperatives, which I have termed 
spheres of relatedness112 in order to approach the different idioms and values of each group 
that, as the discussion on patronage revealed, were mutually incompatible but equally 
informed the cooperatives in their two – usually segregated – tiers. 
4.3.2. Two spheres of relatedness, two spheres of cooperative horizontality 
To summarise: in the context of the Alto Belice cooperatives, patronage and its 
connotations of immorality are not attached to kinship but in fact developed in a locality 
(Alto Belice) where administrators did not have local kinship links. Different forms of 
relatedness have different associated idioms. The appropriation of the raccomandazione 
practice by the Palermitan, leftwing middle-class administrators caused conflict within the 
cooperatives. Workers criticised those among them who had been hired through 
‘patronage’ instead of through ‘raccomandazioni’; they said they were ‘parachuted into our 
team by the administrators’. These ‘political’ links were called ‘false raccomandazioni’ and, 
unlike familial relations, this kind of recruitment was branded as unethical patronage.  
The broader conclusion is that, for cooperative workers (the term including daily 
workers and member-workers), relations between equals, ideologically closer to the 
horizontal work relations in cooperativism, were imagined and deployed through idioms 
and links of kinship, while administrators’ primary orientation to horizontal relations was 
their sense of belonging to meritocratic political networks. However, when vertical 
                                                 
111 Whether class consciousness should be taken into account in analysing  patronage has been the subject of 
extensive debate among anthropologists in the context of the Indian proletarianised peasantry. In India, 
Breman has argued that bonded labour at least provides an important ‘subsistence guarantee’ for peasants 
(1993; 2003); Brass has attacked this view, arguing that patronage relations obfuscate class struggle, which, in 
his view, is crucial in tackling the exploitation of bonded labour relations (1999: 226–32). 
112 The term ‘spheres of relatedness’ although undertheorised generally, is not offered here as a breakthrough.  
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relations between unequals (the administrative and local workforce teams) were negotiated 
through politics, the result was disturbance of the equilibrium. When there was attempt to 
mingle the idioms of relatedness between the teams, ‘patronage’ emerged as the site of 
conflictual discourse. Horizontality – or, more precisely, horizontalities – were separately 
practised by each team. I am arguing that a different sphere of relatedness corresponded to each 
work group, the administrators and the manual workers. Within each sphere, which coincided 
with each team in the cooperatives’ division of labour, there was horizontality – but not 
between them.
113
 
Bohannan and Bohannan’s analysis of the Tiv’s ‘multicentric economy’ proposed 
the classic idea of different spheres of exchange, associated with different values 
(subsistence, prestige, marriage) denoting different spheres of circulation for diverse goods 
and services (1959: 492). This is an interesting analogy, which inspires my argument on 
spheres of relatedness. Bohannan and Bohannan’s (1962) idea of multiple ‘spheres of 
transactions’, where different kinds of goods circulate according to the emotional 
connotations and values of each sphere takes the argument further. The authors’ point 
resembles the Polanyian argument that different currencies speak to different values 
(Polanyi 1957) highlights an interesting idea, which can be applied to the existence of 
different moralities, by and large corresponding to the different social backgrounds and 
current relationships (including class and kinship) of the two teams within the cooperatives.  
In adapting these ideas here, I bring together the concept of spheres of relatedness 
with the existence of separate moral positions, to examine how different relatedness idioms 
are used (in the context of recruitment to employment in cooperatives) in ways that 
highlight the nuances of ‘moral economy’. Specifically, I suggest that the two groups 
support different moralities and indeed different ideas of moral economy, which can be 
                                                 
113 Interestingly, the idea of the virtuous circle of the administrators’ networking alludes to a sphere itself. 
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applied horizontally within each group but not vertically between groups. Therefore, the 
cooperatives were composed of different horizontalities, specifically because the state model 
of antimafia cooperativism was so explicitly suspicious of kinship, promoting political 
alliances and networking instead. The ideological undermining of kinship via the rhetoric of 
meritocracy reinforced the division of labour in antimafia cooperatives. Workers defended 
the raccomandazione practice as a channel that linked work to home (i.e. cooperative to 
kinship). Linking the practice exclusively to kinship-based relatedness, they resisted the 
appropriation of raccomandazioni by the administrators, who were in more established 
positions, glossing it as immoral ‘patronage’. 
I have already alluded to the Bourdieuan notions of class distinction (1989) and 
class reproduction, relevant to the cooperatives’ administrators (1988). For each of the 
teams, their antimafia cooperativist experience was beneficial in horizontal class terms, as it 
provided people with the possibility to distinguish themselves among equals (accordingly, 
other families in the village, and friends in Palermo). The conflict in inter-group 
relationships between teams of the cooperatives confirms this. Despite claims to general 
horizontality (by implication, across all teams), antimafia cooperativism was structured in 
two-tiers, a strict division of labour that reflected and reproduced class backgrounds.  
Among antimafia cooperatives’ manual workforce members, the determinant factor 
for calling a recruitment practice ‘patronage’ is a move not from kinship-to-jobs (the idiom 
of raccomandazione, totally legitimate among workers) but from politics-to-jobs, sidelining 
kinship.114 This finding runs counter to broader debates on patronage in anthropology. The 
classical patronage literature states that kinship and friendship relations determine 
allocation of resources (Boissevain 1965). Authors stress the unequal dyadic relationships 
                                                 
114 This could be seen as further appropriation, by administrators, of control over the position of workers in 
the cooperative – added to the lack of industrial democracy.  
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among people nevertheless related to each other, eventually linked to politics through 
patronage (Mitchell 2001). The violence involved in some patronage cases is a channel of 
political power that bridges the kin-group (and particularly the clan-like male brotherhood) 
to politics and ‘great men’ (Gilsenan 1996). Finally, the findings of certain anthropologists 
in Southern Italy, who rigidly associate patronage with kinship, however broadly defined, 
are also challenged by the reality of antimafia cooperatives (Chubb 1982; Pardo 2004).  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the cooperatives’ two-tiered organisation implies that their reproduction 
is twofold; the relatedness idioms of that reproduction are not interchangeable between 
(class-informed) teams, which correspond to different spheres of relatedness and different 
class horizontalities. Both their idioms contribute to the making of the cooperative and 
both are seemingly about the same thing – equality/horizontality. There is even some 
seeming overlap in kinship ‘talk’. Yet these idioms are in fact not only different but lead to 
mutual unintelligibility. Relating these ethnographically based observations to the current 
state of play in the literature have sparked from this discussion. I here propose some 
concluding thoughts. 
Firstly, in existing analyses, raccomandazioni are typically registered under the classic 
patronage definition of ‘unequal dyadic relationships’ (Gellner and Waterbury 1977). They 
form ‘a system’ guaranteeing jobs (Assmuth 1997: 160) in an ‘atmosphere of clientelism’, 
reproducing mafia power (Schneider and Schneider 2003: 105), or appear as political 
patronage (legitimate, however, on the ground), through exchanging votes with promises of 
work (Chubb 1982: 93–96), the reason for ‘Italian crony capitalism’ (Ginsborg 2003b: 68). 
Often, they do not link to prioritisations of kin, as ‘the resource spheres of kinship and 
friendship are defined entrepreneurially’ (Pardo 1996: 94–95; 2004). In my discussion, 
instead, raccomandazioni form a moral backdrop of kin-to-kin relations; from this perspective 
it is only when they are linked to politics that ‘immoral patronage’ arises.  
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Secondly, therefore, I have debated the term patronage, often used to analyse 
practices of familial favouritism and clientelism (for Italy: Pardo 1996; Cole 1997; Assmuth 
1997). I have shown how, in Alto Belice, this questions the Consortium’s meritocratic 
rhetoric by drawing the line in a different place: kinship networking is immoral when 
connected to political alliance and not to family per se. Patronage is thus linked to political 
alliances (‘networking’) as opposed to personalistic ties (‘raccomandazioni’). 
In fact, the latter proves to be a more dynamic and flexible category than the 
former. This is my third point. Networking links people but this linking leaves their 
relations intact. Instead, raccomandazioni, as an idiom of cooperatives’ reproduction, have 
lasting effects on families’ own reproduction, reshaping the scope of kinship (coop as 
family) or renegotiating familial groupings (antimafia families). In Alto Belice, antimafia 
families were legitimised to perform raccomandazioni and raccomandazioni formed antimafia 
families. The sphere of the home often interlocks with economic practices (Zelizer 1995; 
2005). A ‘processual approach to kinship’ (Carsten 2000: 16) can highlight precisely the 
elasticity of new kinship meanings that such interactions elicit. This speaks against a 
sociological tradition in which ‘familism’ has dominated much of the literature on Italy, 
which in turn promotes civic trust as a replacement for familial loyalty as a premise of 
cooperation (Gambetta 1996; Gunnarson 2008). Self-proclaimed ‘feminist’ sociologists 
have even suggested the ‘return of amoral familism’ in Sicily (Dino 1996; Principato and 
Dino 1997). State agents also employ ideas about ‘the mafia mentality ‘inside’ the [Southern 
Italian] family’ (Jamieson 2000: 156–57). I showed, rather, in the tradition of feminist 
authors, (Morris, Harris, Hareven, Yanagisako, Zelizer and Goddard), that the continuities 
between home and workplace mutually constitute both institutions and extend their 
meanings, reinforcing cooperative work. 
The main argument of this chapter is therefore cooperativism’s entrenchment with 
families; cooperativism develops, in the case of workers, because of this entrenchment and 
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not in the face of it. The ‘incompatibility’ of cooperativism and of personalised, family-
based networks, is therefore dubious, as shown elsewhere (Ashwin 1999). Cooperativism 
can draw from collectivism and political projects while simultaneously being informed by 
(different spheres of) relatedness. This is the way workers experienced cooperatives, which 
consequentially formed their experience of antimafia cooperativism, although it developed 
without a specific rhetoric, like the dominant model of the administrators. I used 
Bourdieu’s idea of middle-class reproduction (1988) applying it to ‘virtual networks’ in 
antimafia cooperatives and showed how their ‘networking’ constitutes a sphere of 
relatedness, problematising meritocracy, as part of a class-informed modern paradigm of 
separating home from work (Yanagisako 2002; Zelizer 2005; cf. Latour 1993). ‘Family’ is 
not an ahistoric, static category, despite the idea that ‘families’ in Sicily often reproduce 
mafia. Feminist sociology has identified a rising ‘moral familism’ in the antimafia 
movement (Santino 2007: 104), in women resisting mafia family ethics (Impastato et al 
2003; Puglisi 2005).  
Within each team, shared idioms among equals (networking and virtuous circles, 
and kinship-based raccomandazioni) construct horizontal relations among equals. Between 
teams, dissimilar idioms produce conflict. Attempts for cooperative horizontality to cross 
over the strict division of labour in the cooperatives lead to disjunctures (over what counts 
as ‘patronage’). I have argued that different spheres of relatedness constitute the teams of 
the cooperatives. These work in two different, detached horizontalities, but cannot mingle 
vertically, to produce an antimafia cooperativism that is generally horizontal. These idioms 
corresponded to the two-tiered organisation of the cooperatives, reinforcing horizontalities 
within each team and engendering an overall cooperativist horizontality, due to the 
incompatibility between different spheres of relatedness. 
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Chapter 5   
Wages as Change, Informalities as Continuity: 
Cooperative Work and Local Livelihoods 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to answer the question of what waged employment in the 
cooperatives implied for the livelihoods of those Alto Belice families whose men1 worked 
for the cooperatives, as member-workers or daily workers, focusing mainly on the manual 
workforce team.2 I ask what changes took place in the relation between formal and 
informal sources of income once local people began to be officially employed in the 
cooperatives. Wages from cooperatives, together with informal wages for seasonal labour 
from fellow peasants, were the main sources of income for households, alongside 
unemployment benefits and farm earnings. Where Chapter 4 discussed recruitment for 
employment by the cooperatives, I shall focus here on people’s means of livelihood outside 
the framework of cooperative jobs. The administrators of the cooperatives promoted an 
idea of antimafia cooperativism as the imposition of a legally bound regularisation of 
labour (what they called ‘standardisation’). Work in the cooperatives was presented as legal, 
remunerative, safe and horizontal. However, the livelihoods of people in Alto Belice were 
more complex, comprising informal means of making a living and a series of relationships 
within and among households, and vis-à-vis the state. I show why this is the case, and how 
it was constructed, elucidating how people’s livelihoods changed and co-articulated with 
antimafia cooperativism, in response to their integration into waged employment. The core 
                                                 
1 As noted in the previous chapter, the cooperatives employed only men for manual agricultural work.  
2 Conversely, in Chapter 7, I focus more on the administrators’ team. However, my particular narrative 
emphases are mutually referential. Therefore, in order to shift the ethnographic emphasis from the one group 
to the other, I start from the idea that my ethnographic discussion of the groups is relational. Both groups are 
always present in my ethnographic narrative, even if the focus is on one in particular.  
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theme is the idea that the centre of antimafia cooperativism was employment; I both explain 
the meanings and ramifications of that policy and assess its adequacy. As cooperative 
remuneration was not sufficient, locals continued seeking other means of livelihood. This 
unsettled the horizontality of the cooperatives, as workers3, unlike administrators, engaged 
in informal activities outside the cooperative framework, to complement their family 
income. 
Ethnographically, I concentrate on the cooperatives’ manual labour teams, to 
explore the complexity of local people’s livelihoods, problematising the idea that being 
hired by a cooperative implied a total radical shift in local ways of making a living. I 
juxtapose the standardised, albeit seasonal and not very remunerative, employment regime 
offered to local men by the cooperatives, to two local practices popular among families of 
male cooperative workers: registering family land in the name of women and exchanging 
‘informal’ work among men. The gendered division of tasks within the household and the 
mafia’s influence in the continuation of these two activities reveal a range of interesting 
implications. These activities existed prior to the establishment of the cooperatives and 
survived the changes in local people’s work patterns developed within antimafia 
cooperativism. In this way, I explore the situated continuities that the deployment of 
antimafia cooperativism was arranged around, discussing locals’ labour activities that 
escaped the framework of political economy. The discussion shows that people’s 
livelihoods were constituted of a variety of different sources that ranged beyond the 
cooperatives and did not cease because of the relative standardisation of labour relations 
that the cooperatives sought to impose on people’s livelihoods. 
                                                 
3 Henceforth to include worker-members and daily workers, unless stated.  
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Gavin Smith, echoing Marx,4 notes how some people’s (branded as ‘ghostly 
figures’) livelihood activities fall outside the domain of political economy (1989: 112). I 
inquire into such invisible, strongly gendered and often illicit activities, in Alto Belice, and 
explore what the integration of local men within the ‘standardised’ political economy of the 
cooperatives’ workforce implied in practice. In this context, I underline the importance of 
gendered configurations of labour and land tenure in Alto Belice. Both practices were 
widely established before the cooperatives were established but local men’s integration into 
the wage employment system of the cooperatives did result in some modifications of these 
arrangements. Exploring the changing meanings of these practices after they became a 
complementary source of income alongside men’s registered wage employment, I elucidate 
the relationship between formal and informal income opportunities in the making of the 
cooperative workers’ livelihoods, problematising the standardisation argument of the 
administrators. As elucidated in 2.2, the cooperatives’ ‘horizontality’ political economy was 
concretised through a practice of organised wage employment. Therefore, the stake of 
antimafia cooperativism is indeed vested in employment – a formal, regularised and 
legalised contractual5 relation binding members together (and to obligations) – a 
standardised model of labour relations that, however, proves unable to sustain family 
livelihood needs or contain the community practices of local workers.  
In the vast literature on livelihoods, Robert Chambers (1993) is a useful source. He 
notes the importance of families’ gendered strategies to negotiate land ownership in order 
to guarantee their ‘livelihood security’ (Chambers 2000: 121). Gavin Smith’s (1989) 
approach includes not only ‘materially’ oriented activities and relationships but social and 
political ones too: people engage in a range of relationships and ‘resistance’ activities (for 
                                                 
4 The young Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844; Smith quotes from Bottomore 1964; 
latest edition: Marx 2011).  
5 Of course, the employer in these contracts (of members, and daily workers) was ‘the cooperative’, as 
represented by the Administration Council and the Assembly. 
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example joining a social movement) as part of their livelihood strategies. This is a useful 
way to think of livelihoods within and alongside cooperativism- as well as paying attention 
to workers’ local codes. I borrow the term from Schneider and Schneider (1976), as I 
discuss below. Chapter 4 focused on the local code entailed in kinship-based 
raccomandazioni; here it is ideas of gendered land tenure and ‘community’-based work 
(‘mutual aid’). I then see the experience of participating in cooperatives as a kind of work 
that, in local understandings, is inclusive of different relationships, which bridge the home 
and workplace, and could even include affiliations to mafia-inspired practices, glossed as 
‘community’ or ‘ways of life’. This approach reviews cooperativism as a modular notion, as 
discussed historically (Chapter 3), locating aspects of it beyond the domain of political 
economy. 
5.1. The Administrators’ ‘Standardisation’ and the Manual Workers’ 
Experience of Work in the Fields 
Gianpiero, the president of Libera Palermo and a member of the Borsellino cooperative, 
spoke to me at length in an interview about the changes that wage employment in the 
cooperatives had brought about locally. He suggested that Libera and the administrators of 
Borsellino: 
had managed to convince the braccianti using only the wallet [col portafoglio solo]: we 
ask them how much the mafioso pays them, they tell us, ‘he pays 30 euro a day’ [iddu 
mi paga 30 euro a jurna].... OK we tell them, last year the daily pay according to the 
law, the daily contract for agriculture was 51.62 euros. ... So, come to us! ... This is 
how much they get, legally. It’s the norm [È la normalità]. And so, imagine Theo, for 
the Borsellino coop there were 300 applications for braccianti positions! People 
realised that their interests were with the legality, the normality.  
[Lengthy pause.] 
But ... I tell you, we can’t pay them more money, say 60 euros a day. Because it’s 
fair not to; we don’t want to reward anyone. [Perchè è giusto- non vogliamo premiare 
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nessuno]. In any case, the mafia boss [il boss]6 would not pay the local bracciante more 
than 60 euros ever. That’s the way forward. We have to speak to people with and 
through the wallet [Così si fanno i passi avanti. E si deve parlare col portafoglio alla gente].  
‘The wallet’ implied not only good daily pay but also legally guaranteed protection, such as 
employment contributions towards pensions.  
Early on in fieldwork, I realised that the cooperative administrators were importing 
ideas about waged work that were new to Alto Belice. Cooperative and Libera 
representatives emphasized the need to ‘standardise work relations’, that is, regulation. ‘The 
wallet’ thus meant not only solid remuneration and other benefits but was also part of the 
process they called ‘standardisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of labour in the form of employment. 
They presented the cooperatives as bringing this standardisation – a protective legal regime, 
never before deployed in Alto Belice. Most cooperative administrators were convinced that 
the process of formally valuing agricultural waged work and promoting labour rights would 
be accompanied by ideological change. Luca told me, that ‘once a labour regime is 
standardised, it would drag peasants away from mafia sympathies. ... Their ideas will follow 
their conditions of living’.7 This normalisation/standardisation involved a net pay of 51.62 
euros per day, plus national insurance contributions, as well as taxes, accumulated towards 
pensions. However, Gianpiero, in another interview, admitted that ‘the wallet’ was not 
always enough to ‘shift ideas’: 
As regards the peasants of San Giovanni, those under contract labour from the 
cooperatives, our member-workers [i dipendenti delle cooperative], I can tell you frankly 
that they are not antimafia [loro non sono antimafia] ... They haven’t been able to listen 
to the antimafia. We have managed to convince them only using the wallet [col 
portafoglio solo], but there is still work to do ... although we have managed to 
consolidate strong networking among us and in the cooperatives. 
                                                 
6 In Italy, the emic term to describe a leader of a mafia clan is the English word ‘boss’. 
7 Luca’s account here seems like a slightly ‘vulgar’, simplified Marxism or, indeed, the discourse of 
modernisation as changing mindsets through imposed restructuring of economic activity, as explored in post-
colonial contexts in relation to moral economies (e.g. Taussig 2010 [1980]).  
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The braccianti of the cooperatives that Gianpiero referred to were the people in the 
manual workforce who were either members of the cooperatives or daily labourers; 
alongside their cooperative employment they were also smallholders. They earned wages 
from the cooperatives by working in the confiscated land plots and also worked on their 
own land tracts (pezzi di terra), mostly vineyards.8 Most of them, when I asked, 
acknowledged that the pay from the cooperatives was ‘pretty good’– but always added ‘but 
not enough’. A part of their income came from selling their own grapes to the local 
wineries, such as the Sancipiriddu, in which they were also producer-members. As 
independent producers, they called themselves contadini (‘peasants’), a term that 
encompassed all landowners, regardless of the production scale; (as noted in 3.2.1 their 
mean landholding was a modest 3.5 ha).  
Loredana, a 35-year-old female administrator for the Borsellino cooperative, was 
sceptical about the extent to which the standardisation of labour ‘could work’, querying 
whether local workers took it seriously. She complained to me, mocking the Sicilian dialect 
of cooperative workers:  
… when local people applied to join the cooperatives, they expected the stable job,9 
... integration into a system of a stable monthly wage [u trabbagghiu fissu…a 
sistemazione].... I have discussed with all members about their views of what the pay 
and the overall remuneration might be like. People think that by entering the coop 
they have found a steady stipend. This condition is an expected Sicilian disease.  
                                                 
8 The co-articulation of waged labour and land cultivation meant that informants were at the same time both 
workers and independent peasant producers. There is a vast literature on people, whose livelihoods combine 
peasant and worker statuses, including ethnographies of Italy (eg Pratt 1994). This experience has been 
identified as a ‘mixed’ one according to the Portici school of sociology; in Emilia, the combination of farmer 
and labourer identities was incorporated within broader development plans (Mingione 1994). In Sicily, it has 
been linked with household subsistence but as not contributing to broader growth (Centorrino et al. 1999). 
Instead, this ‘mixed’ mode has remained in place as a way of sustaining the livelihood of local households, 
precisely due to the 1953 land reform, which fragmented land in small tracts, a situation reproduced in 
inheritance patterns.  
9 Ethnographies of Western Sicily stress how ‘the stable job’ was an idiom of the non-productive middle 
classes of the city, rather than a characteristic term of the rural workforce (Cole 1997; Chubb 1989). 
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Silvio, the president of the cooperative, shared this view on his colleagues, and 
indeed thought their attitude to demand a steady wage was counterproductive.10 The 
production team members regarded these two young and educated administrators as 
ignorant in agricultural matters despite the fact that they were the cooperative’s 
agronomists and the only members with a degree. They thought that the administrators’ 
insistence on ‘promoting the standardisation’ was naïve if they could not back it up with a 
full monthly wage for all members, administrators and workers alike. The explanation 
administrators gave for the fact that they – unlike everyone in the manual cooperative 
workforce bar 3 member-workers of Falcone – received a monthly wage was that agrarian 
work was seasonal, unlike their work, which needed constant presence in the office 
throughout the year. 
Unlike Gianpiero, Silvio and Loredana and other cooperative administrators and 
representatives, who were often disliked by local workers for such views, I was frequently 
invited to homes of sangiovannari to spend time and discuss their experience of wage work 
with the cooperatives. I soon found that what people mostly wanted to talk about, perhaps 
heated by the flow of their homemade wine at the dinner table, was their experiences of 
working their own plots, rather than their paid work for the cooperatives. I spent large 
parts of my fieldwork working alongside them, in the cooperatives’ vineyards, joining teams 
of 5 to 15 men every other morning throughout December, April, August and September 
(months of intense agricultural work). In that context, I witnessed their sense of pride in 
working on ex-mafia confiscated land.11 
                                                 
10 As noted (see Figure 1.1), of the manual workforce’s members, only 4 out of 10 in Falcone, and none in 
the other cooperatives, had a monthly wage; although all of them had permanent contracts, they were paid on 
a daily basis. 
11 I refer to both workers and member-workers as ‘workers’ in this chapter, unless otherwise stated. 
195 
 
  
Photo 14: Workers in the vineyards, applying wire 
over the vines. 
Photo 15: Falcone workers about to take a cigarette 
break in the vineyards. 
The cooperatives modelled the recruitment strategies for their manual workforce 
teams’ on the gendered distribution of labour common in Alto Belice. The absence of 
women on every plot of the cooperative land that I visited made an impression on me. 
Their absence was constitutive of the manual workers’ work identity. Manliness was 
fundamental to the definition of their worker subjectivities and a form of class 
identification. Men experienced working the soil of the cooperatives’ plots12 as an 
expression of masculinity. Their work discourse often evoked stamina and courage,– here 
seen as especially masculine characteristics – which men thought were needed not only to 
undertake the labour process but also the ‘antimafia burden’. Working on the confiscated 
land was thus ‘even more masculine’, Enzo noted. This echoes ideas on the articulation of 
antimafia activity in terms of bravery (as discussed historically in Chapter 3). These 
understandings formed bonds of camaraderie among workers and established their practice 
of calling each other ‘compare’ (godparent, but also comrade13). They also underlined the 
distance between the administration and manual workforce teams, marking the 
                                                 
12 Referring to a plot as Falcone’s or Borsellino’s and so on is obviously not literally correct, as the 
confiscated plots belong to the state and are leased for free (accomodato d’uso) to the cooperatives. However, 
everyone I met used terms that implied ownership when referring to ‘our cooperative’s plots’. 
13 For Alto Belice, it is very important to emphasize that the contemporary use of these comparatico idioms 
among people of the antimafia cooperatives is completely separated from the historically (mafia-) charged 
godparenthood fictive kinship idiom (Arlacchi 1986). More relevant are analogies with compadrazgo in Latin 
America to elucidate how idioms of work camaraderie develop as positively perceived kinship language (Nash 
1979).  
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cooperatives’ division of labour. Often, men working in the vineyards recited sexist jokes 
to contrast themselves to the ‘kids in the office’ or to celebrate the manual labourer’s 
manhood, compared to the ambiguous manliness of the ‘pen pusher’. 
Through masculinity the braccianti underlined the moral superiority of their work 
experiences, which they brought into their new identities as wage workers in the 
cooperative ambience. Phrases like ‘one poor man’s cock is better than those of one 
hundred rich men’ celebrated the presumed sexual capacities of ‘the peasant’, and the 
somatic abilities of manual labour, while associations between their own work making the 
land fertile were also rife. At the same time, they often ridiculed the exclusively male work 
of the countryside, using self-mockery (‘in the village you get pussy, in the plot arse’). 
Promiscuity and sexual potency, men asserted, were ‘naturally’ stimulated by work in the 
open air, unlike the ‘closed’ environment of the administrative team’s office, which they 
considered unhealthy. Despite the overt manliness, they emphasised their fidelity and 
family-oriented ethics, which ‘anchored’ them, as they said, to their homes. As Pippo Pitrè 
put it, ‘In the village, we refrain from these jokes: we are faithful to our wives and honour 
their presence in our households’.14 Men’s experience of their employment in the 
cooperatives was masculinised as a daring political activity but also fed into their family-
oriented livelihoods. 
Male workers hardly ever talked about their wives’ contributions to their household 
income. They claimed that women laboured towards the well-being of the home by making 
sure that food was served after a long day in the fields. Nevertheless, they indicated that 
                                                 
14 Because of the gendered nature of my fieldwork, the fact that I am a man meant that I was not exposed to 
some of the gendered contradictions in households (Morris 1992), about which, researchers should be 
cautious. I have not been able to draw much data for analogies with women’s get-togethers. The 
ethnographic discussion here does contribute further work on the significance of men’s proverbs (Brandes 
1980) in understanding husband-wife relationships. There are, indeed, many points to be made by studying 
these symbols, gestures and sayings among men in public spaces (such as the workplace) to yield an idea of 
relations in the private space between husbands and wives (for Sicily: Blok 2000). Herzfeld underlines the 
performance of masculinity in Crete (Herzfeld 1985). I engage further with this literature in Chapter 7, where 
I discuss local indirect communication. 
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what they called the position of ‘the wife’ (‘a mulher’, meaning ‘the woman’) was 
fundamental for the constitution of the household economy. They also alluded to ‘other 
income sources’ coming from ‘the position of the wife’, which helped with their 
households’ financial needs. 
I was intrigued to find that Pippo and his cooperative colleagues, second- or third- 
generation plot owners, had become mainly wage earners. The factors at play in this 
process stemmed from the coexistence of farm earnings with wage income. This was itself 
the consequence of the recent transformation that the cooperatives had brought about, as 
they hired peasants under standardised contractual employment terms. I wondered what 
were these ‘other income sources’ that men kept mentioning? Were they linked to the 
standardisation process that cooperatives brought to waged work, introduced into local 
discourse by the administrators? The clue to answering these questions seemed to lie with 
the status of land tenure for the cooperative workers’ households. In the following section, 
I scrutinise women’s ‘absence’ from the fields, how the mafia has contributed to that 
condition, and what registering land titles in the names of wives implied for family 
livelihoods. I will pursue these issues through two case studies of local families differently 
linked to the cooperatives: in the first, the man is a daily worker; in the second, there are 
two male member-workers (one with a permanent wage), one male daily worker and a 
rarely employed woman. 
5.2. Registration of Land to Wives  
5.2.1. The Pitrè and the Riceli families: work, plots, benefits 
I became increasingly aware that households had other sources of income alongside 
daily wages from the cooperatives and their earnings from selling the grapes from their 
vineyards to the local wineries. Many informants mentioned unemployment benefits and 
wages from other sources of agricultural work. From discussions, therefore, I identified a 
fourfold income for cooperative workers’ families: cooperative wages; the trading of their 
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grapes to wineries; waged work; and, only for daily workers, but not for member-workers 
unemployment benefits. At the beginning, I thought it odd that people were cooperative 
workers and landowners and yet eligible to claim benefits, as workers told me they did. In 
Italy, being registered as unemployed while owning and running a firm, such as a farm, 
however small, is prohibited by law. Therefore, I needed to examine how the 
standardisation of work had brought with it the opportunity for receiving state benefits, 
especially since all of my informants were also peasant entrepreneurs. 
As noted, domestic arrangements in Alto Belice were usually organised around a 
nuclear family with land ownership as the central feature of familial economic life. In the 
majority of the households I studied (22 out of 25), I visited the homes of cooperative 
workers or people affiliated to the cooperatives, who were all members of nuclear-family 
based households. Generally, commensality and co-residence of a family were the primary 
factors denoting the limits of the households, which were consequently conceptually 
identical to the limits of the family. I came across no virilocal or uxorilocal cases in the 25 
households for which I have data. Inter-generational co-residence was also surprisingly 
rare, occurring in only 3 local families, where the cooperative member was not married. 
Most households therefore were composed of a husband (the effective land 
proprietor, and waged worker), a wife (housewife and sometimes in irregular waged 
employment, and also the nominal land owner, as explained below) and children, whether 
of school age or slightly older (studying, working in waged employment or helping with the 
family plots). Despite women’s absence from agricultural work and their restriction to the 
domestic sphere, the households’ ‘family firms’ (aziende) were registered to wives, who were 
routinely registered as capoaziende, i.e. owners of the family’s land. Conversely, husbands, 
who were the actual managers of the plots, were called capofamiglie (family heads), a title 
descriptive of the domestic sphere rather than that of economic enterprise.  
199 
 
Meillassoux (1981) argues that the status of the head of the household is 
constituted outside the domestic sphere. As Harris notes, in most cases, male power is 
vested by the state: male heads are made answerable to the state, as the household as an 
institution becomes visible to the state through the identification of one person who 
represents it; she calls this process ‘a partial devolution of power to adult males’ (Harris 
1984: 59). In Alto Belice, this devolution has been forged in terms of wives, as those who 
are accountable for the household’s land ownership, but this does not reflect a matriarchal 
organisation of the household.  
Pippo and Maria Pitrè, a couple from San Giovanni, were the first to explain to me 
the details of the gap between legal title and the actual practice of land tenure, as I spent a 
considerable amount of time in their home. This ethnographic data confirms Pratt’s 
findings from Italy, where he notes: ‘those who do have joint property rights in land do not 
necessarily produce together’ (1994: 104).15 Of course, the term property rights, in Sicily, as I 
shall show, does not reflect the actual ownership of the plots and is only nominal. My 
findings are also in line with Pratt’s on how agrarian transformations (in his case in Tuscan 
agriculture) led to wage labour eventually becoming the main source of income for rural 
families (1994: 66). 
Pippo was a 58-year-old sangiovannaro, who used to be a member of the Borsellino 
cooperative but had resigned a few months before I had met him (due to conflicts with the 
administration over the fact that, as member-worker, he did not receive a monthly wage). 
He eventually decided to go back to work as a daily worker for the Falcone, as he needed 
the money. I rented the apartment he owned at the centre of the village. The family lived in 
a farm house, 2 kms outside the village, as they preferred the tranquillity of that area. Maria, 
                                                 
15 Admittedly, a different history of land tenure (sharecropping as opposed to latifundia), as well as a more 
rigorously attentive exploration of a large household sample by Pratt (1994) in Tuscany, are key factors 
accounting for this marked differentiation. Having acknowledged this, I should stress once more that my 
research focused only on families of antimafia cooperative members.  
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his wife, 16 years his junior, did not work outside the home; they had a 17-year-old 
daughter, Elena.  
As I had become good friends with Pippo, the Pitrè family often invited me for 
dinner. Regularly, after a day in the vineyards of the cooperatives, Pippo asked me to join 
him in his house for a warm dish of pasta with vegetables from his garden, cooked by 
Maria. As we sat gathered around the table, he boasted that we were enjoying his ‘own 
wine’, comparing it to the cooperative’s: ‘the cooperative wine is too commercial’, while the 
wine from his vineyard was ‘authentic and pure’. His vineyard was located at Chiana: he 
was proud that he cultivated the red Nero D’Avola variety at 670m above sea level, as it 
was very difficult to grow red grapes at such a high altitude. Pippo was also proud of the 
fact that he matured the wine in his cellar (in fact, the garage). Like other cooperative daily 
workers, he thought home-made wine was qualitatively superior to the wine made at the 
cooperatives’ winery. For him, the only advantage of the cooperative production of bottled 
wine was that they produced it on a larger scale; scale; quality-wise, ‘his own wine’ was 
superior.  
Elena always left dinner early to go study in her room. She was soon to take 
entrance exams for university. The fact that she had chosen Parma (an Emilian city) for her 
studies reflected her father’s involvement in the cooperative, ideologically inspired by 
Emilian ‘red cooperativism’.16 However, when talking about how the family would finance 
Elena’s studies, Pippo barely mentioned his cooperative pay. Rather, the plan depended on 
the year’s harvest turnover, he talked more about harvest expenses, including wages paid to 
friends who would help, than his own wage from Falcone. 
Maria was a return migrant to the village. Her parents had left San Giovanni at a 
young age as landless peasants, before the agrarian reform of 1953. They had immigrated to 
                                                 
16 The consumer coop representatives from Emilia who often visited San Giovanni influenced antimafia 
cooperative members, describing the wealth of Emilia.  
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Uruguay, where Maria was born and raised. She went to live permanently in Sicily in 1985, 
hardly knowing anyone and having no family assets to her name. When she married Pippo, 
her dowry did not include any land at all. She married into the Pitrès, a relatively poor 
family, whose assets included a house and four ha of vineyard that Pippo had inherited 
from his father, who had acquired it through the agrarian reform of 1953. Nevertheless, 
she appeared on the title deeds as the owner of the Pitrè family’s plots. ‘I had nothing 
waiting for me here, when I emigrated,’ she clarified; ‘It was my husband who sort of gave 
his plot to me ... we agreed for him to transfer them to be registered in my name, and here 
I am, owning four ha today’. The transfer had taken place, as with most peasant families, as 
soon as the couple married, in 1986. The scheme was widely practised in the area and the 
reason for it, I was told, was tax avoidance. Registering land to wives minimised the 
couple’s joint tax liability as the assets were shared between husband and wife.17 The 
practice of female landownership, discussed right below, rather than ‘traditional’, as called 
locally, dated back to when tax avoidance started, which coincided with the mid 1950s for 
most local families, as with the Pitrès.  
On several different occasions, I asked Pippo the same question I asked both 
manual daily workers and member-workers: what were the specific sources of his family’s 
income, given that Maria was not in waged employment? Like most other daily workers, 
Pippo worked for the Falcone cooperative for about 100 days a year, earning an annual net 
income of about 5.200 euros. The wage he received from the cooperative for those 
workdays provided the basic subsistence for the family. The Pitrès budgeted around that 
‘family wage’, as they called it. Unlike the steady wage from the cooperative, farming 
involved risk and unpredictability and therefore could not be reliably calculated. Pippo, like 
others, calculated that the cooperative wage provided for roughly 40% of their annual 
                                                 
17 This an interesting ‘diverging devolution’ (Goody 1976: 21), implying inter-spouse trust. As with the Pitrès, 
I have tracked a sample of 22 married families who followed this tactic and have not heard of any couple who 
had separated, so regrettably I have no data to explore what happens in case of divorce.  
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income, while farm earnings yielded around another 20%. He was disappointed about the 
fact that, with the dire prices of the grape varieties he cultivated (Cattaratto, Viognier and 
Nero D’Avola), he had to sell a kilogram of grapes for 0.20 euros (see Figure 5.1) The rest 
came from ‘other sources’, apparently related to his wife’s position in the household 
economy, on the one hand, and to his relations with other peasants, on the other. This is 
what he initially told me, as we worked together at the cooperative’s vineyards. Working at 
his friends’ vineyards, exchanging labour and cash with them, provided another 20% of his 
earnings, as I explore in the latter part of the chapter. Therefore, the family’s livelihood was 
planned according to a multi-source income, sources that seemed connected to each other. 
Figure 5.1: Sancipiriddu grape prices, in eurocents 
PRICES OF HARVEST 2009 
SANCIPIRIDDU WINERY 
MERLOT 26,50 
SYRAH 25,00 
NERO D’AVOLA 24,00 
CABERNET SAUVIGNON 26,50 
SANGIOVESE 21,50 
NERELLO MASCALESE 21,00 
PERRICONE 21,50 
CHARDONNAY 30,00 
VIOGNER 30,00 
CATARRATTO 20,00 
INZOLIA 20,00 
TREBBIANO 18,00 
GRECANICO E DAMASCHINO 20,00 
Source: Sancipiriddu cantina cooperativa, 2008 
Figures: eurocents per kilogram 
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At our third dinner, he finally disclosed that the rest of the family’s income (the 
final 20%) stemmed from the fact that the plots were registered to Maria. What he, like 
other men, had mentioned to me while working in the vineyards about ‘other sources’ now 
made sense: it was state welfare provision. This came in the form of unemployment 
benefits for Pippo, who legally appeared as unemployed for roughly 250 days a year. The 
fact that his waged work was now officially registered with the state made him eligible for 
benefits for the days of the year he did not work. In fact, a good 20% of the Pitrè 
household’s income came from this source. However, if Pippo had the farm registered to 
him, he would not have been eligible for these benefits, as he would have appeared to the 
state as a professional farmer. As the land had been registered to Maria since 1986, when 
Pippo started to engage in registered waged employment for the cooperatives in 2000, he 
immediately became officially employed and therefore entitled to security, pension and 
welfare benefits. When asked about this, he commented that ‘here in Alto Belice, 
everything is a trick’ (é tutto una truffa ccà). 
The incorporation of local male peasants into daily waged employment for the 
cooperatives thus consolidated the pre-existing informal practice of ‘traditional’ female 
landownership, grafting on further positive attributes. What was already a widely deployed 
practice by peasant households, apparently for tax purposes, had now become an 
unexpected source of additional income. Locals thought that state policies imposed 
structural constraints on their households (taxation) and therefore felt justified in using 
these strategies, pointing as well to the lack of welfare provision for housewives. In Alto 
Belice, as in the rest of Italy, women working as housewives were not recognised as 
workers in the state’s employment registers. Hence, they could not claim unemployment 
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benefits, although, according to state regulations they were not in employment18; in fact, 
they were eligible to claim only the lowest, ‘pauper’, ‘social pension’ of 160 euros a month, 
once they reached 60 years of age. For this reason, the Pitrès planned ahead, taking 
advantage of the couple’s 16 year age difference, to improve Maria’s pension. With Pippo 
due to retire in a few years, they planned to arrange a reverse transfer of the land’s 
ownership, from Maria to Pippo; he would then head the azienda himself and ‘hire’ her as 
an employee, until she became entitled to her pension. This way, she would be able to put 
together some years of registered employment, over this time, paying the minimal state 
contributions to be eligible for a pension, once she had ‘retired’. She did not actually intend 
to work on the farm in her 50s; in fact, like most married women in San Giovanni, she had 
hardly visited the plots she ‘owned’. 
Similarly to the Pitrès, other antimafia families with this household livelihood 
pattern also followed the strategy of nominal female land ownership. The Riceli family, 
whom I discussed in the previous chapter hailed from the village of Rocca. All three of the 
male members of the family were employed by the cooperative: Enzo and Ciccio were 
member-workers on permanent employment (Enzo with a monthly wage); Lino was a daily 
worker. The father, Enzo, after years of cooperative employment had brought his sons into 
the cooperative through his raccomandazioni. Santa, Enzo’s wife, did only petty jobs for the 
coop on a daily contract basis and never worked in the fields. ‘Field labour is not for us 
women –everyone knows this in Alto Belice,’ she clarified when I asked her.  
Santa was proud, however, to be the capoazienda of her ‘antimafia family’. The 
Ricelis owned a couple of vineyards, which they had bought when they returned from 
Switzerland, where they had lived for 12 years, between 1985 and 1997. Enzo had initiated 
                                                 
18 The fact that they were not ‘actively seeking waged work’ (understood as regular employment) is not 
relevant, in this context; their husbands (and in some cases, like the Ricelis, explored below, their sons) when 
not seeking regular waged employment either, while receiving unemployment benefits. 
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the idea of moving to Switzerland because, he said, hard as he had tried, he could not find 
work in construction jobs in Rocca; Santa had agreed and, when they were 24, two years 
after they married, they had emigrated in 1985. The 1980s saw a sudden burst of 
construction of public works in Alto Belice, where a significant amount of Cosa Nostra’s 
heroin profits was invested, for money laundering purposes19 (Sterling 1991; Stille 1996). 
Such works included the Palermo–Sciacca highway, just outside San Giovanni. Enzo told 
me that workers were paid cash-in-hand by mafiosi middlemen, precisely to facilitate the 
mafiosi’s money laundering. Most of the workers on such schemes were peasants: grape 
prices were dropping in the mid 1980s and construction work was more profitable than 
cultivating vines. Enzo himself had worked on the Rocca reservoir construction project but 
became disillusioned with how much the project was controlled by the mafia and so he had 
sold the 2 ha vineyard that he had inherited from his father and gone to Zurich with Santa. 
Their son Ciccio was born there shortly after and Lino three years later. When they 
returned to Sicily in 1997 they immediately bought 4 ha of good vineyard close to Rocca; 
the official purchase being registered in Santa’s name, for the usual tax reasons as described 
above. 
In the case of the Pitrès, the transfer of land from husband to wife took place at the 
time of their marriage in 1986. For the Ricelis, the family’s investment in land, after their 
return migration, was directly registered to the wife, Santa, in 1997. She was therefore, from 
1997, a capoazienda in a household with three men who joined the wage employment of the 
cooperatives, as a conscious family plan, beginning with Enzo in 2000, the sons following 
in 2005. Although Santa appeared as the landowner, Enzo and Santa clarified when sharing 
their life stories with me, the money for the land purchase came from Enzo’s waged work 
in Switzerland and it was his idea to buy land in Rocca in the first place. Santa’s 
                                                 
19 San Giovanni mafiosi, especially Brusca, were the key figures in international heroin trafficking at the time.  
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landownership ‘produced’ benefits, for this ‘antimafia family’, only for the daily worker Lino, 
as Ciccio, and Enzo, who were cooperative member-workers, (indeed Enzo, one of the 
very few member-workers on permanent wage), were never registered unemployed. 
Figure 5.2: Two families’ income (numbers are approximate) 
 
 Pitrès Ricelis 
Family members Pippo:working in coop 
Maria and Elena:not 
working 
Enzo: member-worker on 
permanent wage 
Lino: member-worker on 
daily wage 
Ciccio: daily worker 
working in coop 
Santa: working 
occasionally 
Wages from coops 5200 euros annually 
[shared among members] 
Enzo: 13200 euros 
Lino: 7200 euros 
Ciccio: 7200 euros 
Santa: 1800 euros  
[each member kept most 
of his own earnings] 
Privately owned land: 
Earnings from 
grapes [agrarian 
profit only] 
3.5 ha  
2500 euros annually 
[shared among members] 
4 Ha 
2700 euros annually  
[shared among members] 
Wages from informal 
work 
2300 euros annually Enzo: 2000 euros 
Lino: 1000 euros 
Ciccio: 1000 euros 
State benefits Pippo: 2200 euros 
annually 
Lino: 2000 euros  
Ciccio: 2000 euros 
Enzo: no benefits, as he 
was in permanent, 
continuous employment, 
on a monthly wage 
Santa: no benefits, as 
annual workdays to make 
her eligible did not suffice 
5.2.2. Wives as landowners in antimafia families: state, mafia, and local 
codes 
The two case studies (the Pitrè and the Riceli households) are characteristic of the 
broad pattern among antimafia families in Alto Belice: in all 25 households for which I 
have data, where at least one member worked for the cooperatives, the married woman had 
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all the landed property in her name, as the nominal capoazienda.20 This includes land brought 
to households of antimafia families through the wife’s marriage dowry (as was the case with 
Tano, a Falcone cooperative worker, and his Curriuni family) but also households where 
the wife brought no property to her new household. 
Registering land to wives was established practice for both antimafia families and 
mafia-affiliated families. These strategies21 are therefore continuities of practice in which 
local cultural codes are sustained under antimafia cooperativism, despite the cooperativist 
model proposed by administrators, one solidified in a standardised political economy of 
waged employment.  
As already noted, in Alto Belice, the strongly gendered division of (manual) labour 
meant that women never worked in the fields: their labour was largely (although not 
exclusively) domestic, away from the public eye. Married women themselves embraced this 
exclusion: Santa and Maria felt that joining men in farm work would be ‘absurd’. Rita 
Giuffrè also emphasised to me that, although her brother Carelli, her husband Paolo and 
her future son-in-law Donato worked in the cooperative’s vineyards, she was very happy 
that her paid work for minor tasks within the cooperative kept her away from the fields. 
                                                 
20 It was not possible to use the Italian Land Cadaster (the national land registry) to establish the exact picture 
of land tenure in the village overall: one can refer to the Cadaster for details about any one specific plot but not 
all the plots of an area. When I did so, to establish the ownership history of some plots confiscated from 
mafiosi and bestowed on the cooperatives, in 15 out of 19 cases the plots of the mafiosi were registered to 
women: their wives or a straw-woman.  
21 I am aware that, in talking about household livelihood strategies, there is a danger of assuming a unified 
‘husband-and-wife’ stance that overlooks possible tensions or ambivalent feelings (Morris 1992). As already 
mentioned, I lack data about what happens in terms of land ownership if a couple splits. From my sample of 
the 25 closely studied households of antimafia families, no such issue arose and I did not observe behaviours 
that would point in that direction on the part of women, regarding their roles or remuneration – although my 
own gendered positionality must be acknowledged. However, the fact that women were (as shown in the 
previous chapter) strong advocates of the interconnection of cooperatives and family environments and the 
constitution of antimafia families makes a strong case for their commitment to their husbands’ work and their 
sense of partaking in a joint enterprise. In terms of waged labour valorisation, with all the limitations that 
involves, women accessed a degree of economic fulfilment, on the basis of their husbands’ raccomandazioni, in 
performing ‘petty labour’ tasks in the cooperatives, especially in the agriturismi, where, again, they worked in 
what resembled a homely setting. For these different reasons, I stand behind the idea that tension between 
husbands and wives in terms of their economic cooperation in making ends meet was modest. 
208 
 
The cooperatives, also, as mentioned earlier, employed women for work in the agriturismi 
(as well as, of course, in the administrative teams).  
There is an interesting issue here about the mafia role in shaping this gendered 
division of labour. Local people pointed to mafia protocol22 specific to Alto Belice as a 
significant factor: the cultural influence of the monosexual mafia had led to the historical 
phenomenon of women being excluded from working in the fields. The example of 
Antonia Brusca, analysed in the following chapter, may be taken as indicative of San 
Giovanni mafia norms: when her three male children were arrested and charged with being 
Cosa Nostra members, her stance on those of the family’s vineyards registered in her name 
accorded with the model of women’s absence from farm work: she simply abandoned the 
fields. Further evidence in support of this argument can be found through a local 
comparison. Workers such as Pippo or Enzo often contrasted the male monopoly on 
agricultural work in their Alto Belice villages with the neighbouring town of Alcamo, where 
women did work in the vineyards. Visiting the fertile Alcamo valley, just outside Alto 
Belice, I myself witnessed women working as field hands alongside their male family 
members. Importantly, in Alcamo, informants suggested that there had historically been 
different mafia configurations. Evidence from the local press confirmed these oral informal 
communications: seemingly women did have leading roles in Alcamo mafia. As soon as 
local male clan leaders were arrested, they were replaced by their wives, who thus moved 
from occupying roles in the home to fulfilling roles in the local mafia: ‘from family to 
clan’,23 as the local press noted (“S” 15: 2009)24. This, I propose, suggests that there is a 
                                                 
22 It would not be appropriate to attempt a conclusive answer as to whether this mafia ethic was a local village 
practice adopted by mafia or a mafia practice imported into the village. This would be to misunderstand the 
historical relationship of continuities and interactions between ‘local’ and ‘mafia’ codes. My informants were 
confident in giving me three-generation back memories of the practice (i.e. since the agrarian reform). 
23 I take on board the attempt by historical anthropologists to see ‘clan’ as a male brotherhood, a horizontal 
coalition of men whose interests lie in controlling female production and reproduction (Tillion 1978; Goody 
1983; 2000). ‘Mafia’ could be approached, in a similar way, construed in different ways from setting to setting. 
The ways the clan category is used in historical anthropology by Europeanists such as Goody (1973; 1976; 
1983) are different from its emic use in Italian public discourse such as the media. Libera and other NGOs, 
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correlation between female work activity in the fields and contingent characteristics of 
Alcamo mafia, although directions of causality should be left open: it is probably the 
historical interaction between cultural codes local to Alto Belice and mafia that explains this 
situation. Such practices are rooted in localised labour regime histories that spill out of a 
framework of local political economy influenced to a degree by mafia. In Alcamo, for 
instance, a different historical development of the mafia produced conditions where gender 
had different implications from San Giovanni. Despite the lack of grounded ethnographic 
data from Alcamo, there is evidence of women being active in the local mafia, fulfilling 
roles traditionally adopted by men, which relates to the fact that, in Alcamo, ‘female labour 
in the fields was not devalued’ (“S” 14: 2009).  
Anthropology supporting a shift ‘from structure and agency to livelihoods’ (Rigg 
2007: 29–39), ‘draws on families’ strategies to position land ownership in an opaque status 
in order to guarantee their ‘livelihood security’ (Chambers 1998: 121). As alluded to above 
(footnotes 14 and 21), the ‘household responses’ approach (Pahl 1983) ignores internal 
differentiations, including gender differences, among household members (cf. Morris 
1992). At the same time there are potentially multi-layered external influences on 
households (as Pahl (1984) argued, assessing the impact of state welfare schemes on 
household decision making). For these reasons, household-based accounts may be too 
blunt an instrument to explain why families in villages so close to each other, San Giovanni 
and Alcamo, follow such differently gendered tactics regarding work. Pointing to the 
complexity of both internal and external factors, in Alto Belice, women’s main income 
                                                                                                                                               
and the two most militant antimafia newspapers (Repubblica’s Palermo supplement, and the weekly “S”), both 
left leaning, use ‘clan’ to delineate male brotherhoods’ horizontal, compact alliances, as opposed to descent-
based kinship relations. Italian state agents such as the Consortium, tap into this discourse  of the need for a 
move ‘from the clans to the state’ (“S” vol 16). For an African example that suggest different lineage 
continuities, see Gray and Gulliver (2004). See also 6.3 for a discussion of the differences between clan and 
family.  
24 I quote from the actively antimafia periodical “S”, an investigative weekly. The editor, whom I met, was a 
hardliner regarding mafia. For instance, he once had told me that capital punishment should be introduced 
for mafiosi. Many articles, like the ones cited, for fear of mafia retaliations, were anonymous. 
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contribution to the livelihoods of their families was their position as ‘owners of the firm’ 
(capoaziende) i.e. the household land, largely through transfers of land that men had acquired 
through inheritance or purchase, or as dowry in marriage, and not through work in the 
fields. Ethnographic work from Southern Italy, interestingly, confirms that the exclusion of 
women from farm labour is not a general characteristic of Sicily or of the greater area 
(Schneider and Schneider 1976; Assmuth 1997; Pratt 1994; for women’s worth deriving 
from labour in Portugal, see Cole 1991). Pratt notes that in sharecropping women’s work 
was not ‘exclusively concerned with [home-based] activities’ and in fact [women] were not 
‘isolated from a public world’ (Pratt 1994: 38; similarly: Silverman 1970).  
Joining antimafia cooperatives constituted a double mechanism for local families. 
On the one hand, it impacted on their status in the village as antimafia families, as 
described in the previous chapter. For local men who worked as cooperative braccianti, this 
had further positive implications boosting their feelings of manliness. On the other hand, 
participating in the cooperatives’ regulated employment offered a surprising opportunity to 
sideline state regulations, as it were done in the face of the administrators’ claims to legality 
and regularisation of the local work regime.25 This widely adopted livelihood strategy 
entailed taking on board the known risk of a state fine for benefits and pensions illegalities, 
as the government pursued legal enforcement on benefit fraud.26 Registering land to wives 
continued, nevertheless, precisely as it now entailed a wide range of financial benefits for 
families, related to state welfare policies. 
                                                 
25 Pointing out contradictions in informants’ positionalities is not intended to somehow delegitimise them, or 
diminish the importance of their efforts to improve the workings of the local economy. Highlighting the 
discrepancy between discourse and practice is useful because only by acknowledging it can we –
anthropologists and informants together – start to understand the constraints and possibilities under which 
economic endeavours such as cooperativism take place. 
26 This discussion proliferated later, related to the international discourse on the sovereign debt crisis, where it 
has been said that Italy’s (assumed) immense public deficit and adjunct sovereign debt are largely due to such 
schemes of employers’ contribution avoidance.  
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Sociological research from Italy has long emphasised the social consequences of the 
legal determination of certain labour activities as ‘employment’ (Mingione and Pugliese 
2002; Pugliese and Rebeggiani 2004). Ethnographic analyses of small industrial 
manufacturing stress that the success of Italian capitalism, at least at this level of enterprise, 
was predicated on the mobilisation of informal labour contributions from family members 
(Mingione and Redclift 1985; Trigilia 1989, Mingione 1994), notably women’s ‘hidden’ 
labour. Awareness of this process casts a shadow over the whole question of the visibility 
of female work and its consequent de-valuation (Goddard 1996; Goddard 2000). As 
anthropologists have also underlined, access to welfare benefits depends on registered 
employment and, in Italy, ‘employment’ and ‘work’ do not coincide (Goddard 1996; 
Assmuth 1997). The Italian welfare system has developed piecemeal, with somewhat 
haphazard outcomes overall (Blim 1990; Cole 1997). The institutional identification of valid 
work and employment, however, is hardly unique to the Italian state.  
In fact, ethnographic work on the informal economy elsewhere discusses at length 
the consequences of modern states’ conflation of employment and livelihood. This was 
already pointed out by Hart (1973) in respect to Ghana and also became a central issue in 
the European welfare state context. Mollona’s work is one example. Examining the PAYE 
scheme in Britain, he argues that benefits provision, based on definitions of what counts as 
valid work, allowed and implicitly encouraged informal labour opportunities (2005; 2009b). 
This debate also relates to the discussion in the previous chapter on the boundaries of 
home and work, which in this case also prove blurred, both within and outside the 
cooperatives’ framework. 
The introduction of registered wage work via the cooperatives in Alto Belice (the 
‘standardisation’) affected the relations of their families with welfare state provisions and 
policies. The sociological literature on labour regulation alludes to the Fordist security and 
stability of employment framework and the accompanying labour rights (Beynon 1984), 
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although this framework has long been abandoned in most EU countries. The 
normalisation that administrators talked about resonates with ethnographies of Eastern 
Europe (Creed 1998) describing people’s aspirations to become part of a ‘normal society’, 
or sometimes speaking of ‘a return to normality’ (Rausing 2002: 127). Normalisation 
obviously can have different associations. Normalisation for cooperative administrators 
meant to promote regulated employment as against informal work as work relations in Alto 
Belice had been influenced by mafia patronage, which imposed non-legally protected work. 
However, local people’s livelihoods were not ‘normalised’ or ‘standardised’. Chambers 
argues that, social scientists risk error when institutional categories such as ‘employment’ 
count more for them than people’s actual livelihoods priorities (2000). Men and women in 
Alto Belice, negotiated the visibility of their ‘real’ roles vis-à-vis the state in such a way as to 
claim more income from its welfare policy. Continuing with the practice of land 
registration to women, they were able to accommodate the legal normalisation of the 
cooperative employment. James Ferguson argues that, when the ‘normative discourse’ 
(1994: 26) of development agencies and the state fail to take local categories seriously, 
unintended consequences arise.  
Local traditional roles of capofamiglia and capoazienda were reproduced despite wage 
employment was a strictly male work condition. Capoazienda and capofamiglia stem from 
broader gendered roles in Alto Belice, informed by mafia, premised on the condition that 
women were barred from agricultural work. These roles were also reproduced by state 
terminologies, codified in the census and other state documentation, the term itself 
capoazienda being a legal category and the bearer of tax liability. Therefore, people engaged 
in sophisticated activities in order to manage their multi-source gendered livelihoods. The 
roles were negotiated in relation to state policies and mafia influence, mafia and state 
mutually informing the gendered role allocation in Alto Belice households. Ethnographic 
work has identified ‘gendered responsibilities’ which would be trivialising to categorise as 
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just ‘tasks’ in the practices of peasants’ livelihoods (Mosse 2004: 63). Gendered divisions of 
labour in agriculture, often surrounded by ‘mystique’ (Ferguson 1994: 160–66; Mosse 2004: 
62), deserve more attention, in order to comprehend people’s livelihoods outside the terms 
of a standardised wage employment political economy, which is often unable to account 
for irregular, seasonal and contingently gendered agrarian work. The attention to 
livelihoods (understood in a broad sense including household and inter-household 
practices) therefore nuances what was rhetorically identified in the vignette at the start of 
this thesis, as the core of the cooperatives’ contribution to change, namely the offer of 
employment and new work relations. 
In Alto Belice’s gendered household practices, there are continuities in ‘cultural 
codes’ between local and mafia contexts, as Schneider and Schneider (1976: 84) have 
suggested. Michael Blim provides a neat account of the Schneider and Schneider’s 
argument, claiming that, while they sought to: 
… disassociate themselves from [Banfield’s] blaming of underdevelopment on the 
Southern Italian and Sicilian people and their familist values …, they did so 
ambiguously by arguing that ... the cultural values so nearly the same as Banfield’s 
familist values were the consequence of as well as the response to powerlessness 
and economic failure. (Blim 2006: 9) 
In other words, the problem was that a political-economy-focused analysis did not 
fully displace the ‘honour and shame’ literature, as it kept the premise of ‘cultural codes’. By 
showing, however, how such codes inspire practices that co-articulate with antimafia 
cooperativism, I escape this problem, elucidating the contemporary relevance of local 
codes, their dynamic character and development in a new context, alongside regulated wage 
labour. In my ethnography, the survival of these codes is associated not with honour and 
shame but the fragility of people’s livelihoods, looking at the salience of the informal 
economy to the ways people pursued their income sources alongside registered work in the 
cooperatives. Their livelihoods articulate with both informal and standardised means of 
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income, in order to guarantee a decent living, mainly because of the low level of the 
cooperatives’ wages, since most workers, as already noted, were not paid a monthly wage, 
unlike administrators.  
I argue indeed that the state and the cooperatives unintentionally reproduce 
women’s role as registered landowners because of the standardisation of labour the state and 
cooperatives promote. The cultural codes that surround these roles also reflect state 
policies (the benefits system) and cooperatives’ strategies (not hiring women as fieldhands), 
and therefore are relevant to both mafia and antimafia families. While registration of land 
to women is not a novel practice, the role of wives as capoaziende became more embedded 
when their husbands entered regulated employment, as it brought a flow of unemployment 
benefits for their husbands. This land registration practice is an example of what I am 
calling a ‘cultural code’. This continuity in cultural code thus show itself to be compatible 
with cultural variation and pluralism, in a changing Sicily (Schneider and Schneider 2006), 
which proves the historical dynamism of the concept, as these codes adapt to novel 
circumstances. Inasmuch it is registered work that counts as employment, and all work 
within the household is non-valorised in monetary terms, registering land to wives opened 
up the potential for more income opportunities. Women’s absence from the fields and 
agricultural work signifies a set of practices that are the other side of the visibility that 
standardisation brought to wage employment. 
Men’s integration into the cooperatives’ registered employment system thus 
intensified the local practice of registering land to women, adding further consequences to 
it. The practice is itself a consequence of the state policies defining what counts as valid 
work (registered, ‘standardised’ employment). However, the shift from informal lavoro nero27 
                                                 
27 Blim provides a thorough discussion of the variety of  informal waged work practices in Italy that fall under 
the rubric of lavoro nero (‘black [market] work’), including piece rate pay, or the famous fuori busta, in which 
some or all of the employer’s work is not reported, to avoid taxation and social security contributions (1990: 
162–64). Yanagisako also describes the widespread practice of ‘unreported labour’ as she calls it (2002: 137), 
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(unregistered labour) to registered employment among Alto Belice’s antimafia families’ 
men, remained incomplete. I earlier noted how the Pitrès explained that 20% of their 
income came from Pippo’s ‘work for friends’. In the next section, I elucidate this further. 
5.3. ‘Mutual Aid’: Exchanging Informal Work 
My ethnographic attention here shifts to examine male responsibilities in the constitution 
of what Chambers calls ‘sustainable livelihoods’ (1993: 92), elucidating how their informal 
work, outside the cooperative framework, added to the income of local households and 
how this type of livelihood became a political claim to defend in peasant mobilisations. 
Facilitated by their wives assuming the position of nominal capoaziende, this was a crucial 
supplement to their families’ livelihoods. Local trade unionists had spoken to me, early in 
my fieldwork, about unregistered work for wages in Alto Belice (i.e. outside the 
‘standardisation’ rules), after the agrarian reform of 1953. Although they had no formal 
statistics to hand, they confidently asserted that, in San Giovanni, 95% of males engaged in 
agrarian waged work were also landowners – which meant, unionists explained, that they 
engaged in informal work alongside farming. The local union representative of CGIL 
emphasised to me that the ‘social backbone of our village is small land ownership – but 
most men are also engaged in informal wage work, to add up to their income’.  
In late October 2009, Pippo took me in his car to a peasant demonstration in 
Palermo. On the way, he talked incessantly about politics, anxious to convince me that the 
event was a ‘spontaneous protest’, removed from unionised politics. It was just after the 
harvest and peasants had taken to the streets to pressure local government for more 
subsidies for their harvests. They thought that the prices offered by local wineries for their 
grapes were exploitative, averaging 20 eurocents per kilogram (see Figure 5.1) and were 
therefore demanding compensation for their losses through EU subsidies, administered by 
                                                                                                                                               
while Supiot underlines the fundamental importance of the lavoro nero institution for the Italian economy at 
large (2001). 
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the Sicilian Autonomous Region28. Thousands were gathered outside the majestic Palazzo 
dei Normanni, built in the 11th century and now the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
autonomous region of Sicily.  
Meeting several of Pippo’s colleagues on our way, we made our way through the 
crowds to the main focus of attention in the middle of Piazza Indipendenza, the huge 
square behind the Sicilian Parliamentary Assembly building. There, talking loudly, an 
enclave amidst the wider crowd, a group of men from San Giovanni were enjoying a mock 
‘funeral of Sicilian agriculture’ staged by farmers from the neighbouring village of Principe. 
A coffin engraved with the words ‘Alto Belice’ was on public display, symbolising the death 
of the Alto Belice area. People surrounding the coffin told me that this was the first 
demonstration in which they had resorted to such ‘gimmicks’. One man from San 
Giovanni was quick to explain that ‘there has never been so much law enforcement and 
penalisation against us and so we have to be more vocal’. By ‘penalisation’, a term that 
other men invoked as well, I soon realised they meant the law enforcement against lavoro 
nero (unregistered work). After the success of the antimafia cooperatives, and the 
administrators’ talk of ‘standardising’ labour relations, state agents had taken the issue of 
registered work more seriously. The police often raided the fields to check on wage 
labourers’ documentation proving their legitimate, contractual work. The transgressors 
were penalised with heavy fines about unreported work. The normalisation and associated 
standardisation of legitimate work as registered wage employment was certainly being 
enforced in Alto Belice.  
                                                 
28 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Sicily has an autonomous status within Italy and the local government is 
colloquially called the ‘Sicilian Region’. The island has its own parliament and its regional government decides 
a number of internal issues, including the channelling of EU agricultural subsidies. A month after my 
fieldwork ended, the previous (2004–08) Governor of the island, Totò Cuffaro, was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment for ‘mafia allegiance’. The configuration state/mafia was evidently more nuanced than would 
appear at first glance.  
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Many of the demonstrators I spoke to – some of them were my informants from 
the cooperatives – complained that ‘the state’ was penalising them for not paying 
employer’s labour contributions to ‘their’ harvest-time agrarian workers. Describing such 
fines as ‘penalties for our households’, they accused the state of being blind to the fact that 
the ‘agrarian workers’ these farmers paid in cash for their help in harvesting were ‘not 
‘employees’ but friends and fellow peasants’, who were happy to offer their labour to their 
co-villagers on the basis of ‘mutual aid’. Among the voices in the crowd, I overheard 
feverish dialogues on this issue of fines. Some sangiovannari held a banner that read: ‘Stop 
penalising us, stop the fines.’ Coupled with the claim for harvest subsidies, this was a major 
demand voiced by peasants at the demonstration, as they regarded the extra income 
informal work contributed to people’s livelihood security as vital. The basic background to 
this demand was the fact, that by contrast to the practice of registering land in wives’ 
names, the system of informal exchange of labour was not invisible to law enforcement. In 
fact, the police had started to ‘crack down’ on this informal practice, raiding and 
prosecuting peasants in the rural areas of Sicily for lavoro nero, ‘black market’ employment. 
The phrase ‘ci rubiamo tra di noi’, which literally translates as ‘we are stealing from 
each other’, was something that people kept repeating at the demonstration, in the many 
discussions I joined in. (The contextual translation of the phrase would be ‘it’s a system of 
mutual stealing’). In the heated atmosphere of the demonstration, and in a context where 
people felt they had to stress how paradoxical for the state agents, such as the police, the 
situation was, the expression ‘ci rubiamo tra di noi’ was, as it were, a response to accusations 
(and criminal charges) that they as ‘employers’ were robbing their ‘employees’ of social 
security contributions. As a peasant clarified to me, ‘if this is stealing, it is mutual, as 
between us it is turn and turn about: today’s ‘employer’ is tomorrow’s ‘employee’; so ‘we 
are “stealing” from each other’. Normally, they would refer to this mutual exchange of 
labour around harvesting as ‘mutual aid’. This system was an informal network formed by 
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interdependent households through bonds of friendship (and less often kinship) through 
which male agrarian work was exchanged in Alto Belice. Peasants who knew each other 
scrapped social security contributions to avoid expenses, since employer/employee status 
shifted back and forth. Each worked on the plot of the other, without ever paying or being 
paid the legal contributions they would have been due if they were in regular employment. 
Payment for work exchanged hands ‘under the table’. Thus they willingly rushed to their 
neighbours’ plot to help with his vendemmia (harvest) when they had finished with their 
own, and the cooperative’s plots, for some extra income. A day’s work was normally paid a 
(mutually agreed) average of 30 euros – but included a meal provided by the owner of the 
plot.29 At a more complex level, such labour contributions also had the potential to 
manipulate the owner for a time, binding him to ongoing debt obligations (both financial 
and moral), as most peasants were unable to pay back their workers/fellow peasants for 
months. 
Many cooperative workers laboured on a friend’s plot for a while, and then had 
him over to their own to work. Thus Pippo joined Adamo and Tano at their valley harvest 
in mid September and asked for their help with his plots in October, as the harvest on the 
higher Piana plains, where his vineyards were located, took place later in the year. 
Sometimes, these mutual agreements led to conversations about pending, delayed 
payments, which could disturb relationships. In the case of the Pitrès, I noticed that Pippo 
organised feasts in his house, in a couple of cases in late October indeed, to please his 
friends from Piana who had laboured in his plot. These five peasants owned land that 
neighboured Tano’s vineyards and were not linked to the cooperatives. Working on 
Pippo’s harvest, they had built up about 2000 euros of debt due to them. Uncomfortable, 
Pippo, after a generous meal, cracked open the best of last year’s wine to slacken the 
                                                 
29 Unlike work in the cooperatives, which was correspondingly more highly valorised in money terms (as 
mentioned) at 51.62 euros a day, plus employer’s social security contributions. 
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sarcastic comments about ‘the pay from last harvest still being in limbo’. He had owed the 
payment to his five friends for more than a year.  
Research interlocutors from the cooperatives shared the viewpoint that it was 
unfair for the state to penalise peasants for what they called their ‘mutual aid’ informal 
networks. At the same time, this widespread practice was to an extent informed by local 
mafia landowner labour patrons. Just like other peasants, they aimed to maintain a degree 
of invisibility vis-à-vis the state, as they were penalised for their ‘mutual aid’ scheme. 
Sharing with dissenting peasants, the emic term ‘mutual aid’, they identified in this system, 
a repertoire of social relations and, as many said, a ‘way of Sicilian life’ that they wanted to 
defend. The emic term ‘mutual aid’ is debatable, as it does not fully contain the reality on 
the ground. In fact, that local practice was more an organised exchange of fieldhands, 
rather than a scheme based on mutuality. It was, as I shall argue, more akin to informal 
economy practices drawing on discourses on ‘community’, ‘tradition’, and ‘ways of life’.  
In their demonstrations, local manual workers of the cooperatives, alongside other 
local peasants, raised claims vis-à-vis what they saw as ‘the state’ in its various 
manifestations: labour legislation, taxation, EU subsidies, the Regione Sicilia, the police and 
local politicians. Their demands included the de-penalisation of their lavoro nero. Peasant 
struggles in Alto Belice, as elsewhere, defended a heterogeneity, in a struggle between 
opposed ‘ways of life’ (Smith 1989: 24-25), at once integrated in a regulated framework (the 
cooperatives) and in informal relations (‘mutual aid’), a struggle to maintain a fabric of 
social relations solidified in what they called ‘the mutual aid’ scheme. This stance was 
shared regardless of class differences or stratifications among peasants. They were, for this 
reason, also intricately linked with hierarchies encouraged by mafiosi influence, as a vignette 
will show below.  
Peasant struggles were sometimes manifested in violent ways and were quite 
evidently influenced by local mafiosi. In Principe, an Alto Belice village, in early November 
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2009, 700 peasants piled up and burnt their citizen ID cards in a public ritual gesture 
disowning their Italian citizenship, to express how they felt ‘abandoned and penalised by 
the state’. The antimafia cooperative administrators condemned the event as excessive and 
dangerous. The role of mafiosi and politicians close to them was fundamental in 
encouraging sicilianismo30 in peasant struggles (see also 3.1.3) as it offered a rhetoric of inter-
class appeal through which mafiosi sought to incorporate peasants through claims to ‘the 
unity of the peasantry’ or ‘common interests for all Sicilians’. The rhetoric on the 
maintenance of ‘mutual aid’ often involved peasants of different classes: the peasant 
integration through it was equally premised on friendship relations across peasants and the 
mafia’s overarching patronage obscuring such class differences. Mafiosi who had prompted 
the Principe event called for similar activism across all Alto Belice villages. In Principe 
itself, before the ID card bonfire event took place, local mafiosi had publicly supported the 
idea that Sicilians should ‘follow the French farmers’ example31’, in rejecting the state and 
its symbols. They had even suggested that each peasant brought and burnt their passports 
publicly. The policemen I talked with that day were confused about the appropriate 
response. The Carabinieri marshal thought that such massive ‘resistance’ could hardly be 
prosecuted, so the police were deployed in an observer role only.  
The activity of the San Cipiriddu mafioso Baffi32 is typical. Recently out of prison, he 
was a widely popular figure, regarded as the incumbent mafia ‘boss’ of the village. After 
                                                 
30 The historian Lupo suggests that the inter-war historical alliances of ‘the agrarian bloc’ promoted inter-class 
ideologies, pacifying social tensions, often guided by intellectuals waving the banner of sicilianismo (1981: 143–
57), discussed in chapter 3, as part of a Gramscian discourse on hegemony’ (1981: 13). Santino has also used 
this Gramscian approach; accounting for the ‘recomposition of the dominant bloc’, he proposed that the 
entrepreneurial activity of the mafia formed ‘a parasitical bloc’ whose modality of reproduction is to 
constantly transform in order to adapt to new conditions (Santino 1977: 30-31). For this reason, the mafia 
refers to ‘sicilianist demagogy’ as a consensual alternative to coercive strategies of terrorism (Brigaglia 1977: 
44-45). The mafia’s adaptation and emulation processes therefore, employ the language of sicilianismo (Santino 
1977: 32; Marino 1979b) and Southernism (meridionalismo, cf. Pipyrou 2008). I noted similar developments in 
contemporary mobilisations of peasants in Alto Belice.  
31 This is a reference to French farmers’ mobilisations earlier that year.  
32 Gioacchino Nania, a local author in his 60s, widely known in San Giovanni, had published a book on the 
local history of mafia, tracing its origins to the burgisi, the rising intermediary middle class (the gabelloti and 
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another Palermo demonstration in Piazza Indipendenza, in early November, I joined the 
crowds of viticulturalists, driving in their tractors and cars back to San Giovanni. It was the 
day after the Principe event. Dozens of tractors were lined up outside the San Cipiriddu 
municipal hall when we arrived there in Tano’s car. The compact main hall of the building 
was packed with peasants gathered to discuss ways forward for their mobilisations. I sat in 
one of the few free remaining seats. At one point, Baffi grabbed the microphone and 
addressed the public, smiling confidently, as he started speaking. His speech animated the 
crowd from the start. ‘His charisma speaks for all of us,’ an old man sitting beside me, said. 
Another old local man, on my other side, intervened and, in a soft-spoken way, started to 
lecture us on the capacities of ‘that young man’ who delivered the speech. Later, I found 
out that this interlocutor had for years been the chauffer of the most important mafia boss 
Totò ‘The Beast’ Riina, the undisputable ex-leader of Cosa Nostra between 1980 and 1995, 
sentenced to life imprisonment in 1996, for heroin traffic and a number of assassinations.  
Baffi attacked the ‘oxygen doses they give us [peasants and farmers], just enough to 
keep us alive’, meaning petty state funds for agriculture. Speaking against police 
prosecution of the practice, he insisted that the ‘mutual aid’ system was ‘established as a 
tradition in the area’ and was something that ‘Sicilians just do and should be proud of 
doing’. A few youngsters sitting close to me, prompted him to ‘speak in Italian’, because, 
they quickly added, ‘some around here do not grasp Sicilian very well,’ referring to me. I 
started to become anxious about the mafia sympathies of my interlocutors. Everyone 
clapped when Baffi wrapped up. His speech was the high point of the evening. When he 
                                                                                                                                               
senzali), coexistent with feudal lords and largely subservient to them at the beginning of the 20th century 
(Nania 2000). The book is the result of research in state archives, where access is allowed 70 years after the 
events documented. Hence the book’s historical narrative stops short in the late 1920s; nevertheless, it does 
mention some ancestors of mafiosi who currently are considered to ‘command’ (cummannari) in the village. The 
publication never caused him any worries: in fact, he was more afraid of the people he did not cite than of 
those mentioned in his book. Nania told me that Ignazio Baffi openly expressed his satisfaction that his 
grandfather was mentioned as a mafioso, ‘for reasons of mafia pedigree’, while the Di Maggio family, who were 
left unmentioned, complained the book was inaccurate, as they felt ‘left out’.  
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finished, he started chatting with the mayor of San Cipiriddu, as the speeches went on.33 He 
repeated this tactic at the next gathering, a few days later. On that occasion, in the same 
location, he appealed to ‘Sicilian unity’ and expressed ‘disregard for the state’ which ‘wants 
to suck taxes out of Sicily’ and ‘penalise local peasants’. After the evening was over, I 
headed to the main local pizzeria with Pippo. There, we accidentally encountered Baffi and 
the mayor, who were having a pizza together; as the mayor happened to like me, he invited 
us over and we joined them at their table for a little. Baffi told me at some point that ‘the 
law enforcement uses antimafia talk to put fines on us, as if everyone here is a mafioso’.  
The mafioso’s appeal to this assumed sense of community among the peasants 
allows for comparisons between two realms in which cooperative workers were involved: 
the ‘mutual aid’ informal work exchange and the standardised employment in the 
cooperatives. Both made ideological claims to be horizontal, when in fact they were 
segregated across class differences, reflected in the cooperatives’ division of labour. Those 
employed in the cooperatives as member-workers or as daily workers, demanded both that 
their remuneration as waged workers be left intact and that their small farming businesses 
be left unregulated. These ‘mixed’ demands are not specific to Sicily. Most peasant 
movements include a variety of (often contradictory) claims, as identities of ‘peasants’ are 
increasingly enriched with a variety of work experiences such as waged labour. Gavin 
Smith’s (1989) concept of ‘resistance’ is relevant here; the concept is related to livelihoods 
because it encapsulates those contextualised struggles that defend a ‘way of life’ that is 
shared, in specific cultural codes, across different people. Smith notes for Huasicanchinos 
that ‘not only did they have a long history of intense political struggle but also their 
experience of those spectacular moments is inseparable from their daily struggle for a 
livelihood’ (1989: 12). Peasants’ struggles for the bettering of their livelihoods extend 
                                                 
33 I refer to this peasant gathering at length to illuminate the role mafiosi like Baffi played in the local 
community; in events like this, as Geertz (2008) suggested, certain meanings in local people’s lives come to the 
surface.  
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beyond the realm of ‘political economy’ to include a series of organised behaviours and 
practices, such as ‘anti-state’ mobilisations and household practices. Smith’s account 
centres on ‘a culture of opposition’ (1989: 235–36), influenced by Thompson’s notion of 
class (1970) and underlining discursive practices. In Alto Belice, there are tensions between 
the peasants’ incorporation in antimafia cooperatives and some of their gendered practices 
(registration of land to wives and exchange of informal work among men), as well as their 
political struggles – as they were both influenced by mafia ethics and activity. When they 
evoke their ‘traditions’ in opposing the state, the discourse around this opposition conceals 
class differences among them.  
Kearney notes that ‘the cultures of the peasant’ dynamically incorporate a plurality 
of traditions in their joint mobilisations, arguing against the way that social theory has 
reified ‘the peasant’ as a rigid category (Kearney 1996: 4). The status of the cooperatives’ 
manual workers and member-workers is mixed, as they are at once landowners and waged 
workers (in both informal and regulated frameworks), and when they evoke their 
‘traditional way of life’ they are reflecting on this mixed status. In many cases, people’s 
‘rural pluriactivity’ in Mediterranean regions implies that they are partially integrated into 
wage dependencies, arranged around claims to continuing the ‘cultural tradition of a place’ 
(Narotzky and Smith 2006: 27 and 31). Such appeals to traditions are akin to the ‘way of 
life’ defended by mafiosi and antimafia cooperative members alike in Alto Belice’s 
mobilisation over the ‘mutual aid’ schemes.  
Invoking this local ‘way of life’ draws on ideas of mutuality, and alongside those, 
claims to income for ‘our households’: maintaining the ‘mutual aid’ scheme was a crucial 
financial matter for them. But the local ‘traditions’ it refers to should be problematised. 
Although community and ‘the house’ are notions powerfully analysed in Gudeman’s 
model, I should clarify that the ‘mutual aid’ scheme of work cannot be classified as 
exchange as mutuality (Gudeman 2008: 27). Exchange of money involved in the lavoro nero 
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between peasants implied commodification of labour. Moreover, what forms ‘the base’ in 
the case of Colombian peasants (Gudeman and Ribera 1990) is, for antimafia cooperatives 
workers, dislocated away from work on their own plot and towards the cooperatives’ 
employment, the system of mutual exchange being a supplementary exchange of work 
among households for extra cash. As Pippo said, the Pitrè’s family wage was the 
cooperative’s roughly 100 days of paid work per year.  
In fact, as shown above, although the remuneration of the manual workforce from 
the cooperatives was nowhere as good as the administrators, wages from the cooperatives 
were the main source of income for their households, as well as state benefits, again elicited 
from the cooperatives. Pratt also notes this transformation towards a waged work 
orientation in the case of Tuscany (Pratt 1994: 66). Gudeman’s point on the dialectics 
between mutuality and trade implying tensions between community and market suggests 
the different ‘realms’ he recognises in ‘mutuality’ and ‘market’ (2008: 24). This argument 
draws on the presumed solidarity of community relations resting on self-help and 
subsistence agriculture, which Gudeman has stressed34 (1978; 1986; Gudeman and Ribera 
1990). I take on board the argument, to the extent that my ethnography shows how access 
to resources (land, labour, reputation) is organised across different moral claims and values 
(by and large the administrators subscribing to jural categories of regulation such as coop 
‘employment’ and the workers to local codes, such as ‘mutual aid’ work). But Gudeman’s 
scheme should be nuanced, acknowledging the penetrative power of actors, pertaining to 
some local codes and practices, and consequently influential in the reproduction of 
informal economy schemes, dubbed as ‘mutual aid’. In the context of Alto Belice, this flies 
in the face of the antimafia cooperatives’ ‘standardisation’ of employment. In Alto Belice, 
                                                 
34 Gudeman downplays the issue of waged work and commodification in his monograph, as Stephen Nugent 
points out (1981), arguing that ‘the ghost of subsistence’ overshadows the introduction of commodification 
and wage labour into what Gudeman calls the ‘community’ sphere of people’s economic lives in Los 
Boquerones (1978). Gudeman has, to an extent, revised his earlier views (2009). 
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the ideological backdrop of community is in fact vested in the informal economy (lavoro 
nero). 
To consider that ‘community-based’ ways of life, such as the ‘mutual aid’ system 
(and the mafia’s endorsement of it) are removed from labour markets, would echo the 
romantic logic that mafia is archaic and premodern (tackled in 2.1). Instead, what mafiosi 
describe (and promote) as ‘traditional’ practices should in fact be historicised in a context 
of gradual crisis in produce prices (grapes) (already alluded to in 3.2.4), which pushed 
peasants into waged labour for friends as well as for mafia richer farmers (as I show in the 
next chapter). Defending the ‘mutual aid’ – or ‘mutual stealing’ system – is a logical attempt 
to safeguard enclaves of (what is registered for the state as) commodified ‘illicit’ practices 
of informal economy in a context where the rising tide of the antimafia in the area 
reinforced the state’s regulatory mechanisms. What is more, these work relations, part of 
the livelihood practices of locals, developed alongside (rather than against) the locals’ 
involvement in regularised waged work in the cooperatives. The extra income workers 
earned from ‘mutual aid’, as well as the benefits the daily workers (but not the permanent 
coop member-workers) acquired from land registration to their wives, eased tensions 
within their cooperatives. The existence of informal practices, alongside their regular 
employment in the cooperatives, brought their income to levels comparable to that of their 
administrative colleagues, alleviating income differences within the cooperatives; as many in 
the workforce said: ‘At least we have the extra work’. What is more, the benefits daily 
workers acquired bridged any internal differences within the manual workforce teams, as 
their annual income matched (via benefits) that of their fellow member-workers. This 
prevented further stratifications in the cooperatives, among participants in the manual 
workforce teams.  
As the term ‘moral economy’ denotes a weaving together of economic activity with 
community belonging, the local workers’ idea of the moral economy was arranged around 
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ways to pursue their livelihoods outside and parallel to the ‘standardised’ political economy 
of the cooperatives’ waged employment. Mafia’s endorsement of the practice leads me to 
agree with Hann’s critique of the concept of moral economy (2011: 196). Specifically, 
neither Polanyi, associated with the concept of moral economy nor Thompson, considered 
to have fathered the notion, account for the fact that the normative nature of a moral 
economy’s appears to include activities which are of ambiguous moral content, for the sake 
of bettering people’s livelihoods, if we, like Thompson, think in terms of class (1970; 1991). 
The inter-class appeal of mafiosi to ‘tradition’ through ‘mutuality’ certainly reproduced class 
stratification in the peasantry. In Alto Belice, peasant mobilisations developed as partially 
aligned to mafia, as actors of the local society resisted state regulations and market 
injustices. In Polanyi’s ‘double movement’, society reacts to economic deregulation by, for 
example, protectionist legislation (see 2.1) while in the Alto Belice case it was peasants 
defending their sense of community: commodified but non-regular economic relations, 
‘ways of life’. 
In Alto Belice, locals are invested in the state and the cooperatives’ regulation in 
contradictory ways: while some of their informal practices are reinforced by workers’ rights 
regularisation, some others are threatened by it. Moreover, in its Sicilian configuration, the 
interaction of regulated employment and informal lavoro nero as joint sources of livelihood 
of the antimafia cooperatives’ workers was, ironically, informed by mafia activity and 
demagogy. Farmers mobilised in Alto Belice to defend their multiple statuses, denouncing 
the Italian state in terms often associated with mafia influence. These two characteristics, 
state standardisation of activity on the one hand and mafia influence on the other, are 
contextualised in a specific conjuncture of change and continuity in contemporary Sicily.  
However, in reflecting on the plural claims of peasants to defend their livelihoods, 
Kearney’s notion of (post-) peasant ‘hybridity’ (1996: 68) is not applicable here even 
though people build on entirely diversified and often contradictory categories of income 
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seeking. ‘Hybridity’ entails a mingling of some sort. By contrast these two realms, of formal 
and informal labour (state standardisation of activity on the one hand and mafia influence 
on the other) correspond to two different, although juxtaposed ideas of ‘community’: one 
is the Consortium’s idea that community is achieved through state intervention and the 
other pitches community against state regulations (related to penalisation and 
standardisation) (interesting analogies can be drawn with collective tax refusals, as per 
Roitman 2005). These cannot be ‘hybridised’ since the informal labour and standardised 
employment cannot be brought into the same space or negotiated without friction. 
Workers waged from the antimafia cooperatives added to their income through petty 
informal and illegal work for friends. This co-existence of formal income opportunities and 
other means of securing a livelihood, in the case of land registration to wives, reinforced 
the informal practice. In the case of the informal work scheme of the ‘mutual aid’ system 
among male workers-peasants, the coexistence of continuity and transformation entailed 
fissures that led to law enforcement (fines on peasants). 
The mafia’s demagogy, as in Baffi’s case, ideologised the informal work exchange 
of peasants, using community idioms such as ‘ways of life’ (an idea in itself sufficiently 
popular as a consensus for mobilisation among peasants). Predictably, mafiosi also invoked 
the need to defend the informal way of life of local Sicilians. The mafia’s influence on 
peasant mobilisation intensified many people’s beliefs that ‘only unity can save the 
peasantry’, and that all farmers and peasants, beyond internal stratifications, should fight 
against the ‘miserly state of Rome’. In the same way peasants defended their practice of 
‘stealing from each other’, as they thought it allowed informal cooperation and solidified 
local social relations. Their struggles aimed to incorporate this informal status within what 
were becoming increasingly more complex relations involved in making ends meet, with 
ever more regulated wage employment frameworks. 
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This ideological glossing of the practice of ‘stealing from each other’ suggests 
further reflections on lavoro nero. Here, informal work does not draw from pooling from 
familial labour or from relationships within the same family, as in most areas covered by the 
relevant Italian ethnography (Blim 1990; Goddard 1996; Yanagisako 2002). Rather, lavoro 
nero (informal work) in Alto Belice is a system of mutual support among male peasant 
agrarian workers, which sustains a nexus of social relationships: it was this specifically that 
many informants identified as a ‘way of life’ and felt it was their right to defend. This is a 
contingency specific to Alto Belice and its (mafia-influenced) lack of female labour in the 
fields – and hence also the lack of ‘pooling’ from household labour, so popular in the lavoro 
nero literature (Blim 1990; but also Lucifora 2003; Buffa 2008).  
This mafia influence also affects when people suddenly start talking about ‘the 
state’ as an abstract and hostile entity, while in other contexts (cooperative employment), 
they speak of the same institution in different, less hostile, terms. Seeing the state as 
‘sucking taxes out’ while contributing nothing is perhaps the classic peasant attitude that 
one is led to expect by the existing literature, such as Eric Wolf’s famous statement in 
Peasant Wars that ‘peasants in rebellion are natural anarchists’ (1969: 295). It is part of the 
definition of peasants, in fact, that they are potentially self-sufficient but have things 
extracted from their household economy. In Alto Belice, peasant members of the antimafia 
cooperatives experienced the multiple ways they are invested in the state in contradictory 
ways. Specifically, practices within their households (registration of land to wives) went 
unnoticed, while practices among their households were more visible and hence vulnerable 
to penalisation by the state’s law enforcement. Therefore, the ‘legal’ standardisation of 
labour rights interacted with the informal everyday economic life of individuals and 
families. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the interactions between the ‘standardisation’ of people’s 
registered work status, i.e. the legal regularisation of labour relations, in the antimafia 
cooperatives and their supplementary informal activities in pursuit of a better livelihood. I 
have argued that local practices aimed at guaranteeing households’ livelihood security have 
evolved alongside the cooperatives’ standardised employment. These practices involve 
‘ghostly’ activities, often illicit and indeed in line with the local mafia’s ideologies. People’s 
struggles to maintain the regular, cooperative wage work alongside these local practices, 
make the official, visible political economy converge with an invisible, and strongly 
gendered, realm of local livelihood practices. Their ‘mixed’ statuses as employee/wage 
earners and independent peasant proprietors are at once reinforced and contested by the 
standardisation promoted by cooperatives. In the case of registering land in wives’ names, 
standardisation, ironically, facilitated the flow of unemployment benefits that could be 
classified as illicit. By contrast, the exchange of informal waged work among men is 
hindered by standardisation, which penalises their ‘mutual aid’ scheme.  
While formal employment remuneration through cooperative wages was not 
sufficient, people’s involvement in cooperatives added a surprising further source of annual 
income to families through unemployment benefits, negotiated through the informal 
practice of registering wives as capoaziende. The forms of waged work in the cooperatives, 
articulated together with other, informal, means of livelihood (made possible, indirectly, 
through involvement with cooperatives) did bring transformations in people’s lives. This 
was not only because of the financial gains that labour standardisation brought to 
households but also because the regulation regime shifted the meaning of informal local 
practices, continuous with local ‘codes’, as in Schneider and Schneider (1976). This chapter 
has elucidated this interrelation of informal and formal economic practices, where ‘political 
economy’ and ‘livelihood practices’ are each an element within the other. Overall, 
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participation in the cooperatives thus floods into people’s livelihoods in ways that cannot 
be contained in the political economy of waged labour entailed in cooperativism. As in 
Chapter 4, the rhetoric of a (single) model of antimafia cooperativism, assumed by 
administrators and state agents (the Consortium) failed to encompass the implicit (although 
not explicitly backed by rhetoric) model of cooperativism practised by workers – the 
experience of participating in cooperatives for their antimafia families. 
For these participants, their interlocked condition ‘between’ informal and regulated 
activity became a matter of gendered household plans and political mobilisation. This 
condition, I argue, shows the locals’ livelihoods as enmeshed in a relationship between 
informal income continuities and the transformations introduced by standardisation. This 
in turn on the one hand alleviated the income differences between member-workers and 
daily workers (through benefits the latter received); on the other hand, it casted serious 
doubt on the presumed horizontality of the antimafia cooperatives. The cooperatives did 
not succeed in encompassing locals in a realm of stable employment, as local families 
continued their practices of income seeking outside the cooperative regulated framework, 
unlike the administrators. The key factor drawing in local participation in the cooperatives 
was regular waged labour; but they also continued informal practices alongside it.  
The idea (and ideal) of cooperativism as a form of work (implied in the politicised 
project of curbing the mafia) is critical because it opens the way to rethink the definition of 
labour, which is, of course, already in contradiction with legal definitions, notably the one 
encapsulated in the standardisation of waged work on the model of employment. The work 
of what Marxists call social reproduction (Narotzky 1997: 158-159) always falls off the 
map, since it is mostly not commodified and also generally assumed to be mainly women’s 
work. (At the same time, the work of creation of non-market value (e.g., political), such as 
the cooperatives themselves, is, if anything, even more ignored as labour). Taking this labour 
into account re-signifies the range of meanings of informal practices: developing against a 
231 
 
backdrop of registered (‘standardised’) work, these practices become impregnated with new 
potential. Informal work activities therefore become a crucial facet of social reproduction, 
as important as ‘employment’ (Narotzky 1997: 36-37) and in the case of benefits, 
dependent on it. Smooth employment relations in the cooperatives were also dependent on 
informal work, as informalities alleviated stratifications (within the manual workforce) and 
across workers and administrators, bringing all members to comparable income statuses. 
The integration of male peasant-workers of Alto Belice into a regime of standardised 
regulation/registered work (‘employment’) then, affected the established livelihood 
practices of local households in different ways. On the one hand, it reinforced the practice 
of legally registering land to wives, accumulating novel and beneficial consequences to it, by 
facilitating unemployment benefits for their husbands. On the other, the regime formed 
part of a broader state strategy to regulate and standardise labour relations, which resulted 
in the penalisation of local ‘mutual aid’ labour schemes.  
In the face of such legalised regularisation of labour relations, people defended 
their ‘ways of life’, mobilising, in struggles influenced partly by mafia, to demand the 
legalisation of their ‘mutual aid’ schemes. Peasant struggles often develop in ways not 
beneficial to the majority of the peasantry (Mcmichael 2008). Being employed by the 
cooperatives (and hence rendering part of one’s labour visible to the state) exacerbated the 
informal economic outcomes of land registration to wives. In this configuration, people 
mobilised practices, informed by gendered local codes, also influenced by mafia. Therefore, 
perhaps ironically, in Sicilian ‘antimafia families’, practices that were popular partly due to 
mafia influence gained new ground, their meanings reconfigured. The experience of 
antimafia cooperativism did not tackle the informal income practices in which people were 
enmeshed; rather, it developed as a transformation arranged ‘alongside’ a set of continuities 
in people’s day-to-day lives. In the next chapter I shall explore this further, looking at the 
social arrangements around land plots, confiscated and not. 
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Chapter 6   
The Value of  Property and the Values of  Ownership: 
Continuities and Contiguities among Land Plots  
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed waged work employment as a material resource offered 
by the cooperatives. Here, I explore the material resource bestowed on the cooperatives by 
the state: land and, specifically, land confiscated from mafia. Evidently, when it comes to 
land, these are connected: the cooperatives provide their members, access to land, that has 
been granted to them by the state. My central hypothesis is that property constitution 
embodies a variety of values incorporated in the land. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I seek to answer the question what were 
the factors that shaped the antimafia asset confiscation legislation? Although cooperative 
access to land was arranged around the apparently neutral ideology of legality, through 
which kinship was meant to be sidelined,1 I show that the constitution of relevant legal 
categories relating to land confiscation included kinship categories resulting in a crucial 
distinction between two different types of property in land, a distinction that continues to 
reverberate day to day in Alto Belice: familiare and propria. 
Secondly, and more important, I aim to answer the question what social 
arrangements were clustered around the land cultivated by the cooperatives? Following 
Scott (1998; 2010) and Ferguson (1994), I look at the consequences of legal and political 
discourse ‘on the ground’ (metaphorically and literally). Some of the most important 
consequences for the social arrangements regarding land tenure developed because of the 
existence of rigid legal categories (familiare and propria). I focus specifically on how people 
                                                 
1 Similarly, in Chapter 4, I suggested that meritocracy was the state’s main value in respect to recruitment in 
antimafia cooperatives, sidelining kinship.  
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experienced and reflected on land adjacencies (contiguities) between confiscated and non-
confiscated mafia land. I examine neighbours’ continuing past practices in the face of these 
property changes and the ways that cooperative members (administrators and workers) 
responded differently. I argue that these contiguities and continuities developed not despite 
the rupture in local property regimes that the mafia land confiscation brought about, but 
because of it.  
Stratified across the two-tiered organisation of labour in the cooperatives, some 
members considered land plot boundaries to be ‘lines of contact’ while others construed 
them as ‘moral borders’. The cooperatives’ administrators saw, in the confiscated plots, the 
moralisation of the values of legal property, partly because the property remained with the 
state. Conversely, local workers and worker-members saw confiscated land as space for 
contact with neighbours, recognising the values of moral ownership, which were in tune with the 
actual social arrangements around land. 
These social arrangements regarding land manifest a pattern of both continuity and 
transformation (Mundy 2007): change stems from legal decisions and continuity from local 
practices. The confiscations project left the legal status of many mafia-owned plots 
unchanged: some were confiscated (proprie) and some were not (familiari). On the one hand, 
the confiscations entailed radical change: based on the idea of mafia activity being invested 
(literally and metaphorically) in a land plot, the confiscation law disrupted the pre-existing 
‘geography’ of property status on the ground, as the state took away plots from mafiosi 
proprietors and bestowed them on cooperatives. On the other hand, non-confiscated plots 
still belonging to mafiosi (so-called familiari plots), entailed continuities with past social 
arrangements around land: for instance, contiguous plots involved interactions between 
cooperatives members and mafiosi. 
I have discussed some theoretical issues relevant to land in 2.3. I now describe 
continuities and contiguities developed around land plots acknowledging their 
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interrelationship, which I identify with the idea of moral ownership. I show that the 
recognition of mafiosi’s moral ownership of land, manifested in many locals’ reminiscences, 
and based on some mafiosi’s continuous agricultural activity on their familiari plots, led to 
continuations of past practices. The folk conception of moral ownership contrasts with 
legal property.  
My overarching premise is that property embodies a variety of values incorporated 
in the land, to decide whether to confiscate or not. More importantly, the state-regulated 
‘value’ of confiscated land is juxtaposed to a range of local values. As Graeber notes, 
‘values’ and ‘a single system of value’ compete and interact (2001: 1–2). The central point 
then is how local values and codes expressing them (moral ownership) relate to the state’s 
system of value (legal property). In the case of confiscated land, there is a contrast between 
local continuities informed by moral ownership and a legal regime imposed through radical 
change. In that light, I show how property’s reconstitution, in the application of the law, 
creates a series of social arrangements, which suggest continuities alongside change 
(Holston 1991): gendered transmissions, continuations of past activities, moral recognition 
of past proprietors.   
The land plots offer an excellent ethnographic instance to consider how social 
values persist over time but are dynamic and subject to change. Various personal 
trajectories contribute to shaping property as a plateau of intersecting agencies and thus as 
a political realm. The property statuses and the social experience of land uses in Alto Belice 
are built on conflicting and contesting claims and counterclaims, premised on different 
ways of recognising values. The overarching system of values codified in legislation is 
contested by local values deployed around moral ownership. These claims are reproduced 
by locals, in order to make sense of the experience of working on, or in a plot adjoining a 
confiscated land plot. The contiguities between confiscated and familiari plots further 
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elucidate the moral divergences within the cooperatives: for some people, land boundaries 
become ‘moral borders’ and for other people they become ‘spaces of contact’. 
6.1. Categories of Property (Familiare and Propria) 
The Brusca family owned plots of land2 near their, now abandoned, home on the outskirts 
of San Giovanni. These land tracts, used as vineyards, were not confiscated when Giovanni 
and Vincenzo, the older sons of the family, both mafiosi, were arrested, in 1996 (Giovanni 
had already been convicted in absentia for multiple murders). The reason those vineyards 
close to the house were not confiscated, unlike others outside the village, was that they 
were part of the inheritance of their mother, Antonia Brusca and thus did not derive from 
‘mafia activity’. Taking a stroll around the impressive villa of the Bruscas with some of the 
cooperative workers, we ended up walking amongst vines. I was intrigued by the workers’ 
stories about the surrounding landscape: they had all worked in that vineyard in the past, 
during the early 1990s, when Giovanni Brusca was still at large. The pay was not great and 
the workload heavy; but, as Nicola told me, ‘Once a Brusca asked you, you could not really 
turn down the offer of work’. 
Having worked for a few months in viticulture for the cooperatives, I could tell that 
the muddy soil was neglected and the vines were dying. All the men agreed that this plot of 
the Bruscas had, until recently, been very productive: Nicola reminisced how he had 
worked there in the 1990s as part of ‘mutual aid’ between him and the mafioso. The workers 
called the land tract a ‘familiare’ (familial) or ‘storico’ (historical) plot of the Brusca family. 
Adamo recalled a time in the mid 1990s when he and Niki worked together there on the 
harvest. Both men remarked what ‘a pity’ it was that, although non-confiscated, these 
                                                 
2 Mapping is significant in this type of ethnography; also, geographers have shown how the multiplicity of 
mapping techniques helps gather a fuller image of a territory, and land tracts in particular (Abrams and Hall 
2006). As well as the narrative descriptions here, I also use two other methods of mapping the territory of my 
investigation: tables in the text and Cadaster maps in Appendix 5.  
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vineyards now lay uncultivated. They inspected the vines and showed me that the soil was 
not productive anymore.  
As described in 5.3, Antonia Brusca had never involved herself in managing these 
vineyards of hers, nor did she start to after her children (all male) were sent to prison. 
Adamo said that he ‘felt for the vineyard,’ feeling pity also for the proprietor who had 
forsaken it: ‘It shows how they morally feel for it... the mother could not cultivate what she 
feels belong to her son.’ (Years before, she had informally handed over the usufruct of the 
plot to Giovanni.)  
I enquired further as to what the concept of familiare meant. Initially I had thought 
that, if vineyards belonged to mafiosi families, surely they would be confiscated. Discussing 
these questions with lawyers and the Consortium administrators responsible for 
overlooking the confiscations project, it was explained to me that the term ‘historical’ 
(storico) implied family history (genealogy and inheritance) and ‘familial’ (familiare) implied 
belonging to the family unit.3 From the point of view of land confiscation, I found that 
they functioned as equivalent terms, designating plots that had not been confiscated 
because it had been proven that the mafioso owner had acquired them in ways other than 
the ‘usurping’ entailed in ‘mafia accumulation activity’ (Focus 2001). Inheritance and dowry 
were the main ways mafiosi acquired land tracts with familiare status.4 The Bruscas’ mother 
Antonia had ‘given’ her plots to her son Giovanni (as explained above) but retained the 
title to the property herself. Being a woman, she was not a member of the Alto Belice 
mafia. Because of this, the plots were never confiscated; but as Giovanni was in prison, 
Antonia felt it was presumably not proper, as a woman, to work on them. 
                                                 
3 The terms familiare and storico describe the same thing: however, storico has a legalistic air and is consequently 
used more in written documents, as it appears more official a term than that more popular with informants, 
familiare (plural: familiari). I shall use the familiare term in the present text, for this reason. 
4 This is for example the case when a legatee acquires assets through matrilineal descent – not the case here.  
The land, when mafiosi become heirs of their mothers is deemed familiare and therefore legitimately remains as 
the property of the incarcerated mafioso. 
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By contrast, there is the legal category ‘individual property’ (‘proprietà propria’). When 
convicted, the mafioso has to prove the innocent origin of his assets.5 If he cannot support 
his claim that he acquired a land piece of property in lawful ways, the property is legally 
presumed to be the offspring of his mafia activity. Thus, land that falls into this category is 
confiscated because it is taken that (absent proof to the contrary) it has been acquired 
through illicit means: through mafiosi’s ‘dirty money’ or violent usurping (from the 
‘community’). This is also the case with plots formally in another person’s name but where 
that proves to be a ‘straw person’.6 The nominal registration of property to a straw person 
did not offer legal protection: the property of a mafioso is still considered his (propria) so 
long as he has control over how it is used, and has hence to be confiscated.  
In Alto Belice, (as discussed in 5.2), only male members of a mafia family worked 
the land. Antonia Brusca had given usufruct rights to a male child (a mafioso) but retained 
the legal title; as that title came from her inheritance, it was not derived from mafia activity, 
and was thus non-confiscatable. Property carries particular values: a land plot incorporates 
or embodies personal effort, such as the ‘honest labour’ of a San Giovanni mother’s child 
rearing or simply any labour ‘done outside of mafia activity’, as Lucio told me. For the 
state, notions such as family and honest work had moral legitimacy in this sense, associated 
to the Consortium’s abstract (divorced from local experience) idea of community and 
commons. Social bonds of kinship are therefore integrated in legal and ideological 
approaches to property’s statuses, including the ‘mother–child’ relationship and the 
inheritance potential it engenders. Such processes form familiare property, rendering some 
mafiosi-owned plots ‘non-confiscatable’. A familiare plot incorporates kinship values and a 
kind of work seen in a positive light. In that sense, work and ownership claims 
                                                 
5 Another way to approach this though legal theory is to point that, because of the reverse burden of proof 
the starting presumption is that all a convicted mafioso’s property comes from illicit/mafia activity and it is 
for him to prove it is not, so pointing to its being familiare is one way of doing that. 
6 As discussed (1.1.2), straw people were those to whom mafiosi registered their plots, without their having any 
actual say about the assets’ management. 
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incorporated in a familiare land plot are seen as ‘clean’ by definition (family values, honesty, 
morality).  
The respect shown towards family values is significant here. Labour valued 
differently by the state (i.e. the child-rearing labour of Brusca’s mother incorporated in her 
plots) can cleanse a potentially hazardous intergenerational property transmission.7 This 
transmission is, in this instance, gendered. It is evident that gender relations are 
fundamental in respect to inheritance because the plots owned by Brusca’s father, himself a 
mafioso, had to be confiscated. Mafia is male, in that respect, and a woman is, by definition, 
considered a non-member.8 A male mafioso proprietor’s transmission of land plots as lawful 
inheritance to his child is rejected and his plot cannot be classified as storico or familiare.  
As the two values (gender and labour) are interdependent in the formation of 
inheritance practices, they open up new meanings to the intersection of time and space of 
the confiscated land plots. Interestingly, the transmission of property through inheritance 
cannot succeed if the transmission is tainted by values seen as negative by the state, such as 
mafiosity (mafiosità). The co-existence of mafia familiari and confiscated plots, I soon found 
out, yielded surprising continuities in local practices, carried alongside contiguities of plots, 
which, now recategorised, had a common boundary. The social arrangements around 
                                                 
7 The definition storico meant also a shift in generations, which ‘resets the clock’. There are cases, in Italy, I 
was told (although I did not come across any in Alto Belice), where a plot’s propria property status was 
‘cleansed’ through legal processes that take into account the passing of time. This reflects a concession in the 
light of the harsher penalisation regime for mafia-related crimes inaugurated with the 1983 legislation 
(introduction of mafia crime) (Art. 416 bis cp, 157cp). The prescribed sentences for mafia crimes are more 
than for other crimes (10 to 15 years, Art. 157 c.p).  See fn 16 in Chapter 1. Art 14 bis cp clarifies that there 
can be no early release from prison for mafia crimes.  
8 There is some debate regarding the extent to which mafia clans reproduce themselves matrilineally, the 
womanly figure seen as sacred (Dino 1997) or whether indeed there is female membership in mafia at all 
(Longrigg 1998). Italian feminist sociologists such as Puglisi, theorising the ‘other side of the mafia’, speak of 
some 2-3% of female ‘membership’ in the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, but stress the overwhelming presence of 
women in the antimafia movement (2005). Siebert questions the relevance of the ‘feminine subjectivity’ at 
large in the mafia context, although she admits that female participation in the Calabrian mafia has been part 
of an ambiguous emancipatory process regarding gender relations in the region (2003). In the previous 
Chapter, I have noted the existence of mafia clans where women seem to play a significant role, in Alcamo, a 
town close to San Giovanni.  
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neighbouring plots show some locals’ will to continue enduring relationships, despite the 
change the confiscations had introduced. 
6.2. Continuing Practices and Moral Ownership 
6.2.1. Changed property, persisting relationships  
The old gentleman Ciccio Corso had a reputation for good manners and the 
nickname ‘u sigareddu’, as he always strolled around his native village Chiana with a cigar 
between his lips during the time he was the leader of the village’s main mafia clan9, in the 
1990s. In the stories I heard about him (he died two years before I started fieldwork), some 
people emphasised to me that his mafiosity (mafiosità) had not been passed on to his 
daughters Caterina and Serafina, who were ‘honest people’ who had ‘inherited his land 
normally’: being female, they were immune to mafia-related accusations. One of Corso 
vineyards had been confiscated, as interlocutors from the Falcone explained, and the 
cooperative had its usufruct. 
Some cooperative members had met Corso in person. Piero told me about his life 
as a young man (when he was about 25, in 2000) and living in a derelict rented shelter in 
the countryside, where he cultivated his plot (1.5 ha of vineyard), at an altitude of 700m in 
the Chiana heights. (People in the village described Piero’s life during that period as ‘feral’.) 
While he was there, he met sigareddu, whose vineyards were very close to his tiny piece of 
land. Piero, a young and charming man, spent hours every day talking about hunting with 
the old man. Corso liked him so much that he introduced him to his daughters, who 
managed the two plots, although they did not manually work them. Serafina was older than 
Piero and she was a committed peasant entrepreneur but Caterina was still a student of 
                                                 
9 I have already noted (fn 2, section 2.3 and fn 8, this Chapter; see also Appendix 3), in passing, what ‘clan’ 
implies in this context. In the latter part of this Chapter, I explain the connection between propria property 
and ‘clan’, as distinguished from familiare property, which relates to ‘family’. 
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biology at the University of Palermo. Piero brought her fox cubs to play with, which she 
found particularly endearing, and they enjoyed themselves together.  
At the time of fieldwork, almost 10 years after that first meeting with Corso, Piero 
still saw Caterina and Serafina whenever he visited the part of their family land that had 
been confiscated from their father and allocated to Falcone. Ciccio ‘u sigareddu’ Corso, the 
boss of the mafia in Chiana, was arrested in 2003. Piero claimed that, before then, he had 
had no idea about Corso’s mafia involvement; in 2009, he still rang the sisters to have a 
chat whenever he went to the plot to check up on things.10 Although Piero’s antimafia 
opinions had grown stronger since 2000, his affection for those vineyards and the Corso 
sisters had not changed. Property relations may fluctuate – but interpersonal relations 
persist, even in the face of shifts in property statuses. The family’s land tracts were all bar 
one (the only one categorised as familiare) confiscated (See Figure 6.1). Around that piece of 
land, a perhaps minor social arrangement continued, related to local values that 
transcended legalistic approaches to property.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Piero’s lack of knowledge about Corso being mafioso should not be seen as naive; instead, it shows the 
mafia’s banality, how mundane are the relationships people of the cooperatives entered into with local 
families, ignoring their links to mafia clans.  
11 This map is a schematic projection of a detail from a broader map from the Italian Cadaster, which can be 
found in Appendix 5 [map II], with relevant commentary.   
Figure 6.1: Map of the plots11 
 
 
  Plot that used to 
                                belong to Corso,                      Plot still belonging to the 
                 confiscated and now   Corso family, inherited 
                managed by Falcone.            by Serafina and Caterina. 
            Registered as plot 91,              A familiare plot  
                           Palermo cadaster                      (not confiscated). 
                                                                             Registered as plot 153, 
                                                                             Palermo cadaster. 
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Figure 6.2: The gendered transmission of familiare property 
[signora Corso (as dowry) Corso father  Serafina daughter 
Allowed inheritance from a mafioso to a non-mafioso 
 
Antonia mother  G.Brusca son 
Informal transmission from a non-mafioso to a mafioso 
After detailed inspection by the state officials, the acquisition of plot 153 (on the 
map) was proven to be not the result of mafia investment but a familiare property of the 
Corso family. The court’s reasoning was that, since the plot had been the dowry of the 
mafioso’s wife, it should not be confiscated. Furthermore, the mafioso had only female 
children and could pass on to them nothing but the material possessions he had but not, as 
locals remarked, his ‘mafiosity’ (mafiosità), the social capital of his as a mafioso. In this case, 
the plot of land that Caterina and Serafina still owned in 2009 had been proven to belong 
to the mafioso’s family ‘independently of his criminal activity’. The land plots they owned 
were of the familiare type because their father proved to the authorities that he had acquired 
them through his wife’s dowry and not due to his illegal practices within the mafia circuit. 
The daughters had taken over this land after he had been incarcerated. However, the plot 
that Piero visited at Chiana at the time of my fieldwork was proprietà propria (plot 91 on the 
map), and hence legally liable to mandatory confiscation. After it was confiscated, the 
Falcone cooperative took over its use (usufruct).  
When property is passed on, it influences a variety of social arrangements that take 
place around a plot. Continuities in moral and/or legal obligations were thus tangibly 
materialised. Patterns of practices linked to a plot continued despite the legal change in a 
plot’s property status. Hence, genealogical shifts carried along with them (often contrary to 
the cooperatives’ (the new proprietors’) will), different nexuses of neighbourly practices. In 
that respect, the continuity of good neighbourliness and affability between Piero and 
Serafina was organised around their common past and was ‘located’ in the bordering of 
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their plots. The plots here provided a point of reference for the continuation of a 
relationship that was socially immune to rupture by the confiscation of one of the plots of 
Serafina’s father. It was, as discussed below, a ‘line of contact’. 
In other cases however, neighbours found that a confiscation challenged 
behavioural patterns established through longstanding relationships. For example, an old 
woman acquainted with Brusca was allowed, due to her connivance in his mafia activity, to 
make use of water from the pond in a Brusca plot. She continued to do so even after the 
mafioso had been arrested and imprisoned, his plot confiscated and handed over to the 
Falcone cooperative. Once, accidentally meeting Paolo in the streets of San Giovanni, the 
woman complained that the pond had become unreliable and that she needed ‘them’ (the 
people of the cooperative) to make sure the water flow would be more ‘to the standards 
she was used to’ (referring to the time when Brusca managed the plot and the pond). Her 
relationship with Brusca allowed her to think the pattern of getting water could be 
maintained – and even improved – under the new plot management. However, Paolo 
thought it prudent to let her know the cooperative felt ‘no social obligation’ for the 
continuation of this small favour. It was even suggested, in a brief meeting of the 
cooperative administrators, that the woman be taken to court for this ‘illicit’ behaviour.  
Piero’s cordial relationship with Serafina and Caterina, maintained along the 
continuing neighbourliness of the plots he worked and theirs, survived the confiscations 
and continued around a different arrangement. By contrast, the old woman’s practice of 
using the plot’s water was discontinued after the confiscation, as the moral basis that 
legitimated it was her relationship with Brusca and his family, which cooperative members 
(and the legislation supporting their actions) disavowed. When I discussed the issue with 
her, she said bitterly that ‘unfortunately, now morals have changed’. For her, however, 
what she herself called ‘the moral ownership of the plot’ still belonged to the prior owner, 
her ‘neighbour’ Brusca.  
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I use this emic term ‘moral ownership’ to extract, from abstract jural processes and 
legal statuses, the lived experience of land and the social arrangements around it that were 
so important for people in Alto Belice. I appropriate the term and use it analytically against 
the established legal notions of ‘property’. Moving from a focus on the reified (legal) 
‘property’ to the less strictly categorised and more dynamic ‘ownership’, I propose that 
‘moral ownership’ informed a number of practices of many locals, vis-à-vis specific land 
plots. Sneath (2002) notes, for post-Soviet Mongolia, the long (not only Soviet) history of a 
custodial sense of ownership, which survived the demise of socialism. In Alto Belice, moral 
ownership is a set of values (of neighbourliness and community) that transcends the legal 
boundaries of property. As Abramson notes of Fijian mythical land (although in Sicily this 
was not expressed in ritual mediations): 
… jural culture and legal boundaries impact within the transforming sphere of the 
ancestors but neither on or in its own terms. The principal effects of land law have 
been relayed to a realm outside of the latter’s jurisdiction. (Abramson 2000b: 208)  
Continuity with the past is conveyed through some cooperative members (the local 
workers and daily workers) seeing boundaries as lines of contact with their neighbours, 
who shared their lingering memory of (non-mafia and mafia) past proprietors of the land. 
In Alto Belice, local moral discourses on moral ownership tackle the jural statuses of legal 
property. In their relations with their long-term neighbours, local workers mobilised the 
more fluid concept of morals rather than conforming their behaviour to fit the abrupt 
changes in legal ‘property’ status; thus one could say that they refused to reify jural 
categories in dealing with the plots’ social arrangements.  
Maintaining such practices associated with moral ownership was perceived more 
strongly than just a choice but, rather, as an obligation binding people to certain behaviours 
that therefore often continued despite the confiscation of a plot and hence of the shift in 
property and usage statuses). I soon found out that the meaning of moral ownership was 
shared by many different people, suggesting the total rupture with the mafia that the 
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confiscations aimed at was more nuanced than jural processes planned. The morals 
embodied in the continuation of practices and ideas, which often challenged the 
confiscations, elucidate the richness of the antimafia cooperativism experience, as people 
recognising the ‘moral ownership’ of prior proprietors were often local members of the 
cooperatives, as shown below.  
6.2.2. Practices recognising ‘moral ownership’ over confiscated plots 
The issue of moral ownership became more tangible to me when Adamo, a key 
research interlocutor, shared his thoughts about one of the confiscated land plots he 
worked on, a vineyard that used to belong to the mafioso Genovese. He told me that:  
I used to be good friends in school with Giovanni Genovese, the mafioso’s son. I 
know the plot, I’ve worked here before, you know. I’ve worked for their harvest, 
some years ago.... And it is for this reason that I am sure that they [the Genovese 
family] are happy that it is me doing this now, working on their confiscated plot. 
Me and not somebody else, some guy they would not know; for them it’s better if 
it’s me who cultivates their property and not some fellow from another place than 
San Giovanni .... There is a morality to this, you know. And I recognise this, and 
respect this feeling. 
Adamo was not untypical in having such familiar past relations with mafiosi or mafia 
affiliates. Many local people now working for the cooperatives shared this common 
experience as they had been involved in informal work through ‘mutual aid’ practices with 
mafiosi. In fact, many cooperative members still met mafiosi or people close to them, as I 
suggested in the previous chapter and shared a degree of respect for the prior 
proprietors.160 The sense some people had that mafiosi ex-proprietors retained not just the 
                                                 
160 Certain analogies can be drawn with ethnographies of post-socialist villages in China (Yan 2003) or the 
Soviet Union (Humphrey 2002), where locals of bourgeois or kulak origin, although collectivisation deprived 
them of the land their families used to own, retained a social and cultural capital that inspired mixed feelings 
of rage in the local peasantry. Under these socialist regimes, the rage was due to then popular Marxist 
primitive accumulation analyses that saw the rich as having reached their status by violent usurpation and 
coercion (Lenin: 2004 [1899]). In the Alto Belice case, interestingly similar in that respect with the USSR and 
Chinese cases, this social background of people considered criminal still could not be entirely undone. 
However, most locals in Alto Belice did not discredit past proprietors’ rights and interests, recognising them 
as possessing degrees of moral ownership.  
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property of familiare plots but degrees of moral ownership of the confiscated plots as well, was 
also often structurally reinforced through the state’s inactivity in imposing the new land 
statuses. Cooperatives’ administrators often told me, that municipalities in Alto Belice, and 
Sicily at large, committed ‘tactical errors’ regarding the administration of confiscated land. 
After confiscation, it was the municipalities’ responsibility to manage the smooth bestowal 
of seized land on a cooperative (the Consortium overlooking the process). This was a 
source of tension between cooperative administrators and politicians of the area. The 
authorities tolerated mafiosi activities because they recognised degrees of moral ownership 
in them. 
In the case of Lizzi’s municipality, the fact that people recognised moral ownership 
by mafiosi eventually led to the Falcone cooperative turning down the opportunity to access 
a huge piece of dry farming fertile land (100 Ha). The plot was a good distance away from 
San Giovanni (almost 100 kilometres or a 1.5-hour drive). Legal ownership of the plot had 
been passed to the municipality after it had been confiscated from a powerful local mafia 
clan. The mayor of Lizzi, a dynamic young man, suggested Falcone should apply for it. 
Luca did so and established a short-lease contract for it with the mayor.  
The municipality and the mayor personally were, however, ‘unable or unwilling’ as 
interlocutors told me, to protect the property from further mafia manipulation: as Luca 
explained, there were ‘people working the plot as if it had never been confiscated’; in that 
way, the mafia family continued to claim their moral ownership over the land. The mayor 
did not try (he claimed he was ‘too busy’) to convince the family of the incarcerated mafioso 
to stop this illicit activity. People in Falcone thought that this was an irresponsible way to 
manage the confiscated property and that the mayor was ignoring the property’s changed 
status because he recognised degrees of rights to the mafioso. In the end, the cooperative 
decided to drop its claim, as the members thought they could not function without the 
stability and safety that law and order should guarantee. The state institution seemed unable 
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to impose the new property order on its citizens. Members of the cooperative felt the state 
had ‘failed’ them, as its local agent, the mayor, implicitly recognised the moral ownership of 
the plot to the mafia, despite the property was of the state. 
Analogies can be drawn with Verdery’s reflections on the inability ‘of the local 
sphere to be obedient to central directives’ (2002: 27); in Alto Belice too there was ‘a 
marked disjuncture between what was legislated at the centre and what happened in rural 
settings’ (2002: 20). In effect, many mayoral policies were in practice far removed from the 
image of a decisive, law-enforcing state; very often confiscation order were not enforced, 
due to the reluctance of local-level state agents. An important factor for this unwillingness, 
as the Lizzi case suggests, is the implicit recognition of a sphere of moral ownership of the 
prior proprietors, by the state agents themselves. 
In other cases, however, the moral ownership prior proprietors sought to claim 
created circumstances that proved convenient for the cooperatives. The Borsellino 
cooperative owed the usufruct of a confiscated plot in Castelo; but the mafioso and his 
family continued to work the confiscated plot for months as if nothing had changed. 
However, the cooperative administrators suddenly changed their stance at the last moment. 
The land tract was far away from San Giovanni (110 km to the south, more than an hour’s 
drive, on the Agrigento provincial highway). The situation was thus facilitated because the 
cooperative had limited control over how the property was being used – and by whom –
due to the long distance. 
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Photo 16: Harvest at Castelo, August 2009. 
In August 2009, I worked on the harvest of that very Borsellino land plot in 
Castelo. Participant observation with the manual workforce of the cooperative during 
harvest always yielded important data on the social arrangements around land plots. In this 
case, it was only after the harvest that I found what Borsellino members had been hiding 
from me and from the young volunteers who helped out with work on that plot. This was 
when I found out about the prior owner’s uninterrupted cultivation of the vineyard for so 
longer after the confiscation. Informants told me that he probably thought of himself as 
the moral owner of the plot and therefore continued working on it. This situation 
continued throughout the agricultural cycle of 2009: the mafioso, who had been recently 
released from prison, and his family, organised the entire year’s production. Evidently the 
mafiosi and his family felt they were the ‘moral owners’ of the plot. Up until two weeks 
before the harvest, the people of the Borsellino, although they were aware of the situation, 
did nothing about it. As Pino, a cooperative member-worker told me afterwards:  
We did nothing because we feared that if we actually prevented them from doing so 
they would have felt dishonoured ... As we have no one in the territory of 
Casteltermini to impose our will, we lose control over it; it is too far from where we 
are; we could not speculate on what he felt about it, the morals of his family and 
the local community and stuff. 
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Working in Castelo, on the second day of harvest, there was a bizarre visit: a man in 
his forties approached us unexpectedly at the lunch break. He offered wine to the workers 
and tried to strike up a conversation with some people. Everyone refused the offer of wine 
– and chatting –- with the excuse that ‘we really have to get going with work’. The man 
disappeared; and Checco, the youngest member of the cooperative, told me months later, 
‘No one of us ever saw him again’. People were positive that the man was a relative of the 
mafioso original owner, sent to check on the intentions of cooperative members. 
The cooperative’s workers guessed that the mafioso felt exploited because suddenly 
they were harvesting his grapes having tolerated his moral ownership and letting him and 
his family work the land. Suddenly, at the end of the season they were reaping the produce. 
The cooperative’s workers lived a long way from the plot but felt that their legal rights 
protected them; whatever arrangements had been informally allowed to continue, or work 
put into the vineyard, was irrelevant: he simply had no legal right to harvest the grapes. 
What may have amounted to a covert recognition of moral ownership had abruptly 
become an active reappropriation of the plot as their legal property, partly due to 
administrators’ insistence that the plot had to be harvested by the cooperative. 
Different people narrated to me that, at the end of August, a man named Grezzo 
drove all the way from Castelo to San Cipiriddu, in the south part of San Giovanni. He 
arrived at Sangiovannaru, the popular local café where peasants took their early morning 
coffee before heading to their plots. Strategically positioned at the gates of the village, it 
was the most convenient place to seek information on just about everything in the area. 
Grezzo approached the barman and asked where he could find the cooperative’s offices. 
By pure coincidence, the vice-president of Borsellino, Stefano Dino, a 48-year-old farmer 
from Rocca, was there at that moment. The barman told Grezzo to speak to Stefano but 
‘Dino denied knowing anything about anything’, as the barman himself recounted to me. 
The vice-president suggested to Grezzo that he should go to the office of the cooperatives 
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and talk to the 34-year-old president, Silvio. He explained where the office was but when 
Grezzo went there and asked for the president, he found that Silvio had already left. 
Stefano had told him what was happening, calling him on his mobile phone, and he had 
fled the uncomfortable situation. 
Comparing the Borsellino and Falcone cooperatives, we can notice that their 
members acted quite differently. Borsellino members tolerated or ignored technically illicit 
behaviours, which suggested the ‘moral ownership’ of the prior proprietor, but eventually 
did harvest the produce of his labour afterwards, due to administrative pressure. In the case 
of Lizzi, by contrast, the members of Falcone, withdrew from their right to access 
contested property. Similar complexities regarding property flows from the mafia to the 
state can be seen in the case of a 10.5 ha plot in Cattí, today managed by the Lavoro e Altro 
cooperative. That municipality, located far away from Corleone, where the cooperative was 
based, bestowed the plot on the cooperative in 2004; as Vito explained to me, it was their 
first grand project with a vineyard. Two years afterwards the municipality was dissolved by 
the Ministry of the Interior for ‘having been infiltrated by the mafia’. ‘This sad, crazy story 
left us stunned’, Vito told me. He was positive that a mafioso mayor would never enforce the 
confiscations and allocations legislation.  
Such incidents highlight the controversial moralities regarding continuing 
relationships of people whose land had been confiscated, as well as their disregard for 
legalistic ideas of property, trumped by their moral views over ownership. The contradictions 
of moral ownership reinforce the argument on the multifaceted character of land in San 
Giovanni, as different subjects contested ownership statuses and competed for the land’s 
use. The contest between the cooperatives, on the one hand, partially supported by the 
state and, on the other, the mafiosi, supported by their families, neighbours and friends, 
reveal land’s highly politicised qualities. This is true especially considering that land is 
imbued with labour valued in different ways as well as with gendered kinship values. In 
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fact, the different legal statuses of familiare or propria land were crafted on that basis. There 
were also contrasting claims to the imposition of law and order: local people contested 
confiscations and the re-shaping of access to land on the legal and ideological grounds 
entailed in the antimafia confiscations.  
For the cooperative administrators, the state had granted the confiscated land to 
the cooperatives on the implied condition that they would consolidate legality locally and 
become the moral gatekeepers of land resources; this condition further suggests the 
political nature of property. It renders the administration cooperative members reproducers 
of the gate-keeping (to land) morals of legality. The boundaries of the plots they managed 
become boundaries of moral universes. However, as suggested by my ethnographic 
description, while the cooperative members were tied into obligations vis-à-vis the state, 
some of their ‘uncomfortable’ neighbours still experienced the moral bond they had with 
their old plot neighbour, friend or kin: often an imprisoned mafioso. 
In Alto Belice, (legal) property is ‘embedded’161 (Hahn 1998) in a set of enduring, 
persistent relationships between old proprietors and people close to them. This ‘closeness’ 
is both geographical (land plots bordering each other) and ethical (senses of ‘moral 
ownership’, and senses of ‘lines of contact’, discussed below). This embeddedness, which 
transcends legalistic approaches to property, is manifested in the ideas of moral ownership. 
This form of embeddedness of the moral ownership is constructed through family, honour, 
and neighbourhood. It materialised in behaviours that openly contradicted land 
confiscations: from guaranteeing water supplies, to simply taking care of a distant plot. In 
that respect, the political character of property is dynamic. Property might be generally 
constituted by the state in the legal setting, but people constantly renegotiated this setting, 
                                                 
161 Hann’s embeddedness goes back to Polanyi (see Chapter 2); the notion was revived by Granovetter (1985) 
to argue that markets in capitalist societies are as embedded in social relations (networks) as pre-capitalist 
ones.  
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rethinking the fixities of a land plot (Verdery 2003). Such boundary porosities are further 
explored in the following section. The discussion will highlight how the different practices 
of cooperatives’ people in approaching mafiosi over issues arising from confiscated and 
familiare bordering properties, were based on different moral approaches towards 
contradictory ownership claims. 
6.3. Contiguities with Uncomfortable Neighbours: ‘Moral Borders’ vs 
‘Lines of Contact’ 
Many people employed by state institutions, ranging from the Consortium to the police, 
spoke to me about the proximity (vicinato162) of ‘confiscated assets’ to plots that were still 
under a mafioso proprietor. The term ‘proximity’ is not merely about physical space but, 
rather, a relational concept constructed in social space: it refers to the material realities of 
bordering plots, across which people came into contact. In fact, here were the confiscated 
plots, managed by cooperatives, the non-confiscated plots of familiare status managed by 
mafiosi and plots that belonged to neighbours, apparently unrelated to the mafia/antimafia 
distinction. For example, after the mafioso Netti was arrested, half of his land was 
confiscated and integrated into the holdings of the San Cipiriddu municipality. The rest – a 
vast vineyard bordering directly on the confiscated, now cooperative, land – was been 
spared, as familiari. 
The geography of each plot could be given a variety of histories, depending on the 
context. On one occasion, Piero and I were going for a walk and stopped to buy cigarettes 
at a tabbaccheria owned by Leonardo Brusca, a man who became my main ex-mafioso 
research interlocutor. Leonardo was outside, smoking. Piero greeted him but did not 
immediately introduce me. They launched into a long and vivid, albeit serious and 
                                                 
162 The term can be translated as ‘neighbourliness’ as well, according to context.  
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professional, discussion on the subject of property in land, touching on their common 
problem with Leonardo’s neighbour Tizio.  
Figure 6.3: the ‘right of way’ case 
                      Tizio’s plot 
                     A: Leonardo’s plot     B: Borsellino’s plot        R 
                                                                                              O 
                               A         
                                                                                                                    D           
Both Leonardo and Piero knew Tizio, the owner of a plot in the Ginestra area 
located next a familiare plot (plot A on the map above: Figure 6.3) belonging to Giovanni 
Brusca but managed (as Giovanni was in prison) by Leonardo, his cousin, which in turn lay 
next to one of the plots of the Borsellino cooperative (plot B), which had been confiscated 
from Giovanni. Every time they met, Tizio asked Leonardo when the path (indicated on 
the map by the arrow) crossing both Leonardo’s and the Borsellino plots would be 
finished. The path was his ‘right of way’163 as his access to the road Tizio bore the expenses 
for the path but, before it could be finished, the confiscation of part of the Brusca land 
took place in 2005. Tizio had completed the work on the path on the non-confiscated 
familiare plot but the Borsellino cooperative had planted legumes on the confiscated plot 
they had acquired. Ignoring the changed situation, Tizio went right on extending his right 
of way across the land of his new neighbours, to the immense irritation of some of the 
Borsellino members. Leonardo felt responsible for this absurd situation, as it arose from 
his family’s altered circumstances. ‘This is a typical neighbourhood issue,’ Piero remarked 
to me later, adding, ‘Leonardo simply wants to be reasonable [vuole ragionare] about how to 
deal with the problem of the path’. Piero, who was the main agronomist for the two San 
Giovanni antimafia cooperatives, viewed these continuities of past and present with a 
                                                 
163 This is indeed a lawful right, codified in the articles 1051-1055 of the Italian Civil Code (delle servitù).  
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humorous detachment: ‘This is life: things go on, with past issues living on in today’s 
issues. A confiscation happens, we take the plot, but also take on board all previous 
obligations attaching to it.’ Piero himself appreciated Leonardo’s will to settle the dispute 
through dialogue and showing ‘a respectful behaviour’. The administration of the 
Borsellino cooperative, however, had a more rigid legalistic response and wanted to take 
their neighbour Tizio to court to settle the matter. Taking such a strong stance, they 
believed, would consolidate their moral position in the village and defend the ‘integrity’ of 
their plot. 
This vignette illustrates the kind of issues cooperatives often faced in taking on the 
management of a plot confiscated from a mafioso, which not infrequently entailed the 
contiguities and adjunct responsibilities of bordering a familiare plot still in that mafioso’s 
possession. Engaging with the wider social relations of becoming a neighbour in the local 
realm of properties in land involved complicated activities that the confiscations project 
had not predicted. The classic point in legal studies that property is a ‘bundle of rights’ 
(Maine 2008 [1834]) remains true today: in that respect, rightful claims to accessing public 
spaces, such as right of way giving access to a road, override fixed ideas of possession of 
land and call for negotiation. The confiscations catered for rights to usufruct, but not other 
rights included in the ‘bundle’ of property, (such as a right of way), even if the cooperatives 
had full ownership, would prevail. Here, a legal – and moral – obligation of the mafioso ex-
proprietor, which a neighbour deemed had been ‘inherited’ by the cooperative members, 
infuriated cooperative administrators, who felt they should not be held accountable for the 
choices of other people (especially mafiosi) in the past.  
In fringe cases and areas of doubt in dealing with ‘a suspect neighbourhood’ (as 
Domenico, one administrator, called it), the Borsellino administration responded in what 
they saw as a firm and uncompromised way, sometimes threatening to bring people to 
justice and often avoiding face to face meetings with their neighbours to discuss conflicts. 
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Administration members thought that it was impossible to establish any genuine contact 
with neighbours who were affiliated (affiliati) to mafiosi: because of affiliations, their actions 
would always be driven by treachery. Further, they thought that the boundaries between 
the familiari and the confiscated plots needed to be defended. Like borders of a state, the 
plots’ boundaries represented for them a clear mafia/antimafia division which would be 
figuratively threatened by a path ‘connecting’ the unconfiscated and confiscated land. My 
argument here is that administrators’ vigorous defence of their plot boundaries is a 
demarcation of moral borders, seeking to lock the mafiosi outside the realm of decent 
ethical discourse and reason. The administrators’ unwillingness to negotiate, and rigid 
response amounts to a statement that defines a certain ‘moral universe’, separating 
discourses between which communication was thought to be possible or improper. For 
most administrative cooperative members, the mafiosi belonged to a different universe of 
capacity for moral judgment. In defending physical land boundaries, and invoking the 
authority of law, they were expressing their sense of this utter difference and protecting 
what they saw as the moral world of the cooperatives. For this reason, the general idea was 
that court action was the most appropriate solution to all problems regarding people 
connected to the mafia.  
Some Borsellino members in fact stated that dealing with plots boundaries was a 
strategy of ‘defending their borders’, while others expressed the view that land boundaries 
were akin to ‘borders of morality and legality’, sometimes explicitly asserting that ‘the 
Italian state was represented’ by and within the confines of their plots. As Silvio, the 
president of Borsellino, put it in an interview, there was ‘a lot to defend in our boundaries, 
not just land, but whatever both we and the state stand for, in Alto Belice’. 
Not everyone in the locale shared these understandings. Commenting on the 
cooperatives’ predeliction for taking issues involving mafia persons to court, a local mafioso 
commented to me: ‘Moreover, by making a case for mafia intimidation, they attracted 
255 
 
attention to their cause, the antimafia.’ At the same time, many manual workers, such as 
Fano or Pippo, put it to me that these ideas of ‘the administration’ were out of kilter. As 
Pippo said, adding ironic emphasis to the word ‘mafia’: 
They [the administrators] think we border The Mafia [facciamo confini con A Mafia], 
some abstract institution; in fact, our neighbours are actually just people from the 
village; yes, they are what they are, mafia and all, but they are people like anyone 
else in the end of the day; they have their morals. 
On another occasion, Pippo and Fano complained to me about the ‘rude behaviour’ of the 
Borsellino administration team towards some local shepherds whose herd foraged in a 
pasture very close to the lentils field of the Borsellino cooperative. The owners of the herd 
were the Babbi brothers, well known in Corleone for being ‘affiliated’ to the local mafia 
clans. The administrators thought that the very fact that they let the herd forage so close to 
their field was obvious mafia intimidation. Interestingly, cooperative members often 
described shepherds as ‘close to the mafia ambience’. Marelio, an admin member, indeed 
told me that ‘I would kill all them shepherds if I could,’ while Adamo, commented, more 
soberly, that shepherds were ‘always [mafia] affiliated’. Silvio himself told me, ‘These are 
people that due to ignorance are always close to mafiosi, due to their culture’.  
This image of the mafioso pecoraro (the mafioso-shepherd) was commonplace in 
Sicily,164 also familiar to cooperative administrators. In the case of shepherds and their 
sheep, the discourse of proximity to mafiosi did not involve a fixed geographical reference, 
as in the case of a land plot. A herd is mobile; the sheep were brought to the field to forage 
– although this was never actually proved to be a deliberate action directed by the Babbi 
neighbours. The shepherds were, rather, suspect neighbours by definition, due to their 
presumed innate ‘mafiosity’ (mafiosità) attributed to ‘their culture’ and their mobile 
proximity to the Borsellino legume plot: the key thing was that a herd could move at any 
                                                 
164 See also Hobsbawm (1963). 
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time from foraging right next to the confiscated plot to foraging in it. Hence the claim of 
intimidation. The shepherds’ mobility thus posed a constant renegotiation of the (moral 
and material) boundaries of the cooperative land plots, and hence the moral borders, of the 
cooperative, according to administrators. The herd could, at any given moment, enter the 
plots, oblivious to the legal repercussions applicable to humans, such as the mafiosi 
neighbour land proprietors. The fragile state of this proximity was seen as potentially 
harmful to the cooperative’s safety. When, one day, the herd did cross the line to forage in 
the plot, a local cooperative member commented to me that ‘it was an accident waiting to 
happen’. Whether the sheep incursion was planned or accidental, the administrators felt 
that the roaming animals challenged the property status of their plot not only in legal but 
also in ‘moral borders’ terms. 
Pippo, as well as some Borsellino members from Corleone, thought it would be 
wise to talk the incident through with the shepherds. They proposed this to the rest of the 
members, saying that there was no rush to ‘speak to the authorities’. ‘Making such a fuss 
about it was unnecessary,’ Pippo told me. Piero agreed that ‘keeping a relatively low tone’ 
was a strategy of good neighbourliness and ‘peaceful coexistence’, the politicised term he 
often jokingly used. Instead, the tactic chosen by the administration was to call the 
Carabinieri immediately, insisting that ‘there is no chance we could speak with such people 
in person’, as Luca put it bluntly, when I asked him. The police were called in and ‘settled 
the issue’, forcing the Babbi brothers to take their sheep elsewhere: the act was considered 
‘unauthorised pasturage’ (‘pascolo abusivo’) and if it ever happened again, it was made clear, 
the brothers would face court. Local cooperative workers disapproved of this ‘aggressive 
defence of the plots’, instead prioritising contact with neighbours, even if mafiosi. As with 
unregistered work (in 5.3), the police’s activity supported the Consortium’s idea of legality, 
represented by the administrators. 
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Most manual member-workers felt some degree of familiarity with mafiosi although 
some saw their mafia neighbours as a constant challenge at the same time. The Falcone 
cooperative’s, Enzo and Paolo, had told me that, they generally felt they found themselves 
working, as Enzo put it, on the ‘front line of combat’ (‘al fronte’). ‘We feel those people [the 
mafiosi] around us. ... Anything could happen at five in the morning when I get up in the 
mist to take the tractor down to the plot and spray the plants.’ Paolo agreed but also 
stressed the gentle manners of the mafiosi he met: ‘These people are gentle and soft-spoken 
in how they behave and all but you never know, having them right by all the time.’ 
Speaking with the manual team people’s wives, I became aware how they worried their 
husbands would be ‘tricked’ by the ‘gentlemanly’ ways of the mafiosi. Santa, Enzo’s wife, 
noted that ‘thankfully, with the passing of time, worries have been alleviated a lot; but I still 
do the sign of the cross as he [Enzo] leaves home in the winter when it’s dark’.  
Interestingly, different understandings of ‘the borderline’ reflected the ideas 
members of the cooperatives’ manual production team had, across the cooperatives’ two-
tiered organisation. Referring to the administration team, workers stressed the dangers they 
ran themselves: ‘The fellows in the office … they haven’t ever taken a risk, they do not 
know how it is to be here, always right by these people,’ Enzo told me as he drove us by 
tractor to one of the plots. ‘The local community does not consider these people [the 
administrators] as the cooperative in the way it considers us to be; we embody the coop, we 
represent it, because we live the plots, we are more visible’ (emphasis added). On a different 
occasion, Adamo told me, ‘We, people of the area, have been brought up close to our 
current neighbours, next door to them’. In this way, their opinion on strategising over 
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relations with mafiosi took this past into account. Manual workforce members called this ‘a 
civilised convivere’.165 
Hence the frustrated response when Borsellino administrators shouted down other 
voices (such as Marcuso, a worker from Curriuni), when he recommended not immediately 
referring an issue to the authorities. Pippo, in response, left the cooperative, disillusioned. 
Such discounting of local members’ views he described as a matter of cultural divergence 
with Silvio (Borsellino’s president) – a nuisance in working for the cooperative.  
Therefore, the division of the cooperatives in an office-based and a land-based 
team was reflected in people’s attitudes to their neighbours. On the one hand, 
administrators exhibited confrontational behaviour in tackling persons close to mafia 
interests, threatening law enforcement. On the other, the manual workers had a more 
tolerant approach to negotiating contiguities with such people. They were enmeshed in 
everyday flows of relations that made them loath to impose stark decisions on complaining 
neighbours. They thought it was in the interest of their cooperatives to maintain viable 
relations of tolerance with farmers in the vicinato (proximities, neighbourhood), as these 
were often the very people related or affiliated to the mafioso whose confiscated plots the 
cooperatives currently managed. 
In other cases, turbulent moments with mafioso neighbours were resolved less 
confrontationally through face to face meetings. It came to be accepted not only that such 
a neighbour had a right to ask for a discussion in quattro occhi, come signori (face to face)166 but 
                                                 
165 Convivere in this context means ‘living together’ with mafiosi. I was first told this by the Carabinieri marshal 
from San Giovanni, regarding the relation between local mafia and the antimafia cooperatives: ‘They need to 
learn to live together’ (bisogna imparare a conviverci). He argued that the proximity to mafiosi was an indication of 
how innocuous ‘the antimafia’ was: ‘The cooperatives don’t mean anything to the mafiosi; they don’t bother 
them.’ The simple fact that they are working right next to Genovese and Netti, and those people offer them 
water, for instance, means a lot – and it certainly also means that for the mafiosi they just don’t count’.  [emphasis 
mine]  
166 Literally: in four eyes, ‘as gentlemen do’. Classic ethnographies of Mediterranean settings, including Italy, 
stress the ‘directness’ of ‘face-to-face’ conduct and how much it is related to ideas of manliness and honour 
(for Italy: Davis 1977; Silverman 1975; for Greece: Herzfeld 1985).  
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also that he could be law-abiding and that his immediate claims might be sound. People like 
Piero often de-essentialised mafiosi in these ways, for example, respecting the 
documentation that they used to support their legal claims, rather than immediately 
suspecting them. He fiercely criticised the ‘zero tolerance’ stance of his colleagues, which 
he found not only ‘neither polite, nor fair’ but also counterproductive:  
Because of their lack of experience, the Borsellino people don’t know how to work 
these things out ... We really have to show that we do not fear contact, as opposed 
to just expressing distress, which is what they do. ... They have to see what the ex-
proprietor wants, when he approaches them, right there, at the plot. ... You have to 
see what they want; it is a matter of being civilised and also of good 
neighbourliness. You have to listen to them for a bit, basically. 
It was for these reasons that cooperative members like Piero considered plot boundaries as 
lines of contact rather than moral borders, as their colleagues from the administrative team 
saw them.  
Another narrative will further illustrate this argument. From March 2010 onwards, 
Centopassi was the Falcone cooperative’s winery, bottling under the Falcone label. It was 
surrounded by vineyards of autochthonous grape types, Catarratto and Grillo. In 2007, the 
winery building had been confiscated from Genovese, the San Giovanni mafia clan leader 
from 1997 until his arrest in April 2007 (he had taken over local mafia power after the 
downfall of the Bruscas). A vineyard confiscated from Genovese lay to the right of the 
winery, covering a hilly area of 5 Ha. Genovese, the ex-proprietor, was a renowned farmer, 
like many of the village mafiosi167. Genovese had invested in buying land, in order (according 
to some) to facilitate money laundering. Discussing Genovese’s local cummannari (loosely 
translated as ‘rule’), people I spoke with narrated clear memories of his presence in the 
village: he was recognised as a high-ranking mafioso. The case of the Genovese family is 
significant, in that the father was the last ‘top’ mafioso arrested in San Giovanni. Some of his 
                                                 
167 Although the Brusca mafia clan had been, historically, more involved with animal husbandry than with 
agriculture. 
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plots were now confiscated and managed by the Falcone cooperative and some still 
belonged to his family (i.e. they were familiari). 
Some cooperative members had vivid memories of work relations structured 
through patronage dependencies on the Genovese family. Even currently, there were 
continuities with that recent past in ‘mutual aid’ relations that cooperative members, 
outside their coop work, still maintained with the Genovese family, through their many 
familiari plots. Many of these Genovese familiari plots, in turn, border on plots confiscated 
from them and now managed by the cooperatives.  
Right next to a piece of confiscated land now used by the Falcone cooperative, and 
also lying beside the Centopassi winery, was a Genovese familiare land tract that had not 
been confiscated because it was a family inheritance. Early one April morning, Enzo and 
Piero were working in just this part of the Falcone vineyard, with the Genovese familiare 
plot just a few yards away from them. Suddenly, Enzo’s cell phone rang: the number on the 
screen and the voice were unfamiliar. It turned out to be Giovanni Genovese’s 40-year-old 
son Mimmo, just out of prison, complaining, in the Sicilian dialect, that there was a 
problem with plot boundaries: he was asking to meet someone from Falcone to discuss it. 
To this day, no one in the cooperative knows how Genovese junior had found Enzo’s 
number. The incident caused distress amongst the Falcone administrators. Luca, and the 
vice-president, Mina, were particularly upset. They were absolutely against the possibility of 
a meeting with people they considered ‘were unable to reason with’. They insisted that the 
cooperative should call in the police as soon as possible; even if there was to be a meeting 
to discuss property boundaries, they wanted the Carabinieri to be present. ‘Our boundaries 
are not to be negotiated at a mafioso’s phone-call,’ Luca asserted to me: ‘They are not just 
plot boundaries and these land tracts are not just plots; there’s more to them.’ However, 
after they saw that the manual workforce team was adamant in insisting there should be a 
meeting with the mafioso neighbour on this issue, Luca and Mina yielded to the workers’ 
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demands. ‘They realised we could handle the issue, as they trusted our experience’, as Enzo 
told me.168 
The meeting was therefore arranged between ‘any’ member of the cooperative and 
Genovese for the next morning, in the early hours – a detail that caused even more tension. 
Meeting Mimmo was a curious moment for Piero, as he had never met a San Giovanni 
mafioso before in such circumstances. The meeting went well: ‘He is a well mannered 
gentleman. ... His ways were noble and kind and he was very gentle and careful with us,’ 
Enzo reported. In addition, Piero noted that the mafioso ‘was prudent enough to speak 
more in Sicilian with Enzo and in Italian with me, as my Sicilian is not sound’.  
Genovese’s ‘noble and kind ways’, as well as Dammusi, that plot which locals 
considered particularly beautiful, bore a particular cultural significance for people whose 
livelihoods had been connected to a land that was now fragmented across confiscated and 
familiari plots. The remembrance of the ‘past continuous unity of these plots’, as Nicola 
suggested, was juxtaposed to the current experience of working in a now fragmented 
domain where the historical connections of land had been broken up and reconfigured. For 
those cooperative members who, like Nicola, remembered working in past harvests for the 
old mafiosi owners on these same plots, this sense of a lost past was intensified. The 
remembrance of the unity of the land plots reinforced local workers’ sense of the 
confiscated plots’ boundaries being less rigid in practice than imagined in the map of the 
Cadaster and in legal discourse, and constructed their sense of moral ownership.  
The stratification of different plots is of particular importance when considering 
the moral connotations attached to the division of land into familiari (non-confiscated) and 
propria (confiscated) plots, and their associated ethical connotations. In the case of 
                                                 
168 In this instance we see a continuum between the administrators’ idea of moral borders and their practice 
of virtuous networking (4.2). Both can be seen as manifestations of their tendency towards separation from 
the locality; in Chapter 7, this is traced further.  
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contiguities with Genovese’s plots above (confiscated and familiari), the boundaries issue 
did not signify legal rigidities; rather, it marked land plot boundaries as lines of contact. 
Opting for a non-conflictual and ‘civilised manner’ (in the words of Enzo), the cooperative 
members saw the heir of the mafioso under a different perspective after this incident. It is 
through such communications that people of the manual workforce team experienced the 
boundaries of the confiscated plots as lines of contact rather than as moral borders. This 
continuity indicates how some of the cooperatives’ people contacted mafiosi through the 
boundaries of their land plots. As Enzo said, land plot proximity was an ‘issue made of 
people, not just borders’. 
Enzo and Piero meeting Mimmo was part of the lived experience of contacting the 
actual people who used to own the plots their cooperatives cultivated. This is especially 
true after they realised that (ironically?) Genovese did have a rightful claim over the 
disputed piece of land between the two properties, as he proved to them, providing the 
exact legal documents at the meeting. The members checked them and admitted, surprised, 
that the mafioso was legally right, and they had, albeit by accident, extended their plot’s 
boundaries, and trespassed on his familiare property. 
In the cases above, I have ethnographically discussed the fluid nature of property in 
Alto Belice, paying particular attention to the discrepancies caused to local social relations 
because of the confiscations of certain plots and the non-confiscation of others. What I 
identify as a tension here is the interplay between an enforcing system of value (property) and 
a set of local values (ideas about ownership). In Chapter 4, I suggested analogies between the 
spheres of circulation (Bohannan 1959; Bohannan and Dalton 1962) and the spheres of 
relatedness constructed among members of the same group in the cooperatives, and 
distinct between the two groups. Different idioms characterise the two groups’ spheres of 
relatedness, as members of each group drew from different values, informed by class and 
locality. 
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Here, the tension in approaching land is between property, codified in a (legal) 
system of values, and a different set of values, foreclosed in (moral) practices around moral 
ownership. This differentiation mirrors the cooperatives’ division of labour and the 
different values privileged by each group of members. Once again, the ethnographic 
evidence points to differentiated concepts of moral economy between the two groups. 
When the state model of antimafia cooperativism’s moral economy entails specific values 
associated with the state’s protection of the confiscated land, the actual experience of being 
in an antimafia cooperative, as suggested by workers, point to a different understanding of 
(moral) ownership, related to (and informed by) local values. The locals’ experience of 
antimafia cooperatives, allows for moral ways to perceive landownership and 
neighbourliness; but also, the state model of antimafia cooperativism pursued by 
administrators (corresponding to a jural conceptualisation of land), moralises property 
itself. The moral economies of the two groups were arranged on the basis of different 
conceptualisations of land, premised accordingly on legislated property and moral 
ownership. 
The political aspect of land was palpable in people’s contested and contesting ideas 
about it, which utilised a rhetoric of war. The terms cooperative members (both 
administrators and manual workers) used, such as ‘peaceful coexistence’, ‘boundaries’, 
‘borderlines’ and ‘diplomacy’ constitute a range of metaphors shared among all people in 
the cooperatives, which implies that the process of cultivating the confiscated land was akin 
to experiencing a war frontline. However, in this process, there were important 
differentiations among people, arranged across the cooperatives’ division of labour. The 
most important was that, largely, the administrators thought of the plot boundaries as 
borders for their moral universes, while manual workers did not disown the possibility of 
contact with mafiosi and indeed recognised them, to certain degrees, as valid and potentially 
moral people, in terms of their argumentation, morals and overall personhood. This was 
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rooted in locals’ common experiences with many mafiosi before the confiscations: their 
tolerance of mafiosi was continuous with these experiences of convivere, informal work and 
past patronage.  
I have approached spaces of social interaction of the members and workers of the 
cooperatives with the geographical and productive environment in which they are 
integrated. Looking closely at the lived environment of the land plots, I discussed a series 
of stories of contacts between the people of the cooperatives and people who owned land 
plots bordering them. In most cases, this was done due to people owning a nearby plot; in 
others, because the plots the cooperatives cultivated used to belong to proprietors deemed 
mafiosi by the law, who still felt they were related to that land. The moral ownership often 
passed from imagination to the level of material practice. 
In this section, I have discussed a number of continuities of transferable bundles of 
rights, which challenged the ‘thinginess’ of property (Hann 1998: 8), which the cooperative 
administrators and the state argued about, highlighting the relational and fluid, ‘elastic’ 
aspects of property (Verdery 2003). In other words, the transfer of usufruct rights in the 
post-confiscation era was not the static outcome of a historical moment. Rather, it was 
constantly contested, debated and negotiated, allowing space for broader ethical 
considerations and moral demarcations. In the cases of the old lady taking water or 
unauthorised sheep foraging, we witness neighbours’ patterns of behaviour that are 
inherited, often related to bonds and/or trust relations these people maintained with 
mafiosi. These relations were tied to what cooperative local people defended as the 
continuation of past ways of doing things in the face of the changes imposed by the 
Consortium and the state’s legal categories. People experienced this change as a rupture 
that fragmented the geography of the locale in which mafia land was embedded’– so central 
to the collective memory in Alto Belice- into confiscated and familiari plots.  
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Social relations endured and, in fact, were reproduced throughout this patchwork 
of differently adjusted pieces of land. In the case of Tizio and his right of way, such 
relations also entailed legal obligations to neighbours ‘inherited’ from past proprietors 
(mafiosi) by the cooperatives. In the above cases, nevertheless, there was a shared sense that 
plot boundaries were important affirmations of moral behaviour and of local codes of 
conduct. Land boundaries represent more than the materialisations of a legal scheme: they 
affirmed the jural process of the confiscations in ways that meant different things to 
different people. The land boundaries become signifiers of contact with locals and with 
mafiosi, reflecting the internal division of labour of the (supposedly horizontal) cooperatives. 
Namely, for manual workers, the land plot boundaries signified lines of contact, while 
administrators defended a moral universe contained in the boundaries of their 
cooperatives’ plots. 
 
266 
 
 
 
 
 
While it is difficult to depict the neighbourliness between confiscated land plots and familiari still in the 
possession of their original proprietors, these photographs can do more justice to the argument. These two 
buildings, sharing the same courtyard, were part of a masseria, a farmhouse that belonged to the Bruscas. 
 
Photo 17: The building here was deemed familiare 
and thus not confiscated but the owner, Antonia 
Brusca, left it in a state of abandonment. Attached, 
on the right, there is another building whose façade 
figures prominently in Photo 18. 
Photo 18: This building formed part of the 
confiscated property. Allocated to the Falcone 
cooperative, it was renovated with EU monies 
(PON-5 security funds) and turned into an 
agriturismo.  
6.4. Problematising the Relationships Elicited by Categories of Property 
(Familiare and Propria) 
The uncomfortable proximities generated by the state bestowing confiscated land on 
cooperatives underlines the relationality of property in Alto Belice. Where the confiscation 
regime sought to fix property along clearly demarcated lines, this was continuously 
rearranged and renegotiated, as people contested these settings. Thick ethnographic 
description makes it possible to disentangle the use of terms in official jargon from their 
different use as in grounded experience, as with the term ‘boundaries’ here. Many local 
cooperative members thought that, instead of dividing, flows through boundaries actually 
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brought people together as bearers of tangible rights. They did not feel they contacted 
people over land boundaries in their capacity as mere representatives of the abstract 
category ‘antimafia’. Despite property rights derive from notions of individualism, in Alto 
Belice, people experienced contested boundaries as fulcrums of social relations. For some 
people they were porous, open for contacts; for others, they delineated the framework of 
their moral universe. In the case of the confiscated plots, property is by definition a fluid 
concept: legal property was retained by the state, allowed to the ‘community’, bestowed to 
the cooperatives, used by the cooperatives members, and often reclaimed by the mafiosi, 
while neighbours recognised degrees of moral ownership to the mafiosi and their reclaiming 
of the land. 
One inspiration for the anthropological discussion on property in land here is John 
Davis’ comment on land disputes in Italy: ‘You cannot sue an acre: a boundary dispute is 
not a dispute with land but with people’ (1973: 157) – and insight unwittingly echoed by 
my research participant Enzo (quoted earlier): ‘Plot boundaries are an issue made of 
people, not just borders; they are what people make of them.’ Anthropologists, accordingly, 
have stressed the ‘social relationships’ or ‘arrangements’ around land ownership. The 
emphasis on property as a nexus of social relations, thus diverting analysis away from its 
apparent ‘thinginess’ (Hann 1998: 8), was taken up by a series of contributions drawn on 
here (see for example Beckman and Beckman 1999; Hann and Hart 2009; Hann 2009). It 
follows that state assumptions about local kinship relations (family/clan) produce material 
realities on the ground, which, as I have shown, can destabilise state planning. As state 
assumptions on kinship (drawn on abstract ideas of local community) produce unintended 
consequences, they reinforce dissimilarities between local values (corresponding to 
ownership) and a legislated system of value (corresponding to property). 
As discussed (in 2.2), the terminology of ‘clan’ or ‘family’, used as an ideological 
premise to classify land as propria or familiare (and therefore confiscatable or not), suggests 
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that the antimafia confiscation law and associated state planning is informed by specific 
conceptualisations of kinship. As stated, I take legislative activity to be a process that thus 
stretches across a continuum from the inception of a law to its imposition (Mundy and 
Pottage 2004; Moore 2005). This is particularly true of the fabrication of land categories 
where the imposition of law involves ‘messy’ interactions between morals, politics and jural 
processes on the ground (Abramson 2000a; Mundy 2007). 
Understanding the correlation of continuity and transformation here requires 
recognising that the state’s legislative process is itself not monolithic but plural. It 
incorporates a variety of claims, reified in diverse land statuses, and is informed by local 
ideas on kinship. The work of Jack Goody is helpful to approach how the reproduction of 
the clan is charged with particularly negative meanings, in the context of these legal 
categories. Goody’s historical approach underlines how the state formation in Europe drew 
on appropriating power over land (territorial) ownership through controlling inheritance 
practices (1976; 1983; 2000). I have already mentioned, in the previous chapter, how the 
emic term ‘clan’ was equally used by locals in Alto Belice, the Italian state bureaucrats of 
Palermo and Rome and antimafia press such as the “S” magazine. The term is evocative of 
the historical term ‘clan’, which Goody employs to describe a male fraternity exercising 
constant claims over territory.169 In Goody, clan relates to political power, which in the case 
of mafia resonates with the state’s will to reign over territory. Tillion’s work on the 
manipulation of gendered inheritance practices offers insights on how male power was 
                                                 
169 Specific passages from Marx’s analysis on primitive accumulation on the acquisition of the lands of the 
Scottish clans by the state of England are also enlightening. Marx shows how state violence was directed 
against a lineage society’s claims to territory arranged in male-brotherhood alliances. English lords acquired 
the vast lands of the Scottish clans, and hunted them with fierceness, attacking the social organisation of the 
Highland communities by violently disrupting their claims to territory, which allowed for their reproduction 
as communities and for the reproduction of the clan system itself (Capital, vol 1: Chapter 27; 2008: 366-372).  
Marxist-inspired anthropologists have looked at land through a ‘lineage mode of production’ approach 
(Chauveau and Richards 2008). I am cautious as to how African ethnographies can be used in the 
Mediterranean context, to enrich the historical approach of Goody (1983). An ‘evolutionist’ comparative 
approach should be avoided. In any case, claims over land have, in the ‘socialist’ Tanzanian context for 
example, caused tensions among local clans and the state’s novel cosmologies of ‘fair redistribution’ (Caplan 
1975).  
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maintained in the face of bilateral inheritance regulations, in North Africa’s ‘republics of 
cousins’ (1983). 
In Alto Belice, the legislation process produces a legal reification of land in 
property, counterpoising ‘family’ to ‘clan’. These kinship terms correspond to familiare and 
propria property. As discussed earlier, those plots deemed familiari included genealogically 
transmitted land tracts. They were often originally acquired as the dowry of a woman 
marrying a mafioso or simply as lawful acquisitions of the mafioso himself through his lawful 
activities – ‘moral labour’ – outside his capacity and activity as a mafioso. Transmission in 
these cases was seen as morally sound, in that it reproduced the continuity of a family, via 
means acquired through processes valued by the state (motherhood, marriage, decent 
labour). The plural (not, as the Consortium implies, unilinear) jural (and moral) process of 
mapping land plots in Alto Belice suggests a process of broader local social reproduction 
(Narotzky 1997). So, the state’s legal systematisation of value (in making, for instance, the 
jural category (confiscated or familiare) ‘property’) is partly composed of local values itself; I 
argue therefore, that the distinction, between jural value, reified in property, and a moral set 
of values expressed in local practices around ownership, is more nuanced than it originally 
appears. The system of values that supports property derives from the state’s politics of 
antimafia interventionism but also incorporates local ideas of kinship. The set of local ideas 
expressed in moral ownership reflect a community imbued in the locality, with people’s 
memories and morals present.  
A familiare plot incorporates kinship values and a kind of work seen as positive 
reproduction, compatible with values that the state promotes. Instead, when the asset of a 
mafioso is seen as property owned by him in his capacity as a member of a mafia clan, the 
asset is thought to contribute to the clan’s reproduction. In that respect, confiscations act 
as interventions from a regulatory authority that dismantle clan continuities, as in the 
intergenerational reproduction of a clan’s control over land, and hence over ‘territory’. 
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‘Control of territory’ (controllo di territorio170) is an emic term describing mafia clan power 
over land ownership. Unlike the reproduction of a family, which is tolerated by the state, 
the reproduction of a clan is not. It is deemed, therefore, that the unit of the mafia is the 
clan, and not the family (but see the ‘familialist’ discourse in: Dino 1997; Fiandaca 2007, 
often echoing ideas of ‘amoral familism’). 
Here, I once more take on board Carsten’s idea on how kinship interacts with the 
law (2000). In Italy, the law and various categories of relatedness are constantly mutually 
constituted, producing what I called ‘uncomfortable’ realities on the ground. The social 
arrangements around property develop in political ways, as people contest settings born of 
state policies which, incorporating contradictory local terms of relatedness, ‘reproduce and 
reinforce the irresolvable procedural and substantive complexity in land conflicts’, as 
Holston notes for Brazilian legal categories (1991: 702; see also Clemmer 2009). This 
complexity in the Sicilian context is brought about by the legal categories familiare and 
confiscato, which reflect a contested categorical distinction between the kinship terms clan 
and family and the different values the state ascribes to them. The jural 
codification/translation of the kinship term clan, linked to mafia, is associated with jural 
activities, the confiscations. The intention of the state to reconcile claims to land of 
genealogical value (family) and its own counterclaim to territorial control over the mafia, 
through confiscations, have yielded contradictory everyday realities in Sicily. These are 
manifested on the ground in the uncomfortable contiguities of familiare and confiscated 
plots and in moral ownership ideas. In that respect, behind the apparent neutrality of 
legislation lays political choice, in which kinship (family, clan) is a fundamental parameter. 
This is evident as specific treatment is reserved for mafiosi clans’ land and other for their 
families’ land. Only a few people can enjoy access to this newly available land, which 
                                                 
170 This emic notion in Sicily signifies the presumed ‘control’ mafiosi’s presence exercised in their 
surroundings, often translated in their being established as patrons of the local agrarian labour market.  
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Consortium officials claim has now ‘returned to the community’. Following Verdery’s work 
on the post-socialist ‘elasticity’ and ‘porosity’ of land in Romania (2003), I have moreover 
shown how the porous boundaries between land plots formed, for some, boundaries 
between moral universes and for others, lines of contact.  
Therefore, I argue that land in San Giovanni is a palimpsest: overlapping values 
build onto each other, and past owners’ claims to land (as well as their friends’ and 
neighbours’ enduring rapports with their old plots) persist into the post-confiscation 
period, in an interaction of legislated value with local values. The appropriation, by the jural 
codification of the state, of local ‘mythical’ categories of kinship to enact the confiscations 
policy is a form of continuity within change. Property legislation pays attention to local 
categories, which leads to unintended consequences. The political economy of the 
confiscations does take into account some local categories, in order to compose legal ones. 
However, this interaction of community and economy exposes cooperative members to 
mafiosi. The creation of the moral ownership category allows for continuities of local 
practices, whose arrangements were often assisted by law itself, e.g. rights in rem. As past 
relationships are maintained and constantly renegotiated through the pores however, 
boundaries become lines of contact for some people (namely local workers), while for 
others (the administrators), who interpret the legislative process in strict terms, they 
became moral borders. Abramson acutely notes that  
... the relation of identity is linked to mythical contexts of continuity, in which the 
past is inevitably embedded in the land as an inviolable substance. The property 
relation, by contrast, is linked to the jural context, under whose jurisdiction the 
strength of each unit of property, no matter what its history, rests upon the 
legitimacy of contemporary mediations, rather than the authority of the past. 
(Abramson 2000a: 8)  
The interaction of the jural (a codified system of value, that does, however, 
recognise degrees of kinship) and the local (a set of values) has been the pivotal point of 
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this chapter. The jural context, embraced by administrators, calls for law enforcement and 
is akin to their dominant model of antimafia cooperativism, informed by the Consortium’s 
idea that community and state are conflated terms. The ‘mythical’ context, endorsed by 
workers, deploys different, moral ideas on land and allows for a more dynamic experience 
of being in an antimafia cooperative, one intoned with the locals’ obligations and wider 
relations with their material, experienced community. Their idea of community is detached 
from legalistic conceptualisations and the state’s language of reification, so palpably 
manifested in the notion of ‘property’. With this in mind, I move on to some conclusive 
insights. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored the tensions between (moral) ownership and (legal) 
property of land in Alto Belice, and the divergent moral stances taken by cooperatives 
members towards their plot boundaries and their neighbours. Administrators promoted 
change and seclusion, which reinforced the many locals’ tendency to follow the continuities 
of their neighbours’ practices, morals and codes, which they shared, such as ‘moral 
ownership’. The chapter has highlighted the interactions – and resultant tensions – between 
the value system codified in terms of legal property categories and locally orchestrated 
values, formed around moral ownership. I have argued that the way the jural categories of 
land as property shaped (familiare/propria) land pushed people of the cooperatives into 
complex relations with a range of actors: local authorities, mafiosi-ex-land proprietors, and 
land plot neighbours. These people held conflicting ideas about where the limits of their 
activity lay. The distinction between a (state) single system of value/and (local) values is 
more nuanced than it appears in counterpoising legislation to local practices; notably, the 
state recognises kinship values (family/clan), in the constitution of its values, codified in 
law. However, property’s overarching value system, enacted by and enforced through 
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legislation, is composed on the ground by values situated in people’s views of land and 
neighbourliness and manifested in local practices.  
Different people experience land plots as points of division and/or contact. 
Cooperative actors see the boundaries between two land plots of different legal status 
(confiscated and non-confiscated) as demarcators of distinct moralities. For administrators 
the plots seem to inhabit different ‘moral universes’. However, the plots’ social 
arrangements prove messy and blurry on the ground; I argue that the intricacies 
experienced are embedded in the law’s reified categories: familiare and propria. Because these 
categories are formulated along a conceptual separation between two kinship categories 
representing different values (family and clan), they create, on the one hand, confiscated 
and on the other non-confiscated plots. In this way, the ‘uncomfortable’ neighbouring 
arrangements produced, comprise continuities and contiguities. Holston’s work discusses 
the misrule and ruptures that the application of legislation provoked in Brazilian land 
reforms (1991), where contradictory land legislation led to illegalities and uncomfortable 
contestations (2008). In Sicily, the tensions among the legislated and the perceived rights to 
claim land confirm this discussion. 
Although the confiscations brought rupture, continuities persisted, materialised in 
contiguities of land plots, in inherited rights, in continuations of locally situated activities, 
not so much in the face of the radical legislation’s rupture, as indeed because of that rupture. 
This is in line with a series of anthropologists’ arguments on state policy’s grounded 
arrangements, including Scott’s argument that projected top-down change has unintended 
consequences on the ground (1998), Verdery’s point that legislation at administrative 
centres is removed from the law’s local manifestations (2002; 2003) and Creed’s ‘conflicting 
complementarity’ between state strategies and local experiences (1998). I have looked at 
neighbourhood practices continuous with the pre-confiscation period, and cooperative 
administrators’ seeing property boundaries as moral borders marking moral universes. I 
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shall expand on this argument in the next chapter, focusing on the administrators’ 
discursive categories of separation, which again formed moral borders around the 
cooperatives’ activity. 
In sum, as the jural process is removed from the grounded experience of land 
management in Alto Belice, it produces often uncomfortable realities, which implied that 
the transformation of the local political economy could not be conveyed only through the 
radical policy of the confiscations. Specifically, as the legislation caters for mafia ‘familial’ 
property in ways different from ‘clan’ property, it produced two surprising consequences: 
firstly, continuations in local practices of neighbours and mafiosi around the plots; secondly, 
unintended social relationships of neighbourhood as some of the familiari and confiscated 
land plots bordered each other. 
In that way, the legislative process and the state’s activity ironically brought people 
involved in the antimafia cooperatives and mafiosi or mafia-affiliated people closer than they 
ever were. While the confiscations project aimed at a local ‘separation’ of mafia from 
antimafia, marginalising the mafiosi, it has actually positioned them close to cooperative 
members, therefore unintentionally encouraging relationships with them. Thus, the change 
confiscations brought about, produced continuities in practices and contiguities among 
plots, which formulated social interactions that the state’s planning aimed to avoid. In the 
next chapter, I move from exploring the boundaries of mafia and antimafia in land to 
exploring them in discursive, reputational networks. 
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Chapter 7   
The Use of  Gossip: Blurring and Setting Boundaries 
around the Cooperatives 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I showed how administrators supplemented the legally delineated 
boundaries of confiscated plots by construing them as moral borders. I now apply this idea 
of moral borders to explore the administrators’ social activity in San Giovanni and the 
contacts they negotiated during the time they spent outside the cooperatives’ offices with 
people who wanted to collaborate with the cooperatives. These activities will be analysed 
here in terms of border crossing and border marking. The narrative illustrates how 
administrators shielded the cooperatives from certain local influences, elucidating how they 
traced who was a mafioso in the village and negotiated such information, shaping their own 
and their cooperatives’ self-image as against the San Giovanni mafia. I argue that, their 
attempts to reinforce antimafia change suggest interesting continuities with local codes, as 
they appropriated gossip,171 a practice continuous with local ‘cultural codes’ (sensu Schneider 
and Schneider 1976), to seclude the cooperatives from malign (‘unclean’) influences. 
In Chapter 2 (2.1) I discussed a problem identified in the literature: continuity with, 
and interactions between, the histories of mafia and antimafia. In this chapter, I decipher 
how administrators sought to deal with this historical entanglement of mafia and antimafia, 
by using gossip to constitute mafia and antimafia as separate categories. At the same time, I 
show how local codes of gossip were used by other people,  not involved in the coops, to 
                                                 
171 In describing and analysing gossip, the core of my ethnographic attention is verbal communication – 
taking gossip stricto sensu, as speech about speech. However, throughout the chapter, I also refer to non-verbal 
communication that accompanied verbal gossip as these discursive means are part of the broader framework 
of indirect communication, in which cooperative members are locally entrenched. 
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blur mafia/antimafia distinctions. I explore the question of how people in public spaces 
speak to each other and about each other in San Giovanni, and what kinds of idioms 
brought these people together or kept them apart. In what ways did cooperative 
administrators come closer to the locals’ lived experience and thus reinforce the 
cooperatives’ horizontal (egalitarian) ideology? In this chapter, I discuss the issue of the 
possible effects of local gossip on the cooperatives’ presumed horizontality; in other words, 
did gossip integrate the cooperatives’ economic endeavour with the community or did it 
have the effect of separating cooperative members from it? 
Some works identify rumour as more public, while gossip is generated in face-to-
face contact; however, the two often overlap172. Gossip is seen as the exchange of 
information between different actors, i.e. more of a feature of specific social relationship, 
rather than the broader circulation of rumours. It has been pointed out  that, unlike 
rumours at large, gossip is the expression of group-belonging (Gluckman 1963), while also 
being associated with social stigma (Saada 1980; Stewart and Strathern 2004). I shall be 
using the term ‘gossip’, rather than ‘informal information’ or rumours, precisely because 
gossip connotes more than a description of events (however precise), and instead points to 
the acquisition and/or negotiation of specific resources, including material resources such 
as money (see 7.1.2) and social capital, especially reputation (Stewart and Strathern 2004: 
168). Following Schneider and Schneider’s notion of ‘reputational networks’ (1996: 9), I 
show how, depending on the person negotiating the exhange, reputation through gossip 
may be used to blur or to set boundaries. Gossip is therefore not directionless and general, 
like rumours, but a resourceful activity of passing informal information, which often, 
                                                 
172 The gendered element is prominent in analyses of indirect communication and rumours (Hendry and 
Watson 2001). Ιn Southern European ethnography it has been connected with women’s domestic and inter-
domestic contact (Reiter 1975), while the entirely male-centred bar becomes the locus of sociability, 
dominated by codes of male friendship (especially analyses on ‘male commensality’ by Papataxiarchis 1991, 
1992, 1999; Desai and Killick 2010; but also Pina-Cabral 1989; Almeida 1996).  
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informally, has consequences for the lives of those involved, as well as for the individuals 
or groups they may target. The ethnographic focus of this chapter is local gossip and its 
uses; gossip about who was a mafioso and what it meant to be one and, especially, about 
who maintained contacts with such people, and what might be the implications of such 
conduct in San Giovanni.  
Indeed, the police tracked gossip in their investigations and affiliation (of someone 
to mafia) was akin to a legal category. The first part of the chapter explores the modes in 
which gossip among locals blurred boundaries between mafia and antimafia. The second 
part focuses on how administrators (as well as the police) used gossip to demarcate these 
boundaries. This dimension further frames the problem of horizontal relations in the 
cooperatives, offering insights into moralities and practices. Gossip impacted on the equity 
relations among members of the cooperatives, as well as on the relationship between 
cooperative members and the local community. The narrative in the chapter serves two 
aims. The first is descriptive: I aim to elucidate the role of administrators in the local 
community, highlighting instances where they or their allies (like the barman Viriglia) were 
exposed to local rumours, as well as moments when they instrumentalised these rumours 
to demarcate a separation between the blurred categories of mafia/antimafia on the 
ground. The second is analytical: I suggest that the administrators’ plan to shield the 
cooperatives off from local influence takes also discursive forms. Their commitment to 
virtuous networking and their idea that land boundaries were moral borders is here 
reproduced in their appropriation of local gossip. Focusing on contamination, they deploy 
information for purposes of surveillance of other cooperative members. This attempt to set 
moral borders around the cooperatives was informed by their own status as outsiders to San 
Giovanni’s social life and reflected their lack of kinship ties to the area and their suspicion 
of locals’ antimafia commitment. 
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I suggest that gossip is of fundamental importance in the ways people experienced 
their involvement in the antimafia cooperatives. It became an antimafia resource because 
administrators used it to create boundaries, while locally, as a cultural code, it in fact 
blurred the boundaries between mafia and antimafia. The ethnography shows that locals 
used it in different ways, often for instance to prove their antimafia credits, or to cross the 
‘moral borders’ between mafia and antimafia through it. Following Schneider and 
Schneider’s notion of ‘reputational networks’ (1996: 9), I show how, depending on the 
person negotiating it, reputation through gossip, may be used to blur or to set boundaries.  
7.1. Flows of Rumours about Mafia and Antimafia in San Giovanni 
7.1.1. Learning boundaries: administrators in San Giovanni cafés 
Claudia, a 30 year old administrator for the Falcone, could not imagine that men 
visiting the newsagents around the corner from the Rex, a local bar,173 entertained mafia 
sympathies. She was unaware of the kin relations among Rex regulars and the co-owner of 
the newsagents (a man called Salvatore, who had spent three years in prison for ‘mafia 
allegiance’). Once, as we both entered Salvatore’s newsagents to buy cigarettes, Claudia 
inquired whether they sold ‘antimafia periodicals’. Receiving no answer, she flipped 
through the magazines and fished out the only available copy of the ‘S’, an antimafia-
committed investigative journal. Salvatore’s brother-in-law, who sat behind the counter, 
gave us a cold, hard look as he handed her the change. Claudia did not sense his antipathy. 
Some weeks after, when I got to know him better, he explained that, he recognised in me ‘a 
                                                 
173 A bar in Italy, unlike the Anglo Saxon use of the term, is a coffee-house, where espresso is served to be 
consumed usually standing; sweets and pastry are also on sale; a few tables, with a couple of newspapers will 
be available. Most of the clientele would spend just a few minutes in a bar, the time it takes to consume a 
coffee shot, while others, locals to specific bars, would hang out there for hours, especially in bars which had a 
gaming room at the back, from which elder men would come and go holding cards in their hands. (Here, 
when referring to more than one bar, I use the term ‘bars’ in order to avoid confusion (in Italian, the plural is 
bar). 
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male who lived in the village and was hence able to understand’ his look of contempt for 
my companion.  
A few days after my visit to the newsagent with Claudia, I was spending a sunny 
afternoon coffee break at the Rex with some of the members of the Falcone cooperative 
administration when Valentino Brusca appeared in the bar from nowhere (or so it seemed 
to my untrained eye). He was greeted by many of those present, but not the coop 
members. A dandy-like persona, with his expensive sunglasses and gleaming white-teeth-
smile, Valentino looked like a typical male icon from Italian glossy magazines. He was 
popular in San Giovanni as the younger brother of the legendary mafioso Giovanni Brusca 
and had spent a few years in prison himself. He approached me and asked if he could 
borrow the Giornale di Sicilia once I was done with it. Marelio, a cooperative administrator, 
quickly told him that I would indeed give him the paper as soon as I had finished. In 
Brusca’s smile and nod, I noticed that the two young men understood that I was a stranger 
to the mode of newspaper sharing widely practised in bars of the village. While I had 
assumed that the cultural gap between these two individuals (self-categorised respectively as 
mafia/antimafia) would be unbridgeable, in this case they formed an easy consensus out of 
common sympathy for my ignorance of a local custom.  
These two different vignettes, both involving the Sicilian press, elucidate the 
administrators’ varying degrees of knowledge of local codes. Adamo, from the manual 
work team, told me later on, when we were talking about the Claudia incident, that ‘the 
Palermitans just cannot get some stuff’, indicating that there were local idioms and shared 
codes of meanings that only natives of Alto Belice were able to grasp. In my wider 
observations of the Palermitan administrators in San Giovanni, I noticed that some 
scrutinized the locals’ channelling of information flows through gesturing, engaging in a 
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game of Lotto or offering a coffee to somebody they knew or wished to meet. Ernesto told 
me that there was more in spending time in bars than simply occupying one’s leisure time: 
For us it is a way to learn the local society, see how they behave and think, finding 
out who is on this side and who is on the other side... 
[Question: What do you mean by this and other side?] 
Well, studying locals’ behaviours in bars, me and my friends can learn, in the long 
run, not only how to behave in San Giovanni, but also who is sympathetic to our 
cause, and how, and what they do for it, and whether they are philo-mafia or 
antimafia, and so on. So, you learn where the boundary is, between mafia and 
antimafia, in the village. And of course, you learn how to behave and meet people. 
Sharing the same newspaper, as the vignette of Valentino Brusca suggested, was 
one way to meet and discuss local and national issues, which local men did vociferously 
almost as soon as they entered a bar. The Giornale di Sicilia, a conservative and mafia-
tolerant newspaper printed in Palermo, was the main means of official information, in the 
bars, and the most promoted newspaper across all the newsagents in the village. People 
consumed it cover to cover between a coffee and a sweet on small tables, with friends 
throwing in a terse comment or two on football or politics. Rarely did anyone read an 
article from start to finish. Skipping through the pages as others filled in with informal 
commentary, it was satisfactory to learn the news and talk to one’s friends at the same time. 
The paper provided the headlines and photographs, while the ‘real news’ was filled in by 
the live commentary. As the Rex bartender told me, ‘No Sicilians really buy the paper, most 
copies are sold to cafés – but everybody reads it. The Giornale is a paper read and shared 
but not bought.’ Incidentally, this perspective offers a potential counterpoint to Anderson’s 
notion of ‘print-capitalism’ (2006: 37, 48): the convergence of capitalism and print 
technology in spreading information and eventually in nation building.  
The reading and accompanying ‘counter-reading’ – or, rather, counter-speaking – 
of newspapers shows the sense of community that is conveyed in San Giovanni through 
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the layering of trust that does not simply ‘buy into’ the official printed information but, 
rather, re-negotiates it through filters of grounded personal knowledge channelled through 
rumours, which locals were more likely to believe than the newspaper itself. These rumours 
were ‘from the source’, as people put it: from the so-called ‘great men’174 of Alto Belice (the 
active mafiosi) or from people linked to mafia networks around the island. There was no 
doubt about the validity of information derived from such sources, unlike the contested 
‘news’ printed in the paper. The ‘Chinese whispers’ manner, in which news spread around 
was seen as an asset rather than a hindrance in establishing the validity of such information. 
As the village lacked public spaces such as piazzas or parks, the bars attracted locals 
for recreation and socialising. In total there were 13 bars in San Giovanni and San 
Cipiriddu, strung out along via Porta Palermo, the road that linked the two villages. The 
administrators of the Falcone and Borsellino cooperatives took their lunch breaks either at 
Virilia or Rex spending most of their free time in San Giovanni in these neighbouring Porta 
Palermo bars, as they were relatively close to the cooperatives’ offices and generally popular 
and offering a less exclusively male ambience. By visiting these bars regularly and 
interacting with the locals, cooperative members gradually learnt the local codes of indirect 
communication – common gestures and indirect speech forms employed by the local men 
when discussing the news.  
In San Giovanni, the cafés strongly gendered space made them the preferred public 
space for male gossiping, (although those engaged in this kind of talk would not call it 
‘gossip’ but ‘rumour-talking’). The bar was the locus where male sociability was performed, 
                                                 
174 Although the term ‘great man’ is used as an analytical category in the anthropology of Africa (Bayart 2009) 
and the Pacific (Godelier 1986), and is operative in discussion about historical agency of people and 
collectivities (Sahlins 2004b), in the context of my ethnography, the terms ‘great men’ or ‘gentlemen’ (gli 
grandi, i signori, i cappoccia) were emic designations to speak of mafiosi.  
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indirect communication techniques developed their full range of meaning175 – and where 
cooperative administrators negotiated mafia and antimafia boundaries. Certain men 
monopolised narratives about the mafia, local politics and power, construed in this semi-
public ambience: to circulate convincing and interesting information was a manly capacity. 
Bars provided the setting for the reproduction of the blurred boundary between the public 
and the private, in which the figure of the mafioso was central as a metaphor of 
communication through silence (Siebert 2000).  
Certain gestures signified specific things: a subtle touch of the speaker’s nose 
delivered the message that someone was ‘in odore di mafia’ (literally: in mafia odour), that is, 
of suspected mafia allegiances. Cooperative members replicated this gesture at the Rex as 
an inside joke. Nose touching became a humorous, albeit secretive expression, shared 
among friends when they ‘sensed’ mafiosi, a gesture conveying uncomfortable ambiguities 
that they nevertheless found amusing. Similarly, they often mentioned ‘puzza’ (stench) to 
denote that they suspected someone in their company of being a mafioso, evoking an 
intuitive sense of unease176. At the Rex, I also noticed men pressed a thumb against the 
right cheek to indicate that someone was a mafioso. This gesture, at once straightforward 
and indirect, indicated an idea of mafia potency: accompanied by raising the eyebrow, the 
finger slightly pointing to the sideburns, it emphasised machismo. However, social 
interactions involving people from the ‘opposite sides’ of mafia and antimafia manifested 
connotations that not everyone shared, as is evident in Claudia’s case.  
                                                 
175 The gendered element is prominent in analyses of indirectness (Hendry and Watson 2001). Ιn Southern 
European ethnography it has often been connected with women’s domestic and inter-domestic contact 
(Reiter 1975). The entirely male-centred bar becomes the locus of sociability, dominated by codes of male 
friendship in Mediterranean ethnographies (especially Papataxiarchis 1991, 1999; Desai and Killick 2010; but 
also Pina-Cabral 1989; Almeida 1996). Analyses on ‘male commensality’ suggest tavernas in Greece offer 
opportunities for debate and hearty friendship relations constructed around discourse (Papataxiarchis 1992).  
176 Sperber (1996) suggests a hierarchy of senses, ranging from sight, which has the most basic terminology 
based on it (colour words), at one extreme, to smell at the other, which is evocative since all one can say is 
that something smells like something else. Akin to symbolism, smell evokes a field of associations; it relates to 
connotation instead of denotation (Sperber and Wilson 1995). The emic idea of embodying smell (mafia 
stench) as an attribute people carried with them underlines the intuitive basis they evoked to think of mafia. 
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Meeting in bars often entailed allegiance to the ‘great men’ of the village. 
Informants spoke of old mafiosi who spent ‘all their elderly lives’ at that bar. Adamo told me 
he was surprised, as a child, to see that the father of his fellow classmate Genovese always 
sat at the bar Circolo. ‘Didn’t he have a job to do?’ he asked his school friend. Later, as he 
started going to bars himself, Adamo realised that ‘this was Genovese’s real job: to check 
and control the flows of people in and out of the bar; this was his territorial control’. While 
for local workers such knowledge was acquired during their coming of age in the village, in 
the case of administrators, it had to be learnt. On one occasion, I was enjoying my morning 
coffee in the company of Pasquale, a young cooperative administrator from Palermo, at the 
bar Circolo. The place was Netti’s favourite: the old mafioso and his friends gathered there to 
play cards. Ignazio Baffi, fresh out of ‘colleggio’177 himself, walked into the bar. All the men 
present, working and pensioners alike, greeted him warmly, many seemingly competing for 
his attention. One offered the newspaper and asked if he would like a coffee: ‘So what 
about a coffee, Ignazio?’ (il caffè lo vuoi, Ignazio?). I noticed that the man making this offer 
was Mr Pitone, Adamo’s father-in-law, a pensioner who rented out office space to the 
cooperatives. Pasquale and I were surprised to witness the particular enthusiasm with 
which Pitone welcomed Baffi. Later on, discussing the event, we agreed that he had as 
much of a right to ‘hang out’ at a ‘mafia-friendly’ bar as we did. Of the village’s 13 bars, not 
all were mafia-affiliated. Mafiosi would visit the most central ones; in that way, the 
antimafia/mafia rhetoric was somehow inscribed in the local landscape, as certain spots of 
the village were renowned for being mafiosi favourites. The main church was one such spot, 
as leading mafiosi’s alms were displayed in full view.  
The intricacies that involved locals such as Pitone with mafiosi were entangled with 
loose local links of relatedness. This meant that Pasquale, lacking any kinship or friendship 
                                                 
177 ‘College’ is a popular slang term, referring to ‘prison’, and suggesting the educative potential of the prison 
for mafiosi – educational in terms of criminal experience. 
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relationships with the village, felt unable to explain Pitone’s loyalties to me. Not long after 
Baffi had made his entrance, Malva, the mayor of San Cipiriddu, in turn entered the bar. 
Baffi himself treated him to a coffee. Malva remarked smilingly to a few other sympathetic 
men that he was in the habit of meeting Ignazio Baffi in a central bar, which was ‘an act of 
transparency’ as this way their discussions were open to the ‘public’. Probably the reason 
why the politician highlighted this transparency paradox (speaking to a mafioso in ‘public’) 
was because of his role, at the time, as the president of the Consortium, the state local 
antimafia apparatus. ‘Pasquale confessed to me that learning of the blurred boundaries of 
mafia and antimafia in such palpable way – that the incumbent President of the 
Consortium was a friend of the mafioso –was distressing to him but also useful to realise.’ 
Offering coffee was a means to publicly recognise another man’s respected position 
in the local male community, ‘an act of honouring someone’, as a bartender told me. Such 
recognition was often associated with people’s mafia connections, for instance, treating 
signori such as Baffi or Netti to a coffee or a sweet was a noble task. Reciprocity was also 
the main means of engaging with others at a bar, for instance, offering to buy a piece of 
pastry to the man who first laid hands on the newspaper in order to claim access to the 
news and his company. In this way, consensus and popularity developed around the 
circulation of the newspaper and gifts of pastry (sweet in the morning, savoury at 
noontime) rotating among the men. The ‘public, yet hermetically sealed’ (in the words of 
Piero) position of bars as the hub of such information streams was fundamental to the 
development of sociality in San Giovanni. Locals communicated in whispers, gestures, 
dialect jargon, narrations and rhyming jokes in these semi-public spaces. I consider the 
gossiping and whispering as important data precisely because the actual validity of 
information conveyed through rumours cannot be established.  
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Circulating this ambiguous information was a key part of the bartenders’ craft. 
Indeed, the reputation of barmen depended very much on their skill in narrating stories, 
especially from the mid 1990s, when the village reached a historic peak of mafia violence. 
Bartenders and bar locals competed amongst themselves in storytelling, as knowing stories 
meant they were people ‘in the know’ and therefore respected; moreover, they attracted 
clientele through this entertaining facility. The more famed a storyteller, the less he talked 
and the more ambiguous his narrations. Bar owner Virilia used his reputation as a circulator 
of gossip in order to attract clientele. His own life story, which I shall recount below, 
demonstrates the fuzziness of the conceptual distinction between mafia and antimafia. 
Challenging Hobsbawm’s findings (1960; 1972) Blok discusses at length how bandits move 
around and transgress boundaries (2000: 29–43). However, Blok, like others (e.g. Lodato 
2001), identifies mafiosi in terms of a specific ‘territory’ they control (2000: 88). My 
discussion shows that this territory is more fluid than described. Virilia’s story elucidates 
how gossip blurs and confounds fixed categories but also how it is instrumentalised to 
register people in specific state categories (mafia/antimafia) and ‘pick sides’, a process that 
was economically beneficial for many. 
7.1.2. Renegotiating boundaries: Virilia, a storyteller’s story 
Marco Virilia was locally reputed to be the most articulate bar owner and the most 
sophisticated storyteller. Cooperative members often paid his bar a visit. Checco, the 
representative for the two San Giovanni cooperatives, often suggested to his fellow 
Palermitan colleagues that they should take their lunch break in the more indolent and 
classy Virilia bar rather than the Rex. He had established a relationship of mutual trust with 
Marco and often visited his bar to talk news and trivia; Marco often made congratulatory 
remarks on the work of the cooperatives. Checco was, however, unaware of the ‘whispers’ 
regarding Virilia. In male gossiping, there were specific, typified patterns to refer to a 
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person indirectly, usually consisting of an ‘anciuria’, a nickname. Checco was aware that 
Virilia’s anciurie included ‘smarty’ and ‘foxy’ but these ironic nicknames did not signal 
anything worrying to him. When gossip about Virilia’s past eventually reached Checco and 
he learnt of Virilia’s ‘mafia connections’, he admitted that he felt foolish to have trusted 
him and thereafter preferred not to associate with him any more.  
A few locals gossiped about possible ‘dealings’ in Virilia’s bar. Certainly, Virilia’s old 
bar, situated opposite the house I rented from Pippo, was, according to many narratives, 
the favourite hangout of the mafioso Balduccio Di Maggio.178 Balduccio had promised Virilia 
to buy him a bigger place. A policeman I interviewed confirmed that Virilia had been ‘close 
to the Di Maggio clan’ throughout the 1990s. Many of my research interlocutors 
remembered the new bar built in the early 1990s, complete with an almost provocatively 
lavish and decadent decor. ‘It was too much for the village, too excessive … but Di Maggio 
did it because that was his favourite place’, a local man who had been imprisoned for 
having a mafia member told me.  
Until the mid-1990s San Giovanni’s rival clans were Di Maggio and Brusca. 
Interlocutors described how people affiliated to both clans joined each other at Marco’s old 
venue every evening. I often visited the bar, as I lived right across the street; now called 
Billiards, it was under new management. Older locals confirmed, after countless chats, that 
20-odd years ago the place had indeed been a meeting point for San Giovanni mafiosi. It 
was conveniently located at the heart of the newest part of the village, an area that had 
been built through the mafia’s investment in construction as part of the local clans’ 1980s 
money laundering schemes. It was due to Virilia’s personal popularity that his venue 
                                                 
178 Second only to Brusca in sangiovannari mafiosi hierarchy, Balduccio Di Maggio was also high in Cosa Nostra 
status in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He was arrested in 1996. He was the only other person present at the 
controversial meeting (and symbolic mafia kiss) between Totò ‘The Beast’ Riina, leader of Cosa Nostra, and 
Giulio Andreotti, the Italian PM, in 1987 (Robb 2009: 53). 
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became a meeting place for the village’s clans; allegedly, this clan alliance was sealed 
through Di Maggio and Brusca’s meetings there over coffee. 
Pretending to ignore the whispers around him, I kept on visiting Marco’s new 
place. He had mentioned several times that his activity had had ‘an interruption’ in 1995–
1996. Then, in one of our discussions, sipping his preferred amaro, he finally explained: the 
venue had suffered a serious explosion in 1995, collapsing in seconds. Excited, and wound 
up by the liquor, as he narrated the events, he faced me and raised his voice, as if 
addressing Di Maggio in person:  
I was neither with you nor against you. I have my business, I am doing my things 
and do not want anything further to do with you. Yes, we can share stuff but don’t 
get me involved in your stories: my wife did not sleep for a year after this [the 
explosion]. We would never just abandon our property, our entrepreneurial project, 
our bar, and leave the village. We wanted and needed to stay and they couldn’t just 
drag us away like this …. 
I spoke with several other locals about the event. Narratives from different sources 
confirmed that ‘everything was razed to the ground’. Interlocutors who were in their 30s 
when the incident took place described the bar as a luxury symbol, a space that was ‘too 
much’ for San Giovanni – and which became a pile of shattered glass and cement 
overnight. The background is that, Di Maggio had been arrested in early 1993 and had 
turned pentito,179 collaborating with the authorities by revealing Brusca’s hideouts. This 
infuriated Brusca, who turned against those whom he thought were ‘Di Maggio’s allies’: 
‘Virilia was just caught in the crossfire’, a bar attendee confided to me. Memories of the 
explosion contributed to the rumours that Marco had been affiliated to the Di Maggio clan. 
                                                 
179 The formal term, used by media and state agents, is collaboratore di giustizia (‘collaborator with 
justice’); pentito, a colloquial term, literally means ‘repentant’ (Allum 2006b; Lodato 2001). Twelve 
mafiosi from San Giovanni became justice collaborators, including Brusca and Di Maggio. This 
earned San Giovanni a poor reputation as a ‘village of mafia cowards’ among other Cosa Nostra 
members. Di Maggio’s most famous (yet still disputed) confession to the authorities was that then 
Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti had met him and Cosa Nostra leader Riina in 1987, to arrange a 
non-conflict pact between state and mafia (Lodato 2012). 
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Some commented that ‘he got affiliated and paid for it’; those who believed that he ‘had 
invested in mafia contacts’ saw in his bar’s demise the ‘natural outcome of such dealings’. 
‘He wanted to fly high’, an old farmer sarcastically commented; others insisted that this was 
an ‘expected event’ connected to the general fluctuation of ‘developments he couldn’t 
control’. Everyone admitted that linking to mafiosi was perilous because clan relations were 
‘unstable’.180  
In the late 1990s, in order to boost the local economy and the presumed popular 
anti-mafia feeling, reinforced due to the Cosa Nostra atrocities, state institutions subsidised 
private business of the late ‘90s that arose as a reaction to the escalation of mafia violence 
(Schneider and Schneider 2003). Tellingly for the nature of the mafia/antimafia distinction, 
Virilia managed to access EU subsidies to repair his property after the explosion. He 
applied for the subsidy, stating in his application that he was ‘antimafia’, registered with the 
police as a ‘victim of mafia’ and managed to acquire a sum from the EU’s PON–5181 
programme ‘for reconstruction of private enterprise damaged by mafia’. He also 
propagandised the antimafia cooperatives at every opportunity and became a member of 
Libera. When he finally received the subsidy at around the same time the antimafia 
cooperatives were established in the village, this caused a new flood of rumours in the 
village that he had been ‘paid by the Antimafia’, thus gaining him a reputation for being an 
                                                 
180 Interestingly, Adamo, from Falcone, who also emphasised the fluidity of relations with mafia, had told me, 
in connection with another instance, that ‘the mafia is eternal in San Giovanni: as omnipresent as the fog is in 
your London’. Hence, while mafia clans’ inter-relations are unpredictable, the mafia is seen as a constant, much 
as ‘family is the centre of Sicilian life’ as earlier anthropological research stated in essentialist fashion 
(Boissevain 1966: 19). The often used phrase ‘capo di turno’ (‘the current incumbent [mafia leader]’) suggests 
the the rapid changes of fortune of ‘the’ mafia and the risks involved in linking with any one clan instead of 
another. Virilia’s case implies that ‘the mafia’ is, rather, a constellation of competing clans that, at certain 
points, find certain specific arrangements of hierarchy that provide the balance needed to work together 
(Santino 1995). However, abrupt rearrangements of alliances are always imminent in the historical 
deployment of mafia organisation. As the violent act that reduced Virilia’s bar to ruins suggests, such ruptures, 
often caused by pentitismo, can have serious effects on people ‘affiliated’ to the mafia.  
181 A subsidy programme of the EU under its ‘security and development’ programme.  
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‘opportunist’ or ‘going whichever way the wind blows’. ‘Waving the antimafia flag’ showed 
that Virilia ‘crossed sides for interest’, as a local peasant told me.  
The bombing of Marco’s bar was a turning point: as after the explosion he 
considered himself fanatically ‘committed to antimafia’. But rumours told a different story: 
following gossip, the police hypothesised that Virilia did have relations with mafia and had 
realised that maintaining his affiliations with the incumbent mafioso leader (mafioso di turno) 
was risky. This was also suggested when he said ‘the state is always there,’ suggesting that his 
loyalties to the state would guarantee safer results in the long run. Therefore, despite having 
successfully claimed further ‘security and development’ subsidies from the ministry of 
Internal Affairs for the reconstruction of the bar, local authorities turned on him. Maria 
Maniscalco, San Giovanni’s (leftist) mayor in 2000, conducted what Marco saw as a 
character assassination campaign against him. Tracking the rumours regarding the 
explosion, she encouraged a police investigation into what she called ‘the local mafia–
business complex’. The investigation identified Virilia as an ‘affiliated entrepreneur’ in a 
series of press releases by the municipality. Maniscalco explained to me in an interview that 
she appealed to the police ‘after following a stream of whispers myself’. When I discussed 
this with Marco, he complained to me that ‘the cooperatives are the only genuine 
manifestation of the state’s presence here’.  
Virilia’s appeal to the state as a protector from mafiosi shows that rumours and 
whispers about who is a mafioso and what it means to be a mafioso are located on the 
junction of official administration and local power relations, and operate on that junction, 
according to the circumstantial interests of locals, like Virilia. These ideas were heavily 
charged with secrecy, shaped in the form of cryptic messages that often incorporated code 
words (for Virilia, the police note that he was a ‘pere-pere’, i.e. ‘affiliated’). 
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These codes were also made of by the authorities. This intertwining of local 
gossiping with the mobilisation of institutional apparatuses is characteristic of the 
indirectness of conveying information locally. This indirectness is often instrumental to 
state activity. Such indirect modes can often lead to defamation and persecution, as 
experienced by both Virilia and Micci,182 who was also bound in with allegations of mafia 
affiliation. Shifting sides (from mafia to antimafia, and in the legal sense of cooperating 
with justice authorities) is accompanied, to a greater or lesser extent, by rumours and 
secrecy. Virilia’s story indicates the ways in which gossip became a resource for different 
people in the context of the changes introduced by antimafia influence in the village of San 
Giovanni. Gossip can attract suspicion and prosecution but careful strategising around it 
can also lead to support (such as the antimafia EU PON-5 funds). Virilia’s case also 
demonstrates a key point of this chapter: the fluidity of the mafia/antimafia concepts and 
the ways local people shifted among them, following their own interests. Renegotiating the 
boundaries of the mafia and antimafia proved an endlessly beneficial practice to locals. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I focus on how gossiping, a local code often 
blurring the mafia/antimafia boundaries, as shown above, came to be appropriated by the 
cooperatives’ administrators to inform cooperatives’ strategies. In this way, I argue, gossip 
acquired the status of a resource for the cooperatives, in two respects. Gossip was seen, on 
the one hand, as a means of integrating people from Palermo into local life and, on the other 
hand, as a means of distancing them from the ‘calamities’ of that same local life, which in the 
opinion of the cooperatives’ administrators was ‘contaminated’ by its exposure to mafiosi 
activity. In this demarcating role, administrators’ utilisation of gossip was directed to 
securing the ‘cleanliness’ of their activities in San Giovanni. In pursuit of this aim, 
administrators gossiped about ‘contaminated’ relationships and contacts. This type of 
                                                 
182 Mario Micci was the owner of the Trasi cooperative winery, as mentioned in 3.2.4.  
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gossip and the reputational networks it solidified marked the ‘moral universes’ of the 
cooperatives and hence made it an important resource for antimafia cooperativism. In 
addition, I discuss the way the state (specifically the police) made use of gossip, in ways 
juxtaposed to those of the administrators.  
7.2. The Instrumentalisation of Gossip 
7.2.1. Contamination: an idiom used to mark boundaries 
Cooperative administrators and Consortium politicians frequently used the term 
‘mafia’ alongside idioms of insidious growth and contamination. They characterised flows 
and networks deploying interests of people thought to belong to mafia clans, as ‘mafia 
diffusion’. Mafia was compared to disease and indeed to cancer, a language shared by 
public officials (such as judges, Consortium politicians). Reale’s mayor talked to me of the 
‘need to isolate the contaminated cells in our society’. The mayor of Fonte, another 
Consortium village, characterised influences of the San Giovanni clans into his community, 
as a ‘metastasis’ (invoking the spread of cancer cells to other parts of the body), a term also 
used by sociologists in Italy (Sciarrone 2009). San Cipiriddu’s mayor Malva, despite his 
friendship with Baffi (explored above and in Chapter 5), told me in an interview that the 
‘[mafia] lump had to be removed from the body of our community’. Keeping track of 
gossip regarding mafiosi guaranteed, for cooperative members, the preservation of legality: 
they saw it as a mode to frame and contain this contamination and a net to impede its 
spreading.  
The metaphors of diffusion and flows spreading throughout the (community’s) 
body indicate the way that cooperative administrators conceptualised mafiosi as potentially 
contaminating any social networks in which mafiosi participated, even marginally. Any nexus 
with mafia links was deemed to be morally challenged and permanently at risk until ‘the 
lump is removed’, as Gianpiero underlined to me. Gianpiero, not only a Borsellino 
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administrator but also the head of Libera Palermo, reflected the association’s views. 
Pamphlets and leaflets of antimafia civil society associations spoke of the perils of ‘the 
disease of the South’ (Libera 2009, Addiopizzo 2009; cf. Lumley and Morris 1997). Libera 
construed this paradigm in terms of mafia as a nucleus that transmitted its corrupting 
influence to the political and economic order. Nico, a member of the Borsellino 
cooperative, compared the members’ anxiety about becoming exposed to ‘contamination’ 
with the fear of pollution of clean water: a social network was like a river with a dead body 
lying in its stream; when the clean waters pass over it, the stream becomes polluted from 
that point onwards. In that respect, cooperative administrators saw a flow (of things, 
commodities, ideas, jobs, labour and similar resources) as wholly ‘impure’, when a mafioso 
occupied a broker position in it. The contamination imagery was constantly evoked in 
documents and informal discourses among the cooperatives’ administration, the 
Consortium, local policy actors such as the mayors, and civil society agents such as Libera 
activists. Some of this discourse incorporates the flow of gossip and informal information 
gathered in bars and public spaces in Alto Belice. 
Contamination calls for containment and hence articulated the administrators’ 
tendency to form ‘moral borders’ while conversely, underlining the ‘cleanliness’ of the 
cooperatives with their strictly demarcated moral universe. By knowing through gossip 
what was said and who said it the administrators formed discursive moral borders around 
the cooperatives (akin to the moral borders formed around land). This form of gossip in 
San Giovanni was constructed as metatalk, because tracking gossip was to talk about talking. 
A person was ‘clean’ not only when they were not a mafioso or a mafioso’s relative but when 
it was proved that they did not speak with mafiosi or relatives of mafiosi, as this could be 
contaminating for the cooperatives. This metatalk meant sharing information about who 
shared information with whom. Through whispers (sussuri), cooperative members identified 
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who was ‘talked about’ (chiaccherato). My attention to gossip here suggests analogies with 
what Favret-Saada says about witchcraft in France: aiming to study practices, she included 
discourse in her analysis, as ‘the act, in witchcraft, is the word…witchcraft is spoken words; 
but these spoken words are power … to talk, in witchcraft, is never to inform… words 
wage war. Anyone talking about it is a belligerent’ (1980: 8). Although the mafia is more 
than words, a lot of reputation and attached resources (job positions, state funding) was 
attached to spoken word, as it can, in specific contexts, be instrumentalised. 
Ultimately, the administrators rendered gossip a powerful resource for the 
dominant model of antimafia cooperativism that they promoted. This was a vision in which 
the local community was regarded warily, seen as imbued with problematic notions of 
tradition and where the state and law enforcement should be present at all times.  
7.2.2. The police: setting and blurring boundaries 
For this reason, tracking informal information became part of the cooperative 
administrators’ workload. It involved investigating how ‘clean’ the people who approached 
the cooperatives were by examining the discursive networks in which they were enmeshed. 
Secluded in their virtuous networking, Palermitan administrators performed this in two 
main ways. Firstly, they traced information by consulting the Prefecture and the police. The 
police provided an outline of a person’s relationships with the authorities, as documented 
in their official archives. Secondly and more important, the administrators followed 
informal means of gathering information, including paying attention to random local 
gossip, especially the ‘whispering’ (sussuri) that took place in bars. The instrumentalisation 
of gossip therefore developed in a twofold way. On the one hand, state authorities 
documented rumours and shared this information with the cooperatives’ administrators; on 
the other hand, the cooperatives tracked rumours on their own behalf. In doing this, they 
were in fact replicating the state’s surveillance practices – but able to penetrate further. 
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Police practices correlated with the cooperatives members’ interest in local informal 
information. 
Specifically, the state’s gossip tracking resulted in ‘signalling’ (segnalazione), 
documentation confirming a person’s contacts with mafiosi. A law enforcement entity (the 
Carabinieri or the police) inscribed the person’s name as a ‘mafia contact’ and informed the 
cooperatives that the person was to be avoided. ‘Signalling’ therefore, referred at the same 
time to ‘official documentation’ regulations and to informal gossiping techniques. As 
demands for labour intensified with the development of the cooperatives, this situation 
dramatically influenced the antimafia cooperatives’ recruitment, as the cooperatives could 
not hire ‘signalled’ people.  
When an agrarian labourer (bracciante) asked a cooperative for a job, or when a 
peasant who cultivated organic grapes approached the cooperatives proposing 
collaboration under supplier status, cooperative members mobilised a variety of control 
mechanisms, partly based on gossip. Firstly, through rumours documented in the police’s 
records, they traced whether the person was ‘clean’ (pulito) and therefore suitable to 
collaborate with an antimafia cooperative. The administrators did not accept ‘non-clean’ 
people as members, workers or suppliers under any circumstance, as they thought that this 
would introduce ‘contamination’. The case of Leonardo Brusca (cousin of mafia leader 
Giovanni Brusca) is typical. After his release from prison (he had served a three-year prison 
sentence for ‘being a member of a mafia association’), he managed a Brusca familiare plot 
that bordered a Falcone land tract (as discussed in the previous chapter). When he 
approached his old acquaintance Giusy to ask for a possible temporary contract as a 
bracciante in the Falcone cooperative, she calmly replied, ‘Are you serious? If I am to take 
you, I might as well consider closing the cooperative down altogether!’ 
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Antimafia cooperatives’ administrators checking on whether people approaching 
them were clean, through actual existing data and through informal but valuable gossip in 
bars was deemed by the Consortium to be a most efficient way of surveillance. 
Nevertheless, the cooperatives were double-checked themselves for cleanliness by the 
state’s law enforcement agencies. Ironically, given the use of ‘signalling’ by administrators, 
the police sometimes ‘signalled’ cooperative members themselves and communicated their 
conduct to the cooperatives’ presidents. For instance, once Piero, entering a bar at San 
Cipiriddu for his morning espresso, saw the local Carabinieri marshal having a coffee with 
young Aiola, the first cousin of a San Giovanni mafia clan leader. Piero ignored this and 
had a brief trivial chat with both men. The next day, he had the police at his door: he was 
advised not to approach that person again, as he was a mafioso. The police officers told him 
that they were obliged to communicate this information to the president of the cooperative 
and that after that ‘it was the cooperative’s own issue’ to decide on Piero’s future. When 
Piero went to the police department, he complained that he had approached Aiola only 
because the marshal was there, and that the marshal introduced him to Aiola. The police 
replied that they often spent time with known mafiosi and ‘it was not his business imitating 
that conduct’. Therefore, the police strategised on the mafia/anti-mafia discourse as well 
and indeed demanded to monopolise this system. 
‘Signalling’, in this way, did not directly inflict on the rule of law, but it did affect 
the lives of cooperative members themselves. At the very least, it made them realise they 
were not immune from state surveillance. More seriously, it could lead to the signalled 
person’s expulsion from a cooperative. The case of Pino is similar to Piero’s: he underwent 
a segnalazione as he ‘kept contact’ with his village’s mafia boss. Informants confirmed, 
however, that what the police meant by ‘contact’ was that he had simply stopped to say 
hello when he and Netti met on the street. In a small village like San Cipiriddu it was 
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difficult to avoid meeting anyone and Ninno’s civil engineering office was on the main 
road, some 30 metres from the stairs to the main church and to Circolo, Netti’s hangout bar. 
In fact, Pino introduced Netti to me, as we met him by chance at Circolo one day.  
Using gossip to strategise the next moves of a cooperative meant identifying people 
through specific flows of information in their villages. These flows corresponded to 
networks of acquaintances, affiliations and sympathies of the police, because of their will to 
control reputational networks and the setting/crossing of boundaries. The role of the 
police in negotiating the zone among mafia/antimafia behaviour is telling for the nature of 
these imagined boundaries (often demarcated through gossip). The police are of course the 
embodiment of the state’s monopolisation of force, and re-establishing that monopoly had 
a lot to do with re-establishing legality, normality and, indeed, the perceived boundaries of 
mafia and antimafia. This implied that police officers had to be strict with cooperative 
administrators as well, and were often quite arbitrary in the way they redrew these 
boundaries, operating to a degree extra-legally, at least insofar as their own actions were 
very much unregulated. As the local Carabinieri marshal told me, ‘I go about looking for 
gossip to decide my next moves, basically, asking mafiosi about mafiosi. You do the same 
thing, Theo. I look for informers, you look for informants’. 
The boundaries were imagined through the channel of either words attached to 
people (such as ‘fox’, or ‘pere pere’ for Virilia) or words that people shared with others (the 
discourse about ‘who is talking to whom’). As mentioned, I follow Favret-Saada’s take on 
the power of words being actions, having no autonomous meaning outside the practice of 
hex (1980); in San Giovanni, they construed ‘moral universes’ (and resources attached to 
them, as per jobs, or funds). The social nexuses sharing words were, in their turn, formed 
in what appeared to be mutually exclusive patterns shaped by law and the informal 
information around relatedness and friendship. Therefore, internal strategies in the 
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cooperatives involved informal flows of information as well as firm references to 
definitions of ‘mafia’ in criminal law and procedure. Often, people actively evoked the 
language of law, jingling with its applicability, in order to back their suspicions. Hence, they 
talked of Baffi’s release from prison as a legal mistake and circulated rumours in the village 
that he should have been imprisoned for 10 years more but a bureaucratic mistake in the 
wording of his sentencing led to his early release. Tracing these whispers through people 
back to their source, I found that the person who had initiated them was the local 
Carabinieri marshal.  
In that respect, gossip’s relationship to the law, the police and state power is 
explicit and structural. In gossip becoming a resource, there is a discursive realignment, 
translated into structural effects, as the banality of everyday contact is decontextualised to 
fit within a defined category of power and ethics, a moral universe, informed by specific 
values. 
7.2.3. Pursuing ‘the clean’: gossip as an antimafia resource 
Αs described above, the bar was the locus for the process of rumour tracking. The 
case of a prospective supplier from the neighbouring village of Camo further illustrates 
this. As Falcone members collaborated with the sequestrated farm Tazza, which cultivated 
an olive grove, they became increasingly interested in olive oil extraction. Tazza was 
administered by a friend of Luca, Paolo Erice, whom he had met through Palermo 
University’s virtuous circles (as described in Chapter 4). Moving around the area where 
Tazza was located, Luca and his virtuous circle network friend Paolo were anxious to find a 
‘clean’ (pulito) olive mill. Tazza was a long way from San Giovanni; therefore Luca had no 
information about whom to trust in the area. Some locals suggested they should go to 
Camo, a village located far from San Giovanni (a 40-minute drive), and speak with a local 
olive mill owner who could potentially become an excellent supplier. 
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Piero took me with him in his car and we drove to Camo: his first task was to 
establish whether the mill was sound and appropriate for the job. He then asked Luca to 
find out whether there were negative penal records on the olive mill owner in the 
Prefecture archives in Palermo. Nothing came out: the entrepreneur had even received 
public funds for his agricultural business enterprise. The documents proved that the mill 
manufactured organic oil exclusively, that the quality was high enough and that the owner 
was ‘clean’. Piero’s job, however, included not only performing a quality control for the 
prospective cooperative collaborators as an agronomist but also ‘tracing a clean person 
through a spicciola’, minor, detailed research on ‘what people said’ about the people who 
could become the cooperative’s prospective collaborators. He described this process as ‘a 
small-time control [controllo spiccio] that I do myself, often the most important, as it reaches 
to webs of contacts the Prefecture cannot arrive at’. The route he generally followed was to 
ask a local provider or similar contact ‘what is said in the village’ about the prospective 
collaborator or worker. Through this kind of gossiping, the cooperative established some 
security with regard to their next moves in ‘dealing with people who are clean’. 
He therefore went back to the centre of Camo to meet inconspicuously with a grain 
supplier to the cooperative and ask him what he knew about the olive mill. Although the 
supplier knew hardly anything, he introduced Piero confidentially to the owner of the bar 
where they took their coffee. The barman told us he trusted ‘the antimafia’: he himself was 
a member of the Addiopizzo organisation of anti-racket retailers. His choice to join the 
Addiopizzo had resulted in his bar being burnt down by the main local mafioso clan of the 
village a year ago – the state had helped out with subsidies for reconstruction. Piero knew 
from this that the barman would be very much attuned to local gossip regarding mafia 
allegiances. Indeed, when asked, the barman revealed that the supplier with whom the 
Falcone cooperative were about to sign a partnership contract collaborated with that local 
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mafia clan. The relationship with the mafiosi-brokers guaranteed the olive mill owner a 
steady supply of olives and a loyal clientele, both as a result of mafia’s social influence.183 
The cooperative cancelled the agreement with the olive mill. Piero explained to me that: 
small talk in bars is the most efficient way to find out about people’s cleanliness; the 
whispers you hear here and there make you aware of local doings. Of course, we do not 
want to collaborate with a supplier who walks holding hands with these people [‘vá a 
braccieto con questi’]. 
The cases of Pino and Piero’s ‘signalling’, as well as the Camo vignette and Virilia’s 
story, described above, underline the fundamental assumption I identified regarding gossip 
in San Giovanni: sharing information is precisely about information sharing. In the context 
of antimafia gossip, people speak about who speaks to whom. This metatalk, I argue, 
renders gossip a prominent material resource for what I am calling the ‘moral border 
setting’ work of the antimafia cooperatives’ administrators. Moreover, it is a means of 
accessing further material resources, thus forming part of the ongoing social arrangements 
for constituting the antimafia cooperatives. By clearly dividing local social relations into 
distinct moral universes, access to the cooperatives is ensured only to those free from 
contaminating contact with mafiosi. 
In these conditions, antimafia cooperatives rendered rumours and gossip an 
instrument of internal policymaking. The role of gossip as fundamental in reputation 
building is widely documented (Ghosh 1996; Kirsch 2010). What is original in the case of 
the antimafia cooperatives is the way tracking gossip in the gendered spaces of the bars is 
linked to processes of separating the cooperatives from their broader social ambience. 
Where anthropological accounts have characterised gossip as a resource for accumulating 
reputation (Engle Merry 1997), here gossip is a resource in a different way, a means of 
                                                 
183 There is an apparent conflict of values here: what wins a good reputation for some, mafiosity, is seen as a 
contra-indicator by Piero. 
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exclusion/inclusion in the work of creating a bounded universe shielded behind ‘moral 
borders’, which diverged from local values. However, the attempt to construct work and 
experience horizontality within the cooperatives – an important ideal – is trumped by the 
use of gossip by the administrators, as it separates cooperatives from local people, 
including the workers of the cooperatives themselves, forming a hierarchy of reputations in 
which the administrators, because ‘free’ of any local connections, come to be the local 
representation of an ‘uncontaminated’ antimafia element.  
Schneider and Schneider’s classic monograph proposed that ‘control over 
networks’ is the source of mafia’s brokerage power (1976). In a more recent book, they 
identified (hierarchical) ‘reputational networks’ as an important means of social cohesion in 
Sicily, which impacts on production and reproduction patterns, building people’s and 
families’ ‘respectability’ (1996: 195–96). My ethnographic discussion builds on these 
insights. Utilising reputational networks, administrators of antimafia cooperatives render 
gossip a resource, appropriating it from the local context, to use against mafia. These 
networks mediate categories of cleanliness, and antimafia that are further linked to other 
resources (land and labour) available through the cooperatives. Focusing on the flows of 
discourse and the modes of communication helped them to construct the binary 
mafia/antimafia and their conceptual separation in daily discourse. 
As noted above, cooperative members instrumentalised information gathered 
through gossip as often as state actors did, although with more effective penetration of 
local networks. The gossip character of such communication was often seen as a way to 
‘know a territory’ and infiltrate those spheres of information considered too intimate for 
the state to reach. The discourse of ‘cleanliness’ creates a difference from state actors, 
demarcating (in sensorial terms) the social ambience of the antimafia cooperatives. 
Whereas gossip and rumours blur the boundaries within which the people of the 
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cooperatives were meant to act, they were also used to register people on one or the other 
‘side’. This was particularly noticeable in Virilia’s case but was also true of the ‘signalling’ of 
the cooperatives and the Camo vignette.  
Gossip in Alto Belice implied both to tell stories (gossip with a narrative) and to 
talk about talking (gossip about who talks with whom). The antimafia cooperatives 
administrators mainly utilised this latter form, to identify who was a mafia affiliate. Gossip 
thus helps to set the limits of law’s applicability in that it conveys meta-information. In that 
respect, when a person was established to have contacts (i.e. speak to, share words with) 
with someone recognised as a mafioso in legal terms, that person would be excluded from 
the cooperatives. Using gossip to strategise the next moves of a cooperative meant 
identifying people’s location in specific flows of information in their villages. These flows 
corresponded to networks of acquaintances, affiliations and sympathies.  
Gossip consequently entailed controlling channels of cleanliness, as mafia 
contamination transmits through words, through sharing information and talking with 
people perceived as contaminated. There is more interest in speech about speech, in 
knowing who spoke to whom than what they said: as in Favret-Saada’s case (1980), words 
are not dangerous because of their content, but because of their mere existence, addressing 
someone considered potentially contaminating. The use of indirect communication, 
rumours, whispers, gestures, in short, of platforms evoking and conveying informal 
information in the form of gossip, was fundamentally important for the cooperatives’ 
ethical positionality. Reproducing a clear distinction between ‘the mafia’ and ‘the antimafia’, 
administrators employed gossip to distinguish sharply these two ‘moral universes’. This has 
had impacts on the work relations of the cooperatives, in the process of the administrators’ 
seclusion behind the iron cage that these ‘moral universes’ construed. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how informal information, in the form of gossip, is important in 
the everyday lives of locals, mafiosi, state authorities and the cooperatives’ administrators. 
This involves contradictions. Firstly, I showed the fuzziness of the mafia/antimafia 
distinction, in the ways that it was used. As people circulated flows of information 
construed to lie in the zone between mafia and antimafia, in the village’s bars, gossip was a 
vector of resources for locals (barmen and mafiosi in particular) and for state authorities. 
Barmen used gossip to boost their reputation, for instance by narrating stories to attract 
clientele or resources (funds from EU antimafia programs). Blurring and crossing 
boundaries between mafia/antimafia was nuanced in the case of Virilia, which shows that 
the antimafia has been successful in providing opportunities for profit to some locals, some 
sangiovannari being concerned with obtaining a ‘clean image’ and disassociate themselves 
from the mafia clans. Therefore the local gossip about who is mafia/antimafia has obtained 
new significance in San Giovanni. The police used it to enforce the law on locals, tracking 
rumours about their ‘affiliations’ with mafiosi, often using the information provided to them 
by mafiosi themselves, operating between the border crossing and the border building 
processes and, thus, partaking in both.  
Secondly, I showed how the administrators rendered gossip a medium of 
separation. The administrators’ virtuous circles (4.1), their moral bordering of the land 
(6.2), their use of gossip, are all part of their attempts at protective seclusion. In San 
Giovanni, where they perceived mafiosi and people affiliated to them as a threat of 
contamination, this had impacts on the degrees to which they allowed to become 
intertwined with local livelihoods. As the administrators come from networks unrelated to 
San Giovanni, their use of local information secured and consolidated their positions in the 
cooperatives. They participated in gossip flows not in order to engage with the life of the 
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local community but to identify local mafia affiliations and distinguish themselves from 
them. Their idioms of contamination and cleanliness served this aim.  
This argument feeds into my general argumentation about the specificities of the 
division of labour of the antimafia cooperatives. I showed that gossip in the specific sense 
of who is talking with whom is a major resource for administrators, in its capacity to identify 
people with whom the cooperatives could collaborate. This further separated the 
administrators from their local co-members in the cooperatives, as it contributed to the 
antimafia cooperativism, suspicious of local practices proposed by the Consortium. Using 
gossip, the outcome of how (and to whom) people speak to strategise the next moves of a 
cooperative implied locating people in flows of affiliations and sympathies in their villages: 
‘whispers’ around local people often challenged their position and status.  
The above meanings and utilisations of gossip as a resource entailed two important 
ideological consequences. Firstly, for cooperatives, and to an extent for the state, the 
contamination idiom is produced by gossip as metatalk. In my ethnographic depiction of 
people’s behaviours around land plots, the boundaries of the land were identified with 
moral borders for the administrators. Here, the flows of gossip functioned as the 
demarcator of their ‘moral universe’; alluding to contamination was a means of securing 
this universe’s boundaries. Secondly, local people, mafiosi and cooperative members, 
imagine the state (Gupta 1997; 2005), through the semantics of the circulation of informal 
information. The administrators keep back from the local community, while referring, to 
explain their work, to an ‘imagined’ one. This practice of imagining mobilises a set of social 
relations that contributes to the activity of the cooperatives and hence has material 
consequences. People are aware of how discourse can elicit different degrees of law 
enforcement: through ‘signalling’ (Piero) or defamation strategies (Virilia). 
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Gossip is therefore, in Alto Belice, adapted to the experience of familiarisation and 
distance of the Palermitan middle-class administrators in the everyday life of San Giovanni. 
The fact that they relied upon gossip is informed by their lack of kinship connections in the 
area and the ideological separation of home and work that, I argue, underlies the politicised 
endeavour of the antimafia cooperatives to dissociate from certain local codes and 
practices. Therefore, the separation process imposed through rendering gossip a way to 
distinguish clear sides between mafia and antimafia is embedded in the subjectivities of 
those pursuing this process, themselves the products of separation. The administrators 
commuted to San Giovanni in the morning and returned to Palermo in the evening. The 
cooperatives were their work space, Palermo was their home. The separation of work from 
kinship links is the fundamental premise on which activities such as gossip tracking are 
based. This separation is an axis of the antithesis between the two teams of the 
cooperatives, reproducing unequal relations within them. In the conclusion of this thesis, I 
shall discuss this argument and suggest ways to tackle the moral facet of the division of 
labour. 
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Chapter 8   
Conclusion 
8.1. A Summary of the Argumentation 
As stated in the introduction to the thesis, I set out to analyse the differentiations, framed 
in moral terms, running through antimafia cooperatives’ division of labour and, in line with 
this, to examine the consequences of changes (and continuities) that the cooperatives 
contributed to the lives of individuals, families and institutions in Alto Belice. The thesis 
showed that differentiations among members are informed by obligations and values outside 
a cooperative as much as by work performed within it, as members are embedded in (often 
conflicting) broader social relationships. This chapter synthesises the arguments developed 
in relation to the ethnography, and brings the argument one last step forward, to reach 
some overall conclusions. 
The narrative of the thesis could be summarised as follows. Sicilian agrarian 
cooperativism was framed by tensions between peasant mobilisation, the antimafia 
movement, mafia, and the state (Chapter 3). A division of labour emerged in antimafia 
cooperatives, wherein administrators were recruited through political networks and 
workers through kinship, two incompatible spheres of relatedness (Chapter 4). Workers’ 
livelihoods outside the cooperatives continued to be entangled with informal local 
practices, some of which were, ironically, reinforced by antimafia cooperativism’s 
promotion of waged employment (Chapter 5). The division within the cooperative was also 
expressed in different moral evaluations of confiscated land, whereby legal property was 
juxtaposed to local values (moral ownership), resulting in uncomfortable social 
arrangements between neighbouring land plots (Chapter 6). Just as with moralising 
discourses of land, administrators appropriated local gossip in order to further demarcate 
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moral borders around their own, and ‘their’ cooperatives’, position in the locality (Chapter 
7). 
Here I present the characteristics of these boundaries and relations in three main 
arguments. I argue firstly, that two different moral economies developed within the 
cooperative framework, because of different community conceptualisations: the imaginary 
of administrators and the experience of workers (8.2). I then argue that members’ 
consciousness and experiences of relatedness draw on a reality beyond the cooperatives; in 
consequence, tensions, but also alliances, arise. Class, then, relates not only to labour but to 
members’ broader relationships in their community, including a range of loyalties, such as 
kinship, which thus becomes a crucial feature of cooperativism (8.3). I also propose one 
final argument, hoping it delineates future research avenues: relationships between informal 
and regulated categories of labour develop in relation to each other in non-neoliberal 
contexts, including pro-employment projects such as antimafia cooperativism (8.4). 
8.2. Different Moral Economies and Values 
Members’ different ideas of community participation were rooted in the class-based social 
relations in which people’s everyday lives outside the cooperatives were enmeshed. The 
values administrators pursued can be classified as a moral economy, informed by their’ 
social situatedness. Politically driven cooperatives are founded on normative principles, in 
this case the state ideology of legality. Unlike the relevant sociology (Jamieson 2000; 
Sciarrone 2009; Armao 2009; Varese 2011; cf. Santino 2005), I suggest that legality is not 
neutral but socially ordered (and ordering), rooted in ideologies of community. The 
Consortium’s promotion of state intervention in Alto Belice, endorsing an abstract 
‘discursive normativity’ (Ferguson 1994: 30), aimed at the restitution of assets to ‘the 
community’ (Frigerio and Pati 2007). Administrators, being Palermitans, middle-class and 
not owning land, were more inclined than workers to align with these normative lines, their 
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sense of the ‘community’ being divorced from local experience. Steinmetz’ idea of the 
languages of the state’s situatedness in social circumstances (1999) can be applied here vis-
à-vis the urban civil society in which the administrators’ lives were embedded, in line with 
Schneider and Schneider’s analysis of the 1990s antimafia movement (2002a). 
Therefore, I argue that the administrators’ ideological grounding is reflected in an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006) that echoes the aims and principles of the 
Consortium and Libera. Considering Alto Belice’s ‘tradition’ as mafia-prone, they saw 
continuities between cooperatives and local codes as discredited. They endorsed an 
interventionist state, arranging access to resources (land, and through it, labour) for the 
benefit of the ‘community’. The provision of work meant, to quote Ernesto, ‘a mission’; 
the confiscated land, in Luca’s words, was ‘whatever the state stood for, in Sicily’. 
Recognising a broader moral project in antimafia cooperativism, they developed 
recruitment strategies through ‘virtuous networks’ (4.1), standardisation of labour in 
employment (5.1), and discourses on land’s moral borders (6.2) and instrumentalised gossip 
to detect dangerous mafiosi ‘contamination’ (7.2.1, 7.2.3) (although gossip tracking was 
equally a tool for redefining social obligations and boundaries for other groups).  
Local workers and member-workers lacked the administrators’ financial rewards. 
Their livelihoods were in part dependent on their private land tenure, participation in 
informal income strategies (in which they followed mafia-influenced gendered ideologies) 
and exposure to contacts with mafiosi neighbours. Spilling out of the cooperatives’ 
employment setting, their livelihoods were therefore associated with an experience-based 
understanding of community, a ‘way of life’, constituted by values distinct from those of 
the Consortium’s model of cooperativism. Precisely because it was embedded in local codes 
and activities, workers’ experience of participating in antimafia cooperatives eventually 
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proved dynamic, changing aspects of the ways they lived their lives, although often 
contradicting the consciously politicised cooperativism model administrators pursued. 
‘Tradition’, so charged a term for Alto Belice, for workers implied viticulture 
cooperation intrinsically entangled with the antimafia movement’s local history (3.1.1). The 
values they endorsed were relational and dynamic: their cooperative participation expanded 
notions of kinship, creating antimafia families (4.2) and endowed work with masculinised 
idioms, as workers felt proud they ‘embodied’ the coops (5.1). Continuities in their 
livelihood practices (5.2 and 5.3), and contiguities with neighbours’ land plots (6.2), 
developed creative, albeit messy, interactions with fellow locals (even mafiosi). These 
interactions allowed for interconnections between processes outside (e.g. informal work) 
and inside the cooperatives’ activity (waged labour), often merging coop work with local 
life (e.g. in ‘uncomfortable’ encounters at confiscated plots), this way imploding the 
cooperatives’ ‘standardisation’ framework. Therefore, the ways workers made up their 
livelihood (partly) through antimafia cooperativism, in a pragmatic, lived way, meshed local 
codes with channels of change, denoting ‘an escape from -isms’ (Whyte and Whyte 1991, 
regarding Mondragòn). Despite tensions, the ‘informal’ aspects of their livelihoods, 
embedded in morals about land (Abramson 2000a), mediated kinship (Carsten 1995), 
reputation (Schneider and Schneider 1996), and ‘mutual aid’ developed alongside rather than 
against antimafia cooperative (legality-oriented) activity.  
I argue that this contributed to the cooperatives’ ‘success’, which relied on this 
class-related, differentiated coexistence of informal and ‘regularised’ conditions, because 
the interlinking of legality and informality alleviated cooperative tensions. Tolerating (to an 
extent) what took place outside the cooperatives, administrators consolidated their privileged 
positions within them, as member-workers (and daily workers), pursuing informal practices 
outside them, compensated for the lack of remuneration and democracy within them. In that 
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respect, legality and informality co-articulated reproducing class in the coops. The moral 
economies developed in cooperatives corresponded to values regulated by the state 
(pursued by administrators) and a set of values continuous with local cultural codes (pursued 
by workers). The interaction of different values denoted fissures; in consequence, a classed 
heterogeneity bracketed different morals in the same cooperative. This ‘conflicting 
complementarity’ (Creed 1998: 8) bound different moralities and indeed moral economies. 
8.2.1. Values in cooperatives 
Drawing on the idea of embeddedness (Polanyi 2001) of economic activity in social 
life (and the values associated with people’s grounded experience) to see resources as also 
embedded (like land, as in Hann 1998b; 2009a) in socially arranged relationships can 
capture the distinct, and even contradictory, realities sheltered under the same cooperatives. 
This is because a cooperative’s resources are not ‘embedded’ uniformly, but across 
different contexts and different people encompassed in a cooperative. Rather than reifying 
cooperatives, the focus here is on their members and daily workers – and their contradictory 
circumstances, as they bring different values (translated into different practices) into the 
organisations they compose. This entails, specifically, focusing on livelihoods and the 
subjective experience of participating in cooperatives, in order to nuance ideas of the 
‘embeddedness’ of economic activity, thus making space to account for the differentiated 
moral values that co-exist in real-life economic organisations. This is particularly salient in 
the context of a politicised cooperative project bent on re-evaluating, in a context of 
legality, conflicting values. This interaction provokes tensions in cross-team relations, 
engendering differentiations among members. Members’ values are dynamic, open to new 
configurations, interacting with the (partly) imposed values brought about by new 
developments (the confiscations). It is partly this dynamism that renders cooperatives, 
‘modular’, as explored historically and ethnographically.  
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While different morals and values reflected stratifications, shared values prevented 
further hierarchisations, thus contributing to the composition of enduring and efficient 
cooperatives. Shared values between local member-workers and daily workers solidified 
their entanglement in common kinship relations and informal work. Daily workers did not 
stratify out as a third group in the cooperatives’ division of labour. Workers sharing 
common experiences, regardless of their member/non-member status, solidified the 
manual workforce in one team. Kinship relations across daily workers and member-
workers, expressed in raccomandazioni flows, and shared local codes (moral ownership) and 
practices (‘mutual aid’ work) bound them together in one group. Moreover, a widespread 
informal practice (registering land to wives) proved beneficial for daily workers, providing 
supplementary income in terms of state benefits, which permanent member-workers were 
not eligible to claim. Also, despite the coops’ lack of internal democratic representation, as 
coops’ manual workforces (both member-workers and other workers) maintained contact 
with neighbours in land plots, or continued ‘mutual aid’ practices, they were more visible to 
local society (being the face of the cooperatives) than the administrators. 
8.3. Kinship, Class and ‘Codes’ in Political Cooperativism  
I have shown that cooperatives accommodated families and new models of relatedness 
developed, inclusive of labour and politics (antimafia families). Therefore, as suggested 
earlier, reifying local relations by considering workers’ values as statically localised, would 
hinder our appreciation of real developments on the ground, as ‘local codes’ are not limited 
to a locality but open to broader systems, as per Schneider and Schneider (1976). Unlike 
their ethnography, in which such codes are continuous with mafia, however, I have shown 
that, according to circumstance, they can accommodate antimafia change.  
The dynamic role of kinship, proved a fundamental aspect of the cooperatives’ conflicting 
complementarity. Strict divisions of labour, on the one hand, determined each team’s 
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relatedness idioms, which in turn, reinforced the division; on the other hand, these idioms 
merged kinship with work, thus also contributing to the development of cooperativism’. In 
Chapter 4, I showed how the differentiated experience of taking part in cooperatives 
fractured coops in different spheres of relatedness, recruitment tactics and idioms of each 
group that could not communicate between groups. The clash of idioms between the teams, 
associated to the different spheres of relatedness was deemed as patronage. Importantly, 
what registered as ‘patronage’ for workers was the sidelining of kinship (by political 
networking), not its promotion, contrary to what is described in some of the relevant 
‘Mediterranean’ literature (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Gilsenan 1996; Pardo 1996; Cole 
1997; Assmuth 1997; Mitchell 2002; but see ‘clientelism’, from Chubb 1982 to Piattoni 
1998). Antimafia cooperativism therefore, developed through (distinctive) kinship idioms, 
rather than against them.  
In consequence, the enduring association of kinship with mafia in Sicily 
(Gunnarson 2008; Dino 2011; indeed ‘blood’ kinship, as per Blok 2000; Dickie 2011) can 
be critiqued in the same breath as contesting the concept that an enduring cooperative is 
pulled together by ‘trust’ and meritocracy only. Social theory, drawing on Simmelian 
notions of social cohesion to argue in favour of trust as necessary for economic 
cooperation (Fukuyama 1995), and specifically for cooperatives (Cook et al. 2007), often 
overlooks the significance of kinship as underpinning cooperatives. For Sicily, the lack of 
cooperation and cooperativism has been attributed partly to a ‘kinship-based’ mafia 
tradition (Centorrino et al. 1999). Gambetta argued that cooperative institutions rely on 
anonymous technologies such as ‘trust in the market’ (Gambetta 1989: 296–396; cf. Hart 
2000). Taking this line of thought further, he asserts that the mafia fills the lack of trust in 
Sicily, by offering ‘protection’ to Sicilians (1996), implicitly echoing Putnam’s classic point 
on Southern Italy’s ‘problematic’ civic traditions (1993).  
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But an antimafia movement that historically mobilised families (Puglisi 2005; 
Chapter 3) tells us otherwise. Equally, in current antimafia developments, kinship enriches 
cooperativism, allowing for it to be accommodated in local contexts (chapter 4). Therefore, 
the ethnographic findings here on (kinship-based) raccomandazioni recruitment, and the 
modification of local notions of kinship (antimafia families), challenge received ideas of 
familism. Rather than ahistorical associations of kinship with ‘tradition’, my data reflects 
ideas of ‘flexible familism’, which engulfs changes in labour relations (Kalb 1997: 213–32) 
and dynamic interactions of work and home (Hareven 2000). When they seemingly express 
continuity with a problematic (mafia) ‘past’, as per the locals’ defence of mafia’s moral 
ownership of land, local codes, rather, stand against another reification: the recently 
imposed re-juridification of land (Mundy and Pottage 2004; Abramson 2000a). 
The moral economy of the manual workforce, containing a range of subjective 
experiences of cooperation, reflects the rich and dynamic nature of cooperatives. Kinship 
and gender are central, albeit hidden facets, in constituting experiences of participation in 
collective work, which gender solidarity renders a ‘second family’ for members (Ashwin 
1999: 146). Although not forming part of the agenda of antimafia cooperativism, local 
codes, kinship and gender are remarkably important, as they contribute to cooperativism, in 
an indirect way, as much as the political project inspiring it. Women’s invisibility in Alto 
Belice, linked to their centrality in households’ economic strategies (5.2.2), as well as to 
how inheritance through men and women inflects categories of property differentially 
where the law/mafia interface is concerned (6.1), is a fundamental aspect of members’ 
extra-cooperative activity, invisibly shaping cooperatives. As noted, cooperatives’ 
employment meant that registering land to wives was beneficial for daily workers’ families 
(5.2), thus expanding the social base of the cooperatives.  
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The administrators’ networking, however, promoted (and derived from) a model of 
antimafia cooperativism suspicious of kinship. The fact that administrators did not live in 
Alto Belice, but commuted there from Palermo, thus effectively separating work and home, 
meant that their imagined sense of involvement in the local community went unchallenged. 
Their lack of exposure to local obligations and networks involving mafiosi, and their levels 
of remuneration (sufficient without seeking income outside the cooperatives’ employment) 
allowed them to endorse unhesitatingly the legal framework of cooperatives’ waged work. 
The cooperatives’ multileveled ‘cohesion’ was, then, premised on a politics that inherently, 
if unconsciously, reproduced unequal work relations within them, informed by the class-
related, broader social arrangements in which coops operated. In building on this insight, 
anthropological accounts tracing class among peasants in livelihood practices and various 
types of income seeking, including waged work, have been useful (Smith 1987; Kearney 
1996). Recent anthropological accounts re-position class as an analytical category to 
understand community relationships such as neighbourhood (Mollona 2005), and unionism 
(Mollona 2009b), the tensions between work and family (Pun 2005: 49–78) and concerns 
with people’s movement and fixity between (often informal) agrarian and industrial work 
(Narotzky and Smith 2006; Lem and Gardiner 2010a). In antimafia cooperatives, workers 
moving between the coops’ employment, and local ‘community’ codes and informal 
practices outside the coops, alleviated tensions within them, in ways that prevented class 
conflict between administrative and workforce teams, which was never openly expressed. 
Even more so, legality-oriented formal labour in cooperatives secured new informal 
livelihood opportunities for workers, such as welfare benefits. Informalities in workers’ 
livelihoods developed not only alongside legality but, often, because of it. 
I argue that members’ practices outside politicised cooperative contexts deserve 
more attention in order not only to comprehend their livelihoods but also inequalities of 
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cooperatives. In antimafia cooperatives, the political project of curbing mafia was defined 
in terms of disembedding cooperative economic activity from certain traditions. Class 
position was informed by members’ different negotiations of the local arrangements in 
which resources (land, labour) were embedded, especially regarding local obligations and 
networks (e.g. mutual aid work) which are not in line with the movement’s political 
principles. While consolidating cooperatives’ internal division of labour, the tension 
between different values also indicated the dynamic nature of workers’ kinship relations or 
the use of local codes (gossip) by administrators. In Alto Belice, the realm of standardised 
employment and jural codification of property in land was both contested and 
complemented, in members’ experience, by local values, which unfolded in informal 
economic activity in a project seemingly ‘protectionist’ for labour. 
8.4. Cooperativism as Labour and Neoliberalism: Employment and 
Informal Work  
The major breakthrough of antimafia cooperatives’, recognised by the majority of 
informants, was the creation of jobs in an area of chronic informal economic activity and 
unemployment. Cooperative employment, however, converged with continuities on the 
ground, and often intensified informal ideas about recruitment, work and land among 
cooperative participants, as I showed, developing alongside informal economy practices 
(e.g. benefit fraud and lavoro nero). Locals’ livelihoods integrated the stable income from 
cooperatives’ waged employment, maintaining community schemes of ‘mutual aid’ through 
which households informally exchanged money for (unregistered) work (5.3). Moreover, 
the moral connotations of ownership constantly challenged the rigid framework that 
sought to contain confiscated land within new property boundaries (6.2).  
These findings can be used to address Gudeman’s account of the tension between 
market and community in a modern economy (2008). Economies vary depending on the 
degree to which people produce for the self or group (community) or for others (market) 
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(Gudeman 2001), the main local model being ‘the house’, counterposed to – set outside –
market exchange, and aiming to ‘maintain’ what actually are subsistence economy relations 
(Gudeman and Ribera 1990). In Alto Belice, instead, a hidden exchange of money for 
labour is glossed as ‘mutuality’. While Gudeman recognises waged labour as part of the 
models of livelihood he discusses (1986: 37–43), he does not take into account how 
informal economy practices (often influenced by local ideologies including mafia) adopt 
these ‘community’ models, as I show in Chapters 5 and 6. Locals’ (and local cooperative 
workers’) idea of community was thus mediated by commodified relationships, as for 
instance, ‘mutual aid’ entailed the exchange of money for (unregistered) waged work.  
This insight brings my findings into debate with wider discussions of informal work 
and neoliberalism in current anthropological literature, specifically concerning the way 
deregulation of labour markets has proliferated precarious petty income opportunities, 
often informal (a qualitative break in the meaning of work, as per Standing 2011; Castells 
2011). Much of the recent literature addresses people’s modes of resistance, or responses, 
configured in a variety of ways, to the breaking down of work categories that neoliberal 
structural adjustment introduced (Hann and Hart 2009, 2011; Ong 2006; Comaroff 2001; 
Hart et al. 2011). This line of argument states that the neoliberal attack on regulated labour 
markets has broken down previously existing boundaries between different categories of 
labour, a situation encouraging, or even forcing people into petty (often illicit) 
entrepreneurial activity, and seasonal employment – either as a supplement to classic forms 
of wage labour, or as a substitute for it. Some authors suggested that uncertainty in the 
labour market has led to the development of brokerage (e.g. ordering people’s ‘pluriactivity’ 
(Narotzky and Smith 2006)), in which, some point out, mafia-like organisations find a niche 
(Gill 2001; Volkov 2002). Others emphasise that, in this general break in the meaning of 
work, precariousness constitutes exploitative, alienated labour experiences (Procoli 2004; 
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Smart and Josephine 2006; Standing 2009); flexibilised labour regimes produce specific 
‘types’ of workers, who adapt to insecure work conditions by becoming ‘creative’ (Freeman 
1998; 2000). Such ethnographies present the neoliberal state as unwilling to guarantee a 
stable and regulated labour market and hence eroding regimes of labour rights. In most 
cases, people’s plural economic activity is understood as taking place because of the ongoing 
informalisation of labour relations associated with neoliberalism. 
My ethnographic discussion diverges from such anthropological work in that, in 
Alto Belice, the ‘neoliberal’ Italian state, because of the politicised project to curb the mafia 
(and the related labour patronage) that it supports through cooperativism, instead of 
eroding, actually pursues the enactment of workers’ rights, as the coops’ regularisation 
(‘standardisation’) of work in employment’ suggests. This is because the political 
framework of legality included labour (alongside another main resource: land). However, I 
also showed that incorporating vulnerable workers into regularised regimes of labour rights 
does not imply that their everyday economic activity becomes ‘standardised’. On the 
contrary, stable coop work co-articulates with informal means of livelihood and localised 
moralities, often continuous with ‘problematic’ traditions. Alto Belice locals, seeking a 
viable configuration of formal employment and other means of livelihood, mobilised 
practices informed by gendered ideologies of labour (and, ironically, perhaps influenced by 
mafia), embracing new informal income opportunities by strategising vis-à-vis the state 
(land registration to women) or defending older ones (‘mutual aid’ informal work schemes).  
This thesis’ opening vignette suggested that the pursuit of workers’ rights in Alto 
Belice (through the coops) has had positive results. This may seem to be undermined by 
what the ethnography has shown about the fissures and contradictions of this endeavour, 
underlining the richness of local life (unfolding in bars, in confiscated land plots, and in the 
cooperatives themselves), which proved impossible to contain in strict jural categories. 
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Nonetheless, the cooperatives did introduce significant positive changes to the lives of an 
increasing number of people in Sicily; the values the cooperatives represent (albeit in 
dynamic relation – and conflict – with local ones) still count as the most tangible success of 
the antimafia movement in Italy. It is up to future developments to see whether this 
configuration of cooperativism within broader neoliberal developments will further affect 
people’s livelihoods in Alto Belice and elsewhere in Sicily, and how such effects can be 
beneficial. This is not a matter of Lampedusa’s fatalism vis-à-vis change (‘everything has to 
change in order for everything to remain the same’). It is about admitting that cooperatives 
are, willy-nilly, embedded in a particular social context, which for historical, economic and 
political reasons does not ‘fit’ their ideology– though the cooperatives’ pragmatic support 
in the form of jobs is appreciated. As ‘cooperatives’, like ‘livelihoods’, are entangled in 
broad social realities, the future development of cooperatives should be more appreciative 
of local context (Checker and Hogeland 2004), attentive to local livelihood models, codes, 
and kinship, in order to contribute to deeper and more enduring social change. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSORTIUM ‘DEVELOPMENT 
AND LEGALITY’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[MATTEO] 
Director 
(Manages the activity of the 
bureaucratic structure) 
Direttore 
(Sovrintende la gestione 
delle attività della struttura  
burocratica) 
Admin manager 
(general activities and 
procedures management) 
Responsabile 
Area Amministrativa 
i) 
Economic 
manager 
(budgets and accounting) 
  
 
Technical manager 
(management  
of infrastructure) 
[THE EIGHT ALTO BELICE MAYORS] 
Mayors’ Assembly 
(Body responsible for programming and controlling; it approves the annual programme and the pluriannual plan of the 
infrastructural interventions) 
Assemblea dei Sindaci 
(Organo di programmazione e controllo-Approva il programma annuale e pluriennale degli interventi infrastrutturali 
[FOUR APPOINTED BUREAUCRATS] 
Administration Council 
(Body responsible for of the project’s direction; it confers the appointments of projecting and approves administrative 
arrangements of infrastructural programmes)  
Consiglio di Amministrazione 
(Organo di indirizzo-Conferisce gli incarichi di progettazione e approva in linea amministrativa i progetti infrastrutturali) 
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Appendix 2 
 
SOME ASSETS OF FALCONE 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
           Agriturismo 
(Chiana)        
          
  
Winery 
(San Cipiriddu) 
        Plots (c22Ha vineyard: San  
                                                                                            Giovanni) 
 
               Plot (4.5 Ha vineyard:  
                                                                                                         Reale)   
 
 
             Plot (8 Ha cereal:  
                                                                                                 Chiana) 
 
     
Warehouse (San Cipiriddu)       
                                            
       Plots (43 Ha cereal: Curriuni) 
 Plot (c7 Ha, vineyard: San Cipiriddu) 
  The office: San Giovanni    Plot (5.4 Ha vineyard: Curriuni) 
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Appendix 3 
THE BRUSCA FAMILY HISTORY 
(A schematic representation of the most important SG mafia family genealogy) 
  ‘Bisnonno’ From Borgetto 
 
 
NON-MAFIA                                                                           MAFIA 
1st generation 
        
Giovanni      zú Emanuele  
       capomafia 
       1901-1986 
       
 
 
2nd generation 
 
Maruccio                    Rosa                              Peppe ‘the buffallo’ 1930 
                                                                                                                 Enzo1929                                                                                        
          Mario                                                                                                              1932-2000 
                                   Informant, 1935                                                                           
                        Antonia184         Bernardo                        
                                   1935                  capomafia185 1928186- 
                                                                                             
                         
           2000 
                                    3rd generation   
 
Giovanni187                      Maria188             Pippo 
Mafioso informant 1964                   1968    informants    Emanuele 1953 ‘the doctor’        
                 Valentino       1968 ‘the young’    
                                                                                                Giovanni ‘the pig’ [capomafia 1957]                                                                        
                                
                                                 
184 Notice the cross-cousin marriage between a non-mafia and a mafia part of the Brusca family. 
185 The term means ‘leader of the mafia clan’. Notice that ‘clan’, in this emic term, on which the state builds, 
implies really a male-ascendance family genealogy. While Emanuele, his son Bernardo, his sons Giovanni, Valentino and 
Emanule were all mafiosi,  
186 In both the 2nd and the 3rd generation of Bruscas, it is not the first child that became the clan leader. 
187 Notice that in the 3rd generation, one of the descendants of 1st generation Giovanni Brusca non-mafia 
genealogy did join the mafia. 
188 Maria was the wife of Ciccio, a daily worker from Falcone. Thus, the theory of San Giovanni as the ‘800 
Brusca village’ is seemingly confirmed: the cooperatives did not manage to sideline people with ‘3rd degree kinship and 
affinity’ relations with mafiosi.  
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Appendix 4 
PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CONSORTIUM: A DOCUMENT 
DISMISSING ROCCA’S MAYOR FOR SUSPICIONS OF 
MAFIA CONDUCT [IN ITALIAN] 
Il Presidente del Consorzio 
 
PREMESSO CHE: 
 
nel territorio della provincia di Palermo, e precisamente nel comprensorio dell'Alto 
Belice Corleonese, a seguito dell'emissione, da parte dell'Autorità giudiziaria, ex art. 2 
nonies della Legge 575/65, di provvedimenti definitivi di confisca di beni intestati a 
esponenti della criminalità organizzata di tipo mafioso, e della loro successiva assegnazione 
ai Comuni di Corleone, Monreale, Piana degli Albanesi, San Cipirello e San Giuseppe Jato, 
si è determinata l'esigenza di un loro utilizzo, in modo produttivo a fini sociali, con l' 
obiettivo di creare nuove opportunità occupazionali; 
 
che i Sindaci di Corleone, Monreale, Piana degli Albanesi, San Cipirello e San 
Giuseppe Jato, su iniziativa del Prefetto di Palermo, hanno costituito, ai sensi dell'articolo 
31 del D. Lgs. N° 267/2000, un Consorzio, denominato "Sviluppo e Legalità", dotato di 
autonomia gestionale e di personalità giuridica di diritto pubblico, per gestire, mediante 
l'affidamento in concessione a titolo gratuito a cooperative sociali, di cui alla legge n. 
381/1991, il complesso dei terreni agricoli e fabbricati rurali confiscati, che i Comuni 
assegnatari hanno conferito e che conferiranno in godimento allo stesso mano a mano che 
lo Stato li assegnerà loro; 
 
che in data 23 Luglio 2002 hanno aderito al Consorzio Sviluppo e Legalità anche i 
Comuni di Altofonte, Camporeale e Rocca; 
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che nelle elezioni amministrative del 25 26 Maggio 2004  è stato eletto nuovo 
Sindaco di Rocca  Giuseppe Gambino che è divenuto conseguentemente componente 
dell’Assemblea consortile 
 
che da notizie giornalistiche, confermate dalle Autorità, si è appreso che in 
data odierna è stato tratto in arresto il Sindaco di Rocca Giuseppe Gambino e tra i 
capi di accusa a carico dello stesso vi è il concorso in associazione mafiosa e il 
possesso abusivo di arma da fuoco; 
 
che da quanto emerso dalle notizie di stampa parrebbe che cosa nostra abbia 
condizionato in questi ultimi anni la vita politica e amministrativa del Comune di Rocca; 
 
Ritenuto alla luce dell’arresto, delle motivazioni e dei capi di imputazione a carico 
del Sindaco di Rocca  sospendere immediatamente dalla carica di componente 
dell’Assemblea consortile il Sindaco di Rocca Giuseppe Gambino fino a quando non verrà 
fatta definitiva chiarezza sulla sua posizione nell’ambito dell’inchiesta de qua; 
 
Ritenuto altresì alla luce delle ipotesi di reato contestate e del quadro accusatorio 
che emerge sospendere qualsiasi rappresentanza del Comune di Rocca all’interno dell’Ente 
fino a che non vengano adottate dalle Autorità le misure previste dalla legge a tutela della 
Municipalità contro i condizionamenti della vita amministrativa da parte della criminalità 
organizzata; 
 
Ritenuto comunque continuare a portare avanti l’azione del Consorzio anche nel 
territorio del Comune di Rocca ; 
propone di deliberare 
 
per le motivazioni di cui in premessa, 
di sospendere immediatamente dalla carica di componente dell’Assemblea 
consortile il Sindaco di Rocca Giuseppe Gambino fino a quando non verrà fatta definitiva 
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chiarezza sulla sua posizione nell’ambito dell’inchiesta de qua; 
 
di sospendere qualsiasi rappresentanza del Comune di Rocca all’interno 
dell’Ente fino a che non vengano adottate dalle Autorità le misure previste dalla 
legge a tutela della Municipalità contro i condizionamenti della vita amministrativa 
da parte della criminalità organizzata; 
 
di dare all’atto immediata eseguibilità 
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Appendix 5 
MAPS OF CONFISCATED PLOTS FROM THE CADASTER 
MAP I 
  
 
Ginestra area. The plot used by Falcone is noted with a circle. It was confiscated 
from Genovese. Piero’s handwriting indicates the name of the plot and the cultivation type 
(Catarratto: a white vine variety). The plot’s ownership passed from Genovese to the San 
Cipirello municipality after its confiscation.  
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MAP II 
 
Jancheria area. The plot is noted with an oblong. It was confiscated from Grizzaffi, a 
mafioso from Corleone. Piero’s handwriting indicates the name of the plot and the 
cultivation type (wheat), as well an ‘uncomfortable neighbour’ in detail below on the right: 
there, he notes yet another confiscated plot, this time from Corso. As elaborated in section 
6.2.1, there is one confiscated plot that used to belong to Corso and one familiare that still 
belongs to him (managed by his daughters). Piero’s own private tiny plot is also located in 
the area around the confiscated Corso plot, indicated on the map as a roughly rectangular 
shape that reads ‘QUESTO TERRENO’: ‘this plot’ (Piero is particularly fond of it and 
wanted to spell it out clearly).   
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MAP III 
 
Strassato area. The plot used by the coop Falcone is noted with a number indicating its size 
(1.5 ha); it was confiscated from Grizzaffi. Piero’s handwriting indicates the name of the 
plot and the cultivation type, as well as two ‘uncomfortable neighbours’, as the plot Falcone 
uses is bordering  Spatafora’s and Grizzaffi’s familiare plots: the two mafiosi are related and 
hence have familiari plots side by side, inherited by each one individually.  
 362 
 
MAP IV 
 
Drago Estate: Piero’s handwriting indicates the land tract now in use by the Falcone cooperative, where in 1947 Placido Rizzotto gave a 
speech to the amassed braccianti, during the massive land occupation of the surrounding latifundo (which then covered this whole map). The 
cooperative members are particularly proud for this, as Piero puts it, ‘symbolic continuity with the antimafia movement’.
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Appendix 6 
FALCONE’S YEAR’S BALANCES 
 
Giovanni Falcone – 
SOCIETÀ Cooperativa Sociale 
Sede legale in SAN GIOVANNI (PA) 
Iscritta alla C.C.I.A.A. di  PALERMO - Registro Imprese di PALERMO n. 231599 
Partita IVA e Codice Fiscale: 05040580820 
Iscritta nell’Albo Nazionale delle società cooperative al n. A146285 
Sezione: Cooperative a mutualità prevalente di diritto – Categoria: Cooperative sociali 
 
Balance closed at 31 December 2008 
 
(Figures in euros) 
 
Statement of assets 31/12/2
008 
31/12/
2007 
 
A) Receivables from members for contributions   
due 
 1.441  3.050  
B) Fixed assets    
 I. Immaterial    
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3) Industrial patents and intellectual property rights  3.626  1.908  
1) Concessions, licences, trademarks 
and similar rights 
 1.509  751  
  2) Other  226.169  90.529  
  231.304  93.188  
 II. Material    
  2) Plant and Machinery  693.030  112.138  
  3) Industrial and commercial equipment  102.129  67.054  
  4) Other assets  23.548  29.528  
  5) Assets under development and  
                                 advances 
   105.000  
  818.707  313.720  
 III. Financial    
  1) Participation in:    
   b) Associated companies 47.000     
   d) Other companies 5.777   37.254  
  52.777  37.254  
-  52.777  37.254  
Total fixed assets  1.102.788  444.162  
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C) Current assets     
 I. Materials 
   
1) Raw materials and ancillary materials and    
consumables  
 88.115  32.320  
2) Products in the process of  
elaboration 
 86.126  23.462  
  3)     Finished products  10.380  8.556  
  184.621  64.338  
 II. Credits    
  1) to clients    
   - entro 12 mesi 674.819   954.568  
  674.819  954.568  
  3) to associated companies    
   - within 12 months 322     
  322    
  5-bis) taxes receivable    
   - within 12 months 96.244   642  
  96.244  642  
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  6) to others    
   - within 12 months 2.469   3.100  
   - within 12 months 7.546   443  
  10.015  3.543  
  781.400  958.753  
     
  6) Other titles  20.000  20.000  
  20.000  20.000  
 IV. cash     
  1) bank and post-office deposits  720.694  256.723  
  3) moneys and value in cash  3.273  3.697  
  723.967  260.420  
    
Total current assets  1.709.988  1.303.511  
 
D) Accrued income and prepaid expenses    
 - loans 
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 5.687   3.090  
  5.687  3.090  
 
Active total  2.819.904  1.753.813  
 
Balance Sheet Liabilities 31/12/20
08 
31/12/
2007 
     
A) Net Worth    
 I. Capital 
 
 153.801  125.828  
 II. share premium reserves 
 
     
 III. revaluation reserves 
 
     
 IV. legal reserves 
 
 103.250  78.395  
 V. statutory reserves 
 
 181.752 22.124  
 VI. treasury share reserves      
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 VII. Altre riserve    
  Reserve according to art.12 L.904/77    105.562  
  Riserve from concessional contributions 
(law   
                                576/1975) 
115.448   115.448  
     
  115.446  221.010  
 IX  Profit  91.489 50.840  
    
Total Net Patrimony  645.738  498.197  
B) Provisions for risks and charges    
  157.076  159.376  
Total provision for risks and charges  157.076  159.376  
 
C) Post-employment benefits 
 
 
15.947  9.679  
D) Debts    
 4) to banks    
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  - within 12 months 45.441     
  - beyond 12 months 435.683   100.000  
  481.124  100.000  
 5) to others     
  - within 12 months 30.000     
  - beyond 12 months 65.540   111.080  
  95.540  111.080  
 6) Accounts    
  - within 12 months 100     
  100    
 7) To suppliers     
  - within 12 months 837.380   694.406  
  837.380  694.406  
 12) Debiti tributari    
  - within 12 months 10.543   9.864  
  10.543  9.864  
 13) Debts towards social care institutons  
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  - within 12 months 15.348   6.077  
  15.348  6.077  
 15) to members    
  - within 12 months 21.548   62.979  
  21.548  62.979  
 16) other debts    
  - within 12 months 114.091   39.905  
  114.091  39.905  
    
Total debts  1.575.674  1.024.311  
E) Severance indemnities    
      
 425.469   62.250  
  425.469   62.250   
 
Passive Total  2.819.904   1.753.813   
Memorandum accounts 31/12/200
8 
31/12/
2007 
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  2.907.853  3.243.573  
 Total memorandum accounts   2.907.853  3.243.57
3  
Income statement 31/12/20
08 
31/12/2
007 
A) Value of production     
 1) Revenue from sales and services 
 
 1.988.841  1.705.427  
 2) Changes in inventories of finished goods   54.108  11.581  
      
      
 3) other revenues and income    
  - various 3.318   6.165  
  - operating grants 77.613   82.398  
  - capital contributions 8.387     
  89.318  88.563  
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Total cost of production189  2.132.267  1.805.571  
B) Costs of production    
 6) for raw and ancillary materials, consumables    1.163.155  1.034.945 
 7) for services  332.860  300.265 
 8) for others 
 
 30.196  3.376 
 9) for the members190    
                                                 
189 To compare for example with Lavoro e Altro: 
B TOTAL COSTS OF PRODUCTION          
467.516 
           
386.430 
  
 
190 To compare with Lavoro e Altro: 
  wages 138.388 social security charges: 13.561 employees severance indemnities 8.607     
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  a) wages 358.105   303.096 
  b) social security charges 50.433   41.520 
  c) employee severance indemnities 11.055   11.855 
    
  d) other costs     
  419.593  356.471 
 10) Depreciation, amortization and impairments     
Fixed assets  a) Ammortamento delle  
   immateriali 
17.913   11.699  
Fixed assets  b) Ammortamento delle  
   materiali 
49.174   45.082 
Fixed assets   c) Altre svalutazioni delle azioni      
Fixed assets                         d)    Provisions for potential losses 
     
3.462   4.751  
  70.549  61.532  
 11) Changes in inventories of raw materials, consumables  
                   and goods 
 (66.175)  2.674  
      
      
 12) other management expenses  32.986  11.309  
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TOTAL PRODUCTION COSTS  1.983.164  1.770.572  
    
Difference between cost and value of 
production (A-B) 
 149.103  34.999  
 
 23) Profit191  91.489  50.840  
                                                 
191 To compare with Lavoro e Altro: 
23) PROFIT           
23.425 
            
92.020 
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Appendix 7 
MAP OF CONFISCATED ASSETS IN ITALY (2009) 
 
84% of confiscated assets are in the four southern regions. Sicily is first in Italy by 
far, as 47% of all Italian confiscated assets are located there. This proves the 
efficiency of the antimafia movement and especially the state antimafia 
interventionism in Sicily, as mafias in other parts of Italy are equally strong as Cosa 
Nostra, but have suffered fewer confiscations to their assets: Calabria and Campania 
15% each, Puglia at 7%. The remaining 16% is mainly located in Lombardy and in 
Lazio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
